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IN MEMORIAM

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IN MEMORIAM

Mr. Mahamid Ali Abbasi, Member of our Governing Board for the past twenty-two years, died on Sunday, 17th September, 1989. In his death *Islamic Culture* has lost a highly respected and valued advisor, and Hyderabad one of its ablest administrators and most prominent citizens, a man of learning, wisdom, refinement and culture.

Born in Lucknow Mr. Abbasi had his early education in Kakori and Lucknow and then in Aurangabad where he passed his High School and Intermediate examinations. Moving to Hyderabad Mr. Abbasi took his B.Sc. and M.Sc. degrees in Physics from the Osmania University. In 1940 he passed the H.C.S. examination with distinction and entered the service of State of Hyderabad as Asst. Accountant General. Always rated high for his ability, sagacity and financial acumen, Mr. Abbasi had a distinguished administrative career, becoming the A.P. Govt.'s Secretary for Finance in 1960 and of Industry in 1967. In 1969 he was given the post of Secretary of H.E.H. The Nizam's Family Trusts, of which he later became a Trustee.

It is a measure of Mr. Abbasi's wide interests, his energy and versatility, and of the trust that the public reposed in his integrity and competence that while he lived he was on the governing boards or executive committees of nearly seventy financial, industrial, educational, learned, social and welfare organisations and institutions. Of several of these he was Chairman or Vice-Chairman. He served on the governing bodies of such important organisations as the APSIDC, APSF, APSRTC, APS Electricity Board, APS Small Scale Industries, BHEL, Praga Tools, Coromandal Fertilizers, to name only a few. He was a member of the Syndicates of Osmania University, Aligarh Muslim University, Sri Venkateswara University and Agricultural University. He was Chairman of the Idara-e-Adabiyat, Urdu Adabi Trust, member of the Nadwatul Ulama, Daira-tul Maarif, *Islamic Culture* and Darul Musannifin.

Soft spoken and solid Mr. Abbasi was a man of great courtesy and polish who commanded attention and respect of all those who came in contact with him. *Islamic Culture* pays its tribute to his memory

MICROCOSM, MACROCOSM, AND PERFECT MAN IN THE VIEW OF IBN AL-'ARABĪ

WILLIAM C. CHITTICK

WHEN Ibn al-'Arabī discusses "man" (*al-insān*), he normally has "perfect man" (*al-insān al-kāmil*) in view, that is, man as he was originally created and as he is exemplified in the persons of the prophets and the great "friends" of God (*awliyā' Allāh*, corresponding roughly to the saints). He does not mean the forgetful and ignorant man of our own acquaintance. Moreover, "perfect man" can be viewed from two fundamentally different points of view, since we have to distinguish between the human embodiments of perfect man and the "reality of perfect man." In the first case, we are talking about the prophets and the friends of God; in the second, we mean the eternal and immutable archetype of the individual perfect men. The situation is further complicated by the fact that Ibn al-'Arabī refers to the reality of perfect man by many different names. For our purpose here, we can simply say that he often calls it the "Muhammadan Reality."

According to Islamic cosmology in general and Ibn al-'Arabī's teachings in particular, God created man as the last of the creatures, since He employed all the other creatures to bring him into existence. As the final link in the "great chain of being," man brings together and combines (*jam'*) in himself all previous links. Not only does he have animal, vegetal, and mineral components, he also replicates the whole invisible and visible cosmic hierarchy, beginning with the First Intellect and including the Universal Soul, Prime Matter, the Universal Body, the Throne of God, God's Footstool, the starless sphere, the sphere of the constellations, the seven planets, and the four elements. In some mysterious way, man contains everything in the cosmos.

Ibn al -'Arabī discusses the cosmological links between man and the various strata and creatures of the macrocosm in many contexts. In a brief overview we can do no better than to discuss the most fundamental determinant of man's existence, the fact that he was made in the divine image. According to the Prophet, "God created man in His own image," or,

slightly more literally, "Allāh created Adam upon His own form." It is important to note the use here of the divine name "Allāh," which is called the "all-comprehensive name," since it brings together every other names, such as All-merciful, All-forgiving, Just, Creator, Generous, Powerful, Exalter, Abaser, and so on down the list of the ninety-nine, or 1001, or infinite divine names. No name other than Allāh includes in itself all the names, since each of the other names has its own specific and limiting characteristics which sets it apart from the others. Only Allāh is truly a universal name.

Since man was created "upon the form of Allāh," he was also created "upon the form of" the other names. That is why the Qur'ān says that God taught Adam "*all* the names" (II:30). Hence man displays an indefinite variety of divine aspects or "faces" *(wajh).* If all human attributes and activities for the whole of human history could be brought together in one place, we would begin to have an idea of what manifesting "all the names" implies. It is precisely this human all-comprehensiveness which allows for every sort of human possibility, every imaginable attribute, every conceivable act, whether good or bad, high or low, just or unjust, compassionate or cruel. If, in contrast, Adam had been created upon the from of the All-compassionate, no human being would be angry or cruel; if he had been created upon the from of the Vengeful, no one would ever forgive his enemy; if he had been created upon the from of the All-mighty and the Glorious, he would never obey God or anyone else. But since he was created upon the form of all the names, any conceivable attribute can appear within him. For what are the divine names, but the archetypes of every possibility of existence?

Again, since man comprehends *all* the names, each human individual reflects every divine attribute to some degree. But during the course of a human life the divine names manifest themselves in all sorts of combinations and interrelationships which may or may not produce a harmonious and balanced individual. In the last analysis it is the mode in which the names display their properties within man which determines his destiny in this world and the hereafter. From the human point of view this mode is completely unpredictable, and thus our situation stands in stark contrast to all other creatures, since they are created within known and fixed stations *(maqām ma'lūm).* But man has no fixed station, and he can become anything at all. His station does not become fixed until the moment of death.

Only one creature other than man was created upon the form of the name Allāh—the cosmos in its entirety. "Cosmos" or "universe" *(al-'ālam)* is defined as "Everything other than Allāh." God and the cosmos include everything in existence, while each is the mirror image of the other. Hence every name of God is reflected in the universe. As Ibn al-'Arabī puts it, the cosmos itself is the sum total of all the "properties" (*aḥkām*) and "effects" (*āthār*) of the Divine Names. The fundamental difference between God and the total universe is that God exists by His very essence and has no need of the cosmos, while the universe has no existence in its essence and has every need for God. In the last analysis, says Ibn al-'Arabī, even to speak of the "existence" of the cosmos is a metaphor *(majāz)*, not a reality. The cosmos only exists after a fashion, much as a reflection may be said to exist in a mirror. But God cannot not exist.

Man and cosmos are similar in that each was created upon the form of God. However, the cosmos manifests the Divine Names in a differentiated mode *(tafṣīl)*; as a result, each and every name displays its own properties and effects both separately and together with every other name and combination of names. Hence in its spatial and temporal totality, the cosmos represents an infinitely vast panorama of existential possibilities. In contrast, man displays the properties and effects of all the names in a relatively nondifferentiated mode *(ijmāl)*; all the properties of the Divine Names are drawn together and concentrated within him. God created the cosmos upon His own form primarily in respect of the multiplicity of His names, but He created man primarily in respect of the unity of the names, the fact that each and every name refers to a single Reality. Ibn al-'Arabī often expresses these ideas by employing the terms "small world" and "great world" — that is , microcosm and macrocosm. More commonly, he uses the expression "small man" or "micro-anthropos" for man and "great man" or "macro-anthropos" for the universe.[1]

Since man is a part of the cosmos, the cosmos is not a complete divine image without him. Hence, at the beginning of the *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam*, Ibn al-'Arabī writes that man is the spirit of the cosmos, while the cosmos without man is like a proportioned and well-balanced body, ready and waiting for God to breath His Spirit into it, but lifeless as long as man has not appeared. It is for this reason that Ibn al-'Arabī calls perfect man the "pillar" of the cosmos; without him the cosmos would collapse and die, which is precisely what will happen at the end of time when the last perfect man departs from this world for the hereafter. Cosmologically speaking, the corruption and

decay of the natural environment is one of the outward signs of the fact that there are fewer and fewer perfect men on the face of the earth.

Though the cosmos is not complete without amn, man is complete without the cosmos, since he himself is a total divine form and a total world; that is why perfect man loses nothing through death. Quite the contrary, when he dies he is released from the limitations of the spatio-temporal world and actualizes the full ontological expansion demanded by the Divine Form. He himself blossoms into a limitless world, independent of this world and dependent only upon God.

The Goal of Creation

That the universe without man is incomplete should be enough to alert us to the fact that the cosmos has no purpose in and by itself; its only purpose is to bring man into existence. For perfect man is the "Sought-after Goal" *(al-'ayn al-maqṣūdah)*. God's reason for creating the universe. Ibn al-'Arabī writes.

> The whole cosmos is the differentiation of Adam, while Adam is the all-comprehensive book. In relation to the cosmos He is like the spirit in relation to the body. Hence man is the spirit of the cosmos, and the cosmos is the body. Through bringing together all of this the cosmos is the "great man" as long as man is within it. But if you look at the cosmos alone, without man, you will find it like a proportioned body without a spirit. The perfection of the cosmos through man is like the perfection of the body through the spirit. Man is "breathed into" the body of the cosmos, so he is the goal of the cosmos.[2]

Man is also the goal of the cosmos because no other creature can truly know God. In the famous *ḥadīth* of the Hidden Treasure, God says, "I was a Hidden Treasure and I wanted to be known; so I created the creation that I might be known." Every creature knows God after its own fashion, but only perfect man knows Him under the guise of Allāh, the all-comprehensive name. Ibn al-'Arabī constantly quotes the Qur'ānic verses that tell us, "Everything in the heavens and the earth glorifies God" (LVII:1, LIX:1, etc.). This glorification, he says, is grounded in a knowledge of God possessed by each and every created thing. The creatures glorify God inasmuch as they know Him. Flowers glorify Him as the Lord of the sun, the earth, and the rain, while bees glorify Him as the Lord of flowers. Men glorify Him as the

Lord of their goals and desires, whatever these may be. It is God who is Provider, Sustainer, Life-Giver, Merciful, and so on, and all people glorify Him by such names at least by making use of His bounties, whether or not they verbalize their glorification. But only perfect man glorifies God by the name Allah, a glorification which comprehends the glorification of all things.

Perfect man is the only creature complete in itself. Not even the cosmos is complete unless man exists within it. All other creatures within the cosmos are partial images of God and possess an incomplete knowledge of Him.

> Everything in the cosmos is ignorant of the whole and knows a part, except only perfect man, for God taught him all the Names and gave him the all-comprehensive words.[3] So his form was perfected, since he combined the form of God and the form of the cosmos.... God sees His own form in the mirror of man..., since all the divine names are ascribed to him.[4]

To summarize: Man, or more precisely perfect man, is the microcosm, since he was created upon the form of every divine name and thereby contains within himself the realities which brought the whole cosmos into existence. The universe as a whole is the macrocosm, so long as perfect man exists within it, since without him it is but a body without a spirit.

As for the reality of perfect man, the "Muḥammadan Reality," that is the Form of God in Himself, or the Divine Face turned toward the creation of both macrocosm and microcosm. In other words, microcosm and macrocosm are two Forms of God manifest (*ẓāhir*) within the created order; but the reality of perfect man is the Form of God as nonmanifest (*bāṭin*), or in other words, that which is designated by the name "Allāh." Ibn al-'Arabī writes,

> Perfect man is sought after for his own sake, since he is the manifest of the Form of Allāh. But God Himself is both the Manifest and the Nonmanifest.[5]

The Path to Perfection

Because perfect man contains all the realities of both God and the cosmos, he recognizes God in all things. He sees with a vision whereby all

veils are lifted. For him the words of the Qur'ān are concretely realized: "Wherever you look, there is the face of God" (II:115). For perfect man, everything is a divine Self-disclosure (*tajallī*). Ibn al-'Arabī writes,

> The original disposition (*fitrah*) of Adam is the original disposition of all the cosmos... ; it is the Self-disclosure of Allāh.... So within him is the capacity (*isti'dād*) of every existent thing in the cosmos. Hence he worships by every religion, he glorifies God with every tongue, and he acts as a receptacle for every Self-disclosure — on condition that he fulfills his humanity and knows himself. For he does not know his Lord except through knowledge of himself. If anything of himself veils him from seeing the whole, he has committed a crime against himself, and he is not a perfect man.... By perfection is meant knowledge of self, and knowledge of self is identical with knowledge of the Lord. Adam's original disposition was his knowledge of God, so he knew the original disposition of all things. That is why God says, "He taught Adam all the Names" (II:30).[6]

Achieving perfection depends upon knowing oneself, and to know oneself is to know Allāh. In Ibn al-'Arabī's vocabulary, those who do not achieve perfection are known as "animal man" (*al-insān al-ḥayawān*). Though Adam was created perfect, imperfection and animality have gradually come to be the dominating characteristics of his children. But we should not take man's present animal state as normative. Hence it is incorrect to define man as a "rational animal," since, as Ibn al-'Arabī puts it, "Man is defined specifically by the Divine Form."[7] He writes,

> A person who does not reach perfection in this world is a rational animal, a part of the Divine Form, nothing else. He does not reach the degree of man. On the contrary, he is related to man as a corpse is related to a human being, since a corpse is a man in shape, but not in reality; the corpse lacks all powers, just like him who does not reach perfection.[8]

Ibn al-'Arabī refers to the process whereby human beings come to possess the divine names in fact and not just virtually as "assuming the traits of the Names of Allāh" (*al-takhalluq bi asmā' Allāh*), or "assuming God's character traits" (*al-takhalluq bi akhlāq Allāh*). He identifies this assumption of divine traits with the spiritual path.[9] It is clear that the reason man

must assume the divine traits is that he does not manifest them in his present situation, and it would be a terrible error to imagine that man is perfect simply by virue of being human. How then does one become perfect?

To summarize Ibn al-'Arabī's answer: one must follow the divine guidance, revealed through the prophets. Only in this way can man bring his beliefs, his thoughts, and his activities into conformity with the Divine Form upon which he was created. Ibn al-'Arabī often refers to this divine guidance as the Balance of the Law (*al-mīzān al-shar'ī*); in other words, it is the Law or *Shari'ah* revealed by God and exemplified in its highest form through the Qur'an and the example of Muhammad. Only the external, formal, particular pronouncements of God can protect man from his own ego-centric ignorance and the whims and desires of others. Only a norm revealed by God Himself can allow man to assume God's character traits and names. The most dangerous course a person can follow is to fall back upon his own interpretation of the nature of things or upon an interpretation that is not firmly rooted in the Balance of the Law. Many passages from Ibn al-'Arabī's works could be quoted to illustrate these themes. One example will have to suffice:

> Beware of throwing the Balance of the Law from your hand!... If you understand from the Law something different from what the people understand, such that your understanding prevents you from performing the apparent and exoteric statute of the Law, do not rely upon your own understanding! For it is the ego's deception taking a divine form but coming from a direction of which you are unaware.
>
> We have met sincere people... who were confused in this station. They preferred their own mystical unveiling (*kashf*) and their own understanding to the established statute of the Law, thereby nullifying the statute. They depended upon unveiling in their own case, and then they let other people observe the statute exoterically. But in our view this unveiling is nothing.... Anyone who relies upon it has suffered a dreadful confusion and has left the framework of the path of the People of God, thereby joining those who are the "greatest losers," those about whom the Qur'ān says, "Their striving has gone astray in the present life, while they think they are working good deeds" (XVIII:104).[10]

The Balance of the Law provides the only means whereby one can hope to assume the character traits of God, yet, paradoxically, following it

does not mean that one actively strives "to assume God's character traits." In other words, one does not try to imitate God's generosity, His justice, His forgiveness, and so on. A little reflection upon the diversity and multiplicity of God's names should be enough to show that this sort of task is totally beyond the reaches of our forgetful human nature and that the very attempt to imitate God would involve a tremendous arrogance. The goal of striving on the path is not to acquire God's attributes for ourselves, but to negate our own attributes. Man does not gradually grow in stature until he becomes a kind of demigod rivalling God Himself. On the contrary, man is gradually reduced in stature until there is nothing left of himself. But since nothing belongs to man in the first place, once he eliminates his own attributes and effaces his own self, there remains only that which truly is: the face of God turned toward creating him, the Divine Form, the Reality of Muhammad.

This explains why Ibn al-'Arabī often describes the station of perfect man in negative terms, since positive terms can only refer to the Self-disclosure of God Himself. On the metaphysical level, Ibn al-'Arabī explains that perfect man returns to his own immutable archetype, which is nonexistent in relation to the cosmos. It is well known that Ibn al-'Arabī speaks of the "Oneness of Being" and the fact that all true existence belongs exclusively to God. Our *existence* as separate creatures is illusory, since existence is God's; but our *reality* as separate creatures derives from the Eternal Divine knowledge, and so our reality is eternal and immutable. When perfect man negates his own existence as a separate creature, he returns to his nonexistence, which is his true nature; but by the same token he dwells in eternity, at ease in the Being and bliss of God.[11]

Humanly speaking the station of perfection is described by the term "servanthood" (*'ubūdīyah*). As Ibn al-'Arabī often remarks, it is impossible to gain nearness (*qurb*) to God without being His servant.[12] Perfect man is the utter and absolute servant of God; he does nothing on his own, since his separate existence has been negated. Whatever he does is done by God through him. In many passages Ibn al-'Arabī speaks of servanthood as the highest human station, achieved primarily by Muḥammad, the most perfect of the perfect men, who is known to all Muslims as "God's servant and His messenger" (*'abduhū wa rasūluh*). First Muḥammad is God's servant, then only is he worthy to be His messenger. It goes without saying that in order to reach this extremely exalted station of servanthood, one must first follow the commands of one's Lord to the last detail. In other words, servanthood cannot possibly be actualized outside the framework of the revealed Law.

Ibn al-'Arabī tells us that he himself had actualized servanthood in imitation of Muḥammad to the highest degree. He alludes to this point in many passages, and in some cases he is quite explicit. For example,

> On the night that I wrote down this chapter, I had a dream that filled me with joy. I awoke and I composed a verse....:
>
> *Every age has a person through whom it soars—*
> *For the rest of this age, I am that one!*
>
> This is because, to my knowledge, there is no one today who has realized the station of servanthood more than I, though there may be my equal. For I have reached the utmost limit of servanthood. I am the pure and utter servant who knows no taste of Lordship![13]

One more point needs to be brought out. By now it should be clear that according to Ibn al-'Arabī, being a perfect man is not only the *highest* possible human aspiration, it is also, properly speaking, the *only* human aspiration. If man does not actualize the Divine Form upon which he was created, he remains but an animal, less than human, no matter what sort of great deeds he may have accomplished in this world. The station of perfection is the mark of being human, and it has only been achieved by a relatively small number of those whom we normally refer to as "human beings." By reaching perfection man becomes the absolute servant of God, totally effaced as an independent individual but fully affirmed as a Divine Form. Perfect man lives in every situation exactly as that situation demands according to the Wisdom of God, not according to any human norms. Perfect man is fully and completely merciful, compassionate, forgiving, loving, generous, just, and so on, exactly as demanded by the Divine Reality Itself.

One could go on listing the attributes of perfect man indefinitely. I merely want to point out that the station of perfection as described by Ibn al-'Arabī is beyond our wildest fantasies of what it means to be human. If this is so, would it not be better for all of us to give up the idea of being perfect? Certainly not, says Ibn al-'Arabī, since in any case we have to live up to the Truth which is embodied within ourselves; in any case we owe it to God to follow the Balance of the Law, which He revealed to guide our activity; and in any case God has guaranteed happiness in the hereafter to those who follow the Law to the extent of their capacities, whether ot not they reach

perfection. But as human beings, we must always strive to attain to our true archetype, the Muḥammadan Reality itself. I close with one further quotation from the "Greatest Master":

> You should think about the degree of animal man in relation to perfect man, and then you should try to understand which kind of man you are yourself. For you have the capacity to receive perfection, if you understand. That is why you have been admonished and notified by the whole world. If you did not have the capacity to receive perfection, it would be incorrect to admonish you, and letting you know about perfection would be vain and useless. So blame only yourself[14] if you do not reach that to which you have been called![15]

NOTES

(1) On occasion Ibn al-'Arabi employs the term "great man" for perfect man, e.g. *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkīyah* (Beirut, n.d.), vol. ii, p. 120. 23; vol. iv. p. 45. 28.

(2) *Futūḥāt*, vol. ii, p.67.28.

(3) Here Ibn al-'Arabi alludes to Qur'ān (II:30), "He taught Adam all the names," and to a well-known saying of the Prophet, "I was taught the all-comprehensive words," which, according to Ibn al-'Arabi, refers to an even higher stage of perfection than that possessed by Adam.

(4) *Futūḥāt*, vol. iii, p. 398. 15.

(5) *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p. 109.13.

(6) *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 69.25.

(7) *Ibid.*, vol. iii, p.154.19.

(8) *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 441.4.

(9) Cf. *ibid*, vol. ii, p. 42.3; p. 267.11. A term used synonymously is "Gaining similarity to God" (*al-tashabbuh bi-Allāh*), vol. ii, p. 93.30; p. 126.9; p. 385.13.

(10) *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 234.6.

(11) Ibn al-'Arabī calls this station "the ease of eternity" (*rāḥat-al-abad*). He writes, the greatest of the men of God "are protected from attributing acts to themselves when the acts become manifest from them. They say, 'The acts belong to His names which become manifest within His loci of manifestation. So how should we claim them? We are a not-thing (*lā shay'*) in the state of being loci of manifestation for God and in every other state.' This station is called 'the ease of eternity'." (*Futūḥāt*, vol. ii, p. 96.33; cf. vol. iii, p. 48.21)

(12) See, for example, *ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 231.2.

(13) *Ibid*, vol. iii, p. 41.23.

(14) Allusion to the words of Satan to his followers when they enter the chastisement of hell: "So do not blame me, but blame yourselves." (Al-Qur'ān, XIV: 22).

(15) *Futūḥāt*, vol. iii, p. 266.21.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE EUROPEAN MERCENARY ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND HALF OF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY INDIA

S. INAYAT A. ZAIDI

THE Mughals organized their army quite systematically. Detailed records of the army personnel from a noble to the lowest ranking servant *(Shāgird Peshah)*, army animals and weapons were maintained. There were periodical checking to verify the presence and fitness of the troops, animals and weapons. For certain categories like archers and matchlockmen, recruitment and efficiency tests were conducted. To maintain discipline, the army was organized on hierarchical lines, based on the decimal system. It was divided into groups such as 10, 100 and 1000. The commanding officers of these groups were known as *Mirdeh, Sadiwāl* and *Hazārī*. But this systematic organization began to eclipse with the waning of the Mughal empire. The emerging regional powers of the 18th century, to protect and expand their authority, enrolled a large number of soldiers without paying any heed to the efficiency of the army personnel and the systematic organization. They wanted men to fight for them. Thus the European writers of this period who saw unorganized Indian armies painted a very shoddy picture of Indian fighting forces. However, it would also be equally unfair to overlook the new elements introduced by the European mercenaries in the Indian armies.

Though earlier to this period also, one does come across some stray cases of the European mercenaries serving in the Indian armies, yet it is not clear whether they served in an individual capacity or they were given freedom to organize their own contingents. But in case of the second half of 18th century, most of the European mercenaries who served the Indian chiefs enjoyed freedom to organize their forces according to their choice. Therefore, it would be of considerable historical interest to study the structure and organization of the European mercenary forces.

The armed forces of the European mercenaries were denominated. De Boigne's[1] force was known by the name of the Imperial Army.[2] This name was given after Madhoji Scindhia gained control over the Mughal Emperor Shāh 'Ālam II. In obtaining the title of *Vazīr-i Mutlaq* (Deputy of the Emperor) for the Peshwa in 1785, De Boigne played a prime role.[3] Thereafter, Shāh 'Ālam remained under the surveillance of De Boigne's subalterns. Thus De Boigne's army, in order to identify it with the Mughal empire, named itself the Imperial Army.[4] In Hyderabad, Raymond's force was known after his name *Corpse de Francois de Raymond.*[5] The other wing regiments of De Boigne's army were known after the names of forts and cities such as the Ujjain regiment, Burhanpur regiment, Delhi and Agra regiments.[6] The tradition of naming the regiments after the forts and cities was based on the French practice.[7]

For the army, De Boigne chose a flag—the white cross of Savoy to which he belonged.[8] A later description of 1809 indicates that De Boigne's disbanded corps of *'Alīgols* had with them the French flag.[9] Perhaps De Boigne's successor seems to have changed from the white cross of Savoy to the French flag. Madoc adopted his country's French flag for his army.[10] Piron, the successor of Raymond, had the French flag and the uniforms of sepoys were embroidered with the words *Liberte et Constitution.* [11]

The organization of the forces was hierarchical such as (i) company,(ii) battalion, (iii) regiment, (iv) brigade. The numerical strength of the different units varied according to the need of time and the wish of the officers. For instance, Raymond's force had one company of 87 troopers while in another he had 70 troopers.[12] De Boigne's company consisted of 68 men inclusive of officers and staff.[13] Obviously, the variations in the strength of companies would also effect the size of battalions. In 1784, De Boigne's battalion had 850 men.[14] His other two battalions comprised the total strength of 606 and 707 troops.[15] George Thomas maintained 400 men in a battalion.[16] Similarly, the size of Raymond's regiments varied from 340 to 940 soldiers.[17] Thus it goes without saying that the size of the brigades would obviously be varied.

The cavalry force was known as *risālah* and a smaller unit of a certain number of horsemen was known as *platoon.* In De Boigne's platoon there were 18 horsemen. Every platoon had two officers, one *jam'dar,* one *daf'adār* and one kettle drummer. Thus the four platoons made a *risālah* of 75 horsemen.[18] Each cavalryman maintained one horse. Eight horsemen were kept in reserve with each *risalah* to replace the sick men and horses.[19]

Besides one *sā'īs*(groom) and one grass-cutter were employed for every two horses.[20] Further, it seems that extra 50 irregular cavalrymen were also kept for skirmish and reconnoitering.[21] De Boigne is also known to have personal bodyguards known as *turkesuwars*. The horse and feed were provided to them by De Boigne.[22] But in the case of the ordinary horseman the horse and feed were managed by himself.[23]

All the commissioned officers in De Boigne's army were mixed Europeans,[24] while Raymond had exclusively French officers. The designations of the commissioned officers were on the pattern of the English East India Company's army, like colonel, lieutenant-colonel, major, captain lieutenant and ensign.[25] The non-commissioned offices assigned to the Indians were basically indigenous. These were in the following hierarchical order: *subahdār, jam'adār, ḥavāldār*-major, *ḥavāldār*-sergeant, and *nā'ik*. In a cavalry force, there were non-commissioned officers such as *risālahdār* and *daf'adār*.[26] Similar non-commissioned offices seem to have existed in Raymond's force.[27]

Besides the offices, the infantry had colour bearers, cymballs, drummers and fifers.[28] The composition of the artillery was slightly different according to its requirements. Besides a commissioned officer sergeant major, there were ordinary European gunners, *golandāzān, khalāṣīs* (Hindustani artillerymen), sarang (bullock sergeant), tindal (parksergeant), blacksmiths, carpenters, *beldārs* and *gāṛēwāns* (bullock cart drivers).[29]

The clerical staff was almost entirely Indian. De Boigne's battalion had a *panḍit* (accountant), *mutasaddīs* (writers), *bihishtīs* (water-car.iers), armourers, *harkārahs* (messengers), *ghaṛiyāls* (time-keepers), Hindustani surgeon and *mash'alchī* (torch-bearer).[30]

The Indians recruited as non-commissioned officers and ordinary soldiers belonged to different social backgrounds. Rohillas seem to have been the most popular for recruitment in the European mercenary forces. After the downfall of Rohilla power in A.D. 1774, many of them joined the service of the European mercenaries. Rohilkhand was one of the regions from where De Boigne enlisted his soldiers.[31] Each of De Boigne's brigades had nearly 750 to 1000 Rohillas.[32] They had earned the reputation of fighting efficiently in the hill regions and of liquidating fortified places.[33] Even the *Sihbandī*[34] Contingent of De Boigne comprised 1000 Rohillas.[35] Rohillas Murtaḍā 'Alī and Kalb-i 'Alī in the capacity of officers served Perron.[36]

George Thomas had nearly 1000 Rohillas in his service.[37] James Skinner had many Rohillas in his cavalry force.[38] In Hyderabad, Raymond is also known to have employed many Rohillas in his service.[39] However, some Afghans who served George Thomas were Sharīf Khān, Ḥamzah Khān and Raḥmān Khān. The latter had 2000 men in his service.[40]

The European mercenaries also employed many Rajputs in their armies. George Thomas had nearly 300 Rajputs in his force.[41] James Skinner employed many Rajput horsemen in his contingent.[42] A certain official Puran Singh was in Perron's army.[43] Others who served the European mercenaries were Mewatis. They had skilled themselves as post-runners and spies.[44] They were also considered good archers.[45] De Boigne and George Thomas enlisted them in their service De Boigne recruited 500 Mewatis for the routine duties at the camp.[46] George Thomas had also a similar number of Mewatis in his force.[47]

Topaseez,[48] who are identified with the Portuguese settled in India, were also recruited by the European mercenaries. They seem to have served the mercenaries in South India where they were available to them easily. In 1752, Clement Poverio, a Neapolitan who was in the service of Nawwāb Muḥammad 'Alī of Arcot, commanded a company of Topaseez.[49] Monsieur Zaphir and Garde who served Basālat Jung, had many Topaseez in their forces.[50] Lally, when he was in the service of Basālat Jung and the Niẓām, had a contingent of 1000 Topaseez.[51] Raymond had many Topaseez in his army.[52] According to William Franklin, George Thomas had many peasants of Haryana as infantry soldiers.[53] It would be pertinent to identify the peasants of Haryana. They cannot be Mewatis who have been separately specified by Franklin. In fact, Hisar and the surrounding region controlled by George Thomas was chiefly populated by the peasant castes, namely, the Jats, Rajputs and Pachhadas.[54]

Besides the castes and races, there is the emergence of some new social groups who had acquired a particular military professional skill in warfare and, consequently, they were known by those names. One comes across the word *Telingas* frequently. The word *Telinga* seems to have changed its nature from time to time. At the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th centuries, the Karnataki infantry men[55] employed in the Mughal army were the Telingas of the second half of 18th century.[56] The Karnatakis and the Telingas derived the names after the region of Karnataka and Telingana. The Telingana infantrymen were first brought by the English East India

Company to Bengal in the middle of the 18th century.[57] With the passage of time, the word Telinga was commonly used for a sepoy in the regions lying under the influence of the Company.[58] Succinctly, the Telingas had acquired common connection for the regular infantry matchlockmen in the forces of the European mercenaries.[59] It does not necessarily have any link with a particular region or caste.

Nujeebs were one of the social components of De Boigne's infantry. De Boigne's Nujeebs were the Pathans, Rohillas[60] and certain high castes of Hindus.[61] They were armed with matchlocks, shields and swords. Subsequently, they were given newly invented matchlock, and the sword was replaced by bayonet in De Boigne's force.[62] J.P. Boyd, who served the Nizam of Hyderabad and the Peshwa, maintained a force of Nujeebs in his contingent.[63]

The corps of *'Alīghols* were also maintained by De Boigne, Perron and George Thomas. *'Alīghols* were infantrymen and armed according to their choice. They were employed to render service in desperate situations in a battle.[64] The name *'Alīghol* has been acquired from their strategy of charging the enemy, surrounding in a *ghol* and invoke the help of 'Alī [65] for mustering strength psychologically. It appears that a certain Afghan chief of *'Alīghols* deserted George Thomas in the battle of Georgegarh.[66] Perron's *'Alīghols* seem to have been Muslims.[67]

The European mercenaries provided uniforms to their soldiers.[68] De Boigne's Telingas were dressed in scarlet black leather accoutrements and coxcombs in their blue turbans. The cloth was obtained from Calcutta.[69] Similarly, it seems that the cloth used for the uniforms of Raymond's troops was brought from Madras.[70] The Nujeebs of De Boigne wore a Persian uniform, which was made of blue quilted 'country cloth.'[71] His cavalrymen had uniform of green colour with red turbans and *kamarbands*[72] (belts). James Skinner's horsemen were known as 'yellow boys' because they wore yellow coloured uniforms.[73] Ḥaydar 'Alī's infantrymen, commanded by the European mercenaries, were clothed in red and green with lacing of different colours.[74] The uniform of Begam Sāmrū's troops was a dress of dark blue, broad scarlet turbans and waist bands.[75]

Regular drill was carried out by the European mercenary forces.[76] In regard of the language used for commands there is difference of opinion. According to Compton, the command was given in English; he disagrees with

those who hold that the command was given in Irish.[77] From the description of Ferdinand Smith who was in the service of De Boigne and Perron, it appears that Persian was followed at least for the command of Nujeebs.[78] However, English words for command were used in Haydar 'Alī's European mercenary forces.[79]

The European mercenaries used to furnish arms and ammunition to their recruits. In the beginning, De Boigne, in 1784, after finalizing his service conditions with Madhoji Scindhia went to Lucknow to purchase arms for his army men. Raymond, after joining the service of Niẓām 'Alī of Hyderabad, hired muskets for his men at the rate of eight annas per month each from a French merchant.[80] But the rapidly increasing demand caused a scarcity of firearms in the market. The English East India Company which used to sell the condemned firearms prohibited the sale.[81] Similarly, the French East India Company did not like to sell the muskets even to the French mercenaries serving under Niẓām 'Alī of Hyderabad.[82] Even the condemned firearms purchased from the companies earlier needed mending for discharging proper service.[83] Alongwith these factors, the European mercenaries visualized well that without having their own arms manufacturing foundries, they could not establish indispensability to their employers.

Sangster, a Scotchman who first served the Jat chiefs of Gohad, was efficient in casting guns.[84] Subsequently, he was employed by De Boigne who appointed him the superintendent incharge of the arsenals and magazines.[85] De Boigne established arsenals at Mathura, Delhi, Gwalior, Kalpi and Gohad.[86] The cannon balls were casted at Gwalior where mines of fine iron were located. Gun powder was manufactured at Agra. The saltpetre and sulphur were brought from Bikaner.[87] De Boigne also established a foundry for manufacturing muskets at Faizabad.[88] Thomas Legge learnt the skill of casting cannons from Sangster.[89] The muskets manufactured in Sangster's foundries were considered as good as European muskets except for their flint locks.[90] Its cost was Rs.10/-.[91] In Hyderabad, Mathias Tuban, a Venetian, cast brass guns in a foundry established by him.[92] George Thomas founded a factory for manufacturing arms at Hansi where muskets, matchlocks and gunpowder were made.[93]

It appears that generally seniority of service was counted in the matter of succession. For instance, in 1796 after De Boigne's resignation from Dawlat Rao Scindhia's service, Perron, being the seniormost, succeeded De

Boigne.[94] Similarly, in 1798 after Raymond's death, Piron, the second in command, succeeded him.[95] Besides, there are some interesting cases of the succession of the wives of the deceased European mercenaries. A well-known example is of Begam Sāmrū who, after the death of her husband in 1778, assumed the command of his force.[96] In 1790, when Yvon who was in the Peshwa's service died, a certain Robinson succeeded him but when Mrs.Yvon came to know of this, she dispossessed Robinson and assumed the command herself.[97] Haydar 'Alī, after the death of Mequinez, a Portuguese mercenary, conferred the command on Madam Mequinez with the rank of colonel till her son came to the age of commanding the force. Mrs. Mequinez was active enough to accompany the force everywhere and she used to inspect the drill and parade. The pay received from Haydar 'Alī for the force was distributed in her presence after certain deductions. At the time of battle, the second-in-command used to lead the contingent into action. But Haydar 'Alī degraded her to the lower status of a sergeant when she remarried a Portuguese sergeant.[98] However, Captain Little comments that there were many cases of widows' succession in the services of Ṭīpū Sulṭān, the Marathas and the Nizam of Hyderabad.[99] But Perron did not allow the succession of a widow of his subaltern. In 1799, after Captain Le Merchant's death, when his widow assumed the command of her husband's battalions, Perron sent a force against her. After four months' strong resistance from Perron's forces, she had to submit.[100]

The junior officers' promotion, demotion and termination remained in the power of the chief commander of the European mercenary forces. For the above mentioned aspects, the performance in the service appears to have been the main criterion. James Skinner's case is interesting enough to be cited here. He was appointed as an ensign with Rs. 150/- p.m.[101] When he distinguished himself against Amrat Rao, and then in the battle of Shergarh, he was promoted to the next rank of lieutenant with Rs.200/- p.m.[102] In A.D. 1800 after the Battle of Malpura in which also Skinner distinguished himself, he was raised to the higher rank of captain-lieutenant with Rs. 300/- p.m.[103] An extra allowance of Rs. 40/- p.m. for the maintenance of palanquin bearers was confirmed by Perron with a personal letter, praising Skinner's services.[104] Similarly, James Skinner's younger brother Robert Skinner earned promotion after showing his merit in the battle against a certain Rajput Rampal Singh of Chambal region. He was promoted to lieutenant from an ensign.[105]

In 1801, when Colonel Louis Bourguien failed to capture the fort of Ajmer, he was superseded by his junior officer Captain Symes. It caused

Bourguien a great resentment.[106] In 1803, when there was fighting between the English East India Company and the Marathas, the services of many English and Anglo-Indian officers were terminated by Perron.[107] Though James Skinner and others endeavoured hard to convince Perron to continue them in his services, the latter did not concede their wish.[108]

The European mercenaries who had the assingment of *Jā'idād* [109] from their employers are known to have reserved certain revenues for the soldiers who were either killed or became invalid in the battles.[110] George Thomas is known to have earmarked Rs.50,000/- per annum for the purposes of pensions and compensations. The provision was to grant half of the pay to the widows and children of the men killed in battle.[111] Begam Sāmrū used to grant pensions to her military men.[112] Similarly De Boigne made a provision for payment of pension and compensation to his officers and soldiers. A wounded officer and soldier used to receive a certain percentage of his salary, from 15 days to 4 months' pay in addition to his regular pay. The disabled persons were granted pension for life amounting half of their pay and assignment of land also. In case of death, the relations of the deceased were allowed to inherit his property.[113] However, it seems that it was not entirely a new system of the Europeans to make such provisions for the soldiers, wounded or killed in battle. Though the Indian chiefs who had already some provisions for their soldiers might not be having so sophisticated a system, yet there were instances of the Rajput chiefdoms. Such of assignments were called *Mund katai ro patto* (land assignment after death in battle) or *jīvika* (for life).[114] But such assignments were made only by the permanent *jāgīr* holders like the Rajput chiefs who held *watan jāgīrs* (permanent hereditary *jāgīrs*). The ordinary *jāgīrdārs*, whose *jāgīrs* were transferable and could be resumed by the Mughal emperors, were not in a position to make such assignments. However, these are the issues which need a more detailed and deeper study of the documents, preserved in various archival collections of India.

NOTES

(1) De Boigne was a chief mercenary employed by Madhoji Scindhia. For his detailed biography see, Herbert Compton, *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan from 1784-1803* (London, 1893).

(2) Compton, pp. 33, 69.

(3) *Ibid*., pp. 33, 43.

(4) *The Military Memoirs of Lieut. Col James Skinner, C.B.* by J. Baillie Fraser (London, 1851), p. 66.

(5) Compton, p. 384.

(6) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 78; Compton, p. 47.

(7) Sir Evan Cotton, "Benoit de Boigne," *Proceedings of Indian History Records Commission* (1926), p 19. Though the English East India Company's battalions were given numerals, yet popularly known by the name of an individual person. In 1763, the battalion of Captain Trevanion who was popular among the sepoys was known "Teerbaenie's battalion" (corruption of the captain's name). In 1765, a battalion raised in the month of Muharram at Allahabad was called the Husayni battalion. In 1778, the battalion formed by Captain John Byrne at Kanpur bore his name but it was also contemptuously called *Dobie-ka-Paltan* because may *dhobīs* (washermen) were recruited from an adjacent village. See Williams, *The Bengal Native Infantry*, pp. 104, 147, 167.

(8) Compton, p. 49

(9) Constable, *Oriental Miscellany* (London, 1892), vol. iv, pp. 49-50.

(10) Buckland, *Dictionary of Indian Biography* (London, 1906), p. 269.

(11) Compton, p. 379.

(12) *Poona Residency Correspondence* (Bombay, 1936), vol. 4, p. 294.

(13) *Ibid*., vol. 1, p. 394.

(14) Compton, p. 31.

(15) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 394, 395; L.F.Smith, *A Sketch of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the Regular Corps Formed and Commanded by Europeans in the Service of the Native Princes of India* (Calcutta, 1805), p. 52.

(16) W. Franklin, *The Military Memoirs of George Thomas* (Calcutta, 1803), p. 153.

(17) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, p. 294

(18) *Ibid*, vol. i, pp. 393-94.

(19) Compton, p. 48.

(20) *Ibid; Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 392-95.

(21) Compton, p. 48.

(22) *Ibid.*

(23) *Ibid.*

(24) Smith, pp. 72-73, Compton, pp. 46, 48, 66-67.

(25) Compton, p. 64; the rank of ensign was given in the British army to the junior grade of commissioned officer in an infantry regiment. The rank was abolished in 1871 and the rank of sub-lieutenant was substituted. See H.S. Bhatia (ed.), *Military Dictionary and Encyclopedia* (New Delhi, 1980), p. 55.

(26) Compton, p. 64.

(27) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, pp. 296-97.

(28) Compton, p. 64.

(29) *Ibid*, pp. 64-68; *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, pp. 392-95.

(30) *Ibid.*, vol. 4, pp. 296-97. In case of the staff in the Mughal army, a quota was determined according to the strength of a *mansab*. See *Dawābit-i-'Ālamgīrī*, B.M. MSS. n. 1141, f. 38b; W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls* (Delhi, 1962), p. 51.

(31) Compton, p. 47.

(32) *Ibid.*, pp. 63, 65, 254; *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 395.

(33) Compton, p. 65.

(34) Basically *Sihbandīs* were the troopers hired for the revenue collection but in times of necessity they were called for active service in the battles. In the battle of Patan (A.D. 1790) many *Sihbandīs* fought on the side of united army of Ismā'īl Beg and the Rajput chiefs of Jaipur and Jodhpur against Madhoji Scindhia (Compton, p. 530). There were a total of 4000 *Sihbandīs* employed by De Boigne. For *Sihbandīs*, see also W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 166; Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India* (Bombay, 1963), p. 276.

(35) Smith, pp. 72-73.

(36) Compton, p. 245; *The Military Memoirs of Lieut. Col James Skinner C.B.*, p. 163.

(37) *The Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, pp. 153, 167; *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 216, 225.

(38) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 90-101.

(39) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, p. 294.

(40) Compton, pp. 189, 198, 199. There were also Murtadā Khān, Shitāb Khān, Khayrāt Khān, Ilyās Beg and Asālat Khān who served George Thomas but their identity is not specified. (*Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, pp. 307-8.)

(41) Compton, p. 189.

(42) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 99-101. In Skinner's force, there was a certain Rajput holding the office of *subahdar* who refused to accept water from the hands of a *chamār* woman even when he was on the verge of death. (*Ibid.*, p. 179.)

(43) Compton, p. 189.

(44) W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 170; see also Irfan habib, "Postal Communications in Mughal *India*," paper presented to the 45th Session of Indian History Congress, held at Amritsar, 1985.

(45) *Davābiṭ-i 'Ālamgīrī*, p. 596.

(46) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 76; Compton, p. 170; W. Franklin, *The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum* (1978), p. 136.

(47) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 216.

(48) The etymology of the word *Topasee* is vividly explained by scholars. Robert Orme writes, "The Christians, who call themselves Portuguese, always formed a part of a garrison. They are little superior in courage to the lower castes, as well as the modern Moors [Muslims] of Indostan, but because they learn the manual exercise and the duties of a parade with sufficient readiness, are clad like Europeans, they are incorporated into the companies of European troops. From wearing a hat, these... Portuguese obtained amongst the natives of India, the name of Topasses, by which the Europeans distinguish them" (*A History of the Military Transaction of the British Nation in Indostan* [London, 1803], vol. i, p. 80); some show their significance in the Turkish word *Topchī* (a gunner) which they consider a root origin of Topaseez (Hobson-Jobson, *A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases* [London, 1886], pp. 533-34). See also a joint paper of Kenneth McPherson and others, "A Secret People of South Asia; The Origins, Evolution and Role of the Luso-Indian Goan Community from the 16th to 20th Centuries," presented to the Conference "International Seminar on Indo-Portuguese History," held at Lisbon, 1985. I am thankful to Professor Kenneth Balhatchet (S.O.A.S.) who lent me this paper to read.

(49) Robert Orme, vol. i, pp. 258-59.

(50) V.G. Hatalkar, *French Records* (Bombay, 1980), vols. iii & iv, pp. 225-26.

(51) *Ibid.*, pp. xlvi-xlviii, liv.

(52) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, p. 294. In 1785, Monsieur Riviere who was also in the service of Niẓām 'Alī Khān of Hyderabad maintained a corps of Topaseez. (*French Records*, vols. v & vi, p. 235.)

(53) *The Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, pp. 153, 167; Compton, p. 146.

(54) *Imperial Gazetteer of India* (Oxford, 1908), vol. xiii, pp. 148-49.

(55) *Davābiṭ-i 'Ālamgīrī*, MSS, fol. 596.

(56) W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, pp. 170-71, 172-73.

(57) *Ibid.*, pp. 170-71.

(58) *Ibid.*, Hobson-Jobson, *A Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial Words and Phrases*, pp. 694-95; see also Ratan Das Gupta, "Mercenaries and the Political Economy of Bengal: 1727-63," *Social Scientist*, vol. 13, no. 4, 1985, pp. 21, 24.

(59) Tabātabā'i, *Siyar al-Muta'akhkhirīn* (Lucknow, 1897), vol. ii, pp. 545-46; *Calendar of Persian Correspondence* (National Archives of India, Delhi), vol. vii, p. 412; Compton, pp. 45-47; W. Franklin, *The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum*, p. 136.



(60) W. Franklin does not seem to have made a distinction between the Pathans and the Rohillas. The latter were considered socially inferior to the former. (*The History of the Reign of Shah Aulum*, p. 136; M Athar Ali, *The Mughal Nobility under Aurengzib* [Asia Pub. House, 1968], p. 21; C.A. Bayly, *Rulers, Townsmen and Bazaars, 1770-1870* [Cambridge, 1983], pp. 24, 120-22.)

(61) Compton, pp. 46-48, 63; Smith, pp. 72-73; *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 76; Tone W. Henry, *Illustrations of Some Institutions of the Maratha People* (Calcutta, 1818), pp. 47-48. James Forbes writes: "...there are some corps, styled *nujeeb* [*najib*] or men of good family; originally formed by Shujah-ud-Daula and subsequently introduced into the Maratha armies. These are foot soldiers, invariably armed with a sabre and matchlock, and having adopted some semblance of European discipline, are much respected: as are also the Rajputs, Poorbeahs or easternmen and many other soldiers of fortune who enlist under their banners and highly esteemed for fidelity and regularity" (*Oriental Memoirs*, London, 1834, vol. 1, p. 343; see also W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 164). C. Grey is wrong in considering the *nujeebs* as only 'musalman.' (*European Adventurers of Northern-India, 1785-1849* [Lahore, 1929], p. 139.)

(62) Compton, pp. 46-48; Smith, pp. 72-73; *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 76.

(63) *The Asiatic Journal*, vol. vi, 1818, p. 611.

(64) W. Irvine, *The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 164; *Oriental Miscellany*, vol. iv, pp. 49-50.

(65) *Ibid*. 'Alī was the son-in-law of Prophet Muhammad and he is considered a symbol of enormous power and courage by the Muslims in India.

(66) Compton, p. 200. But Compton seems to be mistaken to perceive *'Alīghol* as an individual person.

(67) *Oriental Miscellany*, vol. iv, pp. 49-50.

(68) Though the information in regard of the uniforms worn by the Mughal soldiers is elliptical yet one does come across a specific information suggesting that 'Abd-'Allāh Khān Fīrūz Jung's (died in A.D.1644) soldiers were dressed in gold embroidered uniforms (*Dhakhirat al-Khawānīn*, vol. ii, ed. S. Moinul Haq [Karachi, 1970], p. 175). However, W. Irvine holds that the traditional dresses worn by the Rajputs, Persians, Mughals and the Indian Muslims cannot be compared with the pattern of uniforms introduced by the Europeans. (*The Army of the Indian Moghuls*, p. 183.)

(69) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 397; Compton, p. 65.

(70) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, p. 49.

(71) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 76; Compton, pp. 47, 65.

(72) *Ibid*.; *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 1, p. 397.

(73) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 81-82.

(74) Lt. Col. E.W.C. Sandes, *The Military Engineer in India*, p. 146.

(75) Mrs. A. Deane, *A Tour Through the Upper Provinces of Hindustan* (London, 1823), p. 149. Thomas Bacon writes about the dresses of Begam Sāmrū's military officers and troops as "the most heterogenous and varied possible, being according to the taste or fancy of each without regard to uniformity of pattern or colour, but the troops are clad in vests of dark yellow cloth with some attention to conformity of cut, and they are all armed and appointed alike." (*First Impressions and Studies from Nature in Hindustan* [London, 1837], vol. II, p. 53.)

(76) Compton, pp. 46-48, 50, 383.

(77) *Ibid.*, pp. 46-48.

(78) Smith, pp. 72-73. Sir Evan Cotton wrongly attributes to Smith the view that Irish was used for the command of *nujeebs*. See "Benoît de Boigne," in the *Proceedings of Indian Historical Records Commission*, p. 19.

(79) *The Military Engineer in India*, p. 145; *Memoirs of the War in Asia* (London, 1789), p. 452.

(80) Compton, p. 382.

(81) S.N. Sen, *Military System of the Marathas* (1958), pp. 116-18. In 1793, Nizām 'Alī wanted permission from the governor of Madras to allow Raymond for buying 3000 condemned muskets or the muskets captured at Pondicherry. (*Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, pp. 48-49; W.H. Tone, *Illustrations of Some Institutions of the Maratha People*, p. 54.)

(82) In 1787, Nizām 'Alī of Hyderabad deputed Monsieur Ammont with Rs. 5000 to buy muskets from Pondicherry, but the governor did not allow him. (*Persian Correspondence*, vol. VII, p. 422; vol. VIII, pp. 28, 103.)

(83) J.W. Kaye, *The Life and Correspondence of Sir John Malcolm*, cited by Compton, p. 385.

(84) Smith, pp. 6-7.

(85) Compton, p. 31.

(86) *Ibid.*, pp. 47, 387-88.

(87) *Ibid.*

(88) Thomas Twinning, *Travels in India* (London, 1893), p. 187.

(89) Compton, p. 366.

(90) Smith, pp. 72-73.

(91) Compton, pp. 47, 387-88. In 1789, the cost of a musket sold by the English East India Company to Nawwāb Āsaf al-Dawlah of Awadh was Rs. 8/- (*Persian Correspondence*, vol. VIII, pp. 642, 643). In the bazaars of South India, a good musket was sold at the rate of Rs. 2/- (Edward Moore, *A Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment of the Maratha Army* [London, 1794], p. 157.)

(92) *Poona Residency Correspondence*, vol. 4, p. 298.

(93) *Military Memoirs of George Thomas*, pp. 132-33; Sleeman, *Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official* (Karachi, 1973 edition), p. 604.

(94) Compton, pp. 228, 411. Major Fremont was the seniormost but owing to his death, the command went to Perron who was in the South with Dawlat Rao. Sutherland, being incharge of De Boigne's army in the North, expected to succeed De Boigne. However, Perron's succession made him deeply jealous of Sutherland.

(95) Smith, p. 3; Compton, p. 379.

(96) Smith, pp. 5-6. Zafaryāb Khān, a son from the first Indian wife of Sāmrū, being a minor could not succeed him. After maturity, he tried unsuccessfully to overthrow the command of his stepmother. (Compton, pp. 403, 406, 407; Franklin, *The History of the Reign of Shah Alam*, pp. 134-35; see also Brajendranath Banerji, *Begam Samru* [Calcutta, 1925].)

(97) Edward Moor, *A Narrative of Captain Little's Detachment*, pp. 26-27, 117; Compton, p.368.

(98) Compton, p. 368.

(99) Edward Moore, *A Narrative of Captain Little's Detachment*, p. 117.

(100) Compton, p. 368.

(101) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 108.

(102) *Ibid.*, p. 123; Compton, p. 380. He was also granted one month's leave for rest.

(103) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 156.

(104) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 156; Compton, p. 411. Here, it is significant to note that though the Maratha chief Lakwa Dada, under whom Skinner fought in the battle of Malpura, awarded a grand *khil'at* (robe of honour), a fine embroidered palanquin etc with an allowance of Rs. 40/- p.m. for the expenses of palanquin bearers, these were confirmed by chief commander Perron. It suggests direct control of the chief commander over his officers. There is also one more instance. In 1796, James Skinner saved Harji Scindhia, relative of Daulat Rao, from a fatal attack conspired by Ambaji Inglia and Lakwa Dada near Chittore. Harji in appreciation presented a pair of gold bangles set with diamonds, a sword, a shield and a fine horse to him. When Skinner's officer Sutherland under whose command he was posted came to know about the awards, first he reprimanded him for going without his permission, and then threatened to report to the chief commander Perron. This caused worry to Skinner, but he consoled himself thinking that Harji had already written a letter about his distinguished services to Perron. (Compton, pp. 411-12.)

(105) *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 173, 182.

(106) Compton, p. 341. Even Bourguien in anguish tried to join the service of Raja Pratap of Jaipur. In 1803, when the fight broke out between the English and the Marathas, Bourguien was the first to revolt against Perron. (Compton, p. 342)

(107) Smith, p. 49; Compton, p. 395.

(108) James Skinner records the graphic description of his meeting in which he pleaded with Perron to continue in the service. See *Memoirs of James Skinner*, pp. 250-51, 252, 253.

(109) *Jā'idād* means an assignment in land for the maintenance of establishment of troops (Steingass, F. *Persian-English Dictionary*, [London, 1892], p. 354). It is significant, that the word *jā'idād* is used for the land revenue assignments to the European mercenaries in the sources. Obviously, the word *jā'idād* is used by a certain Persian knowing person (then frequently used in the English works), who shows fine distinction between *jāgīr* assigned to a Mughal noble and *jā'idād* assigned exclusively for the purpose of military service. In other words, distinction in social status is made between a Mughal noble and an European mercenary, serving in the army.

(110) The pay and other service benefits of the European mercenaries and their troops are discussed in my paper entitled, "European Mercenaries in the Indian Armies," presented to the "Ninth European Conference on Modern South Asian Studies," held at Heidelberg, July, 1986.

(111) Compton, pp. 143-44.

(112) *Begam Samru*, pp. 206-08. B. Banerji has furnished a list of the persons to whom Begam Sāmrū granted pensions.

(113) Smith, p. 77. In 1800, when James Skinner with his defeated force came back to Mathura from Unnara, "Perron promoted every man that was able to do duty; on the rest he settled pensions." See *Memoirs of James Skinner*, p. 182.

(114) *Rajasthani Sobdkos*, edited by Sita Ram Lalas (Jodhpur, 1972), p. 3843; G.D. Sharma, *Rajput Polity* (New Delhi, 1977), p. 128.

SIR SAYYID ON THE INDIAN VILLAGE COMMUNITY

K.A.NIZAMI

INTRODUCTORY

With the publication of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie's excellent portrait of a medieval village, *Montaillou*,[1] studies of village culture have assumed unprecedented significance. Unfortunately in India no serious effort has so far been made at a comprehensive study of any village as the centre of a cultural pattern.[2] Some work has been done on village as the nexus of urban economy, but these researches have to be pushed further to recapture the rhythm of life in Indian villages during the medieval period.

It may not be possible to discover documents like *Inquisition Register* of Jacques Fournier, Bishop of Pamiers, on which Ladurie has based his illuminating study, but if the *zamīndārī* records — *roznāmchahs* (diaries of day-to-day events) maintained by the *zamīndārs*, village records kept by the *paṭvārīs* — the *bahīs*,[3] the *arsatās*,[4] the *jam'adāmī* [5] registers — and other source material pertaining to villages, is coordinated, a fairly interesting picture of Indian villages may be drawn. During the Mughal period a number of manuals and records appeared in the form of *siyāq* (accountancy), *dastūr al-'amals* (manuals of administrative procedure) works on husbandry and gardening, like *Irshād al-Zirā'ah*,[6] *Aḥkām al-Arāḍī*,[7] *Nuskhah dar Fann-i Falāḥat*,[8] *Risālah-i Nakhlbandīyah*,[9] *Risālah-i Zirā'at*,[10] and a very large number of *inshā'* (epistolary) collections,[11] but no systematic effort has so far been made to weave the data available in these diverse sources into a pattern and present a vibrant picture of Indian village community. A comprehensive and in-depth study of the Indian village as the focal point of a cultural tradition reflecting the totality of Indian milieu remains a desideratum. Our studies of Indian culture have been, by and large, city-oriented and the bulk of Indian population which lived in villages has not received the treatment it deserves.

Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (A.D.1817-1898) was one of the earliest scholars of modern India to turn his attention to the study of Indian village life. His treatise, *Qadīm Niẓām-i Dehī-i Hindūstān*,[12] is valuable in understanding the social structure of the Indian village community. It cannot be considered exhaustive but it is a singular effort of its type[13] and provides a framework for the portrait of a medieval village. Details culled from different sources referred to above may supply the necessary colours for drawing a lively sketch of an Indian village in all its light and shade. This work remained rather unnoticed by the general reader and even Mawlānā Alṭāf Ḥusayn Ḥālī, Sir Sayyid's biographer, made no reference to it in his *Hayāt-i Jāvīd*.

SIR SAYYID'S KNOWLEDGE OF REVENUE MATTERS

Sir Syed possessed intimate knowledge of the Indian village life. Though born and brought up in a family holding high offices at the Mughal court, he and his elders had occasions to study at close quarters the conditions of the Indian peasantry. His grandfather, Sayyid Hādī, was a *kaṛoṛī* [14] of the province of Shahjahanabad under Shāh 'Ālam. His maternal grandfather, Khwāja Farīd al-Dīn, was entrusted by the British Government with the realization of revenues in the region of Bundelkhand and was appointed *Tahsildār* of Banda. On joining the service of the British, Sayyid Ahmad Khān got assignments which brought him in close touch with the rural community in Northern India. In the beginning he served as *sarishtahdār* in the office of the *Sadr Amīn*. Later he was appointed *Nā'ib Munshī* in the office of the Commissioner of Agra. As the work of land settlement was in progress in several districts of Agra at that time, the Commissioner's office had to deal with a large number of problems relating to land, irrigation, produce, taxes, etc. Sayyid Ahmad applied himself diligently to the work assigned to him and prepared a very useful manual for the guidance of the settlement staff. Later on, when posted at Bijnor, he compiled a history of that district and incorporated in it considerable statistical data from the records of the *qānūngos* and the *paṭvārīs*. Unfortunately this work was lost in the turmoil of 1857. From the pains that Sir Sayyid had taken in collecting material for this book it can be assumed that it was fairly extensive in scope and conspectus. While editing *Ā'īn-i Akbarī* his mind conjured up the picture of rural life during the Mughal rule. He was thus familiar with the condition of the Indian villages both during the Mughal and the colonial periods.

SIR SAYYID'S ANXIETY TO IMPROVE INDIAN AGRICULTURE

Sir Sayyid realized very early that amelioration of the condition of the peasantry, which necessarily implied improvement in the methods of agriculture, was a *sine qua non* for the progress of the country. He founded the Scientific Society in order to develop public interest in the study of science and to familiarize Indians with advanced methods of agriculture in European countries. In a letter addressed to J.H. Prinsep, Collector of Aligarh, on 30 December 1865, he thus spelt out his objectives:

> One of the chief objects aimed at by the Scientific Society is the introduction of improved methods of agriculture into India by which the condition of the people may be improved and the revenue of the empire augmented.
>
> 1. In order to carry out this aim it will be necessary to investigate and collate in one printed work the various methods of cultivation now in vogue in these, the North Western Provinces — to enumerate in detail the various crops of each District, their rotation, and the effect of each on the soil and the method of their cultivation. When this knowledge shall have been obtained it will be practicable to determine on scientific principles whether the various systems as pursued in each District are practically the best adapted to their several soils.
>
> 2. A work on the above has hitherto not been accessible to the inhabitants of these provinces, they are therefore to a very great extent, I may almost say wholly, ignorant of the crops and soils of District other than their own and are in consequence unable to inaugurate important agricultural improvements in their several estates.
>
> 3. The more advanced sections of native community in India have, it is true, free access to the many valuable European works on the science of agriculture in Europe, but from the want of a work as detailed in paras 1 and 2, it cannot with certainty be determined what principles or methods of agriculture it would at present be most suitable to introduce into India and whether it would be advisable to postpone to some future age.
>
> 4. The Society intends after experimenting upon and accurately investigating variety of methods, to publish in the Verancular . . . the most useful.

5. The Society further intends instructing the natives of India in the science of Mechanics — a knowledge of which will enable them to understand and to use many European instruments and mechanical appliances whose introduction would be of the greatest possible benefit to India.

6. In order to accomplish (these) objects . . . it will be necessary:

(i) To compile a work on the various methods of cultivation etc. in vogue throughout these Provinces.

(ii) To translate into vernacular well-known English works on Agriculture and Mechanics .... [15]

This programme emanates from a deep and intimate awareness of the conditions of rural areas during the 19th century. Sir Sayyid's interest in agricultural problems continued throughout his life. In a circular letter (dated July 27, 1866) he has indicated the themes to be covered in books he wanted to be prepared at the district level. These themes were:

1. Boundaries of each District.
2. Natural and artificial features as mountains, rivers, ponds etc.
3. Mode and extent of irrigation, whether from rivers, etc.
4. The practicability of extending irrigation.
5. Extent of forest lands and their products.
6. Large towns and marts, description of the trade carried on thereat.
7. Classes and conditions of the soil. (In compiling this head the *chuckbundee* or the classification of lands by Settlement Officers will also be consulted).
8. Unculturable lands and causes of their not being cultivated. Where practicable specimens of such lands will be subjected to analysis and their component particles determined.
9. Possibility of rendering such lands fertile.
10. Agricultural implements with models and estimates of the cost of each.
11. Methods of cultivating the land and the expense of cultivating per acre respectively.

12. The varieties, and methods of making, manure and the modes of using the same.
13. Irrigating implements, their models and cost of each.
14. Methods of irrigating the land and their respective cost per acre.
15. List of summer crops. The best time for sowing them, the most suitable soils, and the best way of preparing and irrigating the land for them. The best time and mode of reaping, stacking and preparing for use.
16. The quantity of each crop produced per acre, the expense of raising it and profit resulting therefrom.
17. Diseases to which the summer crops are liable and their remedies.
18. How the seed for the next crop should be preserved.
19. List of the winter crops. The best time for sowing them, the most suitable soil, and the best way of preparing and irrigating the land for them. The best time and mode of reaping, stacking and preparing for use.
20. The quality of each crop produced per acre, the expense of raising it, and profit resulting therefrom.
21. Diseases to which the winter crops are liable and their remedies.
22. How the seed for the next crop should be preserved.
23. Classes of grass produced and to what purposes applied.
24. Varieties of cattle. The best mode for breeding and feeding the same.
25. The tribes or sects of the District and which of them most addicted to agricultural pursuits.
26. Population according to the census of the 10th January 1865.
27. The proprietary rights in the land.
28. The rate of assessment of every class of soil.
29. The total extent of land under cultivation, of that not cultivated and of that capable of being cultivated.
30. Map of the District showing the natural and artificial features described in Section 2.

31. Ditto showing the classes and characteristics of land alluded to in Section 7.

32. Ditto showing the villages of the District and original proprietors of the land to be distinguished by certain marks attached to them.[16]

Needless to say these details show not only Sir Sayyid's interest in villages but also his rural conspectus. He was anxious to bring about a change in rural conditions. As in education, so in agriculture, he looked to the West for guidance and inspiration. His "Movement" was not, as is generally but erroneously supposed, limited to the education of the city elite; it had a broad and comprehensive perspective of reform and regeneration of the Indian society, both rural and urban.

VIEWS ON DIFFERENT RURAL PROBLEMS

As a broadminded statesman and patriot, Sir Sayyid gave considerable thought to the problems of the rural population. He frequently wrote about rural hygiene and suggested measures for improving the supply of water to the villages. He exhorted both the people and the government to ensure healthy conditions in the villages so that yearly recurrence of epidemics was stopped. He laid down eighteen rules of guidance for improving sanitation in the villages.[17] His lecture on the Faslī era, delivered on 1 June 1866, reveals not only his insight into the problems of agricultural production in India but also his awareness of the historical antecedents.[18] There was hardly any aspect of agriculture and village-life which did not attract his attention. He wrote about irrigational methods,[19] recommended new implements of cultivation, analyzed the causes of famines,[20] discussed the plight of the rural community and earnestly strove to create an atmosphere of sympathy for the Indian villagers. While discussing the havoc wrought by epidemics in Kumaon and Garhwal — known as *Mahamari* — he not only drew the attention of the *zamīndārs* to the humanitarian aspect of the problem but told them also that it was in their interest also to help create healthy conditions in the villages.[21] He lauded the efforts to improve horticulture in Nagpur and appreciated the initiative to import seeds of cotton, sugarcane, tea, coffee etc.[22] Improved qualities of corn and fruits were displayed by him at meetings of the Scientific Society so that people could realize the value of improved Indian products.[23] He thought that through exhibitions and displays the rural classes could be attracted to new and improved methods of agriculture. When

agricultural exhibitions were organized at Agra, Bijnor and other places, he warmly appreciated the efforts of the organizers.[24] His suggestions about exhibitions, particularly measures to make them more useful and effective, are contained in his speeches and articles.[25] Horticulture also attracted Sir Sayyid's attention and he wrote fascinating articles to inculcate interest in gardening.[26] His earnest desire was to see "Agricultural Societies" established throughout the country so that the public mind was prepared for a revolution in "agricultural methods."[27] He suggested creation of "Agricultural Banks" to advance loans to the cultivators for the improvement of their methods of agriculture.[28] One is simply amazed at the gamut of Sir Sayyid's reformist measures which covered the village and the town alike.

BROCHURE ON VILLAGE COMMUNITY

Sir Sayyid undertook to write on the Indian village community because he considered the existing literature on the subject perfunctory. In his *Qadīm Nizām-i Dehī-i Hindūstān*, he refers to the works of some British officers, like Sir George Campbell, but considers their account inadequate[29] in the portrayal of Indian village scene. He thought that they based their conclusions on conditions prevalent in Europe and so they failed to appreciate conditions in the Indian villages. He himself studied the Indian rural milieu in the context of the general Indian situation. The Settlement Department had collected information about the prevalent practices without any attempt to trace its antecedents and its impact on the contemporary village community. This was a great drawback in rural studies in India and Sir Sayyid thought of rectifying it. Apart from the humanitarian and academic considerations which inspired his study, he thought that a knowledge of the rural pattern of society was essential for those involved in the work of revenue settlement and collection.

Sir Sayyid believed in the basic continuity of Indian rural life. He thought that whatever political changes had taken place throughout the ages were at the higher level; the lower strata, particularly the village community, remained unaffected by these changes. He, however, accepted the fact that enhancement in taxation schedules affected the village community. The medieval Indian governments were not slow to notice the importance of village community and the need to save it from all sorts of economic tribulations.[30]

Sayyid Ahmad's treatise provides a structural study of life in the Indian villages. He was all admiration for the village organization and considered it surprising that illiterate village people, who had no knowledge of civic science or political administration or economic principles of the division of labour, had worked their rural institutions effectively and successfully for centuries.

TWO BROAD CATEGORIES OF THE VILLAGE COMMUNITY

Sir Sayyid categorized the village community broadly into two: the *zamīndārs* and the *ra'īyat*. The *zamīndārs* were defined as that group which considered itself owner of all land included in the village and looked upon itself superior to all others. The ancestors of these people occupied these lands and came to be known as *zamīndārs*, he says. In some cases the occupants were not the descendants or successors of those who initially owned the land but somehow acquired ascendancy in the village *(mawḍa')* and came to enjoy the same position and status whch the earlier occupants of land had enjoyed.

The group designated as *ra'īyat* comprised four classes:

a) cultivators,

b) artisans,

c) service class, and

d) the *khush-bāsh*[31] group.

THE ZAMĪNDĀRS

In areas where the entire land belonged to one *zamīndār*, the administration of the village was in his hand. There was no need to assess the land owned by him, as none shared it with him. On him lay the responsibility of rendering necessary service to the state. Wherever there existed a custom to give some rights to owners of land, such a person was given all those rights. He was responsible for the payment of the entire government revenue *(zar-i mālguzārī)* fixed from that holding.

In case more than one person owned the land or an owner left many inheritors, the right and responsibility of each one of them had to be fixed

separately. Through a crude but effective method intelligible to the illiterate people, this problem was solved. The village *(mawda')* as a whole was deemed either equivalent to a rupee and its fractions in annas and pies or equivalent to yard and its fractions in *biswās*[32] and *biswānsī*.[33] A rupee was divided into 16 annas, and a yard into 20 *biswās*. The share of every owner was fixed on this basis. For instance, if a person owned 1/16 of land in a village, he was called the *haqqīyat dār*[34] of one anna, or of 1-1/4 *biswā*. There were further fractions of every anna and *biswā*, and the status of small land owners was determined in fractions of anna and *biswā*. This crude but pragmatic method which had prevailed in rural areas for centuries proved effective in fixing the share of different *zamīndārs* in a village.

The *zamīndārs* kept their holding (*ḥaqqīyat*) jointly as far as possible, but when differences arose, separate arrangements were made for the holding of every one,

Wherever the land remained under collective control, it was categorized into four types as follows:

a) good cultivable land,

b) second rate cultivable land,

c) not under cultivation but cultivable land, and

d) land left for common orchards, common grazing ground etc.

Good cultivable land was divided according to the share of every individual *zamīndār* and this category of land was considered *sīr-kāsht*.[35]

The second type of cultivable land was given to others for cultivation. The cultivators got a fixed share out of the produce; the owners got their share from the produce in proportion to their share in the holding.

Land which was not under cultivation but was cultivable, was dealt with differently. Sometime the *zamīndārs* themselves cultivated it and sometimes they rented it to others.

In the fourth category of land, every owner had his right according to his share in the property. Even in uncultivable land, which otherwise lay useless, everyone had a share. The land inhabited by the village people was the common property of all owners of land in the village, and all its

inhabitants who were not *zamīndārs* themselves were called *ra'īyat* of the *zamīndārs*.

Natural ponds, lakes, wild trees and plants which grew without any effort on the part of the cultivators, were treated common property and everybody got his share from it, according to his entitlement.

Apart from this, the *ra'īyat* having its cottages on this land had to pay annually something in cash or in kind to the *zamīndārs*. In the alternative they were required to perform certain services. Every *zamīndār* could claim service from them proportionate to his right in the *zamīndārī*.

Sometimes *zamīndārs* who had more power and better resources than others forcibly brought under *sīr* more land than their entitlement. This led to quarrels and tensions in this villages.

There was a practice that out of the *sīr* cultivation, a nominal share was taken and distributed among all. In this way the imbalance in the profit from *sīr* was reduced but it could not be eliminated altogether.

DISTRIBUTION AND DIVISION OF HOLDINGS

Differences among *zamīndārs* led to division of holdings. Collaterals of one family constituted a group and whatever was their share according to the law of succession, they got separated from the main holding and occupied it. This partitioned portion was called *paṭṭī*,[36] and was known after the head of the family, like *Paṭṭī Harī Singh, Paṭṭī Bahādur 'Alī* etc. Sometime this division was complete, and included cultivable and non-cultivable land, fallow land, pastures, orchards etc. In the case of ponds, sides were allotted. Wells which could not be partitioned had days fixed for different families for the use of water for irrigational purposes. Sometimes the division was partial and covered only the cultivable land. Sometimes the cultivable land was further divided. The element of force so operated in the village-life that it very often deprived the weak and poor cultivators of their legitimate share in cultivable land. If the weak cultivators succeeded in enlisting the support of rural officers or some powerful group in the village, a fresh division was made.

In villages with considerable property under cultivation of the peasants, the *zamīndārs* divided peasants in accordance with the revenue paid by the

cultivators and proportionate to their share. Sometimes a cultivator worked for two groups and paid the revenue to two *zamīndārs* according to their share in the holding. This practice was adopted in villages where the *zamīndārs* realized their dues in cash and not in kind. This division led to the development of the institution of *thokdārī*.[37] Even artisans and labourers who lived in the villages were sometimes likewise divided and they performed service of the same *thok* to which they were assigned.

PAYMENT OF REVENUE (*MĀLGUZĀRĪ*) TO THE GOVERNMENT

The village headman settled the amount of revenue with the *'āmil* (the revenue collector). This was proportionately divided over those who owned the land. Sometimes a single person was responsible for payment of the government revenue (*mālguzārī*) on the land occupied by him; at others all the *zamīndārs*, not withstanding the division of their holdings, were collectively held responsible for the payment of the revenue. Whoever had arrears of *mālguzārī* on the land under his occupation, had to pay it personally or out of joint profit, or by collective contribution (*bachch*).[38] The British continued these laws as *Qavānīn-i Baṭvārā*.

The village headman used to enter into agreement with the government officer and paid the *mālguzārī* by collecting contributions (*bachch*). For this service he got something under the Hindu *rājās*. Generally a *rājā* had under him *sardārs* of one thousand villages; every *sardār* had *sardārs* of hundred villages under him. This group of one hundred villages was what later came to be called *parganah*. Under them were *lambardārs*, also called *maṇḍals* or *paṭels* All of them were treated as servants of the *rājā*. The *lambardār* committed himself (*qarār madār*) to the *rājā* to pay the revenue (*mālguzārī*) which he realized through *bachch* from the village people. He was responsible for payment of the revenue and also for the good conduct of the village people. He had some charity land (*lā-kharāj*)[39] while the village people also paid something to him. Sometimes the *rājā* also gave to the *lambardār* some money by way of salary.

The Muslim governments effected certain changes in this practice. They thought of claiming a share from the produce of every holding and so they started realizing revenue from every cultivator. It is difficult to say when exactly this method was introduced. But what was left with the cultivator barely sufficed for his subsistence and expenditure on cultivation. Sir Sayyid

quotes *Ā'īn-i Akbarī* which lays down that an *'āmil* should have a contract with the cultivator that he himself would bring the revenue so that no need arises to employ a middle-man for its collection. Further a cultivator should be given a receipt as soon as he makes the payment. Some English writers say that the revenue administration of Akbar was based on *muqāsimah* [40] or *baṭā'ī* [41] or *bhā'olī*. [42] They say that the arrangement of Ṭoḍar Mal and Muzaffar Khān was with the cultivators and not with the *zamīndārs*. Remnants of this type of arrangement are found at no other place except the provinces of the Deccan. The British Government did not appoint there any intermediary between itself and the real cultivators. This led to the emergence of the *zamīndārī* of cultivators and became known as *ryotwārī*.

The joint family system gave a special position to the head of the family who exercised control over the village and was treated as the *zamīndār*. All disputes in the village were brought to him for arbitration and in case the matter was referred to the *panchāyat*, he presided over it.

VILLAGE *PANCHĀYAT*

The *zamīndārs* were members of the village *panchāyat*.[43] All matters pertaining to the division of holdings, *mālguzārī*, *baṉchṉ*, irrigational problems, right over ponds, wells, even proposals for marriage, were referred to the *panchāyats*. The meetings were held either in *chawpāl* (village community centre) or on land adjoining some temple, or near the tank. The village headman was its presiding officer, persons belonging to different families participated in the deliberations. The influence of a person depended on his share in the holdings. Though the *panchāyats* generally administered even-handed justice, there were occasions when powerful groups influenced its decisions.

The villages were either big or small. Small villages were placed under a bigger village and the *panchs* from bigger villages decided their disputes.

These days some people think that the village *panchāyat* was a very good institution and there was redress of the grievances of the distressed and the weak. "I do not believe in this," observes Sir Sayyid. Might was right and since there was no other agency to administer justice, the *panchāyats* were praised. The actual position was different. Whenever there was any injustice or wrong done to a cultivator, artisan or labourer, he appeared before the *panchāyat* having a *tinkah* in his mouth[44] and with folded hands and on one

leg. Sometimes the headman scolded the aggrieved person and he went away weeping and crying, and sometimes the headman approached the person who had perpetrated injustice and told him to be lenient with him.

Rarely did any civil or criminal case go outside the village. Ryot included in the category of artisans or menials was considered worse than animals. Forced labour was extracted from them. The *baqqāls* [45] and *mahājans*[46] were better off because all village people, even *zamīndārs*, borrowed money from them. In fact it was the effort of all to arrange the village affairs in such a way as to attract *baqqāls* and *mahājans* to the villages.

The *baqqāls* and the *mahājans* maintained good relations with the headman and the powerful group of the village and advanced loans to them on nominal or no interest. In return these groups helped the *baqqāls* and *mahājans* in the recovery of their loans from the villagers, and whatever concessions they gave to the headmen and the powerful group in charging interest from them, they extorted from the poor villagers. But if the relations of any *baqqāl* or *mahājan* became strained with the powerful group, he had no option but to leave the village. "Though exploitation of the poor and the aggrieved has become lesser under the British, the oppression (*zulm*) of the *zamīndārs* still continues," remarks Sir Sayyid.

PREVENTION OF VILLAGE INCIDENTS

There was an unwritten agreement that crimes of steeling cattle or any other crime will not be committed in other villages. It was not difficult to find out whose cattle were stolen and generally these were returned to the owners.

There were *khūjiyāhs*[47] who followed the footprints of the stolen cattle and traced the thieves. Sometimes cases of kidnapping of women or refusal to surrender stolen property led to an attack on one village by another. Regarding treatment of a woman who eloped with somebody, the rural society had different principles to deal with. Some treated the matter lightly, others did not consider it a crime to warrant a death penalty.

Female infanticide prevailed in some villages. Even Muslim converts practised it. Sacrifice in the name of some god or temple was considered a pious act. There was hardly any village where there were no *maṭhs*

(devotee's abode) for *satī* (self-immolation). The British firmly stopped the practice.

BOOTY

A sizeable part of the income of *zamīndārs* came through loot and plunder—Jats, Gujars, Mewatis, Phansiya,[48] Mina[49] and certain other castes and tribes indulged in banditry. Some of them plundered rich men in big *qasbahs* and cities and waylaid the travellers. This looted property was distributed and the *zamīndār* of the village to which the plunderers belonged had his share also, no matter he joined the plundering raids or not.

EXCISE, TAXES AND CESSES

In the past the *zamīndārs* levied three kinds of taxes: transit tax, export and import tax, and *mīr-bahr*. The tax for the use of roads and *pagḍandīs* (footpaths, tracks) was known as *haṯh hilā'ī* or *khāk uṛā'ī* (*haṯh hilā'ī* from pedestrians, *khāk uṛā'ī* from riders on mules, bulls, horses etc.). A traveller had to pay the tax from village to village. The beggars were exempt from its payment. The village headman appointed some *chamār* or *chūrā* to guide the travellers. He was called *agwā*.[50] This was a type of forced labour and menials performed it in turn. Travellers sometimes tipped the *agwās* who guided them to the next stage of their journey. When any headman or soldier or prestigious person or *chawḏhary* travelled, forced labour was drawn from the villages to carry his luggage.

Export and import duties were known as *rāhdārī*.[51] A merchant had to give something at every village that he passed through.

The tax known as *mīr-bahr*[52] was not common. It was realized only where some boat (*kishtī*) or raft (*ghar nā'ī*)[53] had to be maintained for crossing some rivulet or *nālā*. Earlier this tax was realized by the *zamīndārs*, but in Sir Sayyid's days the government realized it.

VILLAGE POPULATION

The original occupants of land treated the poor people like the slaves of South America. The ryot was like slaves for the *zamīndārs* who had full

authority over their life, property and labour. Degrees of servitude varied according to the condition of the ryot.

The villages needed certain people for the performance of certain common or community works: (i) to perform religious ceremonies, (ii) to preserve pedigrees, (iii) to help in the distribution of land, (iv) artisans, (v) labourers, (vi) *mahājans* and *baqqāls*, (vii) dancers, and (viii) accountants.

What was needed for community purposes in the villages was (i) a common hall being common property of all, (ii) irrigational facilities, (iii) vegetables, orchards etc.

Every big village had one or more temples. The Brahman who looked after it was given some land for cultivation out of the joint holdings. This was exempt from taxes and cesses. Sometimes astrologers were kept for deciding the auspicious time for marriages etc. Some *panḍits* performed cremation and were paid from the produce at the time of harvest. Sometimes a *panḍit* looked after several villages and his jurisdiction was honoured.

Custodians of pedigree records were known as *bhāṭs*.[54] They had their areas of jurisdiction in which no interference was permitted. They kept *bahīs* containing pedigrees of all *zamīndārs* of the village. All births and deaths were recorded in these *bahīs*. Sometimes important or significant events were also noted by them. These *bhāṭs* were paid at the time of harvest. They recited the pedigrees and the achievements of the ancestors—this was known as *karka*.[55] Whoever hesitated in paying them was ridiculed by them by placing his effigy on a bambo and taking it from village to village.[56]

Those who had occupied lands within the limits of any *mawḍa'* in the beginning, needed people to help them in cultivation. This led to the appearance of many groups of tillers of land in every *mawḍa'*. Besides, people who could cultivate were brought to villages by original occupants of land. These cultivators got something from the produce for their labour; a fixed portion was paid towards *mālguzārī* while the rest went to the occupants. Originally the principle of distribution of produce (*baṭā'ī* or *bhā'olī*) was adopted. But in this case the *zamīndār* had to look after the produce in the *khalyāns*.[57] They adopted the practice of *kankut*[58]: When the harvests were ready, representatives of *zamīndārs* and cultivators assembled at the field and assessed the grain and the fodder on the standing crops. Whatever the estimate of the shares of the *zamīndār*, it was taken at the time

of reaping the harvests (*dirav*), regardless of the ultimate position of the crop. The *kankut* experts were called *kanayāhs* and they assessed the standing crops. Some *zamīndārs* received payments in cash rather than in kind.

The rights of the cultivators varied — some were "hereditary cultivators with occupancy rights" (*Kāshtkārān-i mawrūthī mustaḥaqq-i qabḍah*) others were" hereditary cultivators without rights of occupancy" (*Kāshtkārān-i mawrūthī ghayr mústahaqq-i qabdah*) Referring in particular to conditions in Awadh, Sir Sayyid remarks: "There was no way of protecting the rights of the *ra'īyat*. All the cultivators were slaves of either the *zamīndārs* or the *'āmils* or *chaklahdārs*.[59] There was none to redress the grievances of the cultivators. Hereditary holdings of cultivators could be confiscated by them."

Zamīndārs in fact stood between the government and the cultivators. Wherever there was *ryotwari* arrangement — as in Bombay, Madras and the territories of the Nizam, Berar and Aurangabad — there was no intermediary but it is doubtful if such a situation actually existed there. Actually the situation seems to be that they were known by a different designation and the word *zamīndār* was not used for them. Documents of the Mughal period show that despite everything else the rights of the *zamīndārs* were never completely ignored.

The artisans — particularly *baṛhaī*[60] (carpenters), *lūhār* (blacksmiths), and tanners of hide — were necessary for village life. Implements of agriculture, though simple and crude, needed the services of these people. Prompt payment for every work done would have entailed huge expenditure which neither the *zamīndārs* nor the cultivators could afford. So these artisans were given land in the villages to build their houses and they were compensated in kind by giving them corn from the *khalyān*. In some villages they were given some plot of land out of the common land to cultivate. Where the population of a village did not justify provision for artisans, neighbouring villages supplied the services.

Apart from these craftsmen — weavers (*koni julāhās*), weavers of blankets, *gaḍariyā*[61] (shepherd), and potters also lived in villages. Some *zamīndārs* allowed them to settle for their own convenience and comfort and did not charge anything; others charge something per house and these taxes were known as *ghar-dwārī*[62] and *muḥtarifa*.[63]

The labourers, particularly menials, *radhīl* castes, like shoe-makers and *chuhrās* [64] who really lived on labour, settled in villages as they could live on

paltry income in the villages. They rendered different types of services. They helped them in ploughing and were, in return, supplied corn at reduced price. They had to perform all works of the category of forced labour. At the time of harvest a handful of corn (*lapbhar*)[65] was given to them.

The *chamārs*[66] (shoe-makers) had one more source of income. They had areas specified from where dead animals could be removed by them alone. They sold the hide of the animals. During the year they gave some hides to the *zamīndārs* also.

The *mahājans* and *baniyās* were humoured and placated by the *zamīndārs*. They were considered a respectable section of the village community. They used to purchase for themselves corn produced in the villages and arranged its sale to others also. They advanced loans to *zamīndārs* and cultivators in times of need. They advanced seed and gave corn also on loan. Generally they charged exorbitant interest on loans given by them. Whatever corn they gave, they realized at least 25 per cent more at the time of the harvest. One very popular practice for recovery of loan was *dharnā*. The *mahājan* used to post his men at the door of the debtor and these men prevented water or food from getting into the house. Women were stopped from going out for easing themselves. Different embarrassments were caused to the debtors till they paid back the debt. British government made the custom a criminal offence.

Mahājans and *baqqāls* so dominated the yillages that all the income of the poor peasants went to them. Sir Sayyid says that in his day the *zamīndārs* had lesser power than the *mahājans* and *baqqāls*. The peasants were dependent on the *baqqāls* and *mahājans* for their daily subsistence. They borrowed seed from them for sowing their crops and paid a heavy interest.

Among the people of pleasure were women known as *naṭnī*, *kuniriyān*, or *kabūtaryān*. They sang and danced while their menfolk accompanied them with *dhūls* (drums). Their performances were generally on the occasion of marriages or at the time of harvest. They got some corn and *sidh*[67] One very important feature of their lives was that they never indulged in trade of the flesh. They were household women who lived with their husbands.

CHAWPĀL

This house for community purposes was constructed at some central place in the village by common contributions. It resembled the Town Hall of

civilized cities. Here people assembled for *panchāyat* and other social purposes. *'Āmils*, government *ahlkārs*, travellers and guests stayed in the *chawpāl*. The village headman gave food to them out of the common fund. The menials of the village rendered service to them, brought fodder for their horses. Earthern pots for their use were brought from the house of potters (*kumhārs*).

METHODS OF IRRIGATION

In the absence of any other mode of irrigation, common wells were constructed for irrigational purposes. Investigations showed that these wells were built by those people who had established themselves in the villages in the beginning. Where wells could not be dug, the *zamīndārs* got tanks and *jūhaṛ* (large ponds) dug out. Rain water was stored there. This water was used for cattle and for irrigational purposes also. In low lying areas where water came from higher lands, many inter-connected tanks were constructed to store water which passed from one tank to another. The villagers constructed *barhas* to take water. In Telengana there is a splendid system of irrigation through *tālābs, kants, bā'olīs* (tanks, pits, large wells into which people descend to get water). This system seems to have been designed by the rulers at a very heavy cost. The people had, therefore, to pay water cess. Similarly the British government realized tax from those who irrigated their lands from canals constructed by them.

There was difference of opinion about the method of realizing water cess. Some realized it as a separate tax; others included it in the total incidence of *mālguzārī* tax.

Mango orchards are also grown in villages, requiring lesser irrigational effort. Besides providing shade and shelter to people in the summer season, its wood was used for constructional purposes.

THE *PAṬVĀRĪ*

Every village has a *paṭvārī*,[8] who keeps account of land, revenues payable, arears etc. This office was hereditary in the past, so much so that minor children of a deceased *paṭvārī* were appointed in his place, and some other elder member of the family worked for them. The remuneration (*ḥaqq*) payable to the *paṭvārī* for his work was fixed. Besides, he was paid corn from every *kẖalyān* and was given some land for cultivation either as free hold or on reduced tax.

This in brief is a brief sketch of the village community as given by Sir Sayyid. His keenness to bring about a change in the existing rural situation is evident from every page of the brochure.

NOTES

(1) English translation published by Scholar Press, 1978

(2) Articles like F G. Bailey's "An Oriya Hill Village" (*Economic Weekly*, vol. v,no.12 March 21,1952), G.morris Carstairs's "A Village in Rajasthan" (*Economic Weekly*, vol. iv, nos.3 and 4, January 26,1952), Kathleen Gough's "The Social Structure of a Tanjore Village" (*Economic Weekly*, vol. iv, no.21, May 24,1952) and some other contributions in Indian and foreign journals are no doubt interesting and informative but they do not encompass the totality of life in an Indian village. A wider perspective and an in-depth study of the local cultural milieu alone can fill this gap

(3) Records maintained by the *paṭvārīs* were known as *bahī* or *kāghadh-i khām*.

(4) Available in Rajasthan Archives; these documents supply details about revenue demands, total revenue realized per crop etc.

(5) Estimated income of every village.

(6) MS. British Museum, Or. 7557.

(7) MS. Osmania, Hyderabad (*Jadid*, No.1156).

(8) MS. I.O 4702.

(9) Add. 16,662.

(10) Edinburgh 144

(11) For instance, *Inshā'-i Bahār-i 'Ajam* compiled by Amānat 'Alī of Faizabad in 1811, refers to the activities of *zamīndārs* of the region; the *Inshā'-i Dilkushā* of Sayyid Nithār 'Alī of Bareilly, compiled in *circa* 1794, contains interesting details about the changing fortunes of *madad-i ma'āsh* grants, increasing interest in the purchase of orchards as safe investment, heavy pressure of debt on rural classes etc.

(12) MS.in personal collection. It was printed in 1978 but no printed copy is available. Mawlana Muhammad Ismail Panipati has, however, included in his collection of Sir Sayyid's articles, *Maqālāt-i Sir Sayyid*.

(13) Baden-Powell's excellent studies of rural India (*Land Systems of British India*, 3 vols [Oxford, 1892]; *The Indian Village Community* [London, 1896]) were undertaken more than a decade after this brief survey of Sir Sayyid.

In 1916 a Conference of the Missionary Societies in Great Britain considered the request of the Bishop of Madras for sending a special Commission of Enquiry for a study of "the educational needs of the villages of India." Its report, *Village Education in India*

(Oxford University Press, 1920), though limited in perspective and dictated by considerations of proselytization, reflects a serious attempt to understand the Indian village community

(14) *Karorī* was an officer who collected revenues amounting to a crore of *dāms*. *Karorīs* were charged specially with the task of developing cultivation (*Tabaqāt-i Akbarī*, vol ii, pp.300-301) For *karorī*, Elliot, *Memoirs on the History, Folklore...*,vol ii, pp.197-200.

(15) *Selected Documents from the Aligarh Archives*, ed Yusuf Husain, pp. 71-72

(16) *Ibid*, pp 78-79

(17) See *Akhbar Scientific Society Aligarh*, 27 April, 1866, pp. 71-76.

(18) *Ibid*, 8 June, 1866, pp. 164-66.

(19) *Ibid*, 6 August, 1869, p. 50.

(20) *Ibid*., 1 May, 1874, pp. 265-67.

(21) *Ibid*, 27 April 1866, pp. 71-76.

(22) *Ibid*, 18 May, 1866, p 125

(23) *Ibid*, 25 May, 1866, p. 137.

(24) *Ibid*, 18 January, 1867, pp 35-36.

(25) *Ibid*., 1 Feb 1867, pp 67-69.

(26) *Aligarh Institute Gazette*, 8 Jan 1878, pp. 38-39. Sir Sayyid himself used to spend a huge sum on the maintenance of gardens and lawns in his house.

(27) *Ibid*, 21 August 1880, pp. 933-34.

(28) *Ibid*, 2 June 1883, pp 619-34.

(29) Writing in 1892 Baden-Powell observed: "it is practically impossible to put one's hand on a single book that has collected and reduced to shape the information which exists in settlement reports and local and special papers and minutes, official and other" (*The Land Systems of British India*, vol i,p 104) He has pointed out the shortcomings in the works of Field, Campbell, Maine and others. If Sir Sayyid thought that the English writers have read European conditions in Indian villages, Baden-Powell opined about Philip's *Tagore Lectures* (for 1874-75) that "unfortunately he has been dominated with the idea that villages are always 'Hindu' and that there is one kind of village only. .he pieces together various items of information gathered from totally different provinces, and thereout evolves a picture of a single form of village constitution" (vol.i, pp. 104-105). Sir Sayyid's survey is based on conditions prevalent mainly in the Punjab and U.P.

(30) The Delhi sultans issued special instructions to their officers and governors to give their attention to the betterment of the agricultural conditions. Aybak, Iltutmish, Nāṣir al-Dīn Mahmūd, Balban, Muḥammad bin Tughluq and Fīrūz Shāh evinced keen interest in rural

areas They created a special department, *Dīwān-i Kohī*, to deal with the problems of agriculture. Abū al-Faḍl speaks about Akbar's concern for the welfare of the rural people. His frequent references to Akbar as "rain-maker" reflect the medieval psychology to which Max Weber has alluded in his sociological studies.

(31) *Khush-bāsh*, a dweller at ease, or at pleasure; a voluntary settler: one who dwells in a place at the invitation of the elder settlers, or who dwells at ease, being a tenant on more or less favourable terms. (Baden-Powell, *Land Systems in British India*, vol. i, pp. 555; vol. iii, p 363.)

(32) *Biswā* is twentieth part of a *bīgha*. A *bīgha* is twenty-two bamboo poles (*bāns*) in length and twenty-two bamboo poles in width. Roughly a *bīgha* is 1600 square yards.

(33) *Biswānsī* is twentieth part of a *biswa*

(34) *Haqqīyat* means right, proprietorship, claim (*Dictionary*, Duncan Forbes); *dār* means holder of.

(35) Lands in a village cultivated by the hereditary proprietors· hence first rate land. See Duncan Forbes for a discussion of implications; Khwaja Yasin's *Glossary*, British Museum MS, f. 66a and 66b.

(36) A Hindi word, meaning 'share' or 'side.' See Khwaja Yasin's *Glossary* British Museum MS, 6603, f 52a *Paṭṭī-dār* is one who has share in a coparcenary village or estate. (Duncan Forbes).

(37) *Ḥaqq ṭhokdārī* is thus defined by Elliot: "Dues and fees to *Kamins*, etc. derived, according to old customs, from the inhabitants of villages and varying in every *patti*, but generally equivalent to about three per cent, on the Government revenue-Kamaon and Garhwal. *Kamin* in the plains is applied to village servants, but in Kamaon it is used synonymously with *Bu'rha*, to signify a superintendent of village management, whose office is in the gift of Government and generally hereditary. *Seana* bears the same meaning in Garhwal." (Memoirs, vol. ii, pp. 174-75.)

(38) *Bachch*, the process of distributing the revenue-demand among the co-sharers under the joint-village systems. See Baden-Powell, *The Land Systems of British India*, vol. ii, pp. 71,145, 150.

(39) *Lā-kharāj* was land granted by the kings to the poor by way of charity. It was treated as *milk* Revenue on the charity land was forbidden. See Khwaja Yasin's *Glossary*, MS. British Museum, f. 8a.

(40) *Muqāsimah*, sharing. The system grew up under the 'Abbasids and became known as *kharāj-i muqāsimah*.

(41) *Baḍā'ī*, literally division (*taqsīm*). According to Khwaja Yasin there were many types of *baḍā'ī* (*Glossary*, MS. British Museum Add. 6603, f 50b). Elliot defines it as "Any share into which the crops may be divided." (*Memoirs*, vol. ii, p. 258.)

(42) *Bhā'o* is defined by Khwaja Yasin: "It is a Hindi word, its opposite is *naqadi* (cash). When crops mature, the *zamindar* collects it from the peasant and the *hakim* from the *zamindar*." See also, Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 227.

(43) For *panchāyat*, Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 279-82. Elliot cites a saying in India "in the *panch* is *God*." (*Memoirs*, vol i, p. 279.)

(44) *Dāṅt tinka*, putting a straw, or blade of grass, in the mouth, to deprecate anger, or to express complete submission. The action is generally accompanied by standing on one leg, which puts the supplicant in a ludicrous position. The custom shows the reverence of the Hindus for the cow, the action implying, "I am your cow, and therefore, entitled to your protection." The custom is very old and is alluded to in the inscription of the *Lāṭ* of Fīrūz Shāh, at Delhi ... The poet Nisar says:

"When the afflicted lover showed his sallow face, Kafur, through fear, seized the grass with his teeth." See Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 240-41.

(45) *Baqqāl*, grocer or grain merchant

(46) *Mahājan*, compound or *mahā* great and *jan* man; meant money-dealer.

(47) *Khuṛiyā*, खुड़ाजया , investigator (Duncan Forbes).

(48) *Phānsīgar*, a highway man who strangles the unwary traveller and takes possession of his money (Duncan Forbes).

(49) *Mina*: "a caste of Hindus, professedly thieves" (Duncan Forbes).

(50) *Agwā* (अगवा), a forerunner, guide, harbinger (Duncan Forbes).

(51) *Rāhdārī*, collection of duties (on the road) (Duncan Forbes)

(52) *Mīr-baḥrī*, harbour dues (Duncap Forbes).

(53) *Ghar nā'ī*, a raft made with pots; a float of pots. (Duncan Forbes).

(54) A *bhāṭ* is a genealogist, a family bard. For details, see H.M. Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 17-19.

(55) Karka, कठका , paean, songs of triumph (Duncan Forbes).

(56) Elliot writes "Both of these classes are held in the same dread for their exactions; which are satisfied by their constituents for fear of being lampooned and paraded in effigy (*Gudda*) before the other members of the family." (Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp 18-19.)

(57) *Khaliyān*, , a granary, a barn, a thrashing floor (Duncan Forbes)

(58) *Kankut*, the process of estimating by eye, the out turn of fields, while the crops is standing, and so fixing the state (or the landlord's) share, without actual measurement or weighing. See Baden-Powell, *The Land System of British*, vol. i, p. 270 (for corruption in the system), vol. ii, p. 176.

(59) Twenty-one *parganahs* were called *chakla*. (In later days *chakladār* was a term used for the 'leader of the prostitutes' and *chakla* for locality inhabited by prostitutes.)

(60) *Baṛhaī*, a carpenter. Had seven or more sub-castes, like *Kuka*, *Tank*, *Khati*, *Uprautiya*, *Baman-Barhai* or *Mathuria*, *Ojha Gaur* and *Chamar Baṛhai*. See Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, p. 56.

(61) *Gaḍariyā*, a shepherd "There are several sub-divisions of Gadariyas in these Provinces - *Nikhar*, *Tasselha* or *Panchhade*, Chak, *Dhangar*, *Bareiya*, *Pailwar*, and *Bhaiyatar*" (Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 120-21)

(62) Ghar-dwārī, house tax (Duncan Forbes)

(63) *Muhtariṭa*, a tax on trade (Duncan Forbes)

(64) *Chuhrā* — Elliot calls it "the lowest caste of village servants." "They are known also by the

names *Bhangī, Halālkhor,* and *Khākrob*, but *Chuhrā* is the most usual term in villages." (*Memoirs*, vol. i, p 62)

(65) *lap*, लप handful (Duncan Forbes).

(66) "A tribe employed in the curing of leather. The *chamars* are generally said to be sub-divided into seven class — *Jatua, Kanyan, Kuril, Jaiswara, Jhusia, Azungarhia* or *Birheria* and *Kori* or *Korchamra* " (Elliot, *Memoirs*, vol. i, pp. 69-71.)

(67) *Sidh* — the diet of a single day of any person from any product. Khwaja Yasin says that the clerks in the *maḥwḍa** got 4 *sidhs* from the house of the *zamīndār*. (*Glossary*, British Museum MS., f 67a)

(68) A clerk who noted down in his *kham* and *pukhtah* papers all receipts and disbursements in a village In the South, he was called *Kulkarni*

SOVIET LANGUAGE POLICY: CHANGE IN SCRIPT OF CENTRAL ASIAN LANGUAGES AND ITS IMPACT ON NATIONALITIES QUESTION

SHAMS-UD-DIN

Soviet language policy was conceived as an important ingredient of Marxist-Leninist nationalities policy which was originally intended to assimilate the different ethnic peoples belonging to different religious-cultural streams. Like the nationalities policy, Soviet language policy too has evolved through three distinct phases of development. The first phase, sometimes erroneously characterized as tolerant-liberal, spanning a period from 1917 to 1925, was essentially a preparatory phase during which Russian linguists were entrusted with the task of devising a pragmatic framework for the implementation of Lenin's ideas on the cultural question. In the following two phases this framework, involving successive Latinization and Cyrillization of the script of Central Asian People's languages, was introduced. The time needed for consolidation of Soviet power in Transcaucacia and Turkistan and a desire to give some sort of an aura of political legitimacy to the proposed changes influenced the Bolsheviks to adopt this long drawn gradualist approach or strategy. While the Soviets claim that the objective of the changes in the script of Central Asian languages was promotion of people's languages and culture it was, in reality, directed to achieve two significant political goals:

i) To cut the Soviet Muslims from their cultural heritage and religious bonds, and

ii) To promote differentiation among various sub-ethnic groups on a linguistic basis.

In this paper an attempt has been made to analyze Soviet Marxist conception of the role of language in statecraft.

SOVIET CONCEPT OF THE ROLE OF LANGUAGE IN THE FORMATION OF A NATION

Lenin was actually conscious of the gravity of the national question in Soviet Russia. In his speeches, writings and polemical debates he extensively dealt with certain basic theoretical issues relating to the development of relations among nationalities. He felt the need for promoting national languages and cultures for the development of a harmonious multinations state. But simultaneously he also recognized the crucial importance of a link or national language for, according to him, "Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity and unimpeded development of language (Russian) are the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commerce, for a free and broad grouping of the population."[1]

A study of Lenin's ideas concerning the national question or assimilation of different nationalities into a new nation leaves no doubt that in his programme of nation-building promotion of a national language occupied a position of prime importance.[2] For him a national language was the most obvious indicator of a nation.[3] This is also borne out by his conception of a nation which, according to him, is "a historically formed community of people that is characterised by a stable community of economic life, of territory, language, a consciousness of an ethnic belonging as well as of certain specific traits of psychology, traditional way of life, culture and of struggling for liberation."[4]

However, Lenin was aware of "the existence of individual ethnic communities, including peoples and nations without a community of territory or language etc."[5] When Lenin talks about the existence of a multi-nations state he must have in mind the need of integration and assimilation of the Mongol, Turkic, and Iranian peoples who had become Russian subjects following Tsarist conquests. For legitimization of their objective of assimilation of non-Slavic peoples Soviet Marxists invariably drew inspiration from Marx and Engels who, in their studies of the evolution of capitalist nations in Europe, had noted that "over the last thousand years practically every major nation has had to part with certain peripheral sections of its organism to *its powerful neighbours*,"[6] and that "these territories, once they have broken away from its national life, for the most part to become incorporated in the national life of another, no longer wish to be re-united with their original stem."[7] (Italics added).

Here one thing that has to be noted is the evolutionary nature of the formation of a nation and the voluntary amalgamation of different ethnic

peoples into one nation. Moreover, the processes of the formation of nation states have been complex, and there are more examples of the formation of nation states on the basis of common language or /and ethnicity, religion etc than through separation of a linguistic group into different nations. Absorption of different language groups in the formation of multi-national, multi-lingual states very often has been through coercion and conquest, and even after formation, multinations states have tended to disintegrate. Thus, according to Engels also "once the linguistic boundaries had been delineated it was natural that they should serve as the basis for the formation of states; and that their nationalities should begin to grow into nations. The strength of this natural tendency [emergence of uni-linguistic states] as early as the ninth century is shown by the swift collapse of the composite state of Lorraine."

It was to prevent the collapse of Soviet Russia and the possibility of emergence of separate ethnic-linguistic states that Lenin emphasized the need for a politically acceptable solution to the nationalities question based on the following measures:

i) Removal of psychological barriers between Slavic and non-Slavic peoples;

ii) Removal of economic disparities;

iii) Development of languages of different ethnic-based nationalities;

iv) Promotion of a national link language(Russian).

Lenin was conscious that removal of psychological barriers between Slavic and non-Slavic peoples, a large majority of whom were Muslims, would be a long drawn out process and that the national question "will continue to exist for a very long time to come, even after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established on a world-wide scale...." Moreover he emphasized that "the communist working class movement in all countries demands not the elimination of variety of the suppression and *mutilation* of national distinctions, but the application of fundamental principles of communism." National psychological barriers cannot be overcome without freedom and equality. It is for these lofty ideas that Lenin advocated "No privileges for any nation or any one language. Not even *the slightest degree of oppression or the slightest injustice in respect of national minority.*"[8] (Emphasis added.)

Before the October Revolution promises for democratization of the political process constituted an important palliative for the solution of the

national question. The Bolsheviks concept of the right of nations to self-determination including their secession and formation of independent states, was a strategy to attract the non-Slavic peoples to the Communist Party. The right of a nation to self-determination was regarded as a key to greater cohesion and unification. Lenin often stressed that Russia's recognition of the right to freedom of non-Russian nations would draw them to form a voluntary union of states with Soviet Russia.[9] Lenin's concept of self-determination included the right of non-Russian peoples to form a separate state or to form an autonomous state within a Russian federation. But in an article on "Critical Remarks on the National Question" he declared that "in order to eliminate all national oppression it is very important to create autonomous areas, however small, with entirely homogeneous populations."[10]

Thus, it is clear that Lenin was propagating an ambivalent and ambiguous policy which, while recognizing the non-Russian peoples' right to complete independence, was in reality directed towards dividing them into small sub-ethnic groups with the objective of assimilating them into a large and centralized state. Elaborating this point in an article on "The National Question in Our Programme" in 1903 he wrote, "we must always unreservedly strive for the very closest unity of the proletariat of all nationalities, and it is only in isolated and exceptional cases that we can advance and actively support demands conducive to the establishment of a new class state for the complete political unity of a state."[11]

The success of the Soviet plan of creating small ethnic national autonomous territories depended on the Soviet language policy. Soon after the October Revolution Russian linguists were asked to design a functional programme for "conscious and intentional guidance of social speech activities."[12] Along with the Marxist-Leninist declaratory language policy the term language construction came in vogue in 1920, and Russian scholars came out with the theory that "the object of language policy could only be the language itself," and that political compulsions or palliatives have no bearing on language policy because "they do not at all influence the language itself."[13] Thus, the Russian statecraft, under the pretext of linguistic technicalities started influencing the implementation of Leninist policy of language. Increasingly Russian linguists used their language policy to refer primarily to what they called the culture of language.[14]

In the mid twenties the first preparatory phase came to an end. Stalin had consolidated his power by eliminating all opponents from the Soviet

scene. During the period 1927 to 1938, when all political dissent was suppressed, Stalin embarked on a massive drive for cultural transformation. Scripts of non-Slavic languages were changed, places of worship and traditional institutions of education were closed. At first script was changed from Arabic-Persian to Latin on the gratuitous plea that it would help accelerate the campaign for eradication of illiteracy. It was claimed that regional republican communist party organs were demanding such a change. There were protests and a number of enthusiastic communist supporters were killed. But Stalin did not yield. There was complete censure on publication of views different from those expressed in various party forums. A society of Militant Atheists, formed with the blessings of Russian Communists, accused the opponents of change as enemies of communists and agents of imperialists.

The Latin script was replaced with Cyrillic without much open protest. The Second World War was raging and any dissent that was there, was suppresssed and opponents were declared agents of fascist Germany.

Even academic debate on the Soviet language policy was curbed and its scope was restricted to "culture of speech" or "problems of stylistics." During the post-Second World War period, that is, by the time all opposition to the change of script of non-Russian languages had been ruthlessly silenced, the term 'language policy' surfaced again in Soviet literature. Now it was used in support of the so-called linguistic "renaissance." According to a Russian linguistic historian, language policy is the theory and practice of a conscious influencing, on the part of society, of the course of language development. In short, it is a goal-oriented and scientifically grounded guidance of the functioning of an existing language, and of the creation of new linguistic means of social communication.[13] Another Russian scholar defines it as "a conscious intervention into a language's development."[14] Political objectives as defined by Lenin were never seriously discussed or spelled out, beyond stating that the creation of written languages and changes in script were in pursuance of the Leninist nationalities policy.

Even after the XX Party Congress, which denounced the Stalinist excesses and the stifling of political processes, nobody raised the question of whether the changes in the scripts of non-Russian nationalities was in response to democratic urges and whether these changes had bridged or widened the psychological barriers between the Russians and the non-Russian nationalities. The unfolding years saw a great din about de-Stalinization but no practical steps were taken to undo the regimented political system introduced by Stalin.

During the entire pre-*Perestroika-Glasnost* period, observes Gorbachev, the General Secretary of CPSU, Marxist-Leninist ideas "were actually equated with the essential characteristics of socialism..." and presented as dogmas that left no room for an objective analysis."

In spite of stupendous material achievements leading to the narrowing of economic disparities between Slavic and non-Slavic nationalities denial of freedom and Stalinist methods of forced changes in languages and culture have left indelible marks on the psyche of the Soviet peoples. Moreover, Stalin's attempts at widening differentiation among various sub-ethnic groups on the one hand and drawing them closer to the Russians on the other have proved infructuous. In fact, both standardization of dialects and spread of the Russian language have tended to bring the Turkic peoples closer to each other.

Thus, according to Fedosoyev "the language of some nationalities has developed into a written language (Abkhaz Khakass) and its terrtorial dialects have been overcome, thereby strengthening nationality consciousness among sub-ethnic groups."[17] Another Soviet scholar holds that standardization of dialects into a language has become a source of unification of national regions.[18] It is now acutely recognized that language is an ethnic property and it cannot serve as a criterion in settling the question of nationalities. Many recent studies done by Soviet as well as non-Soviet scholars reveal deepening of cultural and ethnic bonds. ...The expansion of education has enabled ethnic groups to re-discover their past common cutural heritage. A detailed analysis of the emergence of cultural nationalism and its impact on the relations between the Soviet Muslims and the Russians is outside the scope of this paper. However, the recent disturbance in Alma Ata in protest against the imposition of a Russian as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and the revival of anti-religious propaganda in the Muslim republics including an assault on *Cha'i-Khanahs* (Tea-houses), which are regarded as the centres of nationalist activities in Central Asia, indicate the failure of the Soviet policy of drawing together and assimilating the Slavic and non-Slavic nationalities.

The Russian scholars' criticism against the rise of cultural-linguistic nationalism is regarded by the Soviet Muslims as a betrayal of their narrow chauvinism against which Lenin had cautioned. A Central Asian scholar asserts that the Russian language as the language of communication among nationalities does not differ from any other language in a juridical sense. The

principle of equality of all languages without exception is a corner-stone of the language policy of the Soviet multinational state.[19] He further points out that "constitutionally each citizen of the USSR has the right to address himself to any government institution or social organization in his own language which he considers to be the most convenient."[20] On the basis of the constitutional guarantee the Soviet government must provide full freedom to its citizens in selecting a language for teaching children.

Besides classifying the Soviet languages on the internationally acceptable criterion of genealogy Soviet Muslim scholars have also analyzed the development of languages from the point of view of their written forms. According to this, all the languages of the USSR are divided into three groups:

(i) The old written languages which include Russian, Ukrainian, Armenian, Georgian, Azerbaijanian, Uzbek, Tajik etc.

(ii) The new written languages: these are the languages of small Turkic-Mongol sub-ethnic groups living in the strategic border lands of the country. These languages were created and developed during the pre-War period in order to socialize these peoples through the medium of their dialects and to promote differentiation among these sub-ethnic groups, and accordingly these were declared formal official languages of various autonomous regions and republics etc.

(iii) Languages which even now have no written forms.

On the basis of genealogical classification all the languages of the USSR can be divided into the following major groups:

a) The Indo-European languages consisting of Slavic, Iranian, Baltic, Romanic, Germanic, Indian and Armenian languages;

b) The Altaic languages which include Turkic, Mongolian and Tungus-Manchu languages;

c) The Uralic languages. This group includes the Finno-ugric and

Samodic languages;

d) The Iberian-Caucasian languages; and

e) Other languages.

Each of these groups includes a varying number of languages but the most numerous are the languages belonging to the Altaic and the Iberian Caucasian groups which, not incidentally, belong to the Muslim nationalities. While an overwhelmingly large majority of the population of the USSR – about 80 per cent — speak the Indo-European languages only 20 per cent people speak the other languages. Although in this paper we are mainly concerned with the evolution and developments of the Turkic, Iberian, Caucasian and Iranian languages a brief account of other groups of languages will help in focusing the Soviet language policy in a comparative perspective.

The Indo-European Group of Languages

i) East Slavic Languages:

This group consists of the Russian, Ukranian and Byelorussian languages and is the only group which has not multiplied during the Soviet period. Belonging to the three Slavic nationalities representing almost 75 per cent of the USSR's entire population there has been a narrowing of differentiation in the vocabulary as well as grammatical structure of Russian, Byelorussian and Ukrainian. The Byelorussian language occupies an intermediate position between Ukrainian and Russian. The growing resemblance of contemporary East Slavic languages is explained not only by their common origin but also by common interests of the Slavic nationalities: The Great Russians, the White Russians (Byelorussians) and the Ukrainians.[21]

ii) The Iranian Group:

This group consists of various Persian dialects, such as Tajik, Ossetic, Kurdish and Tati, most of which, with the exception of Tajik, got their written and literary forms during the Soviet period. In addition to these, there are other dialects, which, Soviet scholars lament, do not yet possess a written form. These include Talyshi, Baluchi, Yagnobi, Iskhashimi, Yazgulami and

Shugni-Ruhani. Most of these dialects are branches of the ancient Farsi which is strongly reflected in their phonetic and lexical correspondence.[23] Contrary to the Soviet policy of induced differentiation there has been a narrowing down of differences resulting in improvement of common understanding of different dialects.

iii) The Baltic Group:

The Baltic languages–Lithuanian and Lettish–genetically related to each other are closest to the Slavic languages. Both possess rich literary traditions, reflecting a common cultural heritage.

iv) The Romanic Group:

In the USSR Moldavian alone falls in this group and has retained its original Latin script. Its origin and evolution in Moldavia is related with the Roman conquest of the region including the Socialist Republic of Romania at the beginning of the 2nd century A.D. [23] In its formation the Moldavian language has borrowed heavily from Slavic languages.[24]

v) The Armenian Group:

The Armenian languages represent an autonomous branch of the Indo-European languages and are used in many countries: the USSR, Syria, Lebanon, Turkey, Greece, Romania, Poland, France, the USA and South America.[25]

The Altaic Languages

There is considerable difference of opinion among scholars about the family of the Altaic languages. While some scholars categorize the Turkic, Mongolian and Tungus Manchu as the Turanian-Mongolic group, others consider them distinct and separate language families.

i) Turkic Languages:

As one could expect Turkic language family has become one of most

numerous one in the Soviet Union. There are about 25 closely related languages and dialects spoken by approximately 60 million Soviet Muslims. Thus, the Turkic people form the second largest nation, [26] though the Soviets have divided them into various nationalities. The Turkic people inhabit a vast territory stretching from the Caucasus to the north-eastern parts of Siberia including Central Asia and the Volga region.

Despite the Soviet policy of creating differentiation and formation of new languages out of dialects, most of the Turkic languages and dialects have retained their basic character. Without exception a person trained in one of these languages can without difficulty understand many other Turkic languages and dialects. Nevertheless, the speakers of these languages, due to their dispersal, are more close to certain of the ethnic groups than to others. On this basis the Soviets tend to divide them into five different groups. These are: (i) Gagus, Crimean Tatars, etc., (ii) Azerbaijanian, Kuniyk, Karachai-Balkan and Nogoi, (iii) Tatar, Bashkir and Chuvash of the Volga region, (vi) the Central Asian languages: Uzbek, Kazakh, Turkman, Kirghiz, Karakalpak and Uigur, most of which show strong influence of Arabic, Persian and Chinese and in recent times have borrowed technical terms from Russian, and (v) Turkic, comprising languages of Siberia-Yakut, Tuvinian, Altai, Khakas. In addition, there are some Turkic dialects which do not yet possess a written form.[27]

ii) The Mongolian or Mongolic Languages:

Of this group two languages—Buryat and Kalmyk—are spoken in the USSR. Both got their Cyrillic script during the Soviet period. There are differences among Soviet scholars on the question of their kinship, with Turkic languages or with the Tungus Manchurian languages.

iii) The Tungus-Manchu Group:

In this group there are eight language dialects spoken in the USSR. These include Evenki, Nanai, Evan, Negidal, Ulcha, Orok, Oroch and Udego. Two other dialects of this group—Soloni and Manchu—are spoken in the People's Republic of China.

The Uralic Languages

This group includes the Finno-Ugric and Samodic languages-dialects and their origin is shrouded in ancient history dating back to 2000-3000 B.C., The people speaking Uralic languages are settled in the north of the European

part of the USSR. All these have been influenced by the Russian languages in the recent past.

The Iberian-Caucasic Languages

From ancient times the Caucasus has been known as "a mountain of dialects and peoples" who have intermingled in its salubrious surroundings. No less than fifty sub-ethnic but closely related groups, speaking their own dialects, inhabit this relatively small territory. Thus, about one-third of all dialects belong to the Iberian-Caucasic family. While four dialects, namely, Azerbaijani, Kumyk, Karachi-Balkan and Nogai, are related to the Turkic family, the Armenian, Ossetian, Kurdish, Tate and Talyshi belong to the Indo European family as mentioned earlier. A large majority of the speakers of these languages, except the Georgians, are Muslims. Therefore it is not correct to say that religion alone has been the uniting link between these people, a claim often made by Soviet scholars. Ethnic and linguistic ties also bind them together.

Under the Soviet dispensation some of these dialects have been transformed into languages and given the Cyrillic script. Most Soviet scholars categorize the Iberian-Caucasic dialects into four groups: Kartvelian, Abkhaz-Adyghe, Nakh and Daghestan. However, some native scholars classify them into three groups by placing Nakho-Daghestan under a single group.

The Kartvelian group consists of Georgian, Zan and S··an dialects which are also called Iberian languages and these are spoken in South Caucasus. The second group, Abkhaz-Adyghe, consists of five dialects : (i) Abkhaz, (ii) Abaza, (iii) Adyghe, (iv) Kabardian-Circassian, and (v) Ubykh. The first four are spoken in the North-Western Caucasus region of the USSR. The ethnic group speaking Ubykh, under the pressure of Russian colonization, migrated to Turkey from the eastern shores of the Black Sea in 1864. All these five dialects are closely related from the genetic point of view, though the Soviets allow only the first four dialects to deserve such categorization.

The Nakh group comprises Chechen, Inguish and Bats dialects. Despite zealous attempts made by Soviet linguists to transform the Chechen and the Inguish dialects into separate languages these have retained common

attributes and are mutually intelligible. The Bats dialect has no literary form and differs considerably from the other two Nakh dialects.

The most graphic illustration of Soviet statecraft as reflected in the Soviet language policy can be seen in the case of Daghestan. It is in Daghestan that the Russians, both before the October Revolution and during the Soviet period, confronted a determined and united resistance. Before the October Revolution, the people of Daghestan under the leadership of Imam Shamil waged a bloody struggle against the Russian annexation and colonization of their land. Its memories are still alive. While the Russians describe the Imam as a fanatic reactionary who sought to preserve the traditional order, the natives view him as a great national hero. Even today, after more than seven decades of Soviet social-linguistic engineering, the people of Daghestan have preserved their national cultural tradition. On their part the Soviets have divided them into thirty language groups, almost one quarter of the languages/dialects spoken in the entire Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As pointed out earlier, some native scholars regard the Chechen, Inguish and Bats as a sub-group of a common East Caucasic or Nakh-Daghestan ethnic group. In this group two large sub-groups are distinguished by Soviet scholars. These are Avar-Andi-Dido (or Avar-Andi-Tsez) and the Lezin sub-groups. Two other dialects, Lak and Dargin, are regarded as forming a separate group. Except the last two dialects, most of the other dialects are so close to one another that several of them are, even today, indistinguishable.

There are three other dialects, namely, Nivkh, Ket and Yukagir which Soviet linguists categorize under a separate category of isolated languages. Similarities that exist between these dialects and other Turkic-Mongolic dialects are ascribed to traditional contacts among the bearers of these dialects. Nevertheless there are many elements common to these so-called isolated dialects and the Tungus-Manchu dialects.[28]

Other Languages

Lastly, there are two dialects, New Syrian and Dungan, which from genetic considerations do not belong to any of the language groups in the USSR. In its grammatical structure, the Dungan is very close to Chinese. However, the Soviet Dungans are cousins of the Kazakhs and the Kirghiz and there are many common features in their languages, customs and traditions. Like most other Central Asians they have borrowed many technical and ideo-

logical terms from the Russian language in recent decades. The New Syrian dialect, which is also known as Aisor, is spoken by Assyrians who share many common traditions and customs with other Muslim nationalities in the USSR.

ROLE OF THE RUSSIAN LANGUAGE — THE PERCEPTION OF NATIONALITIES

An important outcome of Soviet language policy has been the development of Russian as a language of communication particularly between the Slavic and non-Slavic people. The role and status of the Russian language is variously described in Soviet literature. Some Soviet scholars term it as the second mother tongue, second native language or simply second language; others, particularly Central Asian scholars, perceive it as an international language, thus putting it in the same category as they put other international European languages, such as the French, German and English languages. Moreover, they dislike to contrast it with their native languages or to see it as a rival to them.

Such a perception has been influenced by two factors. First the knowledge of Russian is considered important not only for acquiring higher education and upward social mobility, but also for establishing contacts and communication with the outside world. The second factor derives from an inarticulate but strong sense of nationality. In order to retain their identity Central Asian peoples want to delimit the role and place of the Russian language in their life. According to them each (Russian and their national language) has its own specific place in life, and its own function. In other words, the role of Russian has been restricted to the work place. Consequently widespread usage of the Russian language has not generated any spiritual bonds between the Russians and the Soviet Muslim nationalities.

On the other hand, spread of secular education has deepened the nationalistic feelings, as has been the case in the former Afro-Asian societies during the colonial period where the leadership of national liberation movement basically came from a section of the Western educated intelligentsia. However, unlike the Afro-Asian colonies where the native intelligentsia suffered from racial prejudices, and the discriminatory and unenlightened policies of imperial rulers, Soviet Muslim intelligentsia, as a rule, has not, so far, developed any strong anti-Russian feelings, though there have been occasional outbursts against the Russians and vice versa. Another

important difference between the Soviet Muslim intelligentsia and native intelligentsia in the former Afro-Asian colonies, that needs to be noted, is the latter's alienation from their own peoples. Soviet Muslim intelligentsia does not face this dilemma because of deepening of linguistic and ethnic ties. This has been a real asset for the stability of the Soviet political system, which, deviations apart, does contain certain inbuilt channels for the absorption of occasional shocks, such as the Alma Ata riots in December,1986.

In short, Soviet language policy, which was an integral aspect of the Leninist policy toward the nationalities question, has evolved through different phases of development. In this sense it is not static or rigid but flexible and dynamic. The answer to the question whether it has/has not been successful depends on how one interprets its objective. If its objective was assimilation of such heterogeneous peoples as inhabit the USSR then it has totally failed to advance that cause. In any case the objective of assimilation, if it existed at all, was unrealistic.

However, if its objective was to promote linguistic-ethnic differentiation among various sub-ethnic groups of non-Slavic peoples, then the Soviets have only partially succeeded. The short term gains from dividing the non-Slavic peoples on ethnic and sub-ethnic basis and the creation of union republics, autonomous republics, regions and districts may in the long term turn into a liability. The differentiation, thus promoted, has led to narrowing down of political, cultural and linguistic differences among the various sub-ethnic and ethnic groups of non-Slavic peoples dispersed over a vast territory. The technological revolution and expansion of means of communication have brought these people closer. Over the years Soviet language policy has in fact deepened the ethno-linguistic nationalism.

However, there is a serious difference of opinion among scholars whether or not the deepening of ethno-nationalism poses any threat to the stability of the Soviet political system. Joseph Rothschild, Seweryn Bialer, Alexander Bennigson, Wimbush and many other Western scholars are of the view that polarization of Soviet peoples along ethnic lines poses the most serious threat to the stability of Soviet regime. According to Joseph Rothschild, the ethno-national problem is currently being managed and contained in the Soviet Union at a level just below that of a crisis.[9] Bialer has argued: "...ethnic consciousness among various nationalities is increasing faster than their identification with consciousness of a new statehood."[10]

These scholars feel that in the coming decades it is likely to further escalate to the extent of becoming insoluble within the existing political system. On the basis of a comparative study similar conclusions have been reached by Rasma Karklins who observes, "[T]he official claim that the policy of increasing belingualism among non-Russian nations contributes to ethnic *rapproachment* is contradicted not only by numeorus data from the USSR, but also by findings in comparable societies such as Quebec." Karklins concludes that in spite of relative success of the Leninist political strategy in avoiding major escalations of conflicts in the past the ethnic relations in the USSR will deteriorate in the time to come.[71]

While the Soviets concede the persistence of ethnic prejudices, racial arrogance and parochialism, they also claim "unprecedented achievements in creating a new historical form of social and international unity of people of different nations."[72] In short, in spite of the "unprecedented achievements" in handling the nationalities question in the past, the Soviets are still confronted with many problems including an increasing manifestation of ethno-nationalistic tendencies and in the coming decades these are likely to deepen further. However, whether these will threaten the stability of the Soviet political system will depend upon the policies the new Soviet leadership adopts to tackle them.

NOTES

(1) V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 20, p. 396.

(2) *Ibid.*, vol. 41, p. 316.

(3) See P.M. Rogachev, M.A. Sverdlin, "Concerning the Concept of a Nation," *Problems of History* (Moscow), no. 1, 1986, p. 45.

(4) *Ibid.*

(5) A.G. Agaev, "Peoples As a Social Community," *Problems of Philosophy*, no. 11 (1965).

(6) Karl Marx and F. Engels, *Selected Works*, vol. 16, pp. 157-58.

(7) *Ibid*, vol. 21, p. 396.

(8) V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 20, pp. 25, 26-28; vol. 30, p. 294.

(9) V.I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, vol. 34, p. 92; vol. 19, p. 92.

(10) *Ibid.*, vol. 20, p. 50.

(11) *Ibid.*, vol. 6, p. 452.

(12) G.O. Vinokur, *The Culture of Language* (Moscow, 1929), pp. 139-65.

(13) *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.

(14) V.P. Grigoryev, *The Culture of Language and Language Policy* (Moscow, 1963), p. 8.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

(16) L.B. Nikolosky, *The Forecasting and Planning of Language Development*, no. 41, p. 6.

(17) P.N. Fedoseyev, *Leninism and the National Question* (Moscow, 1977), p. 47.

(18) *Lenin Miscellany*, XXX, p. 53.

(19) M.I. Isayev, *National Languages in the USSR — Problems and Solutions* (Moscow, 1970), p. 20.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 21.

(21) E. Glyn, *Multilingualism in the Soviet Union* (The Hague-Paris, 1972), pp. 25-26.

(22) M.I. Isayev, no. 19, pp. 63-64.

(23) N.G. Korletyanu, *The Moldavian Language*, p. 528.

(24) T.P. Ilyashenko, *Linguistic Contacts* (Moscow, 1970).

(25) E.G. Tumanyan, *The Armenian Language*, p. 562.

(26) See Shams-ud-Din, "Demographic Changes and Nationality Problems in Soviet Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan," *Islamic Culture*, vol. lx, no. i (January 1986, Hyderabad, India).

(27) See N.A. Baskakov, *An Introduction to the Study of Turkic Languages*, 2nd edn. (Moscow, 1969).

(28) Yu. D.Desheriyev, *The Nakh Languages: An Introduction*, vol. iv, p. 184.

(29) Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York, 1981), pp. 226-27.

(30) Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership Stability and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1980), pp. 208-12.

(31) Rasma Karklins, *Ethnic Relations in the USSR: The Perspective from Below* (Boston/London, 1986), pp. 209-25.

(32) Izvestiya A.N., Kirghiz SSR (Frunze) no. 6, 1975; Yu. V. Bromley, "Toward Study of Basic Stages and Directions of National Relations in the USSR," *Istoriya SSSR* (Moscow, 1979), p. 58; I.S. Gurvich, "Some Problems of Ethnic Development of People in the USSR," *Sovetskaya etnografiya* (Moscow), no. 5, p. 63.

FRESH LIGHT ON ḌIYĀ' AL-DĪN BARANĪ : THE DOYEN OF THE INDO-PERSIAN HISTORIANS OF MEDIEVAL INDIA

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DIYĀ' AL-DĪN BARANĪ is one of those Muslim historians of the middle ages whose works rest on certain theoretical foundations, for they reflected thoughtfully on the method and purpose of history. The variety of changing research methodology and critical perspectives that have been brought to bear upon Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī's (hereafter as Baranī) *Fatāvā Jahāndārī*[1] and *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*[2] reflect their wide range of reference and the strata of significances. The aim of this article is to draw the attention of modern scholars to the manuscript copies of the first version (or recension) of the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*. The rare copies of the first version are available in the libraries of U.K. and India.[3] Besides, an attempt has also been made to discuss the problem connected with the date of the compilation of the *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* on the basis of some similarity in Baranī's approach to the history of the Sultanate in this work and the first version of his *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*.

The first version of the celebrated *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* was published by Baranī sometime in the fifth regnal year of Sultan Fīrūz Shāh's reign, i.e. two years earlier than the second revised version which is available in print.[4] The first version covers the period from the reign of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (A.D. 1266-1287) upto the fourth regnal year of Sultan Fīrūz Shāh's reign. The credit of bringing to light this first version of Baranī's *Ta'rīkh* goes to Simon Digby. He refers to it in his work *War-Horse and Elephant in the Sultanate of Delhi*.[5] Taking his cue from Digby, Peter Hardy compared the two versions and pointed out divergence in Baranī's approach to the history of Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign in the two versions.[6] My study of the two versions enables me to discuss the abridgement as well as enlargement of historical materials in the two versions, marked, at least from the reign of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī (1296-1316). Details of certain events contained in the first version and omitted in the second revised version, or vice versa, certainly extend our understanding of the important problems connected with the history of the Sultanate of Delhi. Our

comparison of the two versions helps us analyze the interaction of the author's mind with the materials he treats and study the internal dynamics of the work as well. Barani's account of Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign suggests that he decided, in particular, to portray the sultan, his benefactor, in favourable light in the first version but two years later he was constrained to revise his approach in such a way that a case could be made for his own defence against his enemies who held sway in the court of Sultan Fīrūz Shāh and accused him of misleading the deceased sultan (Muhammad bin Tughluq) in respect of state policies. In the changed circumstances after the death of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq, Barani seems to find himself on the horns of a dilemma. His second version shows that he was under constraint to take an approach to the history of the reign of Muḥammad bin Tughluq and his successor, an approach he would not have liked in normal circumstances. All this divergence requires us to read Barani's account of the Tughluq sultans in the revised version together with that of the first and do some reading between the lines. The different terms and expressions in these versions also necessitate a hermeneutic approach and a closer scrutiny.

Let us begin with Barani's account of the price control measures, introduced by Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī in the metropolitan city of Delhi during his reign. The first version is brief on the prices of commodities, only those of foodgrains are given.[7] Whereas the revised one mentions the prices of almost all the commodities in demand, including cattle, war-horses, slaves etc.[8] This revised and enlarged list of prices casts better light on Barani's grasp over the market phenomena and his competence in economic analysis.

The details furnished by Barani about the process of urbanization under the patronage of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī in the first version are omitted in the second version. The first version tells us that no reign could be compared with that of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī as regards the construction of innumerable buildings. "The fortification walls of the city (Delhi), Jāmi' Mosque, the fortification of Siri (new capital founded by 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī near Delhi), mosques, his own tomb (royal tomb), and several cities and towns were founded and completed during his reign. The construction of a new minar (tower in the Quṭb complex)[9] was begun and the sea-like lake (Ḥawd-i Khāss)[10] was built."[11] Unlike it the second revised version only refers to the city of Siri that by the year 1306 its fortification was complete and it had become a fairly populous city.[12]

The account given by Barani of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq Shāh is more or less the same in both the versions but the first version briefly refers to

the accidental death of the sultan at Afghanpur, whereas the second version becomes a bit detailed on this matter. According to the other contemporary writers, Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq was accused by people to have conspired against his father's life in order to gain the throne.[13] Baranī who had served Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq as his *nadīm* (counsellor as well as boon courtier) for seventeen years and been showered upon with royal favours frequently remained loyal to his memory even in the adverse circumstances caused by the latter's death. A careful study of the two versions suggests that he had no doubts about the innocence of his benefactor as far as the controversy regarding the accidental death of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq Shāh is concerned. For instance, he writes in the first version that a new *kūshak* (palace) was constructed (by the order of the Crown Prince) two or three *kruhs* (four or five miles) away from Tughluqabad for the reception of the sultan, coming back from Bengal. On his arrival the sultan stayed there. Unfortunately, the roof fell down and he was crushed to death.[14] The passage in the second version tells us that the pavilion was raised in a hurry at Afghanpur in the vicinity of the capital and the sultan was accorded a grand reception there. That every thing was nicely arranged. But, all of a sudden, "a thunderbolt from the sky descended upon the earth, and the roof under which the sultan was seated fell down, killing the sultan along with five or six persons under its debris."[15]

As for Baranī's treatment of Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq's reign in the two versions, that contained in the first one, though comparatively less detailed, helps highlight his intellectual portrait of the sultan and his age. Unlike the second revised version, it neither contains cryptic statements nor omits reference to any important event that took place during his reign. It begins to describe Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq as the most remarkable of the early and later rulers of the past. He also calls him *Sulṭān-i Sa'īd* (the pious ruler) and *Shahīd* (martyr).[16] Then we are told that the sultan being a man of high spirit wanted to combine in him the functions of the Caliph of the Prophet[17] (*Khilāfat-i Nubuwwat*) and the office of the sultan, i.e. he desired to assume the combined role of the spiritual and temporal leader. He also desired to have every country of the world to be ruled over by one of his slaves. Furthermore, he was a man of transcendent genius whom no one among his contemporaries could rival in military generalship, learning, penmanship, oratory, generosity, etc.

Another problem in the description of which difference can be marked in the two versions is connected with the rationalist thinkers who influenced

the sultan. Describing the sultan's interest in rationalist sciences (*'ilm-i ma'qūl*) and also his fondness for the company of philosophers and rationalist thinkers, Baranī tells us in both the versions that the sultan lost faith in the recorded traditions and questioned the accepted Truth under their influence. But Baranī's criticism of the philosophers, compared to their condemnation in the second version, is quite mild (in the first one). For example, he writes in the second version about the sultan's association with the philosophers and also his advocacy of rationalism that Sa'd Manṭiqī (logician) who was a misguided person, 'Ubayd Shā'ir (the poet), an atheist, and Najm Intishār had become his associates since prior to his accession to the throne. Another person, Mawlānā 'Alīm al-Dīn, the most learned of the philosophers, spent much time with him in discussing philosophy. These scholars believed in rationalism and under their influence the sultan had discarded traditional sciences (*manqūl*) and became a great supporter of reason. To him religious scripture and the Prophetic traditions that infuse in man the spirit of compassion and make him moderate in life had no meaning. As a result, he did not refrain from killing pious and religious Muslims, such as *dirvīshes, 'Ulamā', Mashā'ikh* (Sufi saints) and even *Sayyids*. Having said all this, Baranī emphatically states that the sultan led a pious life, offering prayers five times punctually.[18] Contrary to it, the first version provides us with interesting details about Muḥammad bin Tughluq's literary pursuits during the Khalji period as well as his authoritative scholarship and erudition. Further, it provides us with insights into the literary atmosphere in Delhi and the role performed by scholars, including those who had specialized in rationalist sciences. He, says: "He (i.e. Muḥammad bin Tughluq) came from Dipalpur to Delhi during the reign of Sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī when he was yet a youth. He became one of the close associates of Sultan Quṭb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh Khaljī from 1317-1320. Thus he entered the circle of high nobles at the royal court. He got the post of *amīr-i ākhūr* (incharge of the royal stable) and an *iqṭā'* as well. Interested in acquiring knowledge and improving his learning, he joined the circle of the associates of Malik Sa'd Manṭiqī (logician), Mawlānā Najm al-Dīn Intishār (also a poet), Mawlānā 'Alīm al-Dīn and 'Ubayd,[19] the poet. These four persons belonged to the rationalist school of thought (*ma'qūlāt*). They had complete mastery over rationalist sciences. Mawlānā 'Alīm al-Dīn, Sa'd Manṭiqī and Najm Intishār, the poet, had become the distinguished scholars both of scholasticism (*'Ilm al-Kalām*)[20] and logic. No one could rival them in mastery over these sciences. They were found most of the time preoccupied with studying philosophical literature. As for 'Ubayd, the poet, he was without any faith in

religion. It was under his influence that the sultan was attracted towards the study of *ma'qūl* (rationalist sciences)."[21] In short, discussing Muḥammad bin Tughluq's religious policy and his religion, Baranī describes the sultan as the dominant mind of the age in his first version. He implies explicitly that the conflict between him and people took place because the latter were reactionary and not willing to cooperate with him in the implementation of his policies and progressive schemes. Herein, Baranī refuses to speak of the lack of faith in Islam on the part of the sultan, and thus present him an atheist. He rather portrays him as an intellectual follower of Islam, anxious to lead his people on the path of progress through the new laws and regulations formulated by him.[22] Baranī is corroborated by his contemporary Ikhtisān, the *dabīr-i khāṣṣ* of the sultan, when he calls his royal patron, *Nu'mān-i Thānī* (i.e. Abū Ḥanīfah of the age) for his mastery over the sources of Islamic law.[23] But the sultan calls himself on his coins *Muḥy-i Sunan-i Khātam al-Nabīyīn* (Reviver of the Traditions of the Prophet.) This claim made by the sultan implies that he decided to assume the role of *Mujtahid* (the interpreter of law).[24] As regards the second revised version, it contains the statement that the sultan had Muslims murdered, not sparing even the *'Ulamā'*, *Mashā'ikh* (Sufi saints) and the *Sayyids*, yet he emphatically states that the sultan remained an orthodox Muslim in his personal life, offered prayers five times a day and observed the month of fasting zealously.[25]

Similarly, the details of events, the royal projects, their sequence and the rubrics under which these items have been described are different in two versions. For instance, the rubric *fatrat* (trouble) in the first version is replaced with *andīshah* (idea or project) in the second one. In the first version, the transfer of population from Delhi to Daulatabad (old Deogiri) is not described under any rubric. But we find here a more comprehensive account of the event. We are informed that the evacuation of people was completed in three stages. First, the families and dependants of the nobles were ordered to accompany *Makhdūmah-i Jahān* (the mother of the sultan) and her entourage. The treasures, royal household goods, horses and elephants were also taken with them to Daulatabad. That, after the departure of Makhdūmah-i Jahān from Delhi, the *Sayyids*, *'Ulamā'* (scholars), *Mashā'ikh* (Sufi saints) and other notables of the city were summoned to Daulatabad. All of them reached there with their families and dependants. They were received by the sultan with favour; their allowances were increased. They also got villages, in addition to other favours. Moreover they were given money to have their houses constructed. Then we are told

that after the destruction of the rebel governor, Malik Aiba in Multan, the sultan came back to Delhi and ordered through the *farmān* that all the inhabitants of Delhi and suburbs upto four and five *kuruhs* (eight to ten miles) should be grouped and sent in caravans to Daulatabad. Their houses were bought by the state and the price of each house was paid in cash to the proprietors from the treasury, so that they could have new houses built in Daulatabad. According to the *farmān*, the city and its suburbs were so denuded of life that even cats and dogs could not be found therein. The gates of the city were shut for some time. Thereafter, another *farmān* was proclaimed and then the *'Ulamā', Mashā'ikh* and notables were brought from different places and settled in the city (Delhi). They were rewarded with royal favour.[26] Quite the contrary, the second version gives an abridged account, creating the impression that the entire population was forcibly shifted at one and the same time.[27]

One of the important events omitted by Baranī in the second version is Tarmāshīrīn's invasion of India, sometime in A.D. 1228-29. This led Agha Mahdi Husain to reject 'Iṣāmī's testimony on the ground that had it taken place, Baranī, the *nadīm* (associate or courtier), would not have failed to mention it. But the first version of the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, not known to Agha Mahdi Husain, states: "Upon the transfer of the citizens (from Delhi) to Daulatabad, the sultan stayed in Delhi for two years. During this time Tarmāshīrīn (the King of Transoxiana) marched into India at the head of a huge army. He arrived (without meeting any resistance) in the *Mīān-i Dōāb* (Meerut territory). Thereupon the sultan collected his forces. In the meantime, the officers and notables from Lakhnauti (Bengal) sought to go back to their region and foment trouble there. The sultan fought a fierce battle against Tarmashirin. The latter having given a good account of fighting retreated to Tirmidh."[28] It is not difficult to explain the reason for this omission in the second version. Baranī's praise of Tarmāshīrīn, still a Buddhist, that he had given a good account of his fighting capacity as well as the credit given to Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq instead of Malik Yūsuf Bughrā (condemned as one of the tyrants in the second version)[29] for gaining victory over the Mongol army and compelling it to retreat must have invited criticism of his *Ta'rīkh* from the readers associated with the court of Fīrūz Shāh. Therefore, Baranī makes no mention of this event in his revised version and has thus avoided further controversy.[30]

It is also noteworthy that in the second revised version Baranī describes in detail the recruitment of three hundred and seventy thousand *savārs* for the

conquest of Khurasan under the rubric *Andīshah-i Panjum* (fifth project). He tells us that the payment of salary and allowances to the soldiers in the very first year emptied the royal treasury and then it was difficult to maintain the army with the revenue from the provinces and, therefore, it had to be disbanded. All this led to confusion in the provinces and, in addition to the heavy financial loss to the royal treasury, also affected the royal prestige.[31] As the event was disparaging of the sultan, Baranī refers to it in the first version incidentally and not in its proper sequence. Here he refers to it in his description of the causes which led to estrangement between the sultan and people. That the sultan was annoyed by peoples' opposition to his schemes and he started out of anger to impose severe punishments on them in consequence. But the passage is very important in so much as it helps us identify the region of Khurasan that the sultan wanted to conquer as well as explain the circumstances in which the state revenue demand was increased in the *doāb* region. It clearly shows that by Khurasan the Indo-Persian historians meant the region of Ghaznin during the pre-Mughal period. For example, Baranī writes: "As the desire to occupy *Iqlīm-i bālā* (high lands) took hold of him, he decided to distribute money lavishly to the people from the city (capital) upto Ghaznin, so that people (everywhere) might witness with their own eyes what they had heard about his munificence and liberality. This necessitated the collection of money (in every possible way). The *ẓahīr al- juyūsh* (paymaster-general of the army), i.e., *nā'ib-i arḍ*, told me that in one year four hundred and seventy thousand *savārs* were entered on the rolls in the *dīvān-i arḍ* (army ministry) and were paid their allowances from the royal treasury. The following year there was left no money for payment and, therefore, they had to disperse."[32]

As the increase in the state revenue demand in the *doāb* region was connected with the Khurasan expedition, planned sometime in A.D. 1230-31, we may now discuss the difference in Baranī's account available in his two versions. The relevant passage in the first one furnished all the details in a lucid style, not difficult to interpret. Not at all cryptic, it provides with a clearer perspective. As for the sequence, this event is described after the details of the rebellion of Malik Bahā' al-Din Gurshāsp (A.D.1228). Then he states that after the destruction of the rebel, the sultan increased the tax on agricultural produce in the *doāb* and the officials were ordered to collect it according to the enhanced rates from the villages in the *ḥavelī-i Dehlī* (vicinity of the capital), the town around Baran (modern Buland Shahr district), Kol (Aligarh), Meerut and *doāb* (upto eastern U.P.); oppressive

methods were adopted for the collection of tax. Strong *jāndārs* (prefects) and collectors were posted in the towns and *vilāyats*. They dealt with people in a harsh manner. The collectors and finance officers became oppressive while the cultivators found it beyond their means to meet the state demand. As a result, the *vilāyats* suffered and confusion arose everywhere. Ten and twenty villages united and got shelter in the jungles. They plundered the peaceful villages.[33] The author's style being cryptic in the second version, does not indicate the cause of the revolt clearly. If the relevant passage is translated literally, it suggests that the demand was increased ten and twenty times, certainly an exorbitant measure.[34]

It is also worth-recalling that Baranī avoids any criticism of Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq's patronage towards low-born people in the first version. In this he makes mention only of 'Azīz Khammār (liquor-brewer by origin), calling him of base stock, because the action taken by him in haste against the *Amīrān-i Ṣaddah* (officers in-charge of fiscal-cum-administrative units, each comprising a hundred villages) in Malwa had led to widespread rebellions in Gujarat and the Deccan. 'Azīz Khammār is said to have killed a number of *Amīrān-i Ṣaddah* in Malwa just after his posting there as governor because the latter acted in defiance of the royal *farmān*. Their killing made their counterparts elsewhere fearful of the sultan's wrath. In self-defence they organized themselves into a force and rose in rebellion in Gujarat and Daulatabad.[35] But in the second revised version Baranī is not only critical of the sultan's policy in this regard but also gives a long list of officers who had started from below. They came from very low-caste families. But for this list we would have not known that social stratification was much breached if not totally broken down under Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq. In this regard Baranī provides us the following details in the second revised version: "Najib, the musician of obscure origin, was so much honoured that he superceded in position and status many of the (old) nobles. He was assigned the charge of Gujarat, Multan and Badaon (the territorial units, perhaps held in succession). Like him, 'Azīz Khammār and his brother were favoured. Fīrūz Ḥajjām (barber), Mankah, the cook, Mas'ūd Khammār (liquor-brewer by caste), Ladha Baghvān (gardener) and many other base and ignoble persons were elevated to important posts and given charge of *iqṭā's*. Shaykh Bābū, son of Nāyak, the weaver, was made a royal associate and, therefore, the rogue had become an influential man in the society. Pīrā Mālī (the gardener) who happened to be the meanest and worst person in India was honoured with the charge of the *dīvān-i vizārat* and raised in this way over and above the *maliks*,

nobles, *valīs* and *muqta's*.[36] Kishan Bazran of Indri who was the meanest of the mean got the governorship of Awadh (territory). Maqbal, the slave of Aḥmad Ayāz, was entrusted with the governorship of Gujarat, an office meant for high nobles and ministers of prominence, although he possessed no qualities outwardly or inwardly."[37]

Another marked difference in the two versions is found with regard to the sultan's conversation with Barani over peoples' defiance of the royal policies. The first version does not contain any reference to it, while in the second one Baranī makes digressions to describe how the sultan consulted him on several occasions.[38] This is not all. He also confesses here his fault in not being courageous enough to point out to the sultan what was lawful in connection with the state policies according to the religious law, lest he should incur the royal displeasure. He states that he and others who had knowledge of (religious) sciences turned hypocrites out of greed for material gains after they had become the courtiers. "We could not," says Baranī, "gather courage to tell the sultan that punishments dealt out to people by his order were in contravention of the law of *Sharī'at* (religious law) only for the sake of life which is after all perishable. We approved of all the measures and even cited inauthentic traditions of the past in their support. I do not know how would others fare (on the Day of Judgement); as far as I am concerned, I have suffered much; neither position, nor prestige nor means of comfort, nor money have been left with me. I do not know, what will happen to me in the life hereafter."[39] In short, he pleads not guilty of misleading Sultan Muḥammad bin Tuqhluq. He rather blames the nobles of obscure origin as well as the temperament of the sultan for the suffering of people.

As regards Baranī's account of the first four years of Sultan Fīrūz Shāh's reign, it is brief, comprising the single chapter like the treatment of previous reigns. Afraid of the royal displeasure, he provides us with insights through hints into the reaction that had started against the preceding regime. Two years later, Baranī decided to compile a detailed account of the first six years, dividing it into eleven chapters under different headings. Each chapter reads like a panegyric. These chapters suggest that perhaps the criticism by the reactionary nobles at the court of Fīrūz Shāh as well as the hope of getting royal reward, Baranī not only takes altogether a different approach to the reign of Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq but also goes into details about events that had a great impact on the life and conditions of people in the empire. Each chapter on Fīrūz Shāh's reign reads as a panegyric.

However, the sixth chapter, relating to the construction of a network of the canals is invaluable. The details of the canals, cut off from big as well as small rivers are more insightful than their account furnished by the anonymous author of the *Sīrat-i Fīrūz Shāhī* or Shams Sirāj 'Afīf. Baranī clearly implies that these canals would go a long way towards creating conditions favourable for socio-economic growth in the areas through which they flowed. That these canals, besides irrigation facilities had already provided travel and transport facilities.[40]

It is, however, worth stressing that Baranī's statement about the elimination of the most favourite nobles of the late sultan is a bit more comprehensive in the first version. Many confidants of the late sultan were either put to death or thrown into prison. Though Baranī outwardly eulogizes Fīrūz Shāh yet there is some implicit criticism implied of the new sultan. Describing the nice qualities of the reigning sultan, he indirectly refers to the elimination of the favourite nobles of the late sultan because they were close to their master ideologically or carried on his orders strictly. He tells us that their assets were confiscated and their *savārs* and footmen joined other nobles' contingents.[41] In the revised second version Baranī incidentally and very briefly mentions his own imprisonment in the fort of Bhatner after the accession of Fīrūz Shāh.[42] But he mentions his plight in some details in his work *Ṣaḥīfah-i Na't-i Muḥammadī*, the first work compiled by him after the death of his patron sultan. He writes that when his age crossed the seventieth year of his life and old age and infirmity overpowered him, affecting his organs, and he was afraid of meeting death, he decided to do something for the atonement of the past sins. During the five months that he spent in prison at Bhatner (fort) in anguish and despair, not knowing whether he would survive the day in the morning or live through the night in the evening. "In these circumstances I thought to compose a work in praise of the Prophet Muhammad."[43] In another work his Persian translation of the *Ta'rīkh-i Āl-i Barāmikah* (Barmecides), the introduction of which was written in praise of Sultan Fīrūz Shāh, Baranī indirectly advises the sultan that the old families, known for their generosity and excellent achievements for generations should not be ruined because any harm done to them affects the popularity of the ruler as it did in the case of Caliph Hārūn Rashīd.[44]

In short, in Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq's death the present replaced the past for Baranī, with its usual freight of boredom and disenchantment. He seems to have been in the royal camp at Thatta in 1351 and accompanied it to Delhi after the accession of Fīrūz Shāh but somewhere on the way he was put

under arrest and sent to Bhatner as a prisoner.[45] After his release, he found himself without any financial support because every thing was lost. In extreme anguish and despair, he writes: "I, Diyā'-i Baranī, the compiler of the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, have fallen a victim to the vicissitudes of fate after the passing away of Sultan Muḥammad (May God bless him); my illwishers, enemies and powerful rivals conspired against my life. I have been turned mad by the wounds they have inflicted with the sticks of their hostility. They have poisoned the ears of the sultan, the Lord of the World. But for the mercy of Almighty God and the consideration of the sultan (Fīrūz Shāh), I would have slept long ago in the lap of earth."[46] (This passage is not found in the first version.) The second revised version seems to have led Sultan Fīrūz Shāh to reward its compiler with a small pension, in no way enough to heal the wounds.[47]

It is also noteworthy that Baranī's other famous work *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* does not appear to have been written by him when he suffered torments. His forceful expression in this work rather suggests that being an ambitious man, he was sure to impress the reigning sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq with this work and get an agreeable position at the royal court in reward through its presentation. Because Baranī's advocacy of the need for the sultan to formulate state rules and regulations regardless of the *Sharī'at* (Islamic canon law) but in accordance with the requirements of changed times, had an appeal to Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq. All this suggests that it was presented to him.[48] Sultan Muḥammad bin Tughluq was a scholar of history and Islamic sources of law and desired to assume the role of *Mujtahid* (interpreter of religious law).[49] It was perhaps after the compilation of the *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* that sultan appointed Baranī his *nadīm* (a boon courtier as well as counsellor).[50] It also needs to be stressed that the *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* and the first version of the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* do not contain didactic elements and clearly show how secular Baranī was in his approach to history and politics. All this could not be stated during the reign of Fīrūz Shāh when the Muslim orthodoxy had become powerful and the sultan acted as the champion of *taqlīd* (traditional orthodox system). This work is also interesting in so much as it suggests that Baranī was opposed to *ma'qūl* as well as the employment of low-born people from the very beginning.

Before we conclude, a word may be added about the importance of Baranī's lengthy *muqaddimah* (introduction) to the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* which is found in both of the versions unaltered. This part of the work lifts

Baranī to the rank of the man of ideas and thinker in the history of Islamic historiography. But its study by modern scholars has given rise to a controversy about Baranī's approach to history as well as his idea of history. Fully conversant with the sources of Islamic traditions of history, Baranī traces the origin of history writing among the Muslims to the Qur'ān and the *aḥādīth* (the Traditions of the Prophet). He also finds co-relation between the *aḥādīth* and history.[51] This led Dr. Peter Hardy, the first scholar of medieval Indian history to take up the study of Indo-Persian historiography as a new field for exploration, to think Baranī's approach theology-oriented. "Baranī treats history," says he, "as a branch of Theology." Inspired by Hardy some eminent scholars in India and Pakistan took interest in Baranī's approach to philosophy on the basis of his extant works, the *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* and the *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* in particular.[52] In his introduction to the English translation of *Fatāvā Jahāndārī* by Mrs. A. Salim Khan, Muhammad Habib having re-examined Baranī's extant works stated: "History was not a record of a chronicle or a story, it was very definitely a science—the science of the social order and its basis was not religion or tradition but observation and experience."[53] According to K.A. Nizami, "What makes Barani bracket the study of history with the study of *ahadith* is not the theological content of the *ahadith* but the *usul-i asnad*... the principles of critique evolved by the scholars of *ahadith*." Further he remarks: "Barani looks upon history and *ahadith* as twins, and considers the principle of criticism applied to be the same in both."[54] But Baranī nowhere talks about the significance of the *uṣūl-i asnād* evolved by the early scholars of *aḥādīth* for evaluating the authenticity of the Tradition. What actually he stresses upon is the need for a historian to ascertain the truth of the reports he gets hold of and be trustworthy in the Traditions recorded by the early recorders of *aḥādīth*. That is why he is critical of the Shī'ite and the Khārijite writers, accusing them of distorting the facts about the early history of Islam.[55]

Little information on Baranī's life and career, contained in Baranī's own *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* (especially in the revised version) as well as Mīr Khurd's *Siyar al-Awliyā'*, clearly show how preponderant was the Delhi's imperial culture in his life and thought. That is why he stood for social stratification of the society and held that throwing open the doors of bureaucracy to talent would help the rise of the officers of obscure origin against the interest of old aristocratic families. According to him the rise of low-born people led to social tensions, disturbing the social equilibrium in the society. He held an elitist view of history. Thus his social philosophy had nothing to do with the Islamic theology. It was rather in conflict with the

Islamic concept of the universal brotherhood of mankind and the principle of egalitarianism. His aristocratic background influenced him more than his religious education. I may finally quote Irfan Habib in this regard: "[Barani] asserts his orthodoxy by implication at least when he makes it a pre-requisite for a historian. He applauds the suppression of philosophy and inveighs against rationalism. And yet the use of the theological idiom by him ought not to be overstressed."[56]

NOTES

(1) In 1941 and 1942, A.B.M. Habibullah and Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi brought to light the existence of the rare manuscript copy of this work in the India Office Library, London. In their respective works they also pointed out the significance of the contents of *Fatāwā Jahāndārī* (A.B.M. Habibullah, "Re-evaluation of the Literary Sources of Pre-Mughal History," *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, vol. xv, 1941, pp. 10-11; I.H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi* (New Delhi, 1971, p. 267). Thereafter, Muhammad Habib and Peter Hardy took interest in establishing its value and regarded it an important source of information on the political philosophy of the Delhi Sultanate. (M. Habib, *Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate* [Allahabad, 1960], "Introduction"; Peter Hardy, "Unity and Variety in Indo-Islamic and Perso-Islamic Civilization: Some Ethical and Political Ideas of Diya al-Din Barani of Delhi, of al-Ghazali and of Nasir al-Din Tusi Compared," *Iran*, vol. xvi [U.K.], 1978, pp. 127-135.)

(2) Of the modern Scholars, Dowson was the first to observe that Barani's *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī* "approaches more nearly to the European idea of history." He further remarks that Barani "has a care for matters besides the interests of his religion and the warlike exploits of the Sovereign representative of his faith." Long after Dowson, Hasan Barani contributed an article on Barani, dealing with his family background, career and his philosophy of history as well. In recent years Peter Hardy's chapter on Barani in his pioneering work that opens up pathways, still being explored, has enabled certain scholars of South Asia to reappraise the value of Barani's contribution to Islamic historiography from different points of view. (Elliot and Dowson, *History of India as Told by Its Own Historians*, vol. iii [London, 1897], p. vii; S. Hasan Barani, "Zia al-Din Barani," *Islamic Culture*, vol. xii, no. 1, January, 1938, pp. 76-97; Peter Hardy, *Historians of Medieval India* [London, reprint, 1966], pp. 20-39; K.A. Nizami, "Ziya al-Din Barani," *Historians of Medieval India*, ed. Mohibbul Hasan [Meerut, 1968], pp. 37-52; Irfan Habib, "Barani's Theory of the History of the Delhi Sultanate," *The Indian Historical Review*, New Delhi, July 1980-January 1981, vol. vii, no. 1-2, pp. 99-115.)

(3) There are three manuscript copies of this first version, known so far. One is available in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, Elliot Collection, No. 353, other in the Raza Library, Rampur (India) while the third one belongs to the personal collection of Simon Digby (MS. 57). I have utilized the Bodleian and Rampur copies.

(4) *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, ed. Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khān (Calcutta, 1866).

(5) Simon Digby, *War-Horse and Elephant in the Sultanate of Delhi* (Karachi, 1971), p. 83.

(6) Peter Hardy, "Didactic Historical Writing in Indian Islam: Ziya al-Din Barani's Treatment of the Reign of Sultan Muhammad Tughluq, *Islam In Asia*, ed. Y. Friedmann (Jerusalem, 1984), pp. 51-57.

(7) First version of *Tdrīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, MS. Raza Library, Rampur, f. 110 a, hereafter cited Rampur *MS.*; also *MS.* Bodleian Library, Oxford, f. 144 a, hereafter cited Bodleian *MS.*

(8) *Ta'rīkh-i Fīrūz Shāhī*, printed text, pp. 303-19, hereafter cited Barani.

(9) The ruined first storey of the tower shows that the sultan wanted it to be loftier and more spacious than the Qutb tower. Ibn Battūtah wrongly states that its construction was begun by the order of Sultan Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh Khaljī. (*The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, Eng. tr. H. Gibb [Cambridge, 1971], vol. iii, p. 623.)

(10) Both Ibn Battūtah and Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī (the foreign writers) describe the great size and beauty of this lake. The former refers to it as the most important lake built outside the city of Siri It was found by hun. larger than the lake of Sultan Iltutmish. The latter writes that it was so large that an arrow could not be shot across it. (Cf. *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, Eng. tr vol. 3, p. 625; Sharaf al-Din Yazdi, *Ẓafarnāmah* [Calcutta, 1888], vol i, p. 109.)

(11) Bodleian *MS* , f. 125a.

(12) Barani, pp. 325-26.

(13) It seems that the rationalist approach by the sultan to religion and his progressive state policies that had already caused estrangement between him and people were also responsible for giving rise to the controversy that the palace was raised without a strong foundation and it could be pulled down with trick when needed. ('Isāmī, *Futūḥ al-Salāṭīn*, ed. Usha[Madras, 1948], pp. 418-421; *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 3, p. 655.)

(14) Bodleian *MS.*, f. 125a

(15) Barani, pp. 325-26.

(16) Bodleian *MS.*, f. 187a

(17) The second version states that the sultan wished to establish a link between prophethood and kingship. (Cf Barani, p. 459)

(18) Barani (Text), pp 456-66.

(19) 'Ubayd was killed by the order of Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq Shāh on his return from Tilangana in 1323 for he had instigated the army to mutiny against Prince Ulugh Khān, the commander-in-chief of the army. (Barani, pp. 448-49.)

(20) This is for the first time that we find an important piece of information about the popularity of *'Ilm al-Kalām* (rationalist sciences) and its leading scholars in the Sultanate of Delhi during the early period Unfortunately, the works written by them, if any, do not seem to have survived the ravages of time.

(21) Bodleian *MS* , ff. 189a-b

(22) Bodleian *MS* , ff 188a-b

(23) Muḥammad Ṣadr A'lā, known as Ikhtisān, *Basātīn al-Uns*, *MS.*, British Library, London, Add. 7.717, f. 27a.

(24) N. Wright, *The Coinage and Metrology of the Sultans of Delhi* (Delhi), p. 128.

(25) Baranī, p. 506

(26) Rampur *MS.*, ff. 143a-b-144a; Bodleian *MS* , ff. 191a-192a.

'Iṣāmī corroborates Baranī when he says briefly that rustics were brought to take the place of the refined population in Delhi. (Cf. *Futūḥ al-Salāṭīn*, p. 450)

(27) Baranī (Text), p. 474.

(28) Rampur *MS* , ff. 144a. The Bodleian manuscript is defective at the end of the passage (Bodleian *MS.*, f. 192a.)

(29) Baranī, p. 501.

(30) Supplementing Baranī, 'Iṣāmī tells us that Yūsuf, son of Bughrā, was deputed with ten thousand *sawārs* to Meerut where a fierce battle took place between him and the Mongols. Tarmāshīrīn, who was taken unawares, met heavy losses and retreated. (*Futūh al-Salāṭīn*, pp. 463-66.)

(31) Baranī, vol. i, pp. 476-77.

(32) Bodleian *MS.*, ff. 201b-202a.

It may be pointed out here that Baranī's Khurasan in the second version means the region that forms now the modern country of Afghanistan. Like Barani the other early Indo-Persian historians call it Khurasan. (Cf. Iqudar H. Siddiqui, "The Qarlugh Kingdom In North-Western India during the Thirteenth Century," *Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, vol liv, no. 2, April, 1980, p.13, footnote 13 on p. 88.)

(33) Rampur *MS.*, ff. 1440-145a; Bodleian *MS.*, ff. 192b-193a.

(34) Baranī (Text), pp. 473-74.

The relevant passage contained in the *Ta'rīkh-i Mubārak Shāhī* is worth-quoting because it adds to the information available in Baranī's version. According to Yaḥyā Sirhindī, the new taxes *ghar* (house tax) and *charā'ī* (pasture tax) were levied. The animals (owned by people in the villages) were branded, the houses counted and the fields recorded. The yield was assessed and rates were fixed in accordance with the royal *farman*. (Yaḥyā Sirhindī, *Tārīkh-i Mubārak Shāhī* [Calcutta, 1931].)

(35) Bodleian *MS.*, f. 202b.

(36) It needs to be stressed here that certain modern scholars decipher this term as *Muqṭi'* and perpetuate the historiographical error. In the contemporary histories as well as the inscriptions the term occurs as *Muqṭa'*, i e. the holder of *iqṭā'*. The correct term is *Muqṭa'* and not *Muqṭi'*.

(37) It may be pointed out that Baranī is corroborated both by 'Iṣāmī and Ibn Baṭṭūṭah in this regard. According to 'Iṣāmī, the sultan favoured the low-born people, mostly Hindus, owing to his hostility towards Islam and its followers. Therefore, the Muslims were subjected to

humiliation and tyranny. Mention made by Ibn Battūṭah of Ratan (the Hindu barber, well versed in mathematics and finance), 'Azīz Khammār and Maqbal, the slave of Aḥmad Ayāz, shows as to how much they had risen in the sultan's estimation for their competence and loyalty to him.

(Baranī, pp. 505-06; *Futūḥ al-Salāṭīn*, p. 515; *The Travels of Ibn Battuta*, vol. 3, pp.730,762.)

(38) Baranī, pp. 509-10, 516-17, 521-22.

(39) Baranī, pp. 466-67.

(40) Cf Iqtidar H. Siddiqui, "Water Works and Irrigation System in Pre-Mughal India," *Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient*, vol. xxix, part i, Feb. 1986, Leiden, p. 72.

(41) Bodleian *MS.*, f 217a.

(42) Baranī, p. 534.

(43) Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī, *Ṣaḥīfah-i Na't-i Muḥammadī*, MS., Raza Library, Rampur, f. 4a.

(44) Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī, *Ta'rīkh-i Āl-i Barāmikah* (Bombay, 1889), pp. 4-5.

(45) Baranī, p. 521, where he mentions his presence in the royal camp.

(46) Baranī, p. 557.

(47) Sayyid Muḥammad Mubārak known as Mīr Khūrd, *Siyar al-Awliyā'* (Delhi, 1302H), pp. 312-13.

(48) Having referred to the traditions of benevolent despotism, established by Khusraw and Parvez of ancient Iran, Baranī emphatically states that the Prophetic Traditions can not be followed in regard to the state system any longer. According to him the first four caliphs belonged to the age of the Prophet and could follow him successfully but the change of time forced the later rulers to deviate from them. In his own age the sultans were bound to behave in a despotic way and formulate new rules and regulations in the interest of people. (*Fatāwā Jahāndārī*, ed. Mrs. A. Salim Khan [Lahore, 1972], pp. 139-40, 218, 219.)

(49) Baranī, pp. 466-67; Ikhtisān, *Basāṭīn al-Uns*, MS. British Library, London.

(50) Baranī, pp. 509-10.

(51) Baranī, p.9.

(52) Peter Hardy, *Historians of Medieval India*, p. 39,

(53) *The Political Theory of the Delhi Sultanate*, p. 125.

(54) K.A. Nizami, *On History and Historians of Medieval India* (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 125-26.

(55) Baranī, p. 14.

(56) Irfan Habib, "Barani's Theory of the History of the Delhi Sultanate," *The Indian Historical Review*, New Delhi, vol. vii, nos. 1-2, July 1980, Jan. 1981 (pp. 99-115), pp.110-11.

AFRICAN DIASPORA IN INDIA: THE CASE OF THE HABASHIS OF THE DAKAN

OMAR KHALIDI

> "There is no superiority for an Arab over a non-Arab and for a non-Arab over an Arab, nor for white over the black nor for the black over the white except in piety. Verily the noblest among you is he who is the most conscious of God.
>
> PROPHET MUHAMMAD

INTRODUCTION

THE dispersal of people of African descent into various parts of Asia is a little-researched subject. The scarcity of modern critical research is particularly acute in the case of India. Based on a synthesis of a variety of sources— medieval historical accounts, modern anthropological investigations, and personal interviews — this paper attempts to understand the origin and growth of various African communities in India with special reference to the Dakan ("Deccan") during the medieval and modern periods.

The institution of slavery already existed in Arabia at the time of the rise of Islam in the early 7th century. Although the Prophet, Muḥammad, did not immediately abolish slavery, he insisted upon the humane treatment of slaves. In Islam the slaves were not regarded as chattels, and the emancipation of slaves was regarded as a meritorious act. *Sūrah* XXIV:33 of the Qur'an says:

> And those of your slaves who desire a deed of manumission, write it for them, if ye have a good opinion of them, and give them of the wealth of God, which he has given you.

Some of the slaves in Arabia at the time of Prophet Muḥammad were Black Africans, as was Bilāl ibn Rabāḥ, the first man to chant the Islamic call *(adhān)* to prayer. Most slaves, except Jews and Christians, became Muslims early on. Those who came from Black Africa, being adherents of various African religions, invariably adopted Islam.[1] However, the rise of



Routes of African slave trade.

Map courtesy of Ieuan L. Griffiths, *An Atlast of African Affairs,*

(London, Methuen, 1986).



Locations of African settlements in India.
Map courtesy of Joseph E. Harris, *The African Presence in Asia* (Evanston IL, U.S.A., Northwestern University Press, 1971).

Islam did not stop the flow of slave trade from Black Africa to other parts of the world. The African slaves were sold to Arab or other Muslim traders by local African rulers along the Sudanic belt of West Africa, along the banks of the Blue and White Nile and along the East African coast from the mouth of the Red Sea to Mozambique[2] (see Map I). Whereas slavery in the Americas is clearly associated with plantations, in Ismalic lands it was predominantly domestic or military service that the Africans performed. Perhaps the most curious and intriguing aspect of domestic or harem-slavery has been the institution of eunuchs. Eunuchs were not an Islamic innovation, but as with slavery itself and other borrowed institutions, Muslims endowed the employment of castrated men with their own special character. Many examples can be found of eunuchs holding important positions in Arab, Turkish, Persian, and Indian Islamic kingdoms.

THE HABASHĪS IN INDIA

The people of African descent who were introduced into various parts of the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf, Iran, Iraq, and the Indian subcontinent were part of the East African slave trade.[3] Between the 14th and the 19th centuries, the Arab traders and slave dealers, Indian merchants and potentates, along with the Portuguese colonists brought into different parts of India[4] people from Africa who are collectively known as the Habashis or Siddis.[5] Used interchangeably in historical literature, both terms, "Ḥabashī" and "Siddī," have survived, and both mean "African," though the official preference of the Indian Government—as shown by census listings, for instance—seems nowadays to be for "Siddī." The term "Siddī" is said to be derived from the Arabic word *sayyid*, meaning master or lord. It seems improbable that this is the etymology of the term as applied in our context, since the Africans were brought in as slaves. The Africans in India belong to various parts of Africa as is evident by geographic identifications, namely, Abyssinians, Nubians, Somalis, Zanzibaris. These divisions were further divided by religious loyalties: Muslim or Christian. Most Africans in the Dakan came from the Horn of Africa, or Ethiopia, called al-Habashah by Arabs. Therefore, the present writer has preferred the term Habashi.

Detailed documentation concerning the numbers, the status and role of the Habashis in the earliest Muslim period in Indian history is lacking. However, the favour shown to the Habashi slave, Jamāl al-Dīn Yāqūt, by

Sulṭānah Raḍīyah (reigned *c.* A.D..1236-40)[6] in the early 13th century is an indication that even then Habashis were able to rise to positions of power and eminence, though the story that Yāqūt was the sultanah's paramour does not find support in contemporary chronicles. Ibn Baṭṭūṭah, who travelled widely in India between *c.* 1333 and 1342 notices them from north India to Ceylon, employed especially as guards and armed sailors.[7] Towards the close of the 14th century the slave, Malik Sarvar, who was most probably a Habashi eunuch, achieved (but never declared) independence from the Dihli [Delhi] sultans to found a dynasty known as the Sharqis of Jawnpur which ruled a part of the present north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh for nearly a century, *c.* 1394-1479. Under the Sharqis, the city of Jawnpur became a major centre of Indian Islamic art, architecture, and culture.[8] In Bengal, where the Habashi slaves arrived directly by sea, it is recorded that Sultan Rukn al-Dīn Bārbak Shāh (reigned *c.*1459-74) maintained some 800 African slaves mainly for military purpose, many of whom were raised to higher rank. In 1486 the leading slaves murdered Bārbak's successor and put one of their own number on the throne. For seven years the kingdom remained under a remarkable African regime. When it finally fell due to mismanagement, all the Africans were expelled from the region. The refugees, many thousand, were turned back from Dihli and Jawnpur and finally drifted to the Dakan.[9] They did not, however, altogether disappear from the scene since Tome Pires, a European traveller, found them very much in evidence in the second decade of the 16th century. He asserts:

> The People who govern the kingdom are Abyssinians. These are looked upon as knights; they are greatly esteemed; they wait on the kings in their apartments. The chief among them are eunuchs and these come to be kings and great lords in the kingdom. Those who are not eunuchs are fighting men. After the king it is to this people that the kingdom is obedient from fear.[10]

A Victorian explorer, Richard F. Burton, found that in Sindh

> Under the Amirs [1783-1843] six to seven hundred Zangibari, Bambasi, Habashi (Abyssinian) and other blacks were annually imported from Africa.[11]

The descendants of these Africans are found today in different parts of Sindh and Baluchistan provinces in Pakistan. The Habashis known locally as

Shiddis (as opposed to Siddis) celebrate an annual festival called Waghu Mela (or Crocodile Festival), with dance and music, according to a report in *Dawn*, a Karachi newspaper. It is unclear what significance there is of this reptile in Habashi culture.[12] In neighbouring Gujarat, it appears that Habashis were important in Gujarati armies as early as the 13th century, and there seems to have been a continuous supply of Habashis by sea through the ports of Bharoch, Surat-Rander and Khambayat. Sultan Bahādur (reigned *c.* 1526-37) especially welcomed foreign Muslims to his service, and according to one authority, Ḥājjī al-Dabīr, there were said to have been as many as 5000 Habashis in Ahamadabad alone.[13] Many of these were probably prisoners taken during the Muslim invasion of Ethiopia in 1527, and brought to Gujarat in 1531 by Muṣṭafā bin Bahrām, an Ottoman admiral, who was ordered by the authorities in Constantinople to help defend Muslim India against Portugal. The abler Habashis rapidly obtained positions of importance in the Gujarat sultanate. For example, Sayf al-Mulk Miftāḥ was governor of the fort of Daman, with a force of 4000 Habashis under him in 1530. Shaykh Sa'īd al-Ḥabashī, a cultured and wealthy soldier, who had performed the Ḥajj, maintained a fine library and public kitchen. But Shaykh Sa'īd is chiefly remembered as the builder of the exquisite Siddi Sa'īd's mosque (built 1572/73) in Ahmadabad. The mosque's most beautiful features are the arched perforated windows with beautiful tracery and floral patterns.[14] Numerous other Habashis received titles from the Gujarati sultans. Today the descendants of these Habashis are found mainly in the Saurashtra region of the state of Gujarat, but also in other parts such as Katch and Kathiawar. Economically poor and educationally backward, the Habashis are included in the Scheduled Tribes (a state-approved list of tribes which receive government aid and preference in several economic and educational spheres) only in Saurashtra, but not elsewhere in Gujarat. The community panchayat (council) regulates Habashis' social behaviour and a Gujarati language journal *Siddhi Samachar Patrika* (Habashi news magazine) was brought out during 1976-77 by the Bhavnagar Negro Welfare Board, and the Gondal Youth Organization keeps the community informed about the activities of its members.[15] But of all the regions in India, it was in the Dakan that the Habashis were most conspicuous over a long period stretching from the time of the Bahmanids to the Asaf Jahis, *c.*1347-1948.

THE HABASHIS IN THE DAKAN

The Muslim penetration of the Dakan was initiated in 1296 by 'Alā' al-Dīn Khaljī, sultan of Dihli, with the invasion of Devagiri and Warangal.

The successors of the Khaljis, the Tughluqs, maintained Muslim control of the region until 1347 when the *amīrān-i ṣaddah* (the hundred chiefs) proclaimed independence of the Dakan from the Tughluq sultanate of Dihli, under the leadership of Bahman Shāh I, who gave the name to first Muslim dynasty of the Dakan. Under him and his successors the Bahmanid kingdom expanded west to incorporate Diu and make Dabol its principal seaport. At the height of its prosperity in the 14th and early 15th centuries, it exerted a profound influence on the history of Northeast Africa, from where numerous Habashis were enlisted in the Bahmanid army and administration.[16] The earliest mention of African presence in the Dakan was noted by the historian Rafi' al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, who states in his *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk* that a Bahmanid sultan, Tāj al-Dīn Fīrūz (reigned *c.*1397-1422), had several Habashis in his harem and as his personal attendants.[17] This was followed by an influx of the Africans in the Dakan, many of whom held prominent positions in the royal army and civil administration. For example, the *tarafdārs* (governors) of two out of four provinces of the Bahmanid kingdom, namely Mahur and Gulbarga, were Habashis. Dilāwar Khān, another Habashi, was appointed as *dīvān* (minister) of revenue by Sultan Maḥmūd (reigned *c.*1482-1518). Persian historical accounts of the Bahmanid era are replete with mention of many other nobles, ministers, commanders, and soldiers of Ḥabashi origin. In Bidar, the Bahmanid capital, is found the *Habashi Kot,* or the fortress of the Abyssinians, where some tombs of the African nobles are located.[18] Within a decade of Sultan Maḥmūd's death, the Bahmanid kingdom disintegrated into five dynasties, three of which — Ahmadnagar of the Nizam-Shahis, Golkonda of the Qutb Shahis, and Bijapur of the 'Adil Shahis — survived and flourished until the Mughal conquest in the 17th century. The most prominent of the Habashis in Ahmadnagar — or indeed elsewhere in India — in the 17th century was undisputedly the *vazīr* (regent-minister) Malik 'Anbar, a slave who had originally been purchased in Baghdad and rose to power when he defeated the Mughal forces in Berar in 1601, and two years later virtually installed Murtaḍā Niẓām Shāh II as the ruler of Ahmadnagar despite the presence of Mughal troops in the capital. Malik 'Anbar reorganized the revenue system of the kingdom, set its finances on a sound basis, and organized the training of troops, mostly Marathas, as guerillas to fight against the imperial Mughals. Malik Anbar's record as a clever military strategist won praise from no less than his imperial adversary, the Mughal Emperor Jahāngīr, who wrote in his *Memoirs*:

> In the art of soldiering Anbar was unique in his age.[19]

'Anbar's guerilla tactics were faithfully adopted by the Marathas who used the training with devastating effect against the ponderous Mughal armies equipped with long baggage trains, suitable perhaps in the plains of North India, but useless in the Dakan plateau.[20] He also founded the city of Khirki, which was eventually named Awrangabad. Many of the buildings in that city are evidence of his interest in monumental architecture. He also made water supply in the town a public utility. According to a modern writer, an engineer,

> The water works he set up are extant today and known as the Ambar canal. This canal not only collects but also filters water and then distributes it through a network of earthen pipes.[21]

On Malik 'Anbar's death in 1626 the Ahmadnagar king came completely under the influence of another Habashi, Ḥāmid Khān, and his wife, the latter becoming the recognized means of communication between the sultan and his subjects. On Hāmid Khān's decline from power Malik 'Anbar's son Fath Khān[22] attained the same control over Ahmadnagar as his father had done until his defeat, on honorable terms, at the hands of the Mughals.

In Bijapur, Habash Khān, a Dakani Habashi officer, made a mark both in the 'Adil Shahi kingdom and the Mughal empire. He and "His descendants served the Mughal emperors faithfully and well, and many of them held important positions including the *Kotwali* (police commissionership) of Delhi."[23] In Old Dihli, Ḥabash Khān's name is associated with a *phātak* (city gateway) known as Phatak Habash Khan. Apart from holding important posts on land, the Habashis were also prominent in the navies of Gujarat and Dakan powers. At the beginning of the 16th century, Aḥmad Nizām al-Mulk, founder of the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar (not to be confused with the later rulers of Hyderabad, the Asaf Jahi Nizams), conquered the region of Danda Rajpuri in the southern Konkan coast from Gujarat, giving the command of its island fort, Janjira (perhaps a Marathi corruption of the Arabic word *al-Jazīrah* = island), to his Habashi noble Siddī Yāqūt. It remained entirely under Habashi governorship thereafter. By the middle of the 17th century, the Habashis were firmly established as an effective, though small naval power on the west coast maintaining on behalf of the sultans of Bijapur, a powerful fleet for protecting the maritime trade of the kingdom and seaborne pilgrim traffic to the holy cities of Makkah and Madinah. Later, on the weakening of the Bijapur sultanate, the Habashis transferred their fleet and allegiance to the

Mughals, who were willing to and capable of supporting them against the mounting menace of the Marathas. Consequently in 1670, Emperor Awrangzīb 'Ālamgīr made the Habashi chief admiral of the Mughal navy with an annual grant of 400,000 rupees for the maintenance of the fleet. The Maratha attempts to wrest the fort from Habashi control were beaten back and three generations of Maratha chiefs, namely, Saha, Sivaji, Sambhaji—father, son and grandson respectively—failed to capture the tiny island. In the early 18th century concerted efforts of the Peshwas (Maratha chiefs) were as unsuccessful as the preceding attempts. The Habashi chiefs of Janjira maintained their independent status—untill 1870 when, following a breakdown of law and order there, the Habashis were forced to conclude a treaty with the British colonial authotiries resulting in the despatch of a political officer called the Resident. Along with other native princely states, Janjira merged with India upon British withdrawal and Indian independence in 1947. One of the Janjira chiefs, Siddī Aḥmad Khān, was married to an upper class Muslim woman (Nāzlī Begam, 1874-1968) of Bombay.[24] At present, Janjira is part of the municipality of Murud in the district of Kolaba, Maharashtra. Although a Habashi community survives in Janjira, it is without any political or economic power following the abolition of the princely states. Remnants of the Habashi rule include a palace built in Indian-Saracenic style, a mosque, an *'Īdgāh* (special mosque for the annual festival prayers of the two *'Īds*), and a Hindu temple.[25]

Although most Habashis were and even today are Muslim, in parts of Goa and Maharashtra such as Bombay and Nasik, there are those who profess Christian and Hindu faiths. Evidence of the usual Christian missionary activities—religious conversions, establishment of schools and hospitals—has been documented since the 19th century.[26] A census conducted in 1981 in the Karwar district of the state of Karnataka revealed that of the nearly 5000 Habashis counted, only 1000 were Muslim, the rest being Christian or Hindu. Apparently, the absence of Muslim ambience in this district and economic pressures forced them to change their religion.[27] The Siddis of Karnataka are included in the list of "Backward Classes" announced by the state government in October 1986.[28]

As described earlier, throughout the medieval times, the Habashis were generously treated in the Dakan. However, they were not entirely immune from the ethnic rivalries among the ruling elite in the Dakan. The constant Dakanī-Āfāqī (native and migrant Muslim) conflict that plagued the Muslim

kingdoms had its impact on the Habashi fortunes. Although the Habashis were technically Āfāqīs, they were associated with the Dakanis on account of their dark skin and profession of Sunni faith, characteristics shared by the Dakanis. In contrast to the Dakanis, the Āfāqīs—Central Asians/Iranians—were mostly Shī'ah and fair-skinned. The often violent Dakani-Āfāqī conflict led to frequent fluctuation in the ethnic composition of the ruling class: one faction gaining an upperhand for sometime only to be removed by the other. The conflict, however, never resulted in the complete annihilation of either group. Thus the Habashis shared the fortunes or the misfortunes of the natives.[29]

THE HABASHIS IN THE HYDERABAD STATE

Following the surrender of the Qutb Shahi kingdom of Golkonda in 1687, the Mughal conquest of the Dakan was completed. The Habashis, according to one source, were as many as 500 in the Golkonda forces at the time of its surrender. As loyal soldiers of the Qutb Shahis, the Habashis fought the Mughals bravely and held on tenaciously to their positions. But as with most of the soldiers and officers of the defeated kingdom, the Habashis were absorbed into the Mughal army or bureaucracy. In the Golkonda Fort two massive structures called the Habashī *Kamāns* (arches) are associated with the African soldiers. Not too far from the fort is a beautiful mosque—Masjid-i Miyān Mushk, built by Habashi noble of the Qutb Shahi sultan Abu al-Ḥasan Tānā Shāh.

Unfortunately, little is known of the condition of the Habashis for the next more than 150 years, until we find the Hadrami Arabs bringing the Habashis in for sale in the 1840s. Thus

> In 1841, an Arab merchant reported that Hyderabadi agents in Muscat were buying African slaves. In 1842, the British Resident observed that a heavy traffic in slaves was being conducted in the city by Arabs, some of whom were mercenary soldiers. In the same year the Resident in the Persian Gulf, Lt. Col. H.D. Robertson, reported that many Muslim slave dealers and the chief slave markets of India were in the towns of the Nizam of Hyderabad. Some of those dealers were Habashis working with Arabs: Reuben Aslam, an Arab agent in Muscat, reported that one Yacoob, a Habashi of Jedda married to a Hyderabadi woman, was engaged in the slave trade. He brought slaves,

who posed as his wives and daughters, into Hyderabad and sold them. The assistant Resident in Hyderabad confirmed that Yacoob and an Arab, Shaik Mohamed, were well known in the city as slave dealers. Yacoob, a former slave, was known to have brought back several slaves from his visits to Arabia and to have sold them. Sometimes he purchased children from poor Indian families and sold them in Aurangabad, another Indian city. The Resident observed that there were several dealers in Hyderabad and that every wealthy family there had three or four domestics purchased either from poor families or from Arab dealers who sold Africans in their homes. The following were listed as Arab dealers: Mookaree, Ismail Fuquchee, Ahmed bin Ali al-Asceree.[30]

Besides the slave-dealers, wealthy Muslim pilgrims occasionally brought one or two Habashis to Hyderabad whom they had purchased in Arabia during the Ḥajj. In order to bypass the passport regulations in force in Bombay since 1862, many African slaves were allegedly disguised as women to escape the scrutiny of the immigration officials at the Bombay port. Throughout the 19th century, British officials in Bombay and the British Residency officers in Hyderabad,[31] who always kept a close watch on the movement of foreigners to the city, reported the migration of Africans to the Nizam's territories. Some slaves were freed from Arab dhows landing at Bombay, others jumped the boats, and still others migrated to Hyderabad in search of employment. Because there existed an African settlement in Hyderabad dating at least from the Qutb Shahi (if not the Bahmanid times), it was quite natural for the newly-arrived Habashis to go to Hyderabad. Apart from possible recruitment in the Nizam's (Irregular Forces) *Afvāj-i be-Qā'idah*,[32] there were other possibilities for the Habashis. For instance, the Raja of Wanaparti Samasthan (a tributory state in Hyderabad),[33] who had the suggestive title of *Bin-Bahrī* ("son of the seafarer"), bought a number of slaves in Bombay in the 1850s. These served as the praetorian guard in his principality. In 1863, the Raja was asked by Salar Jang I to "loan" his African Cavalry Guard ("the A.C. Guards"), also known as the African bodyguards. The African guards were also called Risalah-i Hubbush. The "loan" became a permanent part of the *Afvāj-i be-Qā'idah*, and by 1895, the Guard had expanded to 305 troops mounted on horses and armed with sabers. Physically fit sons of the guardsmen were recruited to replace the fathers upon retirement. As in the case of the immigration of the Arabs of Hadramawt (present-day South Yemen) to Hyderabad in the 19th century, so

also the flow and concentration of the Habashis in the Nizam's Dominions caused uneasiness among the ever-watched British authorities. The British feared that with the powerful backing of the Arabs, Habashis, and other foreign Muslim groups such as the Pathans, the Nizam could become a threat to the imperial interests in India. Consequently

> the government of India in 1882 began to restrict the movement of Africans into Hyderabad. It justified this action by explaining that the Africans "consort with Arabs, follow the same leaders, are of the same turbulent habits and for police purposes, are practically the same." [34]

Habashis entering India at Bombay were not allowed to proceed inland unless they had obtained clearance from the British Resident in Aden. It is safe to assume that the Resident issued passes to only those Habashis who were being sponsored by the Arab *jam'adārs* (chiefs of the Nizam's Irregular Forces, i.e. premodern Mughal army, as opposed to the newly-organized State Forces) loyal to the British. The restrictive measures taken to check the immigration of the Habashis had only limited results. Legally or illegally the Habashis were still brought in as relatives or recruits to the Nizam's forces. In 1883, the Arabs in Hyderabad had caused a major riot over a trivial reason, therefore it seems quite understandable that

> No one at Hyderabad would like to see breachloaders under any circumstances put into the hands of the African Guard, of whom everybody there seemed to be a good deal afraid.

and

> Being loose in discipline they [the guardsmen] used to indulge in drunkness [*sic.*], gambling and rowdiness. Special efforts were necessary to keep them cowed down to peace and order, as there was no arms act in Hyderabad, and they could posses all sorts of weapons like matchlocks, swords, lances, and daggers.[35]

On an official visit to Dihli in 1905 to attend a durbar, the Nizam Maḥbūb 'Alī Khān (reigned 1869-1911) took eight of his African body-guards armed with carbines, bandoliers and dummy cartridges. This show of innocuous pomp drew a sharp protest from the Inspector-General of the Imperial Service Troops who branded this as a "dangerous act." Only when the

Resident in Hyderabad confirmed that dummy ammunition had been issued was the controversy resolved.[36]

As part of the Irregular Forces the African troopers were quartered in an area around Tālāb Mān Ṣāhībah ["Masab Tank"] now known as the Siddī Risālah ("African Guards") in northwest Hyderabad. Most Africans reached Hyderabad as young unattached males. African women rarely accompanied them to the Dakan. Consequently they married local women. Soon a community of Dakan-born Habashis grew up. Although the Habashis were of diverse origins, the common denominator among them was Islam and, consequently, identity with the larger Muslim community of the Dakan. This identity with the Muslim community was heightened by the Habashis' employment in the state-armed forces which were predominantly Muslim. As there was no possibility of the Habashis ever going back to any part of Africa, the Habashi identification with Hyderabad was consequently reinforced. Indeed with secure life-time service in the army, the Habashi position was perceived as quite privileged by the other less privileged Hyderabadis. Meanwhile, the independence of India in 1947 brought home the notion that Haydarabad State, whose population was overwhelmingly Hindu, was being ruled by the Nizam and his Muslim nobility. As the Nizam and his advisors sought to remain independent of India, pressure began to build up on the state to merge with the newly independent nation. This caused sharp religious polarization within Hyderabad, most Hindus clamouring for union with India, while most Muslims preferred to remain outside of it. For months futile negotiations went on between the representatives of the two states. In September 1948, following the breakdown of the talks, Indian troops marched on Hayderabad in a five-pronged attack. Overcoming weak and sporadic resistance, the troops occupied the state and forced its merger with India. In the days that followed hundreds of Arabs and Habashis were deported to Aden, many others fled to the safety of distant Pakistan. By 1950, Haydarabad State Forces and the Nizam's Irregular Forces (which included the A.C. Guards)[37] were disbanded by the new government. Lacking any marketable skills, most Habashis, along with Muslims of other ethnic backgrounds, were forced into unskilled low-paying jobs. A fortunate few were adopted and raised as *khanahzads* (household scions) by the last Nizam Osman Ali Khan(reigned 1911-48). The Nizam, divested of power after the Indian invasion and occupation of 1948, retreated into the recesses of his palace, the King Kothi, where he kept himself occupied with the management of his enormous wealth and

properties, and the affairs of his large family, servants and *khānahzāds*. As *khānahzāds* some of the Habashis were better fed and better clothed than those outside the palace. Some went to schools, others started their own businesses, many disappeared into the wider Muslim society. But still the largest segment of the Habashis continues to live in Siddi Risalah, a neighbourhood of slums and narrow dingy lanes, where declared an old Habashi:

> Our prestige died with the Nizam. My sons are now pulling rickshaws, some are in petty security jobs, some are hawking. Our widows are sick and they don't have money to buy medicines. Many widows have not received family pension as they cannot cut through the enormous red-tape....There is no allotment of land for us, there is no colony for us, there is no reservation for our children in schools. I want my child-ren to be educated but how can I pay Rs. 30 per month in fees when my pension of Rs.100 a month has to feed a dozen mouths?...[38]

Several neighbourhoods in Hyderabad city have names associated with the Habashis: Habashiguda, Siddi Anbar Bazar, Bagh Anbarpet. But none has any significant African population. There are some towns and locations associated with the Habashis in Andhra Pradesh, Siddipet for instance, but no Habashis are found there now.

HABASHI CULTURE

For some inexplicable reason, a disproportionately large number of male Habashis have been named after precious stones such as *Almās, Jawhar* (diamond), *Marjān* (coral), *Yāqūt* (carnelian), or after odorous substances, plants and flowers such as *Mushk* (musk), *Sunbul* (hyacinth), *Rayḥān* (basil), *Qaranfīl* (clove), *Kāfūr* (camphor), and *'Anbar* (ambergris). A Persian aphorism common in India alludes derisively to the dark skin of the Habashis: *Bar 'aks nihand nām-i Zangī Kāfūr*, i.e. it's an irony that they give a Zangi (Negro) the name of Kafur (camphor which is white). The present generation of the Habashis of course have names not different from other Indian Muslim names, and they retain few aspects of African culture. This is because of the simple reason that before reaching Hyderabad, individual Habashis were sold and resold in several parts of Africa and Arabia. In addition, their extended sojourn in Arabia Islamized their culture to a high degree. They, however, do retain aspects of their Afro-Arabian culture:

musical instruments such as *daf* (frame drum), for example.[39] The Habashi musicians, formerly of the Nizam's orchestra, played the *tanburah* (bowl lyre) which is played by the Habashis thoughout the Persian Gulf states. An American ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, and his family, watching a Republic Day musical performance by the Habashis in New Delhi, thought the rhythm came "right out of Cab Calloway," a black American jazz singer.[40] A few elderly Habashis still don the *iqal* and *thawb* (Arab headgear and robe), but the younger Habashis wear conventional dress. They speak Urdu as their native language, and in habits of food or drink and rituals and life cycle ceremonies there is little to distinguish them from other Dakani Muslims. The Habashis, therefore, identify themselves with and are accepted as such by the larger community of Dakani Muslims.

CONCLUSION

There is no substantial evidence to show that there was great demand for African slaves in India. In a land teeming with surplus labour it could hardly be expected that there would be great need for foreign slaves. Despite their small numbers, the Habashis played significant roles in medieval and modern Dakani history. Numerous individual Habashis achieved political and military successes in different parts of India, particularly in the Dakan. Habashi chiefs and nobles built mosques and monuments, struck coins in their own names, and patronized arts and letters. Islam and the Muslim community provided Africans of diverse origins and backgrounds with a common denominator for cultural identification in a region known for its diversity. Most Habashi nobles were so steeped in Indian Islamic political culture that Persian chroniclers do not always distinguish between Habashi nobles and those belonging to other ethnic affiliations. Therefore it is not always possible to identify an achievement or failure in strictly ethnic African terms. In the 16th century we have the example of Malik 'Anbar and his son who gained political power and used it wisely. In the 17th century, numerous Habashi officers were prominent in the Muslim courts of the Dakan and the Mughal empire in North India. Beginning in the 18th century the Siddi chiefs of Janjira ruled an island fortress on the strategic west coast of India until the late 19th century. A Habashi named Siddī 'Anbar was the trusted *khān-i sāmān* (steward) of Nawwāb Mukhtār al-Mulk, known as Salar Jang I, who was the vizir of the Haydarabad State during 1853-88. Although Siddī 'Anbar's designation was humble, he exercised great powers — granting access to the *divan*, recommending appointments and so forth. He



was evidently richly rewarded for his services and died a wealthy man, having owned commercial real estate property in the heart of Hyderabad city. A retail centre known as Siddi 'Anbar Bazar is named after him.[41] In the 20th century, we have the example of Nāṣir ibn Miftāḥ, who won the confidence of the last Nizam, Mir Osman Ali Khan, after his deposition from power by the Indian army. As a *khānahzād*, he was raised in the King Kothi palace, where he eventually acquired charge of the palace, the huge kitchen, and other matters relating to the *khānahzāds*. Ibn Miftāh owned sizeable rental property and a poultry farm, which his son inherited upon his death in 1974.[42]

The present position of the Habashi communuties is one of marginal existence. Considering large scale inter-marriages, spread of education, and efforts toward greater conformity to the norms of the larger Muslim community among the Habashis, it is safe to predict that most Habashis may soon get assimilated into the local Muslim communities in the states of Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, and Maharashtra.

NOTES

(1) Muslim historiography on the question of slavery or the presence of the African communities in non-African Islamic countries is almost non-existent. This phenomenon is perhaps part of the larger pattern of the neglect of ethnic studies in Muslim scholarship. A few modern writers have discussed the status of slaves and slavery in general theoretical terms without empirical data or evidence and with no regard to colour or ethnic origin. Some examples of this kind of writings are: Mustafā al-Jiddawī, *Dirāsah al-Jadīdah 'an Riqq fi al-Ta'rīkh wa fi al-Islām* (Iskandariyah, 1963); Ibrāhīm Hāshim al-Fallālī, *al-Riqq fi al-Qur'ān* (Dār al-Qalam, al-Qahirah, 1966), Muḥammad Shawkat al-Tūnī, *Muhammad Muharrar al-'Abīd*, (Mu'assasah Dār al-Shaab al-Qahirah, 1975), Muhammad al-Bahī, *al-Islām wa al-Riqq* (Dār al-Turāth al-'Arabī, al-Qahirah, 1979); 'Abd-Allāh al-Mashd, *al-Riqq fi Nazm al-Islām* (al-Majlis al-A'lā li-Shu'ūn al-Islāmīyya, Wizāra al-Awqāf, 1962) Slavery in the context of Islamic law is discussed in Muḥammad Jābir 'Abd al-Aal, *Dirāsahi Islamīyah mun al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Dār al-Maarifah al-Qahirah, 1966); *The Qur'an and Slavery* (American Society for Education and Religion, Washington D C , 1984) In the context of southern Arabia, the question is dealt by Faḍl ibn al-'Alavī (d 1900) in his tract entitled *Ifādhā Risāla Asaf al-Shafīq bi-Bayān Hukmah bi'a' al-Raqīq*(Maṭba'a Fita Kohen,al-Iskandarīyah,n d.). See also Abū al-Fadl Mūsavī Zunjānī, *Nizām-i Ijtimā'ī-'i Islām· Badamūma-yi Burdagī* (Dār al-Tablīgh-i Islāmī, Qum, Iran 1972); Sa'īd Ahmad Akbarābādī, al-*Riqq fi al-Islām* (Nadwat al-Muṣannifīn, Dihlī, 1946), 'Āsim Nu'mānī, *Mas'alah-i Ghulāmī aur Islām* (Islamic Publications,Lahore, 1977), Hasan M Rawat, *Slave Trade in Africa A Historical Perspective* (Mutamar al-Alam al-Islami, Karachi, 1985) On *Ḥadīths* relating to Africa, see Muḥammad al-'Arūsī Matwī, *Fad'ail Ifrīqīyah, fi al-Āthār wa al-Aḥādīth al-Mawḍū'ah*, (Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, Bayrut, 1983); Aḥmad Suhayl Albi, *Thawrat al-'Abīd fi al-Islām* (Dār al-Adab,

Bayrut, 1985) Western orientalists' understanding of the slavery and ethnic questions in Islamic societies is often marred by ignorance or bias, and sometimes both Instances of this scholarship are found in Berbard Lewis, *Race and Color in Islam* (Harper & Row, New York: 1971), and "The African Diaspora and the Civilization of Islam," in *The African Diaspora*, pp. 37-56, ed. Robert Rotberg and Martin L. Kilson, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1976), which appears to be a plagiarism of G. Rotter. *Stellung des Negers in der islamischarabischen*. Gesellschaft bis zum XVI Jahrhundert (Bonn, 1967). See also *Encyclopedia of Islam*, Leiden, 1960 - s.v. *'Abd*, and the chapter Slaves in Adam Mez's *Renaissance of Islam*, Luzac, London, 1937). For Bilal, see H.A.L. Craig, *Bilal* (Quartet Book, London, 1982.)

(2) The African diaspora is succinctly described in *The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Africa*, ed. Roland Oliver and Michael Crowder (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England, 1981), pp. 469-84. Recent writings on the Black American scholars is coloured by their enthusiasm to "prove" the achievements of individual Habashis in Islamic societies as isolated instances and not patterns. See, for example, Graham W. Irwin, *Africans Abroad*, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1977); *Global Dimensions of African Diaspora*, ed. Joseph E. Harris (Howard University Press, Washington, D.C., 1982); and the same author's "The Black Peoples of Asia," in *World Encyclopedia of Black Peoples*, pp.264-72 (Scholarly Press, St. Clair Shores, Michigan, 1975).

(3) Modern accounts of the East African slave trade, of which Arabia and India were important parts include Edward A. Alpers, *The East African Slave Trade* (Historical Association of Tanzania, Nairobi, 1967); Joseph E. Harris, *The African Presence in Asia Consequences of the East African Slave Trade* (Northwestern University Press, Evanston,IL, 1971); R.W. Beechey, *The Slave Trade of Eastern Africa* (Harper & Row, New york, 1976), pp.4, 39,50,174-87. In the context of Arabia, the African diaspora is described by Robert B. Serjeant, "South Arabia and Ethiopia—African Elements in the South Arabian Population" in *Proceedings of the Third International Conference of Ethiopian Studies, 1966*, pp.25-33 (Addis Ababa, 1969); in Asir, Saudi Arabia, the present Arab population shows a considerable degree of admixture from Africa, see N. Saha and others, "Some Blood Genetic Markers of Selected Tribes in Western Saudi Arabia," *American Journal of Physical Anthropology*, 52 (May 1980). 595-600, John O. Hunwick, "Black Africans in the Islamic World. An Understudied Dimension of the Black Diaspora," *Tarikh* (Lagos, Nigeria) 5, no.4 (1978): 20-40. For Persian perceptions of Africans, see Minoo Southgate, "The Negative Images of Blacks in Some Medieval Iranian Writings," *Iranian Studies*, 17, no.1 (Winter 1984): 3-36 The author, an Iranian, seeks to establish that Blacks were poorly thought of in medieval Iran, and says that, "when [Imam] Khomeini ordered the release of all blacks among the American hostages because they [the blacks] are oppressed by American society" (*New York Times*, 9 November 1979, A:12), I was... prompted to ... set the trade into Turkey, see Norman N Penzer, *The Harem: An Account of the Institution As It Existed in the Palace of the Turkish Sultans* . (Spring Books, London, 1936); a modern account is by a Jewish writer Ehud R. Toledano, *The Ottoman Slave Trade and Its Suppression, 1840-1890* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1982).

(4) For slavery and the arrival of the Africans in India in general,see D. Pandey, "Medieval Indian Slaves: Their Status and Political Importance, (1206-1388)," *Quarterly Review of Historical Studies* 16(1976-77): 42-46; Balakrishna G.Gokhale, "Slavery in South and Southeast Asia in the XVII Century," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay* 47-48 (1972-73). 108-17; Richard Parkhurst, "The Habshis of India," which is Appendix E to his *An Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia*, pp. 409-22 (London,1961); Journalistic

accounts in Vasant D. Rao, "The Habashis: India's Unkown Africans," *Africa Report* 18, no. 5 (September-October 1973):35-38; K.N. Sud, "Brought in Chains Centuries Ago", *Overseas Hindustan Times*, 24 March 1984, p. 8-9 For the Portuguese role in the slave trade to India, see Ann M. Pescatello, "The African Presence in Portuguese India," *Journal of Asian History*, 11 (1977) 26-48; Jeanette Pinto, "Slavery in Portuguese India, 1510 - 1842," unpublished Ph D. thesis, Heras Institute, University of Bombay, 1985; P.P. Shirodkar, "Slavery in Coastal India: With Special Reference to Goa, Daman, and Diu," *Purabilekh-Puratatva* (Goa) 3, no. 1 (January-June 1985) : 27-43. See also D C. Keswani, "Indian Cultural and Commercial Influences in the Indian Ocean from Africa and Madgascar to South-East Asia," pp. 31-43, in *The General History of Africa, Studies and Documents*, volume III (Unesco, Paris, 1980). Adam Williams, *Slavery in India*, (London 1840), and *A Brief View of Slavery in British India* (London, 1841); John Scoble, *Slavery and Slave Trade in British India* (London, 1841).

(5) It is difficult to agree with Joseph Harris's contention that the term "Habshi" came to be applied to slaves from the southern regions of Africa, see his *African Presence in Asia*, p. 39. Many factual errors marr this otherwise well-researched pioneering book; for instance his assertion that "During the later part of the nineteenth century the nizam [sic] began to select young Arab and Siddi boys as *khanzahs* [sic], see p. 103. The fact, however, is that, none of the 19th-century Nizams had anything to do with the *khanahzads* who began to be raised — regardless of ethnic origin — by Osman Ali Khan, the last reigning Nizam, c. 1911-48. It was only after his deposition by the Indian army in 1948 that Osman Ali Khan began adopting young children of poor families. On p. 114, Harris claims that the inhabitants of a neighbourhood in Hyderabad called "Habshi guda...today claim Arab descent," There has hardly ever been any significant Muslim population in that suburb of the Hyderabad city, much less anyone claiming Arab ancestory.

(6) Rafiq Zakariya has attempted a biography of this remarkable woman, see *Razia, Queen of India* (Popular Prakashan, Bombay, 1966); Radiyah's alleged affair with Yaqut is repeated in an Urdu movie entitled Radiyah Sultana, which was released in 1983.

(7) Ibn Battuta, *Rehla of ibn Battuta: India, Maldive Islands and Ceylon*, tr. Agha Mahdi Hasan, second edition (M.S. University, Baroda 1976).

(8) See Mian Muhammad Saeed, *The Sharqi Sultanate of Jaunpur: A Political and Cultural History* (University of Karachi, Karachi, 1972).

(9) *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. "*Habshi*," Firuz Minar, a building said to have been erected by a Habashi ruler of Bengal, Sayf al-Din Firuz (reigned c. 1487-90) is described in *The Islamic Heritage of Bengal*, ed. George Michell (Unesco, Paris, 1984), p. 73. There is some disagreement among historians about Sayf al-Din Firūz's role in the erection of this minar as some writers contend that the minar derives its name from the *fīrūzah* colour (turquoise) decoration inside the structure. See Munshi Shyam Prasad's Persian account, *Ahwāl-i Gaur wa Pāndwa*, which forms an appendix in Ahmad Hasan Dani's *Muslim Architecture of Bengal* (Paramount Press, Dacca, 1961), p ii, and p. 42. For the political history of the Habshis in Bengal, see A.B.M. Habibullah, "Later Ilyas Shahis and the Abyssinians (1442-98)," in *The History of Bengal. Muslim Period*, 1200-1757, ed. by Jadunath Sarkar (Calcutta, n.d.), pp. 130-41. See also Zakiuddin Ahmad, "Slavery in Eighteenth Century Bengal" *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan* 11, no. 3 (December 1966): 71-95. Inscriptions of the Habashi era are gathered in Muhammad Yūsuf Siddiqī, "al-Nuqūsh al-Katābīyah ' ala al-Imayir al-Islāmīyah fi al-Bangāl Qabl al-'Asr al-Mughūlī." master's thesis, Umm al-Qura University, Makkah, A H. 1404, pp. 276—84.

(10) See Armando Cortesao, *The Suma Oriental of Tome Pires* 2 vols. (London, 1944): vol. i, p. 178, cited in Gavin Hambly, "A Note on the Trade in Eunuchs in Mughul Bengal," *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, 94, no 1 (1974): 125-30.

(11) Richard F. Burton, *Sindh and the Races that Inhabit the Valley of Indus* (London, 1851; reprinted with an introduction by H.T. Lambrick (Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1973), pp 253-60, see also Alexander F Baillies, *Kurrachee: Past, Present and Future* (Simpkin & others, London, 1890); G S.P. Freeman-Grenville, "The Siddi and the Swahili," *Bulletin of the British Association of the Orientalists*, 6 (1971): 3-18.

(12) See M.Amuddin, "Shiddis Celebrate 'Crocodile Festival,'" *Dawn*, (4 April 1986) p.vii. A similar report appeared in *Arab News* (Jiddah), 26 March 1987, p.1, entitled "Pakistanis Celebrate Their African Roots." See also Ali Baba, "The Shiddis of Sind," *Focus on Pakistan* 4 (no date given): 37-41, where information about Habashi arts and crafts is given with colour illustrations

(13) For these matters consult 'Abd-Allāh Muhammad ibn 'Umar al-Makkī Ulugh Khānī (1540-1605), popularly known as Hājjī al-Dabīr, *Ẓafar al-Wālih, bi Muẓaffar wa Ālih*, translated into English by Edward Dennison Ross as *An Arabic History of Gujarat*, 3 volumes (John Murray, London, 1921-28) See also J.W. Watson, *Statistical Account of Junagadh* (Bombay, 1874); R.E. Enthoven, *The Tribes and Castes of Bombay* (Government Central Press, Bombay, 1920).

(14) Consult James Fergusson and Theodore Hope, *Architecture of Ahmadabad* (London, 1866); and *Encyclopedia of Islam*, under s v. "*Gudjarāt*."

(15) For the Habashi population in Gujarat, see *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency*, IX, pt. 2, Gujarat population , Musalmans and Parsis, edited by Fazlullah Lutfullah Faridi. (Government Central Press, Bombay, 1899), Recent anthropological investigations are found in N.G. Nag, M L. Sah, and R.K. Trivedi, "Siddi: A Negroid Tribe of Gujarat," in *Census of India* 1961, volume 5, pt. 6-B, no. 1, Village Monograph Survey no. 10, Census of India, Ethnographic Series, New Delhi 1969); D.K. Bhattacharya, "Anthropometry of a Negro Tribe in India: The Siddis of Gujarat," *Zinruigaku Zassi: The Journal of the Anthropological Society of Nippon*, 77 no. 5/6 (1969) : 30-43, and the same author's two other articles. "Siddis of Rajkot," *Hindustan Times Weekly* (16 June 1968), p. 7, 1A and "Indians of African Origin," *Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines*, 10, no. 40 (1970): 579-82, D.K. Kawa, *Jambur na Siddio, Ek Adhyayan*, thesis, Dept of Sociology, School of Social Sciences, Gujarat University, 1967; Prabha Bhattacharya. "Siddis of Gujarat," *Times Weekly* (Bombay) 20 June 1970, p 4; "Siddi: Negroid Tribe in Saurashtra," *Statesman*, 22 June, 1970, p. 7; Tushar Bhatt, "Siddis of Jambur," *Economic Times* (Bombay) 22 March 1971, p. 5; Arun Gandhi, "Siddis of Saurashtra," *Times of India*, 20 June, 1976, p. 11; D.A. Ol'derogge, "Afrikantsy v Indii," *Strany Vostoka*, Book 3 (1972): 147-52 (in Russian); Bulbul Pal, "Rooted in an African Past," *Indian Express*, Magazine Section, 5 January, 1986, p 3, T.B Naik and G.P. Pandya, *The Siddis of Gujarat (A Socio-Economic Study and Development Plan)* (Gujarat Vidyapith, Ahmadabad, 1981); Jayanti K. Patel, "African Settlements in Gujarat," *India Quarterly* XLII, no. 3 (July-September 1986): 238-45. The Anthropological Survey of India, Calcutta, produced a documentary film about the Gujarati Habashis in 1974 For Habashis in Gujarati painting, see B.N. Goswamy and Anna L. Dallapiccola, "Painting in Kutch," *Artibus Asiae* 40 (1978), pp. 62-74, where the authors say that Maharao Godji II, a ruler of Kutch (1760-78), surrounded himself with the Siddis, who can be seen frequently in the paintings from his reign.

(16) For the history of the Bahmanids and their successors, see *History of Medieval Deccan*, ed. P M Joshi and H K. Sherwani (Government of Andhra Pradesh , Hyderabad, 1973-75). A comprehensive bibliographic survey of the medieval and modern history of the region is given in Omar Khalidi, *Dakan under the Sultans, 1296-1724 A Bibliography of Monographic and Periodical Literature* (Haydarabad Historical Society, Wichita, KS, U S.A., 1987); and the same author's *Haydarabad State under the Nizams, 1724-1948. A Bibliography of Monographic and Periodical Literature* (Haydarabad Historical Society, Wichita, KS, U.S.A., 1985).

(17) Rafiuddin Ibrāhīm Shīrāzī, *Tadhkirat al-Mulūk*, edited and introduced by Abunnasr Muhammad Khalidi (Costa Mesa, California, forthcoming). The *Tadhkira* was composed in 1653. For another source for the Habashis in Bijapur, see Teotonio R. de Souza, "Jesuit Records in Portuguese on Shivaji's South Indian Campaign and its Impact on the People," *Indica* (Bombay) 23, no. 1-2 (March-September 1986): 89-100, which is related to the annual letter of the Madurai Christian Mission dated 1677 regarding the Habashi activities.

(18) Ghulam Yazdani, *Bidar: Its History and Monuments* (Oxford University Press, Oxford 1947)

(19) Quoted in Henry M Elliot and John Dawson, *History of India As Told by Its Own Historians* (London, 1867), vi, pp. 414-15.

(20) Malik 'Anbar's career has been studied by several modern writers, see Shaykh Chand, *Malik Anbar* (Matba'-i 'Ahd-i Afirin, Hyderabad,1931); Jadunath Sarkar, "Malik Ambar, A New Life," *Indian Historical Quarterly* 9, no. 3 (September 1933), pp. 629-44; Yogindra Nath Chaudhuri, *Malik Ambar A Biography* (Dacca, 1934); Banarsi Prasad Saksena, "A Few Unnoticed Facts About the Early Life of Malik Ambar," *Indian History Congress Proceedings* 5 (1941) pp 601-05, D.R. Seth," Life and Time of Malik 'Ambar," *Islamic Culture*, 31, no 2 (April 1957), pp. 142-55, this article was earlier published in the same journal's volume 19 (1945), pp. 349-51, Motichandra and Karl J. Khandalawala, "Identification of the Portraits of Malik Ambar," *Lalit Kala* 1-2 (April 1955-March 1956), pp. 23-31; Radhey Shyam, *Kingdom of Ahmadnagar* (Motilal Banarasidas, New Delhi, 1966), and the same author's *Life and Time of Malik Ambar* (Munshi Ram Manoharlal, New Delhi, 1968); B G Tamaskar, *Life and Work of Malik Ambar* (Idara-i Adabiyat-i Delli, Delhi, 1978). For Habashis in the neighbouring kingdom of Khandesh, see *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. "Farukids," and "Khandesh"; and Charles F. Beckingham, "Amba Gesan and Asirgarh," *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 2 (1957), pp. 182-88; for an Arabic source with copious references to Malik 'Anbar, see Muhammad Abu Bakr al-Shilli Ba 'Alavi, *al-Mashra al-Rawi fi Manāqib al-Sādāt Al abi 'Alavi* (Makkah, 1982).

(21) Mohammad Ahmad Mirza, 1890-1959, "The Ambar Canal," *Islamic Culture* 34, no. 1 (January 1960), pp. 60-62.

(22) For Fath Khan and other Habashis in the service of the Mughal empire, see Shah Navaz Khan, *Ma'athir al-Umara'*, English translation by Henry Beveridge and Baini Prasad, 3 volumes (Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1911-41). A portrait of Fath Khan was on display during an exhibition entitled "Reality Transformed Indian Paintings from the 16th-19th Centuries," 13 October 13 December 1983 at the Rhode Island School of Design, Providence, R.I., U.S.A.

(23) Maheshwar Dayal, *Rediscovering Delhi: The Story of Shahjahanabad* (S.Chand, New Delhi, 1975). See the chapter entitled Phatak Habash Khan in this book.

(24) Theodore P.Wright Jr. quoted in *Family, Kinship and Marriage Among Muslims in India*, p.227, ed. Imtiaz Ahmad (New Delhi, 1981).

(25) A full-length history of the Janjira Habashis is yet to be written, but the following sources may be useful for an eventual comprehensive account: *Gazetteer of the Bombay Presidency, Kolaba and Janjira* (Bombay, 1883), xi, pp. 409-23; A.A. Kadiri, "Inscriptions of the Siddi Chiefs of Janjira," *Epigraphia Indica, Arabic and Persian Supplement* (1966), pp. 55-76; R.G. Gyani, "Some Copper Coins of Janjira," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Numismatic Supplement* XLV, no 320 (1934). The Habashi-Maratha conflict seen from the perspective of the Maratha records are given in several sources: *Selections from the Peshwa's Daftar*, vol 3, entitled *Shahu's Campaign Against the Siddis of Janjira, 1733-1736* (Government Printing Press, Bombay, 1931); D.V. Apte and S M Divekar, "The Rebellion of Siddi Johar," *Bharata Itihasa Samsodhaka Mandala* 9, no. 3 (no date given)' pp. 19-22, V G Dighe, "Bajirao I Peshwa and His Janjira Expedition," *Indian Historical Records Commission, Proceedings*, 15 (1938), pp. 159-71; A.G. in 1683," *New Indian Antiquary*, 6 (1943-44), pp. 1-6; and the same writer's article entitled "Shahu's Letter to Nizamul-Mulk Asaf Jah Relating to Sidi Sat, 1735," *Deccan History Conference I* Proceedings (Hyderabad, 1945), pp. 332-33. It is significant that also D.V. Chauhan, "Siddi Jauhar at Panhala," *Indian History Congress Proceedings*, 25 (1963), pp. 133-37; D R Banaji, *Bombay and the Siddis*, (Macmillan Bombay, 1932); R.V. Ramdas, "*Relations Between the Marathas and the Siddis*," unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Bombay, n.d. About the Habashi role in the development of the Mughal navy, see Atul Chandra Roy, *A History of the Mughal Navy* (World Press, Calcutta, 1972). In spite of the clear evidence to the contrary, P.L Saswadkar claims that the Habashis persecuted the non-Muslims, see his article entitled "The Siddis' Tyranny Over the Hindus in the 18th Century Konkan," *Indian History Congress Proceedings*, no. 37 (1976), pp. 223-29. Recent publications on the Janjira fort include: Vigmia Fss, *Forts of India* (Roli, New Delhi, 1986), where excellent colour illustrations are produced. For the problems of the physical preservation of the Janjira fort, see Heta Pandit, "Janjira: An Island fortress Fights for Survival," *India Magazine*, 5, no. 6 (May 1985), pp. 74-79, and the same writer's article "The Threatened Environment of Murud Janjira," *Design Magazine for Arts and Ideas*, 29, no.3 (July/September 1985), pp. 29-33. Journalistic writings on the subject are: Vasant D. Rao, "Unknown African Dynasty in India," *India News* (Washington D.C.), 24 April 1978, p. 6; Madhu Valluri, "Negroes of Gujarat," *Society* (Bombay) (October/November 1982); and the same author's "Janjira Palace," *Society* (Bombay) February/March 1986. A succinct account is in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. "*Djandjira*." Brenda Kidman has discussed village life under the Janjira chiefs in her *Once Upon a Far Hillside The Life and Times of An Indian Village* (Century, London, 1985).

(26) Joseph E. Harris, *The African Presence in Asia*, pp. 68-76.

(27) Most, if not all of the Portuguese slaves of African origin brought into India were probably of Christian faith. See Ann M. Pescatello's article cited in footnote # 4. For the Karnataka Habashis, see B.M. Chandrashekharaiah, "Siddis: A Negroid People of Karnataka," *Vanyajati* (New Delhi), 13, no. 1 (January 1965), pp. 9-14; T.C. Palakshappa. *The Siddhis of Kanara* (New Delhi: Sterling, 1977), reviewed in *Social Action* (New Delhi), 28, no. 1 (January-March 1978), pp. 105-07; and the same author's "Life Organization of the Siddhis," *Journal of the Indian Studies in Social Sciences* (Bombay), 1, no. 1 (January 1967), pp. 55-57. Kanara is the old name of Karwar district. See also M. Vijayakumar and K C Malhotra, "Inbreeding and Matrimonial Distance Among the Siddhis of Karnataka," *Current Anthropology A World Journal of Sciences of Man*, 24 (1983), pp. 2228-29; Dibyendu Roy

Chaudhuri, "Anthropology of the Siddis (The Negroid Population of North Kanara," *Bulletin of the Department of Anthropology*, Government of India, no. 1 (1957), pp. 53-66.

(28) "New Reservation Policy Evolved in Karnataka," *Statesman* (New Delhi), 8 October 1981, p.1

(29) The Dakani-Afaqi conflict is discussed in the *History of Medieval Deccan*, vol i, *op.cit.*

(30) Bombay, Department of Archives, Political Department Diary, August 3, 1842, pp. 335-36, cited in Joseph E Harris, *African Presence in Asia*, p. 103. I have also greatly benefited from "A List of Sources in Andhra Pradesh State Archives for the Study of Haydarabad State-Africa Relations," unpublished manuscript dated 1986, compiled by Sayyid Shakil Ahmad, Assistant Archivist, Andhra Pradesh State Archives, Hyderabad. The list shows how several Habashis were attracted to the Nizam's Dominions in search of employment. For the Arabs in Hyderabad, see Omar Khalidi, "Arab Hadramawt fi Haydarabad," *Majallah Dirasat al-Khalijī wa al-Jazīrat al-'Arabīyah* (Kuwait) 10, no. 45 (January 1986), pp. 35-69; preliminary English version is entitled "Consequences of Hadrami Migration to India: The Arab Presence in Haydarābād," *Addarah* (Riyadh, Saudi Arabia), 10, no. 3 (December 1984), pp 5-29.

(31) Residency refers to the quasi-diplomatic British office in the Indian princely states. The one in Haydarabad was established in 1779 and abolished in 1947. A brief account of the Residency is in Omar Khalidi, *The British Residents at the Court of the Nizams of Haydarabad*, (Haydarabad Historical Society, Wichita, KS, U.S.A.).

(32) The only account of the Nizam's armed forces including the African Cavalry Guards and the Irregular Forces (*Afwāj-i be-Qā'idah*) was written by Muhammad Ashraf, "The Hyderabad Army, 1724-1950," *Military Historical Society Bulletin* (London) 8 (February, 1958), pp. 63-67, 8 (May 1958), pp. 75-79; 8 (August 1958), pp. 5-9; 9 (November 1958), pp. 32-36; 9 (February 1959), pp 56-57; and 9 (May 1959), pp 82-84.

(33) K. Krishnaswamy Mudiraj has devoted a chapter to the Wanaparti Samasthan, see his *Pictorial Hyderabad*, 2 vols (Chandrakant Press, Hyderabad, 1929-34), vol. ii, pp. 59-65. Wanaparti now forms part of the Mahbubnagar district, A P See also Harriet R. Lynton and Mohini Rajan, *Days of the Beloved* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1974), pp 178-79 for references to the Habashis in the service of the Raja of Wanaparti

(34) Joseph E. Harris, *The African Presence in Asia*, p 104.

(35) India, Secret Department, January, 1890, vol. i, p. 56, quoted in Joseph E Harris, *The African Presence in Asia*, p. 105.

(36) *Ibid*, p 105.

(37) For the African Cavalry Guards, see Syed Hossain Bilgrami and Charles Wilmott, *Historical and Descriptive Sketch of the Nizams' Dominion* (Education Society's Press, Bombay, 1883) I:

(38) M.R. Sameeran, "A Dark Future [of the Habashis]," *Illustrated Weekly of India* (5 December 1982), pp. 25.

(39) Interview with several Habashi *Daf*-beaters in Hyderabad, March 1983. *Daf* is a generic term for frame drum or tambourine See Lois L al-Faruqi, *An Annotated Glossary of Arabic Musical Terms* (Greenwood Press, Westport, CT: 1981). See also Jean Jenkins and Poul

Rovsing Olsen, *Music and Musical Instruments in the World of Islam* (World of Islam Festival Publishing Co., London: 1976), p. 51; and Poul Rovsing Olsen, "La musique africaine dans le Golfe Persique," *Journal of the International Folk Music Council*, 19 (1967), pp. 28-36.

(40) Chester Bowles, *Ambassador's Report* (Harper & Brothers, New York, 1954), p. 87.

(41) A brief account of Siddi 'Anbar is given in Tamkīn Kāẓimī, "Siddi 'Anbar" in *Ḥaydarābād kī Dāstān*, pp. 70-73 (Maṭbū'āt-i Siyāsat, Hyderabad, 1986).

(42) For Nāṣir ibn Miftāḥ, see Joseph E. Harris, *The African Presence in Asia*, pp. 103, 113.

THE SUFI CONCEPT OF OBLIGATORY KNOWLEDGE: A STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF SHAYKH AL-MAKKĪ

MUHAMMAD ABUL QUASEM

I

It is well-known to Muslims, including the Sufis,[1] and Western orientalists that the Prophet Muhammad (may peace be upon him !) said, "To seek knowledge (*al-'ilm*) is an ordinance obligatory upon every Muslim."[2] Although this Tradition (*hadīth*) is not to be found in any of the six cannonical collections of Traditions (*ṣiḥāḥ sittah*) other than the *Sunan* of Ibn Mājah,[3] and although it is considered to be a 'weak' (*ḍa'īf*) Tradition,[4] it is stated strongly by Muslims, including the Sufis, and often quoted by them in support of the view that Islam has attached tremendous value and importance to knowledge, education and instruction. They argue that 'weakness' in the chain of narration of this well-known Tradition does not warrant its rejection, because its meaning and content are in full accord with many 'correct' (*ṣaḥīḥ*) traditions on the value of knowledge[5] to be found in the six cannonical collections as well as in the biographical writings generally considered as highly reliable.

The Prophet's attribution of great value and importance to knowledge is not something originating from his own mind; on the contrary, it is but an explanation and elaboration of great value briefly attached to knowledge in the Qur'ān.[6] In fact, not only in the case of knowledge, but also in all other fields, whatever the Prophet said or did is nothing but an explanation of what the Qur'ān has taught briefly—brevity and conciseness being two main characteristics of Qur'ānic exposition.[7] The Qur'ān has emphasized the value of knowledge through such verses as: "Say: can those who know be like those who do not know?"[8] "He gives wisdom to him whom He pleases, and whoever is given wisdom has indeed been given abundant good."[9] However, neither the Qur'ān nor the Prophet has put forward a theory of knowledge, whether brief or detailed, although from a thorough analysis of their teachings on different subjects, including knowledge, relevant theories may somehow be formulated. Basically the Qur'ān is not a work giving abstract theories and formulae, nor is the Prophet a theoretical man engaged in

abstract thinking and armed-chair theorizing. The teachings of both the Qur'ān and Prophet are fully practical in nature, aiming at providing mankind with guidance (*hidāyah*) in all aspects of life.[10]

Some time after the Prophet, however, Muslim intellectuals started formulating theories of knowledge for reasons which need not be mentioned here. The jurists (*fuqahā'*) and the theologians (*mutakallimūn*) discussed epistemological problems to a certain degree, but elaborate and comprehensive discussions of these problems were made by the philosophers and the orthodox Sufis[11] of the medieval times in different perspectives. However, there were differences between the discussions made by these two groups of Muslim intellectuals. The philosophers' treatment of this subject is less comprehensive but much more abstract and theoretical in nature than that of the orthodox Sufis; their mainly theoretical motive is variously described by such phrases as 'satisfaction of intellectual curiosity', and 'knowledge for the sake of knowledge.' In all this, as in their other theories, they are deeply influenced by Greek philosophers, especially Plato, Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, whose mainly theoretical motive of philosophizing is well known. The orthodox Sufis, by contrast, are almost exclusively influenced by the teachings of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, and since these teachings are thoroughly practical in nature, the Sufis' treatment of the problem of knowledge has assumed the same practical character.[12] The Sufis are not 'men of words' (*aṣḥāb aqwāl*) [13]; on the contrary they are men of action, believing that knowledge which is not acquired for action is no better than ignorance.[14] With such an attitude towards knowledge the Sufis have dealt with epistemological problems most elaborately, formulating theories on different aspects of cognition[15]—theories which aim at providing Muslims with such knowledge as may really be useful to them.

Among those medieval Sufis who have discussed epistemological problems in detail the most prominent are the Baghdadian Sufi Shaykh Abū Ṭālib Muḥammad al-Makkī (d.386/996) and the great Imam Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d.505/1111). The former is a Traditionist and Sufi and head of the theological school of the Sālimīyah of Basra. He has devoted the 31st chapter[16] of the first volume of his principal Sufi work, *Qūt al-Qulūb fī Mu'āmalat al-Maḥbūb*, to a discussion of knowledge and the learned men. The chapter is divided into many sections dealing with different aspects of knowledge considered relevant to the contemporary Islamic society. The discussion starts with an enquiry into the knowledge which God, through His Apostle, ordered every Muslim to seek. Another independent work of al-

Makkī entitled *Kitāb al-'Ilm* is devoted to epistemological discussions. In a whole chapter of this work the problem of obligatory knowledge is treated,[17] but some parts of this treatment are more detailed than, while other are an abridgement of, their corresponding parts of the discussion made in the *Qūt al-Qulūb*. In this, as in many other aspects of Sufi doctrines and practices, his influence upon al-Ghazālī has been tremendous—a fact which al-Ghazālī himself states in his *al-Munqidh*. [18] In view of the extreme need of knowledge for religio-mystical practices[19] al-Ghazālī deals with the problem of knowledge in the very first 'book' (*kitāb*) of his magisterial *Iḥyā'*.[20] He divides this book into seven chapters, the second of which is partly devoted to a discussion of the knowledge, the seeking of which is binding upon every individual Muslim.[21] This paper aims at representing only the view of al-Makkī on this knowledge, for it is complete in itself and has a strong influence upon subsequent Sufis. The theory of al-Ghazālī which is even more complete may be considered in a separate article.

II

Shaykh Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī's treatment of the obligatory knowledge mentioned in the Tradition, "To seek knowledge (*al-'ilm*) in an ordinance obligatory upon every Muslim,"[22] has two parts: one dealing with his own opinion, and the other considering the views of others, most of whom were his predecessors from different categories of intellectuals. He does not subscribe to these views wholly, although he appears to appreciate them.[23] His own theory deserves consideration here first in view of the fact that it is subsequent, more developed, more correct and thus more important than the views of others.

Al-Makkī's own opinion is that obligatory knowledge is the knowledge of those five actions on which Islam is based.[24] They are: "the testimony (*shahādah*) that there is no god but Allāh and that Muhammad is His servant and messenger, the performance of ritual prayer, the payment of *zakāh*, the pilgrimage to the (holy) House, and the fasting during (the lunar month) Ramaḍān."[25] To prove that knowledge of these five actions is binding upon every Muslim al-Makkī argues as follows:

> Only these five actions are obligatory upon Muslims—no other action is binding upon them; an action is correct if its agent has knowledge of it; so knowledge of these five actions must be obligatory.[26]

This argument al-Makkī explains:

> The first thing about an action is knowledge of it. Thus knowledge of an action becomes obligatory if the action is obligatory. Since only these five actions are obligatory upon Muslims, seeking knowledge of these five has become obligatory, for it is obligatory of the obligatory.[27]

Al-Makkī includes knowledge of Divine unity (*'ilm al-tawḥīd*) in the knowledge of the five basic actions, for the first concern of knowledge of Divine unity is with 'the testimony that there is no god but God,' through the affirmation of the attributes attached to His essence, and the negation from Him of the attributes of other-than-Him. All this is included in the knowledge of 'the testimony that there is no god but God.'[28] Thus that part of Islamic theology (*'ilm al-kalām*) which deals with Divine unity is, in al-Makkī's opinion, binding upon every individual Muslim.

Al-Makkī also includes knowledge of sincerity (*'ilm al-ikhlāṣ*) in the knowledge of the five basic actions, for sincerity is a stipulation for the correctness of one's Islam, as evident from a Tradition to the effect that one cannot be Muslim unless one performs devotional acts (*'ibādāt*) sincerely for God.[29] Sincerity is stressed in the Qur'ān as well.[30]

Aside from the argument stated above, al-Makkī puts forward what he calls a "basic proof"[31] by obligatory knowledge the Prophet did not mean knowledge of everything that is possible to be known, for there is a 'consensus of the Muslim community' (*ijmā' al-ummah*) that he did not mean sciences of medicine, astronomy, grammar, poetry and warfare, although the term knowledge is applicable to all these and their possessors are called knowers. There is also a 'consensus' that the Prophet meant neither the science of legal decisions and judgements, nor the science of different schools of Islamic jurisprudence and different opinions on legal matters. None of these forms of knowledge is obligatory upon *all* Muslims according to the 'consensus,' whereas a grammatico-linguistic analysis of the Tradition under consideration shows that the Prophet meant in it a specific knowledge which is obligatory upon *all* Muslims. The analysis is: the word 'kul,' meaning all, shows that the intended knowledge is binding upon all, not on some, Muslims; the term *al-'ilm*, a noun— made definite by adding the letters *alif* and *lām* to the word *'ilm*—shows that what is intended is something definite and already known, to which the word 'knowledge' is applicable. Since the possibility of the Prophet's intending sciences of

medicine, legal decisions, etc. is thus absent it is correct to assert that what he intended by obligatory knowledge is only the knowledge of the five obligatory actions on which Islam is based, for without knowledge these actions cannot be correct.[32]

To prove that only these five basic actions are binding, so that obligatory knowledge is only the knowledge of these five and not of any other, al-Makkī cites a Tradition to the effect that once an *a'rābī* (villager) asked the Prophet about what God has made obligatory upon him. The Prophet replied: the testimony, ritual prayer, the fast of Ramaḍān, *zakāh* and the pilgrimage. The *a'rābī* asked, "Is any other action obligatory upon me?" The Prophet replied, "No. You may, however, perform supererogatory acts." The *a'rābī* said, "By God, I shall do nothing more nor less than these five." The Prophet said,"He shall succeed and enter Paradise if he is true."[33] This Tradition proves that only these five actions are obligatory upon a Muslim. Since without knowledge no action is correct, knowledge of these five acts must be obligatory.

If knowledge of the five basic actions is what the Prophet meant by obligatory knowledge the question arises as to why he did not specifically say this. Al-Makkī replies to this question, saying that God made acquisition of knowledge obligatory through many Qur'ānic verses, seven of which he cites partly.[34] Then the Prophet made five actions obligatory through the two Traditions quoted above. Then he briefly said, "Seeking knowledge is obligatory." Then he emphasized this using the phrase, "on every Muslim." Thus the term knowledge here obviously refers to those five actions which have already been made obligatory; for the sake of brevity they are not mentioned again; instead of mentioning them again a noun with a definite article, i.e. *al-'ilm* (the knowledge), is used in order to allude to them. Thus an explanation of the Tradition is: seeking knowledge of those actions on which Islam is based is obligatory upon every Muslim because of their obligatoriness.[35]

Knowledge in general, al-Makkī says, cannot be obligatory upon every individual, because some forms of knowledge are not useful and some are even harmful, and ignorance is better than these kinds of knowledge. In support of this point al-Makkī cites a Tradition that the Prophet regarded knowledge of poetry, genealogy and the days of the Arabs as not useful for action or for drawing man towards God, so that lack of this knowledge is not harmful.[36] He cites another Tradition that the Prophet sought protection of

God against a knowledge which is not useful.[37] All this proves that knowledge in general cannot be regarded as binding upon every Muslim.

In the second part of al-Makkī's treatment of obligatory knowledge eleven views are stated together with proofs and evidence. These views are held by his predecessors as well as his contemporaries from among Sufis, theologians, jurists, religious scholars and devotees. Al-Makkī divides them into (a) those who are concerned with man's inward self (*ahl al-bātin*), i.e. Sufis, and (b) those who are concerned with man's outward self (*ahl al-zāhir*).[38] The different views of the former group based on interpretation (*ta'vīl*) of the Tradition on obligatory knowledge quoted above, are near to each other in meaning, though not in words. The latter group took the outward meaning of the Tradition and, accordingly, formed opinions on obligatory knowledge. These opinions are different from those of the Sufis, but not in conflict with them; rather these are complementary to them, as the body is to the soul. Al-Makkī, therefore, evaluates the views of both groups as "good and possible" opinions,[39] though he does not accept them wholly. Only a small part of them, i.e. the part dealing with Divine unity and sincerity, he incorporates into his own theory.[40]

These eleven views need not be discussed here in detail, for these are not fully correct in the opinion of al-Makkī. Their importance is mainly historical, and hence it will be sufficient here to mention them very briefly together with the names of those who held them.

SCHOLARS	VIEWS ON OBLIGATORY KNOWLEDGE
1) Sufi Abū Muḥammad Sahl al-Tustarī:	Knowledge of the state (*'ilm al-ḥāl*) existing between man and God.
2) Some gnostics(*al-'ārifūn*):	Knowledge of gnosis(*'ilm al-ma 'rifah*).
3) Some scholars of Syria, e.g. 'Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Yaḥyā al-Armavī and his followers:	Knowledge of sincerity (*'ilm al-ikhlāṣ*), evils of the outward self (*nafs*) and its suggestions, guiles of the devil and his deceptions, and what causes good and bad deeds.

4) Some devotees and Sufis of Baṣra, e.g. Mālik ibn Dīnār, 'Abd al-Vāḥid ibn Zayd and his followers from devotees(*nussāk*) and their preceptor al-Hasan al-Basri:	Knowledge of the outward self and details of passing thoughts (*khavāṭir*).
5) Devotees (*'ubbād*) of Syria, e.g. Ibrāhīm ibn Adham, Yūsuf ibn Asbāṭ, Wuhayb ibn al-Ward, and Ḥabīb ibn Ḥarb:	Knowledge of what is lawful (*ḥalāl*) according to the *Sharī 'ah.*
6) A group of gnostics :	Knowledge concerned with man's inward self (*'ilm al-bāṭin*).
7) Devotees (*nussāk*) of Basra:	Knowledge of the Islamic faith (*'ilm al-īmān*).
8) Some righteous scholars of early Islam (*salaf*) :	Knowledge of the most essential part of Divine unity (*'ilm al-tawḥīd*),
9) Some jurists (*fuqahā'*) of Kufa, e.g.Imam Abū Ḥanīfa, Sufyān al-Thawrī, and their followers :	Knowledge of sales and purchase, marriage and divorce, etc., when intention is made to involve in these contracts.
10) Some early scholars of Khurasan, e.g. Ibn al-Mubārak and some Traditionists :	Sometimes a man intends to do a religious deed, or a question concerning belief in God or worship of Him occurs to his mind. Seeking correct knowledge of this deed or correct answer to this question is obligatory upon him.
11)Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī and those	Knowledge of those things

theologians who followed him, Abū Thawr Ibrāhīm ibn Khālid al-Kalbī, Dāwūd ibn 'Alī, and al-Ḥusayn al-Karābīsī :

or deeds about the lawfulness of which there is doubt (*shubahat*) ; and knowledge of those actions or affairs, on the lawfulness of which it is difficult to decide (*mushkilat*).[41]

As to the methods of seeking obligatory knowledge al-Makkī states different opinions held by scholars just mentioned. Thus some of them maintained that this knowledge should be acquired by way of proofs and evidence. Some considered research and reflection to be the correct methods. Some believed that from the teachings of the Qur'ān and Tradition obligatory knowledge should be sought. The Sufis added their personal experiences to all these three methods.[42]

III

In the first section an effort is made to determine the source from which the Sufi concept of obligatory knowledge originates. It has been found that the source is a Tradition recorded in the *Sunan* of Ibn Mājah, and that for practical reasons some orthodox Sufis of the medieval times have sought to specify the knowledge which was unspecifically mentioned in that Tradition to be obligatory upon every Muslim. In the second section is given an account of al-Makkī's view as well as the views of eleven other scholars or groups of scholars on obligatory knowledge. The account given there is purely descriptive, having no critical examination or evaluation of them whatsoever. It seems proper to undertake, in the present section, a somewhat impartial evaluation of these views — impartial in the sense of having no undue sympathy for, or prejudice against, them. The views deserving an evaluation first are those which were held by scholars other than al-Makkī, for these views were prior to his own theory and exerted an influence, however small, upon it

Some of these views held by esotericists (*ahl al-bāṭin*) and gnostics (*ahl al-ma'rifah*) are: by the obligatory knowledge the Prophet meant knowledge of the state between man and God, afflictions of the outward self, the devil and his guiles, details of passing thoughts and so on. These views have not been accepted by al-Makkī as fully correct, although he speaks of

them as "good and possible" (*ḥasan wa muḥtamal*).[43] It seems that anyone familiar with the nature of prophetic teaching will find it obvious that the Prophet did not make acquisition of knowledge of these mystical things obligatory upon every Muslim. This point may be made clear by elucidating the nature of Prophetic teaching: All teachings of the Prophet may be subsumed under two broad categories: general and special. The latter was taught to some, not all, Companions (*ṣaḥābah*) [44] when they sought guidance about certain matters related to the higher level of faith (*īmān*) and action (*'amal*) appropriate to the higher level of paradise.[45] These matters are very subtle and difficult in nature and, therefore, comprehensible and appreciable only by men of superior intelligence and serious interest. Examples of such men from among the Companions are: 'Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib, Abū Hurayrah, Ḥudhayfah ibn al-Yamān, and Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī. Ḥudhayfah privately received from the Prophet knowledge about many subtle matters and was called "*ṣāḥib al-sirr* " (possessor of secret).[46] One of such matters is the hidden signs of hypocrisy (*nifāq*) [47] in addition to its obvious signs made known publicly to all Companions.[48]

The general teachings of the Prophet, on the other hand, were addressed to all people of his community (*ummah*), including the less intelligent multitude. The nature of these teachings consists in simplicity, clarity and easy comprehensibility in respect of exposition as well as subject-matter, so that they are comprehensible to all sane, adult human beings. [49] If any general teaching is not of this nature but ascribed to the Prophet, then doubt may be entertained about its genuineness. There are such subtle and difficult matters as are beyond the intelligence of most people, and so the Prophet prohibited them from making efforts to understand these. Examples of such matters are: the inmost nature of the soul (*sirr al-rūḥ*) [50] and the inmost nature of predestination (*sirr al-qadar*). [51] Now, since simplicity, clarity and comprehensibility are generally recognized to form the nature or mark of Prophetic teachings of the general type, one can safely assert that the Prophet did not make it obligatory upon every Muslim to acquire knowledge of such mystical issues as the relationship between man and God, afflictions of self, details of passing thoughts, etc., for these subtle, complicated, inward matters are incomprehensible to general people, whereas the knowledge which he made obligatory must be sought by such people as well. If these matters are considered in light of the criteria of simplicity, clarity and intelligibility, it becomes apparent that it is highly unlikely that knowledge of them is meant in the Tradition on obligatory knowledge which is of general type. Thus the

interpretation (*ta'vīl*) [52] of this Tradition which the esotericists and the gnostics made in order to hold the views that knowledge of the state, etc. is what was meant by the Prophet is not correct.

As for the scholars who do not interpret Traditions but accept their outward meaning (*ahl al-ẓāhir*), their views were: by the obligatory knowledge the Prophet meant knowledge of sales and purchase, marriage and divorce, principles of Divine commands and prohibitions and so on. These things are clear and understandable to general people; yet al-Makkī's rejection of these views seems justifiable on the ground that these things are not binding upon every Muslim, whereas knowledge of a thing becomes binding upon him if the thing itself is equally binding. [53]

Coming to al-Makkī's own theory we find that its sole concern is with the question of "what" obligatory knowledge, and that the question of "how" is totally omitted. It assumes that knowledge itself, a mental process, is neither good, nor bad, nor obligatory, etc., but that it becomes good, bad or obligatory according to the goodness, badness or obligatoriness of the object known. This assumption seems to be correct and is later incorporated in the theory of al-Ghazālī. [54] In the light of this assumption both al-Makkī and al-Ghazālī have sought to determine the obligatory form of knowledge. The core of al-Makkī's argument in found to be this: since it is the obligatory knowledge, of which the Prophet spoke, its object must be something obligatory; since the things obligatory upon every Muslim are only five actions, it is the knowledge of performance of only these five which must be regarded as obligatory. This argument is also logically valid, and hence its main elements, too, are incorporated in al-Ghazālī's theory. [55] However, al-Makkī's statement that only the five actions are binding upon every Muslim is not fully correct, for al-Ghazālī subsequently shows that there are other obligatory actions, seeking knowledge of which is also obligatory upon every Muslim. [56]

The question of "how" (*kayfīyah*) has different aspects, two of which are most important. One of them concerns the methods of acquisition of obligatory knowledge, and the other deals with the manner in which its acquisition becomes obligatory, i.e. the acquisition becomes obligatory at once or gradually. These aspects have totally been omitted in al-Makkī's own theory, but are, later on, discussed in detail by al-Ghazālī. [57] The extent of obligatory knowledge which is to be acquired about an action is also not

mentioned by al-Makkī; it is later specified by al-Ghazālī.[58] Thus al-Makkī's theory, though correct in essential elements, suffers from omissions and inaccuracies.

Despite its shortcomings al-Makkī's theory is important inasmuch as it is the first correct, though incomplete, answer to the question concerning the form of knowledge stated obligatory in a Tradition. These shortcomings have later been removed by a greater thinker, al-Ghazālī, and consequently a better and complete theory of obligatory knowledge has evolved. [59] Most Muslims have accepted it as fully correct, but some intellectuals have put forward different theories of their own. [60]

NOTES

(1) Abū Ḥāmid Muhammad al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn* (Beirut, n.d.) vol i, pp. 2, 14 (referred to hereinafter as *Ihya'*), Shaykh Abū Tālib al-Makkī, *Qūt al-Qulūb fī Mu' āmalat al-Maḥbūb* (Egypt, n.d. vol. I, 262 (referred to hereinafter as *Qūt*).

(2) Ibn Mājah, *Sunan al-Muṣṭafā*, Int., p. 17:5; al-Baghavī, *Masābiḥ al-Sunnah* (Cairo, A.H 1318), vol. i, 15.

(3) See *Supra*, n 2.

(4) Al-Mulla 'Alī al-Qārī, *al-Mirqāt fī Sharḥ al-Mishkāt* (Multan, Pakistan, n d.), vol i, 282 f, 'Irāqī, *al-Mughnī 'an Ḥaml al-Asfār fī al-Asfār*, on the margin of al-Ghazālī, *Iḥyā'*, vol. i, p. 2, where 'Irāqī says that Imam Ahmad, al-Bayhaqī and others have regarded this Tradition weak.

(5) For some of these Traditions see, *Iḥyā'*, vol i, pp. 4-11.

(6) The numbers of Qur'ānic verses on knowledge are to be found in Muhammad Fu'ād 'Abd al-Bāqī, *al-Mu'jam al-Mufahras li-Alfāz al-Qur'ān al-Karīm* (Beirut, n d), pp 469-80

(7) Abū Hāmid Muhammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Qistās al-Mustaqīm*, ed.al-Yasū'ī (Beirut, 1959), p.49.

(8) The-Qur'ān XXXIX· 9 The English translation of all Qur'ānic verses cited in this article is mine. The translation is made in free-flowing, modern English in order to make it not only scholarly but also enjoyable and interesting. Such translation of about 1500 Qur'ānic verses I have made in my book, *The Jewels of the Qur'an* (2nd ed , Kegan Paul International Ltd London; 1979), pp. 89-223.

(9) *Ibid* , II. 269

(10) *Ibid* , II 2, 5, 97, 159, 175, 185; IX: 33; X· 57, XIII· 7, XVI: 64;XXX. 53, IIL 28, *et passim*

(11) Orthodox Sufis are those Sufis who follow the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* very closely. Prominent among them are: al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, Imam al-Qushayrī, Shaykh Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, and Imām al-Ghazālī. Orthodox Sufism of the medieval times culminated in al-Ghazālī. This form of Sufism has been continuing since al-Ghazālī's time, and now-a-days there are many Sufis of Indo-Pak-Bangla subcontinent who rightly claim themselves to be orthodox Sufis.

(12) *Iḥyā'*, vol. i, 4, *Qūt*, vol. i, 265.

(13) Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad al-Ghazālī, *al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl*, 2nd ed. Aḥmad Ghalwash (Egypt, 1952/1371), p. 25 (referred to hereinafter as *al-Munqidh*).

(14) *Qūt*, vol. i, 265f. For more information on the Sufis' emphasis on knowledge for the sake of action, see M.Abul Quasem, *The Ethics of al-Ghazali* (New York, 1979), pp. 22f.

(15) *Qūt*, vol. i, chap. xxxi, 262-364; *idem*, *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, ed. 'Abd al-Qādir Aḥmad 'Aṭā (Cairo n.d.), pp. 14-86, 274-90, *Iḥyā'*, vol. i, 1-89. Throughout the middle ages al-Ghazālī's theory of knowledge was generally accepted by Muslims as correct. Now-a-days also it is regarded as valid for the most part and widely studied.

(16) pp. 264-364. For an account of al-Makkī, see al-Sam'ānī, *Kitāb al-Ansāb*, ed. D.S. Margoliouth (Leyden, 1912), fol. 541a; Ibn Khallikān, *Wafayāt al-A'yān wa Anbā' Abnā' al-Zamān* (Cairo, 1299), vol. ii, 297.

(17) Al-Makkī, *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, pp. 80-86.

(18) *Al-Munqidh*, p 24.

(19) *Iḥyā'*, i, 2.

(20) This work is divided into four parts each of which is called a 'quarter' *(rub')* Each quarter is sub-divided into ten parts called 'books.' The reason for such division is given in *Iḥyā'*, vol. i, pp. 4-5.

(21) *Ibid.*, pp. 13-16.

(22) See *supra*, n. 2.

(23) *Qūt*, vol. i, p 264.

(24) *Ibid*, p. 264; *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, pp. 83 f

(25) Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, vol. 1, 3; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 19-22; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Īmān, p. 3; al-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, Īmān, 13.

(26) Al-Makkī, *Qūt*, vol. i, p. 265.

(27) *Ibid.*, *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, pp. 84f.

(28) *Ibid.*

(29) *Ibid.*

(30) Al-Qur'ān IV 146; XXIX: 3; XXXIX: 2, 11, 14, II: 139; VII: 29, X: 22; XXIX 65, XXXI 32; XL: 14, 65; IIC· 5.

(31) *Qūt*, vol i, p. 265; *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, p. 84, where this proof is given briefly but not called a "basic proof"

(32) *Ibid.*

(33) Al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 34, Sawm, 1, Shahādat, 36; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 8; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Zakāh, 3; al-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, Ṣalāh, 4.

(34) *Qūt*, vol. i, p.66. These Qur'ānic verses are VIII.: 86, IV: 43, VI: 148; XXX: 29; VL: 18; IX: 14; XVI: 43

(35) *Ibid.*; i, *Qūt*, i, p. 266.

(36) *Ibid.*

(37) *Ibid.*; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Dhikr, 73; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Da'wat, 68; al-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, Isti-'ādhah, 13, 18, 21, 64; Ibn Mājah, *Sunan*, Muqaddamah, 23, Du'a', 2, ; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. ii, 167, 198; vol iii, 192, 255; vol. iv, 371, 381.

(38) *Qūt*, vol. i, p 264; *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, p. 81.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 264. This evaluatory comment is not made in the *Kitāb al-'Ilm*

(40) See *supra*, p. 5.

(41) *Qūt*, vol. i, pp.262-64; *Kitāb al-'Ilm*, pp. 81 ff. where the views of certain scholars, e.g. Abū Muḥammad Sahl al-Tustarī, are elaborated, while those of others abridged probably because of their little importance in the opinion of al-Makkī.

(42) *Qūt*, vol. i, p. 264.

(43) *Ibid.*, p. 264.

(44) *Iḥyā'*, vol. iv, p. 248.

(45) For levels of Paradise, see Quasem, *The Ethics of al-Ghazali*, pp 54-78.

(46) Al-Bukhārī, *Sahīh*, Fadā'il Aṣḥāb al-Nabī, 30, 37, Istu'dhān, 38; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Manāqib, 37; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, vol. iv, 449, 459, 454; *Iḥyā'*, vol. iv, p. 248.

(47) *Iḥyā'*, vol iii, p. 64; vol. iv, p. 248. This hypocrisy is in action and not in belief. For the two kinds of hypocrisy see al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Iman, 14.

(48) For these obvious signs see al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 24, Mazālim, 17; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Īmān, 102; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Īmān, 14; al-Nasā'ī, *Sunan*, Īmān, 20; Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, vol. ii, 189.

(49) This is also the nature of Qur'ānic teachings addressed to all human beings. See al-Qur'ān 19. 97, 44.58, 5:15, 12:1, 15:1, 26:2, 195, 27:1, 28:2, 36.69, 43:2, 44:2, 4:174, 34:28.

(50) *Iḥyā'*, vol. iii, p. 13, al-Bukhārī, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, I'tiṣām, 3, 8, 'Ilm, 47; Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, Munāfiqīn, 32; al-Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, Tafsīr Sūrah 17: 11, 13; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, vol. i, 410, 444. The last part of the Qur'ānic verse 17:85 implies that man is unable to know the nature of the soul fully

(51) The relevant Traditions are narrated by Ibn Ḥanbal (*Musnad*, vol. ii, 178), Ibn 'Adī, Abū

Nu'aym and al-Ṭabarānī. It is quoted in *Ihyā'*, vol. iv, p. 248.

(52) *Qūt*, i, 264.

(53) *Ibid.*, pp. 265f.

(54) *Iḥyā'*, vol. i, pp 14f.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 15.

(56) *Ibid*, pp. 14f.

(57) *Ibid.*, pp. 14ff.

(58) *Ibid*

(59) *Ibid.*, pp. 13-16.

(60) A few of these theories are cited in al-Qārī, *al-Mirqāt fī Sharh al-Mishkāt*, vol. i, p.282.

METHODOLOGY OF UNDERSTANDING ISLAM: SHARIATI'S VIEWPOINT *

BASHIR A. DABLA

ISLAM represents a world view which encompasses the whole of life. While it deals with personal matters, it also provides guidance in social affairs. According to Dr. Ali Shariati, Islam is "a school of thought that gives life to man, individual and society, and that is entrusted with the mission of the future guidance of mankind."[1] He felt that Islam is universal, humanistic, scientific, innovative, creative, providing divine guidance to Muslims and humanity. It is for change and revolution and against exploitation and injustice; demands full commitment in theory and practice; and provides the model society (*Ummah*) and the model personality (Prophet Muḥammad). He presented Islam in the historical perspective by observing that

> ...Islam is not a new religion but an integral part of a larger stream which has flowed through the chord of entire human history. Various Prophets were ordained at different times to establish the universal religion in accordance with the circumstances of the age and the need of the era. Islam ... (is related) with other movements which, throughout history, have been launched to emancipate and ameliorate the lives of the people."[2]

Shariati believed that the analysis of the approaches and methods of understanding Islam is of fundamental importance because they develop correct thought which is basic to true knowledge and that (true knowledge) creates sound belief. This analysis is of utmost importance because the Muslims, in general, and non-Muslims, in particular, lack the proper understanding of Islam.

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* This paper is based mainly on the views of the late Dr Ali Shariati expressed in his lectures at Hussainieh Ershad, Tehran.

In regard to the understanding of Islam, Shariati raised a question of fundamental importance, i.e. what is the correct method of knowing about Islam?[3] He answered this question in detail. According to him, while trying to know the correct method, one must not fall into the trap of imitation of any European method—naturalistic, psychological or sociological. This is because the wholesale borrowing or borrowing with certain adjustments of the European methods distorts theoretical as well as empirical realities. So, he felt that in order to find a proper method to learn about Islam, one must be innovative enough in devising a new method, which may include some of the elements of the European method/s. The partial inclusion of the Western methods is necessary because new approaches have been discovered in the West for investigation of religion and its role in the society. He asserted that there may not be a unique method for understanding Islam comprehensively due to the fact that it (Islam) is multi-dimensional. So, the application of plural methods seems realistic. He said:

> Islam is not a religion based solely on the mystic intuition of man and restricted the relationship between man and God; this is merely one dimension of the religion of Islam. In order to study this dimension, a philosophical method must be followed because man's relation to God is discussed in philosophy, in the sense of general and unfettered metaphysical thought. Another dimension of this religion is the question of man's life on this earth. In order to study this dimension use must be made of the methods that have been established in the human sciences of today. Then, too, Islam is a religion that has built a society and a civilization; in order to study these, the method of history and sociology must be used.[4]

Shariati held that there are two fundamental methods for learning Islam correctly. These methods are as follows:

i) the study of the Qur'ān, taking it as the compendium of the ideas and the scientific and literary output of the person known as 'Islam'; and

ii) the study of Islamic history, taking it as the sum total of the developments in Islam from the beginning of the Prophet's mission down to the present.

He explained these two methods in the logic of equating Islam with the human personality. A religion, according to him, is like a person in the methodological context. In order to acquire correct knowledge about a great personality, the researcher adopts two main methods which are: (i) investigation of the intellectual, scientific, and written works of the individual concerned; and (ii) extensive study of his biography which includes all of his major and minor life-events. Similarly, the correct understanding of Islam can be achieved by the study of its original source, i.e. Qur'ān and its historical development. What precisely he meant was as follows:

> The knowledge and understanding of the Qur'ān as the source of the ideas of Islam, and the knowledge and understanding of Islamic history as the record of the various events that have occurred at different times – these are the two fundamental methods for attaining a precise and scientific knowledge of Islam.[5]

Shariati felt that the degree of knowledge and understanding of both, the Qur'ān and Islamic history, prevalent among the Muslims is very low. By implication, he meant that both of these original sources must be studied comprehensively for knowing Islam correctly.

Shariati presented another method, which is one of the widely used methods in Europe, for gaining knowledge and understanding Islam, i.e. the method of typology. The meaning which he attached to this method is that it consists of "classifying topics and themes according to type and then comparing them on that basis."[6] In this context, he developed a particular method for studying religion, which is applicable to all religions. This method has got two important features: first, it emphasizes the identification of five distinctive characteristics of Islam; and secondly, it compares them with the corresponding features in other religions. He felt that the five distinctive and comparable characteristics of any religion are as under:

i) the god or gods of every religion, i.e. the entity worshipped by the followers of the religion;

ii) the prophet of each religion, i.e. the person who proclaims the message of the religion;

iii) the book of each religion, i.e. the foundation of the law proclaimed by the religion, to which it invites men in faith and obedience;

iv) the circumstances of the appearance of the prophet of each religion and the audience to which he addresses himself, for each prophet proclaims his message in a different fashion; and

v) those choice individuals each religion nurtures and produces—the representative figures it has trained and then presented to society and history.[7]

Shariati has operationalized this method in five stages in the case of Islam. We will explain these stages in the following:

1. *The First Stage*: One must examine the type, concept, features, and characteristics of God discussed in Islam; one must refer to the Qur'ān and words of the Prophet as well as the elite among those whom he trained; and one must compare Allāh with the figures depicted in other religions as God, such as Ahuramazda, Yahwa, Zeus, Baal and so on.

2. *The Second Stage*: One must understand what kind of a book the Qur'ān is, what topics it discusses, and what areas it emphasizes; one must study what matters the Qur'ān treats and in exactly what fashion; and one must develop a comparison between the Qur'ān and other religious texts, such as the Gospels, the Torah, the Vedas, the Avesta, and so on.

3. *The Third Stage*: One must concentrate on the personality of the Prophet in both human and prophetic dimensions; one must study the way in which he spoke, worked, thought, smiled, sat, and slept; one must observe the nature of his relations with strangers, with enemies, with friends, and with family; one must examine his failures and his triumphs and the manner in which he confronted great social problems; one must compare him with other prophets and founders of religions like Moses, Jesus, Zoroaster and the Buddha.

4. *The Fourth Stage*: One must examine whether the Prophet appeared without any preliminary and if anyone was waiting for him; one must know whether he anticipated and knew the mission; one must enquire about the extraordinary current of thought which began to flow through his mind, totally changing his manner of speech and personality in such fashion that he

initially found it difficult to bear; one must observe how he confronted men when he first proclaimed his mission; one must compare the circumstances under which the Prophet of Islam appeared with those under which other prophets such as Jesus, Abraham, Moses, Zoroaster, Confucius, Buddha and others appeared. A definite comparison is portrayed by Shariati among the prophets of the Abrahamic and non-Abrahamic lines. While all prophets of the non-Abrahamic line turn immediately to the existing secular power, hoping to propagate their message in society by means of that power, all prophets of the Abrahamic line from Abraham to Muḥammad proclaim their missions in the form of rebellion against the existing secular power.

5. *The Fifth Stage*: One must choose to study Aaron in the religion of Moses, St. Paul in the religion of Jesus, and 'Alī, Ḥusayn and Abū Dharr in the religion of Islam, as outstanding specimens of each of the religions. During the study of the life of Ḥusayn, one must try to know the principles for which he fought, his sensitivity with respect to social matters and the destiny of the people, and his devotion and self-sacrifice towards the Islamic cause. Shariati compares Ḥusayn with Abū 'Alī Sīnā and Ḥusayn bin Manṣūr Ḥallāj. Ibn Sīnā was a great philosopher, scholar, and genius, and an outstanding figure in the history of science and philosophy in the Islamic civilization. But he placed himself in the service of rank and power and never showed any concern with the destiny of men and the fate of his society. Similarly, Ḥallāj was a man aflame with the passionate love of God. He was constantly immersed in the burning invocation of God and this was a source of true exaltation for him. But, his 'spiritual lunacy' could hardly have any social impact.

Shariati felt that if Islam is understood through the adoption of the above-mentioned scientific methods, new realities will dawn upon observers, including laymen. In fact, the scientific study of Islam lead to new horizons of knowledge. He said:

> There are several important topics in the human sciences that I discovered with the aid of the Qur'an that have not yet been discussed by these (natural) sciences.[8]

In order to prove his point, he gave the examples of the ideas of 'migration' and 'change and development.' He maintained that the study of these ideas in the Islamic context would divulge new realities which could not be discovered within the Western scientific framework. This type of study will also help in understanding many questions of history and sociology

in a better, fresher and more precise fashion.

According to Shariati, migration (*Hijrah*) is not merely "a historical event" from the point of view of the Qur'ān. It is rather a profound philosophical and social principle in the sociological and historical sense. It is because the development of all known civilizations is directly related to the process of migration. On the basis of his study of the Qur'an, Shariati concluded that

> all the civilizations in the world—from the most recent, the civilization of America, to the most ancient that we know of, the civilization of Sumer—came into being on the heels of a migration. In each case, a primitive people remained primitive as long as it stayed in its own land, and attained civilization after undertaking a migration and establishing itself in a new land. All civilizations are, then, born of the migrations of primitive peoples.[9]

Similarly, Shariati discovered some very distinguishing ideas in Islam regarding the basic factors in the change and development of societies, the topic which has been debated in the human sciences for hundreds of years. In regard to this topic, the social scientists in the West have taken varying positions, often contradictory and one at the cost of the other. While one school considered accident to be the basic factor, another school believed in the human evolution in accordance with pre-determined laws that play exactly the same role in human society as the laws of nature in the human realm. In the same way, while some proclaimed that laws are no more than a tool in the hand of powerful personalities who always act as the guides for societies, others held the opinion that the people—the generality of society—do play the role in determining their destiny. Shariati comments that none of these theories could be found in Islam exclusively. After a detailed and careful study of the Qur'ān, he concluded that

> While the people are those to whom the Qur'an addresses itself and they constitute the axis and fundamental factor in social development and change, and while they are responsible before God, at the same time, personality, chance and tradition also have been recognized as capable of affecting the destiny of society. According to Islam, there are then four fundamental factors of social development and change—personality, tradition, accident and *al-nas* (the people).[10]

Among these four factors, he distinguished two—*al-nās* and tradition—

as the most important. *Al-nās* represents the scientifically demonstrable laws which exist in society. The meaning, nature and implications of the above-mentioned fundamental factors are explained in the following five ways:

(i) Personality, according to Islam, is not a creative factor in itself. Even the prophets have not created new norms in society. Sociologically, their superiority over teachers and reformers may be explained in terms of their divine knowledge and the consequent behaviour. In the Qur'ān, the prophet has been portrayed as the bearer of message whose duty was to show man the school and the path of truth. However, his message had a definite context. That is why, his personality had an important "role in bringing change, development and progress in building a future civilization and in changing the course of history."[11]

(ii) Accident has no decisive role in Islam, for God intervenes directly or indirectly in all affairs. It has neither a logical cause nor an ultimate purpose. Moreover, accident cannot come in the way of Islam because it, as a scientific school of thought, believes that change and development stem from the societal dynamics which possess immutable and scientifically demonstrable norms. However, a certain form of accident exists in human fate. Shariati explained it by the example of Chingiz Khan who appears in Mongolia, comes to power in accordance with social norms, and assembles a large force around him. But, the defeat of Iran at the hands of Chingiz Khan is an accident; it was quite possible for it not to have occurred.[12]

(iii) The historical fact is that those addressed by any school of thought, religion or prophet constitute the fundamental factor of social change. While the Qur'ān is addressed to *al-nās*, the Prophet was sent to the same. Moreover, it is *al-nās* (the people without any particular class or social form), not the prophet, who are accountable for their deeds, especially for decline and degeneration. Thus Shariati claimed:

> Islam is the first school of social thought that recognizes the masses as the basis, the fundamental and conscious factor in determining history and society.[13]

(iv) Islam appears to approach the theory of determinism in a particular way. While accepting the fact that change emanates in society on the basis of fixed patterns and immutable laws, the individual is equally responsible in determining society's fate. So, both—society and individual—are responsible for their destinies. Shariati says that

> Society... has been established on the basis of God-given norms and patterns, and its development and evolution is also founded on them. But at the same time man is responsible, and he cannot divest himself of his responsibility through reliance upon Khayyamian fatalism or historical determinism, thus ridding himself of accountability for the destiny of his society.[14]

(v) The role and interaction pattern of these factors, mentioned above, is interesting. The proportional influence of these factors depends on the circumstances prevailing in society. In societies where *al-nās* is in an advanced stage of development in the cultural and educational fields, the role of personality gets minimized. In contrast, in societies that have a lower level of civilization, the individual emerges as influential. Moreover, at different stages of societal development, one of the factors will have greater effect than other factors.

NOTES

(1) Lectures by Ali Shariati at Husseinieh Ershad, Tehran, in October 1968, quoted in Hamid Algar, tr., *On the Sociology of Islam: Lectures by Ali Shariati* (Berkeley, 1979), p.42.

(2) A.H.H. Abidi, "Dr. Ali Shariati: The Man and His Ideals," *Islam and the Modern Age*, (New Delhi), May 1982, p.95.

(3) See Bashir Ahmad Dabla, "Sociology of Islam: Shariati's Viewpoint," *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad), October, 1983.

(4) Lecture delivered at Husseinieh Ershad on the topic 'Ravish-i Shinakht-i Islam.' See Algar, *op. cit.*, p.60.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 63.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 64.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 43.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 44.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 50.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 51.

(12) *Ibid.*

(13) *Ibid*, p. 49.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 51.

METHOD OF UNDERSTANDING ISLAM - I



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

THE STUDY OF MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCES ON MODERN SOUTH ASIAN STUDIES*

MARC GABORIEAU

THE aim of this paper is to evaluate the studies of the Muslim communities of South Asia presented to the Conferences from the very beginning in Herrenhalb (near Heidelberg) in 1966 to the present meeting in Heidelberg in 1986.[1]

Only papers where Islam is a significant variable have been taken into consideration. I have excluded those which contain only passing references; or those which describe populations which happen to be Muslim but where the religious affiliation is not taken as a variable in the topics studied (for instance many papers on the economy and the politics of Pakistan and Bangladesh). 66 papers have been finally selected on these criteria.

How far do they cover the field? How far do they keep pace with the contemporary trends in the research on the subject?[2]

GENERAL ASSESSMENT

From a first general survey of the papers, four striking features emerge. First, the interest in Muslim communities appeared rather late in the history of the Conferences. The first great influx of papers started in 1970: no less than eight. The interest thus aroused subsided in 1972 and 1974; it reappeared in 1976 and has been steadily maintained to this day.

In the second place, the number of papers remained low throughout.

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Paper presented to the Nineteenth European Conference on Modern Sputh Asian, 9-12 July 1986, South Asian Institute, Heidelberg, for the panel on *The European Conferences on Modern South Asian Studies An attempt in the Sociology of Knowledge*, convened by Mrs. Alice Thorner.

Muslim communities make out 26% of the population of the sub-continent; their historical, sociological and political importance is not adequately reflected in the Conferences. There are too few papers about them. One had to wait until the 1978 Paris Conference to find a session exclusively devoted to them, with only three papers. The convener, Peter Hardy, concluded that the idea of special panels on Islam should be dropped for lack of interest. It is good news that the present Conference managed to convene a panel, even a substantial one, on Islamization. Let us take it as a good omen for an increased interest in Muslim communities.

Thirdly, the regional coverage of the Muslim communities is inadequate. Most of the papers concentrate on Northern India (particularly U.P.) and Pakistan. Both Western Bengal and Bangladesh, do not get a share proportionate to their importance. The other regions of India (i.e. excluding U.P. and Bengal) are very thinly represented, if not absent. Minor States with Muslim majority (Maldives) or with Muslim minority (Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka) are practically unrepresented except for one paper on Sri Lanka (Kannangara,1981) and two on Nepal(Gaborieau,1976, 1978, SA). The South Asian Muslim diaspora has only paper (Nemo, 1978,D).[3]

The coverage by academic disciplines is not very adequate:

Economics, development, planning(E).	2
Films(F).	2
Geography (G).	0
History(H).	15
Literature, language, culture (Lit).	6
Law(L).	3
Medicine, health (M).	1
Politics and international relations (P).	18
Religion, philosophy (R).	7
Sociology, anthropology (SA).	14
South Asian diaspora (D).	1
Total	69

(N.B. Three papers having been entered twice, the actual number of papers is 66).

A mere glance at the table above shows how unbalanced the treatment of the various disciplines is. History and Politics, with 15 and 18 papers respectively, account for nearly a half. Then come Sociology and Social anthropology with 14 papers. Ranking third on equal footing are Literature on the one hand, and Religion-philosophy on the other, with 6 and 7 papers. Law is poorly represented with only (parts of) 3 papers. There are only two on films; two papers on Economics; one on South Asian Muslim Diaspora. One discipline is conspicuously absent: Geography; this is the more to be regretted since the uneven distribution of Muslims over the subcontinent is an important factor in history and politics; no paper has addressed itself to this question.

INVENTORY OF THE THEMES STUDIED

The scope of the Conferences is further narrowed by the concentration of most of the papers on a few selected themes, leaving aside (with some happy exceptions) equally rewarding and interesting themes.

History and Politics. Historians and political scientists have concentrated mainly on three themes: the Medieval Muslim State, Muslim separatism and Islamization in contemporary Pakistan.

The Medieval Muslim State. Curiously enough for a series of Conferences on Modern South Asian Studies, one of the best explored themes has been the Medieval Muslim State and its survival in the princely states of the colonial period or even in the very structure of the British Indian Empire. The focus of this group of studies was the workshop on *Kingship and Authority in South Asia* held during the 1976 Leiden Conference (Hardy, 1976, H; Ziegler, 1976, H; Richards, 1976, H; Gordon, 1976, H). This impressive seminar crystallized the research of Western scholars on the authority of Muslim kings in South Asia. It was completed by other papers on the British Empire (Cohn, 1976, H), and on regional princely states like Awadh (Llwellyn-Jones, 1981, H), Berar (Dhanagare, 1983, H) and Mysore (Frykenberg,1983, H).

The economic aspects of the Medieval State were inadequately explored except for the two early papers of Ashin Dasgupta on merchants (Dasgupta, 1966 and 1968, H). The important question of agrarian administration under Muslim rule has not been specifically dealt with.

Nationalism, separatism, communalism. From this medieval heritage we jump to the end of the nineteenth century and to the twentieth century with the rise of Muslim separatism in connection with nationalism and communalism. This has been the main topic under which the Muslim communities were discussed, both in terms of the number of papers presented and of the range of the themes discussed. The topic was announced in 1968 by two suggestive papers: one by P.D. Reeves on the U.P. Muslim electorate in 1937 and 1946 (Graham and Reeves, 1968, P); the other by Anthony Parel on the political symbolism of the cow (Parel, 1968, P). The debate was solidified in 1970 with the entrance of the great tenors who presented every facet of Muslim politics: the political thought of nationalist *'Ulamā'* (Hardy, 1970, H), municipal government and Muslim separatism (Robinson, 1970,H), the emergence of Gandhi as a leader in alliance with Muslim politicians (Brown, 1970, H), the problem of Urdu and Muslim grievances (Brass, 1970, P) and the identification of Muslim culture (Dittmer, 1970). After a two years eclipse the topic came back to remain in the foreground with a series of papers on Hindu-Muslim communal relations and conflicts: we hear of the communal riot of 1931 in Kanpur (G. Pandey, 1976, H), of conflicts over conversion, migration and birth rates (Wright, 1976, P), of communal relations in Indian politics (Graff, 1978, P); the topic of communal riots was discussed twice by Suranjan Das for India (Das, 1983, H, and 1986, P) and once for Sri Lanka (Kannangara, 1981). Other themes were sporadically discussed like the political role of Muhammad Ali (Iqbal, 1976, H), the role of Urdu as a symbol of Islam (Phadniss, 1983, P). The entire history of Muslim separatism as surveyed again by Hamza Alavi in his paper on Pakistan and Islam (Alavi, 1986, P).

Ethnicity and Islam in Pakistan. As some of the papers quoted above show, the communal problem in India continued, basically unaltered by the partition of 1947. In Pakistan, on the contrary, the emergence of a Muslim majority state radically altered the debate. The question shifted from communalism to the role of Islam in the new political framework: how can a common religious affiliation overcome ethnic conflicts? (Hussain, 1976, P; Raghib-ul-Islam, 1986, P; Rizvi, 1986, P). How can Islam be used for political, economic and social control, either under the slogan of Islamic Socialism as Bhutto did (F.M. Malik, 1986, R), or in a more conservative and fundamentalist interpretation as nowadays in the Islamization policy of General Zia? (M.D. Ahmed, 1986, R; Gieraths, 1986, R).

The present politics of Bangladesh has been discussed in several papers of Kirsten Westergaard (notably Westergaard, 1978, P) whereas the return to Islamic values, after the phase of acute Bengali nationalism in 1971, has not been studied in the Conferences.

LITERATURE: COMMUNALISM AS REFLECTED IN LITERATURE

Among the papers devoted to literature, only two are genuinely interested in literary history and criticism: one on Urdu drama (Zaidi, 1981, Lit.), the other on the religious poetry of the Ismailis (Mallison, 1986, R). All others leave aside the study of the immense cultural heritage of the South Asian Muslims to consider only the expression of Hindu-Muslim confrontation in modern literature. Bengali writers are best represented by a study of modernization (Zbavitel, 1970, Lit.) and an analysis on the ever increasing communalist content of Bankim Chandra's novels (Roselli, 1974, Lit.). A most interesting paper by Induprakash Pandey discusses the social and political conditions of the Shī'ah Muslims of U.P. village as depicted in a novel (I. Pandey, 1976, Lit.). There is finally an analysis of the communalist content of the early twentieth century Marathi literature (Gokhale, 1983, Lit.).

As in the case of History and Political Science, communalism has been the main focus. The papers on literature in the Conference are more a complement of the studies on politics than studies of literature per se which remains a neglected subject.

Sociology and Social Anthropology. These disciplines rank second by the number of papers; and probably first if we consider the range of topics discussed.

Methodology. Problems of methodology have been discussed at length in various papers falling under this heading, to which should be added the very important discussion of the British censuses by Bernard Cohn (Cohn, 1970, H). I believe he goes too far in his criticism; nevertheless his reservations are to be kept in mind, since British colonial ethnography remains our main source of information.

Urban sociology: class, occupation, mobility. One paper studies the way class, caste and Muslim identity correlate in the urban milieu of Calcutta (Eade, 1976, SA). Two papers by a political scientist turned sociologist focus

on social and economic mobility in marginal Muslim groups. The first one (Wright, 1978, SA) studies mobility through peripheral occupations like music, cinema, sports, smuggling. A second and more promising one (Wright, 1981, SA) studies the emergence of new Muslim enterpreneurs; it shows how this mobility is rooted in the traditional social structure and the hereditary ascription of castes and occupations; this enquiry is important because the rise of new Muslim businessmen is at the root of recent communal violence in India. A third paper by the same author (Wright, 1986, SA) deals with interprovincial marriage as a factor of national integration in Pakistan.

Social anthropology: caste and class, kinship, local politics, women. A historian with a keen interest in Anthropology and Law (Conlon, 1972, L) and four social anthropologists (Alavi, 1970, SA; Gaborieau, 1976, and 1978, SA; A. Chowdhuri, 1978, P; P. Jeffery, 1981 and 1983, SA) produced a series of papers dealing with caste and class, kinship and local politics. First chronologically was the paper of Hamza A. Alavi which is the most comprehensive and the most ambitious one; the other papers, less comprehensive, go deeper into the questions involved.

Social stratification: class and caste. There is complete agreement among the contributors to juxtapose the land owning (or trading) dominant groups on the one hand, with the tenants and service people on the other hand. Then the question arises whether the former dominant groups should be termed "castes" or not. Patricia Jeffery (1981, SA) describes the *Pīrzādahs* of Nizamuddin (Delhi) in terms reminiscent of high caste endogamous groups. Frank F. Conlon provides a fine sociological analysis of the proceedings of the British courts concerning the authority of the Agha Khan over the Ismaili traders of Western India; he concludes that the community of the Khojas looked "very much like a caste within Islam." The question is debated on the theoretical level by Hamza Alavi (1970) and Marc Gaborieau (1978). The former argues that caste among Muslims is only "a vestigial phenomenon and does not constitute a referent in social action." A contrary conclusion is arrived at by Marc Gaborieau: although deprived of religious and ideological sanction, caste is still operative among Muslims, at least at the middle and lower levels of the social hierarchy, to define dominance and social interaction.

Kinship. If one is to find features particular to Muslim society, one has a better chance to encounter them in the field of kinship than of caste. Two

opposite systems of kinship are in competition. One is typically Muslim: it is the so-called endogamous system which allows one to marry inside lineage, up to the level of first paternal parallel cousin; this system is found practically at all levels of the social hierarchy in Punjab (Alavi, 1970); but only at the highest levels of the *Ashrāfs* in India; Patricia Jeffery (1981) gives the most interesting account ever published of this system. The other system is the so-called exogamous one, where one has to marry outside one's own native patri-lineage; it follows the old Hindu rule of lineage exogamy; it is found in India from the level of converted Rajputs downwards. It appears at first sight to be only a continuation of old Hindu rules; but the contention of Marc Gaborieau (1976) is that Muslims introduce subtle modificatons; in spite of overwhelming structural identities, there is still scope for the study of the effect of minor dissimilarities. This point is also made by Patricia Jeffery in her paper on childbirth and collaboration among women in Bijnor district (1983).

Local politics. Three of the above-mentioned papers (Alavi, 1970; Chowdhuri, 1978, and Gaborieau, 1978) describe dominance and local level politics in Pakistani Punjab, Bangladesh and Nepal respectively. All three show the domination of land-owning groups and their monopolization of local politics. Only Marc Gaborieau examines the question as to how far the political game played in a Muslim context differs from the game played in a purely Hindu context. His answer is that nothing, substantially, differentiates the Muslim landowning groups from the Hindu dominant castes.

All these papers raise more questions than they solve. To understand the social structure of Muslim communities in the local context, a differential sociology is needed, which would compare Hindus and Muslims in every feature. Wide differences between the two communities are usually assumed to exist on ideological groups; on enquiry they prove to be minimal; but this minimum (historically on the increase) is significant; its import should be more carefully studied. More empirical studies are needed to build a significantly structured Sociology of South Asian Muslims.

Muslim women. The papers of Patricia Jeffery quoted above focused mainly on the roles of women. Several papers in the present Heidelberg Conference deal with Muslim women in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, particularly the paper of Farah Nizami on arguments for and against Muslim female education in North India. (F. Nizami, 1986, SA)

Religion and films. In terms of the number of papers submitted, Religion comes third (with Literature, already dealt with). The two films available also concern Religion. All these papers and films deal with a variety of themes: political, juridical and mystical thought, training of religious experts, religious institutions.... They may be conveniently classified under two traditional headings: exoteric and esoteric disciplines.

The exoteric (*zāhirī*) disciplines are the domain of the '*Ulamā*' who are experts in Qur'ānic exegesis, Tradition, Religious Law, Theology, Political Theories.... Out of the four papers dealing with this domain two concentrate on the training of the '*Ulamā*' at two different periods of the historical evolution. One deals with their social adjustments to British rule in North India in the first half of the nineteenth century (F.A. Nizami, 1986, R); the other with the reorganization of religious schools in contemporary Pakistan (J. Malik, 1986, R). The two other papers explore with great depth the thinking of the '*Ulamā*' in the domain of politics (Hardy, 1970, H, already mentioned) and of family law and the status of women (Baljon, 1986, R). This is a very promising field which has been recently considerably developed in Western scholarship; it is a pity that so little of the current research on the subject was reflected in the European Conferences.

The esoteric (*bātinī*) disciplines have more attraction for a Western audience, although they do not fare much better in the Conferences. Two papers deal with the *dargāh*, i.e. the shrine built around the tomb of a reputed Muslim saint. The first one describes the functions and sources of income of such shrines in the traditional setting (Schwerin, 1978, R); the other analyzes the results of the present control policy of the government of Pakistan both on the income of the personnel and the style of the rituals performed (Buddenberg, 1986, R). Two other papers (Jeffery, 1981, SA, already mentioned; Pfleiderer, 1981, Lit.) and one film (Pfleiderer, 1981, F) deal with the staff and the rituals of the Muslim shrines.

But the esoteric aspects of Islam are best illustrated in the paper of N.K. Wagle on the Muslim Saints of Medieval Maharashtra (Wagle, 1986, R). Starting from the texts, he gives us an insight into the speculations of Muslim mystics and studies their convergence with certain trends of the Hindu *bhaktī*.

In the esoteric as well as in the exoteric disciplines, the European Conferences lag behind the recent developments of the research.

A film by Jacques Lombard (Lombard, 1978, F) illustrates an important aspect of a Muslim ritual in South Asia: the commemoration of the martyrdom of Ḥusayn, grandson of the Prophet, during the first ten days of the month of Muḥarram. The film was made among Khoja emigrants to Madagascar.

Positive Law. Positive law as administered by ruling authorities is a much neglected subject in the Conferences. No paper dealt with the legacy of the Mughal era when Islamic Law was the law of the land. Only two papers consider the way the British reformed existing laws (Hjejle, 1966, L) and administered it to various communities (Conlon, 1972, L, already mentioned). The administration of Muslim personal law is an important aspect of the life of South Asian Muslims; no paper dealt with its codification under British rule, and the demarcation between *Sharī'ah* and custom during the same period. After 1947 the preservation of Muslim personal law in India, the Family ordinances and then the *Ḥadd* ordinances in Pakistan have aroused many debates which have not been echoed in the Conferences. The only questions which were raised concerned the thinking of the *'Ulamā'*, acting in a private capacity since the British takeover; their doctrine has been studied by Peter Hardy (1970, H, already mentioned), F.A. Nizami (1986, R, already mentioned) and in the most detailed and scholarly way by J.M.S. Baljon (1986, R. already mentioned).

Medicine. Up to now medicine was only represented by the paper and the film of Beatrix Pfleiderer, already mentioned, on the rapeutic rituals in a Muslim shrine. Although this is an important aspect of the religious and social life, it is not particular to the Muslims. Similar rituals can be observed in Hindu shrines. But the Muslims introduced to India their own system of Yunani or Greco-Arabic medicine, which is officially recognized in competition with Ayurvedic and Western allopathic medicines; its use by the various communities, and its recent revival as a means of asserting Muslim identity, have not been adequately studied. It is a good omen that this 1986 Heidelberg Conference includes, for the first time, a paper on Yunani medicine (Pugh, 1986, M).

Economics, Development, Planning. There is a great wealth of papers on the subject in the Conferences, many of which concern Pakistan and Bangladesh. But Islam is seldom, if ever, taken as a significant variable. The only serious attempt in this direction was made in the session organized in 1978 by Peter Hardy on "Islam and Economic Development and Activity

in South Asia" (Hardy, 1978, E), which included the valuable paper of Mumtaz Ahmad on the perceptions and attitudes of the *'Ulamā'* in Pakistan (M.Ahmad, 1978, E). The debate remained inconclusive for lack of comparable papers; it has not been resumed since. The debate on Islamic Economics has been going on in Pakistan under Bhutto and Zia, as alluded to in several papers in this Conference. Could not the issue be taken up again, especially the question of how far Islam and Islamic institutions are relevant variables in Economics?

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

The above assessment and inventory contain a diagnosis of the failure of the Conferences to cover adequately the field of the study of South Asian Muslim communities.

It is often said that the study of South Asian Muslims has been mainly a by-product of the research on politics. The foregoing examination of the papers presented to the Conferences bears this out: the most extensively studied topic has been Muslim separatism.

Not enough room is left for other, more fundamental, topics. Only two of the latter are fairly treated: the medieval Muslim state, and contemporary social structures. Beyond this point there is no more than a sprinkling.

Further Conferences should try to correct this imbalance. To correct the uneven distribution of papers by disciplines, an effort should be made to attract more specialists acquainted with Islamic studies and the technical languages of these studies (Urdu, Persian, Arabic etc.); this would mean in particular more invitees from the Indian Muslim community, from Pakistan and Bangladesh; and also probably from the U.S.A. where there is a growing concentration of such specialists. Only such experts can highlight the Islamic dimension of the various topics studied.

The regional imbalance should also be remedied. Until now most of the studies concentrate on Pakistan and Northern India. Bangladesh should be more fairly treated. The Southern part of the subcontinent should no longer be treated as terra incognita from the point of view of Islamic studies; experts on those areas, or even from those areas, should be invited to join the Conferences.

NOTES

(1) I want to thank the Centre for South Asian Studies in Cambridge for making available to me for study its complete collection of the papers of European Conferences on Modern Asian Study.

Up to now only the proceedings of the 1976 (Leiden) Conference have been published in parts; and those of the 1978 (Paris) and 1981 (London) Conferences have been fully published in the following books.

J.F. Richards (ed.), *Kingship and Authority in South Asia* (Publication Series, Publication no.3) (University of Wisconsin, Madison,1978).

Marc Gaborieau & Alice Thorner (edf.), *Asie du Sud Traditions et Changements* (Colloques Internationaux du CNRS, no.582, CNRS, Paris, 1979).

Kenneth Ballhatchet & David Taylor (eds.), *Changing South Asia*, 5 vols. Papers presented to the 7th European Conference on modern South Asian Studies (Centre of South Asian Studies, SOAS, London, 1984).

The proceedings of the 1984 (Heidelberg) Conference are to be published in part.

For a short history of the Conferences, see Marc Gaborieau & Alice Thorner, *op cit.*, Preface and Introduction.

(2) In order to assess the contemporary trends in the study of South Asian Muslims, I made use of the following Conferences and collective works:

-1974:Conference on Islam in Southern Asia, Heidelberg. Proceedings published in D. Rothermund, ed., *Islam in Southern Asia A Survey of Current Research* (Franz Steiner, Wiesbaden, 1975).

-1977: Conference on Islam in Asia, Jerusalem. Proceedings published in Y. Friedmann, ed., *Islam in Asia*, vol.1, *South Asia* (Magness Press, Jerusalem, 1984).

-1978: Conference on Islam in South Asia, organized by Charles J. Adams (McGill University, Montreal) (unpublished).

-1979: Conference on the place of *adab* in South Asian Islam. Proceedings published in B. Metcalf, ed., *Moral conduct and authority. The place of* adab *in South Asian Islam* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1984).

-1986: M. Gaborieau. ed., *Islam et Societe en Asie du Sud/Islam and society in South Asia*,vol.9 (EHESS, Collection Purusartha, Paris, 1984).

-1986: Symposium on Islam in South and South East Asia, organized by Denys Lombard & Marc Gaborieau, Paris (Proceedings to be published).

(3) References to the papers discussed here are given between brackets; they will enable the reader to trace the full titles in the bibliography compiled for this Conference by Alice Thorner & Catherine Champion. The abbreviations refer to the academic discipline concerned as indicated on page 2 of this paper; the date, to the Conference year; e.g. for: (Nemo, 1978, D), look to South Asian Diaspora, 1978.

For the convenience of the readers, the papers referred to in this communication are listed below and entered alphabetically under the names of their authors:

AHMAD,M., 1978,

Perceptions and attitudes of the Ulema to problems and policies of economic development in Pakistan

AHMED, MUNIR D., 1986,

Religious groups and the development of the polity in Pakistan

ALAVI, H.A., 1970,

Clan, Caste and Class....Punjab, West Pakistan

ALAVI, HAMZA, 1986,

Pakistan and Islam: ethnicity and ideology

BALJON, J.M.S., 1986,

Status of Women in Muslim family life on the Subcontinent as reflected in 20th century Fatwas

BRASS, PAUL, 1970,

Urdu and Muslim grievances in N. India, 1947-69

BROWN, JUDITH M., 1970

Gandhi in India, 1915-22

BUDDENBERG, DORIS, 1986,

Islamization and shrines: An anthropological point of view

CHOWDHURY, A., 1978,

Emerging leadership pattern in rural Bangladesh

COHN, BERNARD S., 1970,

The Indian Census and the History of Indian Social Structure

COHN, BERNARD S., 1976,

The durbar of 1877: an Indo-anglo ritual

CONLON, FRANK F., 1972,

New Power to Old Authority? The Khojas and the Courts in 19th century India

DAS, SURANJAN, 1983,

Examining Violence from below: a comparative study of the Calcutta "communal" riots of 1918 and 1926

DAS, SURANJAN, 1986,

Popular violence in Bengal: a comparative study of the 1926 communal riots in Calcutta, Pabna and Dacca.

DAS GUPTA, ASHIN, 1966,

Some Characteristics of Medieval Asian Trade

DAS GUPTA, ASHIN, 1968,

The Character of Traditional Trade in India: Introductory Remarks

DHANAGARE, D N., 1983,

The Emergence of separate identity in Vidarbha. Historical Background

DITTMER, KERRIN & LUTT, J., 1970,

Identification of regional cultures — the Muslims in the United Provinces

EADE, P.J.K., 1976,

Ideology and Identity among Indian Muslims: the Case of Calcutta's Bengali Muslim Middle Class

FRYKENBERG, R E , 1983,

Conflicting norms and political integration in South India· the case of the Vellore Mutiny

GABORIEAU, MARC, 1976,

Some Specific Features of the Kinship System of Muslims as Compared to the Kinship System of the Hindus, a Case Study of the Kinship System of Muslim Bangle-Makers of Central Nepal

GABORIEAU, MARC, 1978,

On traditional patterns of dominance among South Asian Muslims

GIERATHS, CHRISTINE, 1986,

Social welfare through "Islamisation." Assessment and evaluation (Pakistan 1977-84)

GOKHALE, J.B., 1983,

Region and Nation in early 20th century Maharashtrian Literature

GORDON, STEWART, 1976,

Legitimacy and Loyalty in Some Successor States of the Eighteenth Century

GRAFF, VIOLETTE, 1978,

Communal relations in Indian politics. a case study — Chandni Chowk (1967-1977)

GRAHAM, BRUCE & REEVES, PETER D , 1968,

Electoral Statistics of Uttar Pradesh, 1920-1967

HARDY, PETER, 1970,

The "Political" thought of some "National" Ulama in British India in the 20th century

HARDY, PETER, 1976,

The Growth of Authority Over a Conquered Political Elite: the Early Delhi Sultanate as a Possible Case Study

HARDY, PETER, 1978,

Islam and Economic Development and Activity in South Asia

HJELM, BENEDICTE, 1966,

Social Legislation in India Under the East India Company

HUSSAIN, ASAF, 1976,

The Politics of Ethnic Nationalism in Pakistan

IQBAL, AFZAL, 1976,

The Contribution of Maulana Mohammed Ali to Muslim Politics in India

JEFFERY, PATRICIA, 1981,

Women's Private Work — The Social Organisation of Childbearing in a Muslim Village in Delhi

JEFFERY, PATRICIA, JEFFERY, ROGER & LYON, ANDREW, 1983,

Childbirth and Collaboration among Women in Bijnor District, Uttar Pradesh

KANNANGARA, A P , 1981,

Religious revivalism, popular disorder and authority: the disturbances of 1915 in Sri Lanka

LLEWELLYN-JONES, ROSIE M , 1981,

The Court and the Residency at Lucknow — A Study in Functionalism

LOMBARD, J., 1978,

Husain, martyr de Kerbela (les fetes de Muharram chez les Khodja du Gujarat emigres sur la cote occidentale de Madagascar)

MALIK, FATEH MOHAMMAD, 1986,

Islam versus Islam in Pakistan: Controversy on the concept of Islamic Socialism — 1947-1977

MALIK, JAMAL, 1986,

The Islamisation of the dini madaris and the Ulama (1977-1984)

MALLISON, FRANCOISE, 1986,

Hinduism as seen by the Nizari Ismaili missionaries of Gujarat: The evidence of the *ginan*

NEMO, J , 1978,

La communaute gujarat a la Reunion identite ou identification?

NIZAMI, FARAH, 1986,

Arguments for and against Muslim female education in North India

NIZAMI, F.A., 1986,

Islamisation and social adjustments: the Muslim religious elite in British North India, 1803-1957

PANDEY, GYANENDRA, 1976,

The Genesis and Impact of a Communal Riot: Kanpur 1931

PANDEY, INDUPRAKASH, 1976,

Social and Political conditions of the Shia Muslims of Ganguli as Depicted in the Novel *Adha Gav* — Published in 1966 by Akshav Prakashan, Delhi — by Masum Raza, Rahi

PAREL, ANTHONY, 1968,

The Political Symbolism of the Cow in India

PFLEIDERER, BEALTRIX, 1981,

Patterns of Traditional Therapeutic Drama in Northern India

PFLEIDERER, BEALTRIX, 1981,

Therapeutic Ritual in a Muslim Shrine

PHADNIS URMILA, 1983,

Politics of Language in South Asia

PUGH, JUDY F., 1986,

The semantics of pain in Unani Tibb

RAGHIB-UL-ISLAM, 1986,

Regiono-ethnic conflict in Pakistan

RICHARDS, J.F , 1976,

The Formulation of Imperial Authority under Akbar and Jahangir

RIZVI, GOWHER, 1986,

Conflict and accommodation in a multi-national state: The case of Pakistan

ROBINSON, FRANCIS, 1970,

Municipal Government and Muslim Separatism in the U.P., 1883-1916

ROSSELLI, JOHN, 1974,

Towards the nationalist novelist Bankimcandra and the Muslims

SCHWERIN, K G., 1978,

Functions and sources of income of Muslim Dargahs in India

WAGLE, N.K., 1986,

Hindu-Muslim interactions in the sphere of law, religion and historiography in medieval Maharashtra

WESTERGAARD, KIRSTEN, 1978,

Local politics and its relation to state power in Bangladesh

WRIGHT, THEODORE, 1976,

The Ethnic Numbers Game in India: Hindu-Muslim Conflicts over Conversion, Migration and Birth Rates

WRIGHT, THEODORE P., 1978,

Muslim mobility in India through peripheral occupations: music, sports, cinema, smuggling

WRIGHT, THEODORE P., 1981,

The New Muslim Businessmen of India

WRIGHT, THEODORE P., 1986,

Can there be a melting pot in Pakistan? Interprovincial marriage and national integration

ZBAVITEL, DUSAN, 1970,

The modernization of culture and the regional identification of Bengal

ZAIDI, MUJAHID HUSAIN, 1981,

Amanat's *Indar Sabha* in the Context of Lucknow Culture: the First Urdu Dance Drama

ISLAM AND SOCIETY IN SOUTH ASIA*
(Review Article)

GAIL MINAULT

* Marc Gaborieau (ed.) *Islam et Societe en Asia du Sud*, Collection Purusartha, no. 9, Editions de 1 'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Socials, Paris, 1986

MARC GABORIEAU of the School of Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences, Paris, has assembled a collection of articles dealing with Islam and society in South Asia. To deal comprehensively with this subject would take a longer volume than this, and Gaborieau and his colleagues have presented a sampling of topics that do not always fit together well. While the work suffers from heterogeneity, it contains a number of fine contributions which deserve to be summarized in detail. Articles in this volume are in either French or English, with a summary paragraph in the other language for the benefit of those not conversant with the tongue of the contributor. This review will report more fully on the articles in French, since these are presumably less accessible to readers in India.

In his introduction, Gaborieau points out that the Muslims of the five countries of South Asia (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) are a minority, to be sure, but a 25% minority in a population of some 800,000,000 is approximately 200,000,000 and thus the largest bloc of Muslim population in the world. Scholarship about South Asian Islam in Europe can be classified into several fields: history and historiography, law, ethnography — and here Gaborieau emphasizes the particularities and complexities of South Asian Muslim society; the study of Islamic religious specialists: Sufis and *'Ulamā'* ; and the study of relations between Hindus and Muslims in various South Asian contexts. In addition to the papers in this volume, which provide examples of some of these fields of study, Gaborieau provides a useful bibliography of recent works.

Gaborieau concludes by emphasizing several themes which emerge from the articles and, one might add, from his own work. First he points to

the diversity within Islam in the subcontinent, which is ethnic, regional, sectarian, political and social. Then he discusses the tendency on the part of Western scholars to "dichotomous thinking" about Islam in South Asia. In the context of fundamentalist expositions of what Islam is, scholars tend to view Islam as its scriptural ideal and treat it as a uniform whole mistaking the text for the context, one might say. A scholar may then fall into the trap of comparing such an ideal model of Islam to a view of Hinduism that is equally idealized or simplified. One must transcend this dichotomizing tendency and evolve more complex definitions of Muslim society that take into account variations in practice. It contributes little to our understanding, for example, to regard Islamic society as egalitarian and Hindu society as hierarchical, and then to consider Muslims who act in hierarchical ways as somehow aberrant or "contaminated" by the Hindu milieu. In fact, ideas of superiority and inferiority exist in other Muslim societies, as does the concept of the vile (polluting?) nature of some occupations. Gaborieau suggests that a more comparative approach, taking into account Muslim societies elsewhere, as well as the complexities of Muslim and Hindu praxis in South Asia, will lead to more sophisticated theoretical formulations.

After this thought-provoking introduction, the volume is divided into three sections: the first containing historical perspectives, the second focusing on Muslim social groups, and the third analyzing the contemporary political scene. The historical section commences with a brief and superficial article by Jean Aubin on India in the context of the Islamic world. His point that India is not on the periphery of the Muslim world, but is actually its geographic and demographic centre, is well-taken. Otherwise, he indulges in the kind of stereotypical thinking that Gaborieau's capable introduction avoids. Islam and Hinduism—albeit each heterogeneous—confronted one another. Islam made compromises and was "contaminated." Islam in India flourished artistically and mystically, while the "Muslim Orient" (West Asia?) "was sunken in a profound intellectual lethargy." These are examples of the kind of facile generalizations that get us nowhere.

Genevieve Bouchon, by contrast, follows with a very informative article on the spread of Islam in the coastal regions on India during the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. She emphasizes that histories of Muslim settlement in India pay great attention to the conquest and rule from the Northwest, but insufficient attention to the peaceful process of Islamization carried on by maritime merchants who came from Arabia and the Persian

Gulf. She then taps sources such as Arab geographers, Ibn Battutah, Marco Polo, and Tome Pires to describe the coastal societies of Malabar, Kathiawar, and Bengal. She mentions the origins of the Mappila, the Navayat, and the Ilappai among others, the long-range commerce of Yemenis and Hadramis from ancient times, the prosperous horse trade from the Persian Gulf during the time of the Deccan sultanates, the activities of the Karim merchants from Egypt in the spice trade, and the role of Gujarati Muslims in shipping spices and textiles all over the Indian Ocean. Much of her data is well-known from the history of trade, but she assembles it here in a brief compass, using a fruitful combination of historiography and ethnography.

Peter Hardy, in an excellent article on the authority of Muslim kings in medieval South Asia, complains that while recent historical scholarship has improved our knowledge of religion, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in the pre-modern period, and Muslim political and economic institutions, there remains a big gap in our knowledge of the actual behaviour of rulers. How did they impose their authority on their various subjects? He then examines the sources closely in order to define the content of political legitimacy during the period of Muslim rule in India. Muslim writers, who viewed the purpose of earthly society as the carrying out of God's commandments as contained in the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, traced the legitimacy of their rulers back to the Prophet. His immediate successors, the four rightly-guided caliphs, carried out God's mandate, but then, when their successors as caliphs failed to maintain the military might to enforce God's law, the sultans of the house of Timur (the Mughals) succeeded to that function. Political legitimacy, for Muslims, is thus linked to religious purpose. If a sultan is pious, he should be obeyed, unless he is too weak to enforce God's law. Conversely, a strong sultan who is impious or wicked should be resisted. Ideally, the ruler should be both faithful to God's commandments and militarily capable of enforcing them.

For non-Muslim subjects, however, such arguments lacked binding force. In their case, the structure of authority was based on patrimonial idioms and behaviour: the granting of boons and the taking of oaths of loyalty, patron-client ties of various sorts. Since loyalty to a master did not necessarily imply loyalty to his set of religious beliefs, these rituals and exchanges applied equally to Muslims and non-Muslims, and were thus effective in binding the various peoples of the Mughal empire to the person of the emperor. In addition, for the Rajput warrior-kings of North India, the

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similarities between the values of Muslim sultans and their own traditions enabled them to profess their loyalty. Hardy's point, then, is that Mughal authority was based on an ideology and a performance of kingship and kingly rituals which, in their composite nature, were truly Indian. Hardy's article is historiographical and hence more textual than contextual, so whether it reveals much about the actual behaviour of rulers is open to question. Still, it is rigorously reasoned, and provides an easily accessible summary, and bibliography, of the literature on Indo-Muslim kingship.

Looking at the problem of authority from a different angle, Simon Digby contributes a subtle and original article on the Sufi *shaykh* as a source of authority in medieval India. His study concentrates on the Chishtī *silsilah*, which provided "an easier path of devotion, of mediation and guidance... a channel of intercession with the Deity," which helped the new, locally formed Muslim community identify both with an alien faith and with the land in which they dwelt. Sufism, especially in its Chishtī form, was a fully evolved import, a form of mystical practice that owed much to the magical, shamanistic forms of belief of Central Asia. But this mystical, magical form appealed greatly to non-Muslims. The holy man who renounced worldly wealth, but who nevertheless claimed high social status (descent from the Prophet as a substitute for high caste), religious knowledge (whether scriptural or esoteric), and poetic brilliance in the transports of ecstasy, was a recognizable type in the *bhaktī* and *sant* devotional traditions of North India. In addition to the personal charisma of individual saints were the miracles attributed by their followers to their persons, or after their deaths, to their tombs. The cult of tombs perpetuated the authority of the Sufis in certain regions, and belief in their continued blessings spread that authority, through the institution of pilgrimage, to include all of India.

A final article in the historical section, by Yohannon Friedmann, discusses Islamic thought in relation to the Indian context. In summarizing much, Friedmann has necessarily to hit the high spots, and resorts to the familiar opposition between separatists and syncretists. Those who sought to preserve Islam in its pristine form, free of indigenous accretions, included Ḍiyā' al-Dīn Baranī, 'Abd al-Qādir Badāyūnī, Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindī, and Awrangzīb. Those who attempted to find a common denominator for Hindu and Muslim civilizations included Amīr Khusraw, Akbar, Dārā Shikūh, and Mirzā Maẓhar Jān-i Jānān. The uncompromising attitude, he feels, was always stronger than the conciliatory one. This fed directly into the nationalist movement and led to the emergence of a separate Muslim

nationalism. This kind of rigid dichotomizing is entirely too simple and contrasts markedly with Digby's sensitive rendering, in the previous article, of the ways in which aspects of an exogenous Muslim culture fitted in with indigenous cultural structures.

The second part of the volume deals with Muslim social groups. M.R. Tarafdar discusses Bengali Muslims in the pre-colonial period and analyzes problems of their conversion, class formation, and cultural evolution. He argues that conversion to Islam in Bengal was most effective among lower caste Hindus and tribals, who brought into Islam their caste ethos, which afforded them little scope for upward mobility. The upper strata of Muslims in Bengal came from immigrant groups of nobility and *'Ulamā'*. This led to a pattern of social fragmentation among Bengali Muslims which prevented the growth of a middle class. This argument seems spurious to me, for surely the emergence of a middle class in India is the product of post-, not pre-, colonial times. Further, the lack of a "middle class" in earlier times involved factors other than simply the hierarchical ordering of Muslim society, which was particular to Bengal, as Tarafdar suggests. Indeed, social hierarchy would, logically at least, seem to encourage the emergence of "middle" groups. The reason for the lack of merchant and craft groups among Bengali Muslims in pre-colonial times, if such was the case, would seem to indicate rather that Muslim and non-Muslim societies were closely interdependent, and that such "middle" groups were non-Muslim. An explanation that relies on a classification of Muslim social groups alone is entirely too simplistic.

Claude Markovits contributes an article on Muslim businessmen in the first half of the 20th century which is a model of clarity and a very important contribution to our understanding of this little-studied group. He points to the vigorous development of private capitalism in Pakistan since partition as evidence that the spirit of enterprise in the subcontinent is not a monopoly of the Hindus. He then presents some statistics, drawn from the commerce, region by region, noting that in the Punjab and Bengal, the regions in which they were a majority, Muslims were also predominantly rural, and hence less involved in commercial enterprises. In Bombay, Madras, and U.P., however, areas of Muslim minority population, they were also markedly urbanized and played a role in commerce out of proportion to their numbers in the population.

Markovits then breaks down this commercial group into its constituents, noting that Muslim enterpreneurs tended to specialize in the trade of certain products, such as hides and skins, luxury craft items and textiles, rather than in major industries or in banking and finance. Further, Muslim enterprises tended to be smaller operations and larger industrial establishments and managerial cadres tended to be Hindu in composition. Muslim entrepreneurs were thus, in the main, merchants rather than industrialists. In characterizing the Muslim commercial elite in the early twentieth century, Markovits further points to a number of families, or dynasties, and of these, a considerable proportion were Shī'ahs, whether Khojas, Bohras, or Ithnā' 'Asharīs. Of the Sunnīs, a number of inportant families were Kutchi Memons. The Muslim commercial elite was thus unrepresentative of the regional and sectarian composition of the mass of Muslims in the subcontinent; they were largely coastal in origin, of recent provenance and/or prosperity, and lacked organization among themselves. With the founding of the Muslim Chamber of Commerce in Calcutta in1932, Muslim businessmen began to organize themselves into separate associations. But it took a vigorous effort by Jinnah in 1945 before these separate Muslim bodies assembled into a Federation of Muslim Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

Markovits then asks why Muslim businessmen did not invest more in industry in the period before independence. Was it because of a Hindu conspiracy to keep them out? Or were there other decisive factors? Certainly, in a situation of caste specialization in certain enterprises, those into the field first tend to exclude newcomers; although Markovits also notes that in an economy expanding rapidly, opportunities for new investors would exist in any case. In fact, the Indian industrial economy was not expanding exponentially during the 1920s and thereafter, and thus Muslims with money to invest tended to look elsewhere for opportunity. It was the presence of alternative opportunities, in overseas trade or government contracts, that was more decisive in Muslim investment choices. Markovits therefore puts little credence in the "Hindu conspiracy" theory. In addition, he notes an attitude among the dominant Muslim elites, landed magnates and service gentry, that depreciated the importance of industrial investment. If the community as a whole, or at least its major political leaders—Jinnah was an exception—did not regard industrial investment as prestigious, or vital, for the survival of the community, then Muslim enterpreneurs were only being prudent in hedging their bets. They sought opportunities in areas where the competition from

enternched Hindu interests was less, but at the same time, they conserved ties with Hindu enterprises rather than setting up a parallel "Muslim" economy. There is much more to Markovits' argument than I have been able to summarize here. I found his reasoning both rigorous and convincing, and his contribution one of the most informative in the present volume. It deserves to be translated into English for wider dissemination.

The subsequent article by Gerard Heuze on the relationship of Muslims to the working class in North India is considerably less rigorous and informative. Heuze points out rightly that we know little about Muslim component of the Indian working class. There are several reasons for this. For one thing, Muslim workers traditionally concentrate in the unorganized sector, in small - scale enterprises that employ skilled workers and artisans, rather than in the large-scale, organized sector of the industrial economy. For another, secularist political ideologies and class-based workers' organizations both tend to ignore or downplay the religious affiliation of workers, and so the Muslim component of the working class only becomes visible at times of communal strife. All of this is quite true, but it does not get us very far. Unfortunately, Heuze has little hard data to add to these overall ideological considerations.

The last article in this section, by W.J.Argyle, deals with the migration of Indian Muslims to East and South Africa and compares the two groups. In describing Muslim migration to East Africa, i.e. Zanzibar, Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, Argyle notes that this movement of population was a continuation of long-standing trade contacts between India and East Africa. It was not, therefore, a result of colonial rule in Africa, but preceded it, although migration accelerated during the period of British colonial rule. Secondly, most Indians who went to East Africa did so on their own initiative and at their own expense. Thirdly, these migrants were relatively homogeneous, coming from a restricted area in India (Kutch and Kathiawar), speaking the same language (Gujarati), and belonging mostly to Isma'ili Shi'ah sectarian groups. From their position along the coasts, they moved inland in response to trading opportunities, not necessarily because of a connection with the white rulers. They also developed into a relatively autonomous, self-perpetuating community, without the need to maintain close ties with their homeland.

By contrast, the migration of Muslims from India to South Africa was closely associated with colonial ruler, and particularly with the import of

indentured labour. Muslim indentured labourers were largely "Hyderabadis" and Sunnis, although they were later joined by Muslims of the Gujarati trading communities who came in response to trading opportunities among the immigrant labourers. In contrast to East Africa, however, the larger European population of South Africa, firmly entrenched, was hostile to Indian commercial activities. The insecurity of the political and economic environment, in turn, led the Indian immigrants to remain in contact with their places of origin. Indian immigrants to South Africa were thus less homogeneous, less influential, and less autonomous than their counterparts in East Africa. In East Africa, Indian Muslim immigrants made an important economic contribution, whereas in South Africa their role was severely circumscribed.

The third section of the volume concerns the contemporary political scene and includes a theoretical article by Akbar S. Ahmed on "Islam, Ethnicity and the State: Models of Political Leadership among South Asian Muslims." His thesis, summarized briefly, is that Muslims in South Asia, confronting a major world religion to which the majority of the people belonged, faced a continuing serious challenge to their religious and cultural identity. As a consequence of this confrontation with the Hindu majority, Muslims in India adopted one of two distinct, mutually opposed models of socio-political behaviour: orthodox, legal, and formal on the one hand; and unorthodox, syncretic, and informal on the other, Awrangzīb and Akbar, if you will. In addition, a third, more recent model developed as a result of the secularizing trends in the British colonial period, a type represented by M.A. Jinnah. Ahmed places General Zia in the Awrangzīb mould and Bhutto in the Akbar on Sufistic mould. He sees Ayub as following more in Jinnah's path. I must admit that I find these classifications unconvincing and lacking in historical accuracy, particularly with regard to the modern characters that Ahmed tries to fit into his classificatory boxes. Perhaps my main quarrel is with his rigid categorization, which does not allow for a creative leader to combine these types (as Bhutto certainly attempted). Ahmed has recently published a book that further elaborates on the thesis presented in this article (*Pakistan Society* , Oxford University Press, Karachi, 1986). Perhaps when his arguments are presented in greater detail, they may be more convincing than they seem here.

This is followed by Mariam Abou Zahab's study of the Pakistan People's Party, 1967-71, as an example of an Islamic populist movement.

This is a short, but very capable, examination of political conditions in Pakistan during the time of the Ayub regime and its demise. She first outlines two distinct political cultures in Pakistan: the first, that of the *muhājirs* or refugees from India, who sought a truly Islamic state in Pakistan; the second, that of rural Sind and the Punjab, held together by links of *barādarī* or lineage rather than ideology, and with religious life centred around Sufi *pīrs* and their tombs rather than scriptural authority. The political system as it had evolved, however, with the military and the bureaucracy in power, satisfied neither those who wanted to see Islamic ideals embodied in the state, nor those with links to the land and its charismatic traditional leaders. These political frustrations, compounded by the economic discontent in the late 1960s, were tapped by Bhutto with his newfound People's Party. He promised "Islamic Socialism," after the model of the Prophet's just society, and linked himself to the tradition of charismatic leadership by adopting as the symbol of his party the sword of 'Ali (*Zulfiqar [Dhu'l-Fiqār]*, his name), symbolic of struggle (*jihād*) in the just cause. The PPP appeared at a time of ideological polarization and succeeded in uniting various discontents beneath its banner. One would be interested to have further explanation by Abou Zahab as to why this populist movement, so successful in opposition to Ayub, did not succeed in building lasting institutions to perpetuate the movement Bhutto began, and to forestall further military rule.

The last contribution to the volume is a study by Violete Graff on the Muslim vote in the 1984 Indian Lok Sabha elections. The article consists of a series of random impressions, region by region, rather than a systematic analysis. Graff's point seems to be that Muslims, in the aftermath of Mrs. Gandhi's assassination, did not turn against the Congress, but rather refused to vote in any bloc-link fashion. They voted according to regional and local conditions, for candidates belonging to a variety of political parties. The "Muslim vote" thus seems to be a will-o'-the-wisp that Graff chases from place to place. This may be a futile pursuit; in any case, this article leaves us with no clear sense of the direction, if any, of Muslim politics in contemporary India.

Gaborieau concludes the volume with a most useful indexed glossary: terms in Arabic/Persian/Urdu defined in French and English with page numbers for ease of reference. *Islam et Societe en Asia du Sud,* as a volume, is very much a mixed bag. The articles by Hardy, Digby, and

BOOK REVIEWS

AHMAD ALI

AL-QURAN, A CONTEMPORARY TRANSLATION
Oxford University Press, New Delhi-1987. Also published by Akrash Publishing, Karachi, 565 pp.; price — Pakistan Rs. 200-00, U.K. and U.S.A. S. 25-00.

Prof. Ahmad Ali's rendition of the meaning of the Qur'ān in readable and fluent English is unique among the renderings of the Divine Writ published so far in English language. 'A Contemporary Translation' alludes to the fact that every translation and commentary on the Qur'ān is essentially contemporary since a new rendering becomes necessary after every few decades.

The translations and commentaries on the Qur'ān reflect, in truth and reality, the times and intellectual climate of the various translators and exegetes The first commentary on the Qur'ān by Ibn Jarīr al-Tabarī (224-316/ 839-928) brings to mind the time when the Traditions of the Prophet had been put together in a written form and their study and compilation into fresh anthologies were the most favourite pursuits of scholars The commentary by al-Tabarī is thus a compilation of Traditions, practice of the Prophet's Companions and exegesis of the Successors to the Companions Muhammad al-Farrā'-al-Baghavs's (d. 510/1116) commentary has the distinction of providing grammatical and lexical explanations besides elucidations through the Traditions During his time, that is, the sixth century of Islamic era, non-Arab Muslims intent on studying the Qur'ān felt handicapped in the task without first mastering the grammar and syntax of the Arabic language They were thus disposed to study Arabic grammar, language and literature, nuances, idioms and metaphorical use of words. Al-Rāzī (544-606/1149-1209) was born at a time when Islam was assailed by Greek logic and philosophy and theological scholasticism held the pride of place in intellectual pursuits. If we glance through Al-Rāzī's commentary we would find that the Qur'ān is a store-house of the theological scholasticism, logic, Greek philosophy, astrology and physics.

In short, the commentaries of the Qur'ān, whether medieval or modern, represent the contemporary approach and world-view of the time in which they were written. Or, we can say a bit more boldly that the commentaries on the Qur'ān are historical records of the intelligence and wisdom of the Muslim scholars and the social needs and problems of the times in which they wrote them This can very well be illustrated through an analysis of these commentaries but that would be going too far away from the subject under discussion.

Prof. Ahmad Ali has, thus, absolved himself of certain obligations by giving the title 'A Contemporary Translation' to his work much in the same way as Prof Arberry's *The Koran Interpreted* suggests that his work is intended to present the meaning of the Qur'ān rather than giving a precise translation of the Qur'ānic text"[1].

Prof. Ahmad Ali's translation is unique in its fluency which distinguishes it from other English renderings of the Qur'ān. It has the lyrical charm of Abdullah Yusuf Ali and the fluency of Mohammad Marmaduke Pickthall but intellectually it is nearer to the rendition of Mohammad Asad since both seem to write primarily for the native English speakers Both these translations keep the British and American readership and the intellectual

climate of the West in view. They try to interpret Qur'ānic concepts in a way that they may be acceptable to their readers in Western countries without hurting the susceptibilities of the Muslims. The sincerity of these translators is beyond doubt for their purpose is to disseminate the message of the Qur'ān. They seem to hold the view that if Islam is to be presented before the West, it should be done in a phraseology the average Western reader does not dismiss as a fantasy or fiction. They have, for the purpose, taken recourse to interpreting the concept like genie, angels, miracles, heaven, hell, houris with the words having a wider connotation, and wherever they have failed to do so, they have tried to explain them away by saying that Islam shares those concepts with Christianity and Judaism. I do not mean to say—in fact, it would not be correct to maintain it—that Prof. Ahmad Ali has religiously followed this approach, yet at places he seems to be completely in tune with Mohammad Asad in such matters.

Prof. Ahmad Ali is successful, in large measure, in capturing the nuances of Arabic idiom and phraseology. To give an example, his rendering of the word *dalla* in verse 53:2 can be cited. The verse *mā dalla sāḥibukum wa mā ghavā* in which this word occurs has been translated in a way which will find support from Arabic lexicographers and Traditionists. His translation reads: " That your companion is not confused nor has gone astray." Similarly, the translation of *dāllan* in verse 93:7 by the word 'Perplexed' is most appropriate in the context in which it occurs.

According to Arabic usage the phrase *hal laka an taf'ala kadhā* signifies a courteous expression of desire. Prof. Ahmad Ali has appropriately rendered the phrase *hal laka ilā an tazakkā* in verse 79:18 as "would you like to .." which conveys the inner meaning of the original, but his rendering of *tazakkā* "as to grow (in virtue)" seems to be a bit far-fetched. Likewise, in the phrase *ihbaṭū miṣran* occurring in the *Sūrat al-Baqarah* the word *miṣran* has been translated by him as "city" unlike certain other translators who have erroneously taken it to mean "Egypt." There are, however, instances where he has followed the incorrect renderings of others. One such instance is the translation of the word *qur'ān* in the phrase *innā sami'nā qur'ānan 'ajaban* of verse 72:3. It has been rendered as 'Qurān' while it carries the same connotation as in verses 75:17-18 and where he has interpreted it as 'recitation.' Pickthall has also correctly translated the word as 'recital.'

The syntactic construction of the Qur'ānic text does not permit that a distinction between singular and plural pronouns should be ignored since this is essential for an accurate rendition. Where the Qur'ān addresses a single individual the most appropriate words for communication of the inner meaning of the original text would be 'thee' and 'thou,' while for a group of persons it would be 'you.' Use of singular or plural pronoun in accordance with the syntax cast of the sentences would always leave the doubt whether any particular piece of revelation is meant to address the Prophet or the entire Muslim Community. Here are a few examples taken from the rendering of Pickthall since he has been careful enough to maintain the distinction.

1. Yet now He hath forgiven you. (3:152)
2. Allah forgive thee (O Muhammad). (9:43)
3. Didst thou say unto man-kind (5:114)
4. Are ye the harder to create? (79:29)
5. They said: We shall worship thy God. (2:133)
6. Your God is only Allah. (20.98)

There are innumerable verses whose sense can be deciphered from the context but an indiscriminate use of pronoun would make it difficult to make out as to who is being addressed in a particular verse. Mohammad Asad and Prof. Arberry have kept up the distinction so far as the pronouns are concerned, but omitted the suffixes and prefixes to the verbs. They have maintained 'shall,' not 'shalt,' 'will' not 'wilt,' and not

added *s* or *es* to the verbs to indicate present tense. They have thus maintained accuracy by following this middle course.

A reference has been made earlier to the intellectual climate of the West kept in view by Mohammad Asad and a few other translators in the interpretation of recondite realities. The following rendition of verse 3:49 by Prof. Ahmad Ali, shows his anxiety to convey Islamic concepts in the modern idiom.

> 'I have come to you with a prodigy from your Lord that I will fashion the state of destiny out of mire for you, and breathe (a new spirit) into it, and (you) will rise by the will of God. I will heal the blind and the leper, and infuse life into the dead, by the leave of God. I will tell you what you devour and what you hoard in your homes (3.49).

This rendition does not indicate that Jesus Christ performed any miracle or that he was endowed with supernatural powers for the attestation of his prophethood which he displayed before his people. Prof. Ahmad Ali has used the word 'prodigy' for *ayah* which can more appropriately be rendered as 'sign.' 'Prodigy,' as defined by the *Oxford Dictionary* means 'some thing extra-ordinary from which omens are drawn' and hence the word does not convey the sense of miracle. Any mastermind or a discoverer can do a thing which may appear to be of an extraordinary nature while miracle alludes to the application of supernatural power. The *Oxford Dictionary* explains the word miracle as 'a marvellous event exceeding the known power of nature,' such as, giving sight to someone born blind, healing an incurable disease like leprosy by touch or restoring life to a dead person. The word *āyah* has been rendered as message by certain other translators, but the correct word for it is 'sign' which carries the sense of miracle.

In the verse cited above Prof. Ahmad Ali has given the meaning of the word *tayr* as "state of destiny" while in a foot-note he says: "apart, from 'bird' and other things, 'tair' also means 'omen' as in 7:31, 27· 47, 36·19 and 'actions' or 'good or evil fate'—'the register of deeds'—as in 17 13. It also means 'destiny' or fortune." In fact the word *tayr* is used by the Arabs as an ominous portent because the sorcerers used to drive out birds on the person to whom they wanted to cause some harm. An Arab poet says·

> If (my enemies) drive out birds of evil (*tayran*) portent down on me, I am accustomed to drive out birds foreboding good fortune on them.

Hence, *tatayyur* was used by the Arabs for anyone considered as inauspicious. The Arabic lexicon *Lisān al-'Arab* defines the word as a sign of misfortune. The word *taṭayyara bi 'l-shay* is accordingly used metaphorically in different contexts, such as *Maymūn al-Tā'ir* signifying a fortunate person. During the pre-Islamic era the Arabs believed that if the death of someone killed by another person was not retributed, a bird came out from the skull of the person killed crying *asqūnī* asking his clansmen to quench the thirst for revenge with the blood of the killer. A poet says in the *Ḥamāsah*:

> If I die before union with Laylā, no grave will be more thirsty than mine.

The context in which word *ṭayr* is used alters its meaning. Prof. Ahmad Ali, Mohammad Asad and certain other scholars have been misled by ignoring the context of the word in a particular sentence which clearly indicates whether the word has been used to indicate 'bird'—its real meaning—or has any other connotation. In all the verses referred to by Prof. Ahmad Ali in support of his contention, the word *taṭayyara* precedes the object which indicates that the people regarded their prophet as ominous. They were in reply told that the misfortune lay with them or that God has caused them to suffer that misfortune. The rendering of this word in the translation of the following three verses would illustrate this point.

1 Yet when good came their way they said· "It is our due"; but when misfortune befell them they *put the omen down* to Moses and those who were with him. But surely the omen was with God (7 131)

2. They said: · "You betoken evil, and those with you." (Saleh) replied· "The evil you presage can only come from God. (27 47)

3. They rejoined. We have found you inauspicious If you do not desist, we shall stone you to death, and inflict a grievous punishment on you." (The Messengers) said: "The augury is within your own selves (36:18-19)

In the first of these translated passages Prof. Ahmad Ali has correctly rendered *taṭayyara* as 'put the omen down.' Similarly the word *ṭā'ir* occurring in the same verse in the reply given to the infidels, 'omen' has been used to convey the same sense. In the subsequent two verses he has rendered the same word more idiomatically as 'betoken evil' and 'inauspicious.' Notwithstanding the different words used by Prof. Ahmad Ali to convey the import of the same word *ṭā'ir* in the three verses cited above, he has interpreted it to mean "augur evil" In the Qur'ānic diction normally the same word is used in reply with which an allegation is made. It would be seen from the above verses that when the disbelievers alleged that the Prophet was the cause of inauspiciousness or ill fortune, the same word was used in reply to say that they were themselves inauspicious or the ill fortune was from God. Let us take a few more examples to substantiate this point.

1. But they (the un-believers) conspired, and God did the like. (3:54)

2. They were hatching up a plot, but I too am devising a plan. (86:15-16)

3. We were joking But God will turn joke against them (2:14-15).

In the *Sūrat al-Isrā'* where the word *ṭā'ir* occurs with the connotation of 'ledger of deeds,' the context is clear enough to indicate that it has been used figuratively in the verse.

Round each man's neck We have hung his ledger of deeds, and on the Day of Resurrection will present it as a book spread out.(17.13)

The rendition of the above verse, like the earlier ones, has been taken from Prof. Ahmad Ali's translation. In it he renders the word *ṭā'ir* as 'ledger of deeds' which being a derived meaning of the word, should have been given in parenthesis or better still rendered as 'a shape of ledger of deeds.' However, the translator has not been able to convey the sense clearly since the words *Kitāban yalqāhu manshūrā* explicitly indicate the metaphorical implication of the word *ṭā'ir*. Wherever any word is used metaphorically there is always some indication, normally in the shape of a common expression, which suggests that the word had been used figuratively. But the verse wherein the word *ṭā'ir* has been rendered as 'state of destiny' by Prof. Ahmad Ali, has no such indication. On the contrary, there are two words which clearly imply that Jesus Christ used to make birds of clay and then breathe life into them. This is followed by other miracles of Jesus Christ like giving sight to those born blind, healing the lepers and quickening the dead. These miraculous deeds, described one after the other, impart a definite purport to the word *ṭā'ir*. There is thus no indication whatsoever to suggest that the word means evil presege or ledger of destiny.

Incidentally, the translation of the word *akmaha* by Prof. Ahmad Ali is also not correct. The Arabic word for the blind is *a'mā* which has been used in the Qur'ān at other places. The word *akmaha* used in this verse means one born blind and it has been used here by the Qur'ān to refer to a miraculous deed of Jesus Christ. Had it been simply blindness, its restoration would not have been regarded as a mir-

acle. It was not through a curative treatment but by miraculous power that those born blind were restored sight by him.

In conclusion, one may express the opinion about the rendition of Prof Ahmad Ali. It may be inferred from his work that instead of attempting a translation of the Qur'ānic text, he has taken the sense of the verses from different translations and then re-written them in fluent and idiomatic 'modern' English. This is undoubtedly a task involving great labour. However, one is led to this conclusion through a comparison of the text and the translation of a number of verses. Had he translated the Arabic text, he would have kept the explanatory words and phrases in brackets. My contention finds support from the following examples taken from the *Sūrat al-Baqarah*, in which the words italicized by me, being of explanatory nature, should have been kept in parenthesis.

2. This is the Book free of doubt *and involution* a guidance for those who preserve themselves from evil *and follow the straight path.*

3 Who believe in the *un-known and are firm in devotion*, who spend *in charity* of what we have given them

5. They have found the guidance of the Lord and *will be* successful.

7. God has sealed their hearts and ears, and veiled their eyes. For them is great *deprivation.*

In verse no.2 the words 'and involution' have been added by way of elucidation while the words 'and follow the straight path' are not warranted at all. In verse no.3 the word 'unknown' should have been 'unseen' for *ghayb* means what is beyond the ken of human perception. In the same verse *yuqīmūn al-Salāh* has been translated as 'and are firm in devotion,' but such a rendition amounts to taking liberty with the Qur'ān. *Yuqīmūn al-Salāh* is a term for prayer and has been used with that import throughout the Qur'ān No other translator of the Qur'ān has rendered this word in this manner. In translating the phrase *yunfiqūn*, Prof. Ahmad Ali has added the words 'in charity' but it severely limits the spending in the way of God which also includes expenditure on *Jihād, Zakāt* etc. In verse no.7, 'great deprivation' for *'adhāb-'alīm* is neither in conformity with Arabic lexicons nor the exegesis of the Qur'ān.

In short, there are innumerable additions and explicative words and phrases which cannot be properly deemed as translation. It is true that syntactic construction and the nuances of idiom and phraseology differ in different languages and a literal translation from one language to another would make the whole exercise meaningless, let alone any attempt to retain the inimitable harmony and felicity of the Qur'ānic text, translations of the Qur'ānic text needs elucidatory words to communicate the inner meaning and spirit of the original. Such explanatory words are given in parenthesis as Abdullah Yusuf Ali and Pickthall have done in English, and Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī, Shāh 'Abd al-Qādir and others in their Urdu renderings In English translations only N. Dawood, an Iraqi Jew, has taken liberty with the Qur'ān by airing his own views in his rendition. But that was a noxious attempt to misrepresent the Qur'ān and we are loth to suggest that Prof. Ahmad Ali has followed him. Prof.Ahmad Ali has just tried to present the Qur'ān in readable and fluent English according to the modern idiom of the language. But as he has not translated the text from the original Arabic, he has unwittingly committed these mistakes. He has undoubtedly put in great labour which needs to be appreciated but if he had given the name of 'Elucidatory Interpretation' to his translation, no one would have taken exception to his rendition.

ABDULLAH ABBAS NADVI

ISMAIL RAJI AL-FARUQI

TAUHID : ITS IMPLICATION FOR THOUGHT AND LIFE

The International Institute of Islamic Thought, Herndon, U.S.A., 1982; 367 pp.; price not mentioned.

The book under review relates to *Tawhīd* which is the essence and core of Islam. It is not only the gateway to the world of Islam, but also the fountainhead of all the teachings of Islam. In the words of the author himself, "Traditionally and simply expressed, *Tauhid* is the conviction and witnessing that 'there is no god but God.' This simply negative statement, brief to the utmost limit of brevity, carries the greatest and richest meaning in the whole of Islam." In view of the prime importance of *Tawhīd* in the structure of Islam, it is no wonder that the scholars and authors have shown a keen interest in this subject from the very beginning of Islamic history and produced a lot of literature on this subject. The present work is undoubtedly a valuable addition to such literature. The work, consisting of 13 chapters, is a scholarly interpretation of the concept of *Tawhīd* and an indepth study of the Islamic way of life in the context of the concept of *Tawhīd*. Stressing the relevance of *Tawhīd* to every aspect of human life, the author has elaborately discussed the potentials of *Tawhīd* for bringing revolutionary changes in the thinking as well as actions of its adherents. In this connection the author also highlights the great impact left by *Tawhīd* on the socio-economic and political life of human beings in general and that of Muslims in particular.

In the first chapter "*Tauhid*: The Essence of Religious Experience" the author establishes the notion that in Islam God stands at the core of religious experience as the very first pronouncement of Islamic faith (*Kalimah-i Shahādah*) asserts that there is no God but Allāh. According to the author, in the Muslim's experience, 'God is not merely an absolute, ultimate first cause or principle but a core of normativeness' which means that He is the Being who commands and whose will is imperative and a guide for all men's life. The second chapter "*Tauhid* : The Quintessence of Islam" is an analysis of *Tawhīd* as the essence of Islām, its culture and civilization. The author is right in his observation that it is *Tawhīd* which gives Islamic civilization its identity. As a matter of fact, *Tawhīd* governs every aspect of a Muslim's life. Without *Tawhīd* there can not be any real concept of religiosity, piety and sincerity of devotion to God. The view that *Tawhīd* is the highest and most important commandment of God is established by the declaration of God that He might forgive all sins except the violation of *Tawhīd*.

Discussing *Tawhīd*'s relevance to history in the third chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of History," the author states that history is as crucial for Muslims as it is for others with a striking difference that "the Muslim knows himself, not the Absolute, as responsible for history." According to him, *Tawhīd* enables the Muslim to see himself as the vortex of history because he is the only vicegerent who can bring the Will of God to fulfilment in history. The fourth chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Knowledge" shows the close relation between *Tawḥīd* and knowledge. As a principle of knowledge, *Tawhīd* is the perception that Allāh exists and that He is One and Alone. It is one of the distinctive features of the religious truth (*Tawhīd*) in Islam that it is knowable and not mysterious. The Holy Qur'ān defines this truth in these words "Truth has become manifestly distinct from the Error" (2:256). It is an admitted fact that the beauty of Islam lies in its appeal to the mind and its

address to reason which is the mainstay of knowledge. The author considers *Īmān* (the affirmation of the absolute unity of God) the prime principle of reason and, therefore, he thinks, it can not be irrational. In the fifth chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Metaphysics," Professor Ismail Raji asserts that in the view of Islam nature is creation and gift placed at the disposal of man to enable him to do good and achieve felicity. In the Islamic concept of nature no power is operative in nature except God, as to believe that there is no god but Allāh is to hold that He alone is the Creator and the Ultimate Cause of every event. According to him 'Nature' if seen in the light of *Tawḥīd* is "fit and ready for scientific observation and analysis."

In Islam ethics is an integral part of religion and the two are inseparable and complementary. *Tawhīd* itself leads man to the conclusion that he has been created in the best form and for a great cause. This cause is obviously, as has been explained in the sixth chapter, "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Ethics," obedience to God and fulfilment of His commands as vicegerent of God on earth. In the opinion of the author man is the "Crown of Creation" mainly on account of his ethical striving and action. Stressing the same point he further says that the divine trust with which man has been invested is nothing but "the fulfilment of the ethical part of the divine will." In the seventh chapter "*Tauhid* :The Principle of Social Order," the main theme of discussion is the Islamic concept of society and the basic features of the Muslim social life. In the very beginning of his discussion, the author emphasizes the point that contrary to other religions of the world Islam defines religion as the very business of life and the very process of history. He means to say that "they are piety and righteousness when well conducted, impiety and unrighteousness otherwise." He is of the view that discharging of responsibilities of the vicegerency of God itself requires social order. The distinctive aspect of Islamic social order, according to the author, is that it is interlinked with religion while the social system of modern secular world seeks to separate the public affairs of society from every possible determination by religion. Moreover, the Islamic society is an open society, in the sense that anyone may join it either as a 'constitutive member' or as 'covenanter.' The eighth chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Ummah" seems to be the continuation of the above discussion as, here also, he defines and highlights the Islamic society and its constituents in term of *Ummah*. According to him *Ummah* can not be explained by "the people," or "the nation" or "the State" as it is trans-local, trans-social and transtatal. In his own words, "the *Ummah* is a universal society whose membership includes the widest possible variety of ethnicities or communities, but whose commitment to Islam binds them to a specific order." The most important thing of the *Ummah* is that it is not an aimless body. It exists solely for actualizing the Will of God. This aim can be attained mainly through calling the people to good and preventing them from evil. In the ninth chapter "*Tauhid* : the Principle of Family," the author again takes up the issue of society and that is the formation and role of the family as the basic unit of society in the light of Islamic fundamentals. In his opinion the family, from the Islamic point of view, is indispensable for the fulfilment of the divine purpose. Its importance is very much evident from the fact that the category *dhul qurbā* (kinship) figures very prominently in the social commandments of God in the Qur'ān. With regard to the composition of family, he explains the Islamic stand that man and woman are the two wheels of the same vehicle. They are equal in their religious and civil rights, duties and responsibilities with a few exceptions due to greater responsibilities of man as guardian and head of the family.

The Qur'ānic concept of state and its main organs have been defined in the tenth chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Political Order." Here again, his discussion is based on the interpretation of the term *Ummah*. He thinks that the more reasonable equivalent for *Ummah* in the sense of state is *Khilāfah* instead of *dawlah* as the former is closer to the Qur'ānic concept of vicegerency. He considers

the *Ummah* in the above sense "the agent of world reconstruction or world reformation to fulfil the divine will." As a matter of fact, this is an order of human beings which knows neither colour nor ethnic or racial identity. The Qur'ān declares, "This is your *Ummah*, one, united and I am your Lord. Serve Me" (21:92). In the course of his discussion the author has dwelt at length on the political decay of the Muslims and shortcomings of the *Ummah* in present times. In the eleventh chapter "*Tauhid* The Principle of the Economic Order" the author first points out the essential relation of the *Tawhīd* to the economic order and shows the unbreakable bond between the material and spiritual aspects of human life. He is of the view that if Muhammad Iqbal asserted that "political action is the expression of Islam's Spirituality," one may not be wrong to say that "economic action is the expression of Islam's spirituality." He further elaborates the point that the economy of the *Ummah* and its good health are the essence of Islam. The characteristic feature of economic order in Islam is that it is value-based. This order requires the people to show fairness and justice in material transaction with each other and enjoins upon them to take care of others' right in all matters including production and consumption.

The twelfth chapter "*Tauhid* The Principle of World Order" contains a thorough discussion on international relationship in the light of the principle of *Tawḥīd*. The main theme of the discussion is that *Tawḥīd* stands for universal brotherhood and that it is the basis of world order in Islam. Professor Ismail Raji is realistic in his point of view that earlier human beings associated together on the basis of race or culture or both, and it was Islam which provided a novel base of human association in the form of *Ummah*. He thinks the universalism implied by *Tawḥīd* is an ideal one, enveloping the whole of mankind without exception. He is of the opinion that the social order of Islam is the nucleus for the world order. By virtue of being human, every person is an actual member of this social order, or a potential member whose recruitment is the duty of all other members. Moreover, the author considers the well-known "Charter of Madina" as the model constitution of the world order of Islam and calls the establishment of peace and banishment of hostility from the world scene the main aim of this universal order.

In the last chapter "*Tauhid* : The Principle of Aesthetics," the author has discussed the Islamic treatment of art and artistic manifestations. He makes it quite clear that *Tawḥīd* does not oppose artistic creativity; instead it favours its promotion. But *Tawḥīd* asserts that 'nothing is like unto God and nothing in nature can represent or express Him.' The author finds one common factor in all creations of Islamic art and that is unity of purpose and form. Explaining this point he states that "all Islamic art has recourse to and used the highly emotive words of the Quran and the *Hadith*, of Arabic and Persian poetry or of the Islamic wisdom literature and rendered them in Arabic calligraphy." In his opinion almost all artistic works of Muslims relating to calligraphy, decoration or architecture demonstrate a special design known as "arabesque."

In view of the above details it is fully established that the work under review is a comprehensive study of the essence of *Tawḥīd* and the elucidation of its lasting impact on thinking and action of mankind in every sphere of life. *Tawḥīd*, being the very basis of Islam, determines the whole system of Islamic life. It is a notable feature of the work that in every chapter a comparison has been shown between Islamic attitude toward the concerned issue with that of other well-known religions of the world. It looks strange that a considerable part of the subject material has been presented in philosophical terms and difficult style, while the work is intended (as clarified in the Preface) to provide guidance to the Muslim youth and enable them to comprehend the realities of *Tawḥīd* and its impact. Obviously, a simple style and plain explanation would have been more useful for this purpose.

The repetition of certain points and unproportional details on some issues may be

listed as the shortcomings of the work. The *Ummah* and its characteristics have been defined in these chapters dealing with social, political and economic orders. In the same way 7,8 and 9 chapters take up for discussion almost the same issue—Social Set-up or Social Order. The work is well-documented and has extensive references from original sources. But it must be pointed out that in quoting verses of different *Sūrahs* from the Qur'ān in a single footnote, no distinctive mark has been given berween verses of separate places. It creates confusion. Moreover, the footnotes of the eighth chapter have not been printed in order (pp.322-23). These minor shortcomings apart the book has great merit, value and a high standard of scholarship Taking interest in this esteemed work and the propagation of its contents would be a fitting tribute to its author Professor Ismail Raji al-Faruqi who was put to death in the way of Allah on 28th May, 1986

ZAFARUL ISLAM

RIAZUL ISLAM

A CALENDAR OF DOCUMENTS ON INDO-PERSIAN RELATIONS (1500-1750) Vol. II

Iranian Culture Foundation, Tehran, and Institute of Central and West Asian Studies, Karachi, 1982; 489pp.; Price Rs. 250/-, Foreign price U.S. $ 30.

For presenting a true picture of any aspect of history nothing can be more authentic and reliable than documentary evidence. The present-day historians, therefore, lay full emphasis on the utilization of documents and records for reconstructing the history of the past.

There is no dearth of original source material on medieval Indian history which is available in many premier institutions in India and abroad. The original source material for medieval Indian history includes documents preserved in archival institutions and contemporary literature. The political histories and administrative manuals form the main bulk of the contemporary Persian literature. But some Persian manuscripts contain various types of documents such as *farmāns*, *nishāns*, *dastaks*, letters etc. The compilation and publication of catalogues and calendars of contemporary manuscripts and documents preserved in the archival institutions go a long way in meeting the requirements of the researchers The language and script of the documents of the medieval period are the main hurdles for the present-day research scholars and it is difficult for them to utilize and analyze these manuscripts and documents without sound, exhaustive and illustrative catalogues. As a step in this direction some catalogues of records pertaining to documents of medieval period have been brought out by the A.P. State Archives, Hyderabad. The National Archives of India, New Delhi, has also brought out calendars of Acquired Documents. We come across many other catalogues of manuscripts published by some of the prestigious institutions. In recent times efforts have been made to achieve greater excellence in this field. Prof. Riazul Islam's latest effort is yet another link in this continuing chain. The calendar

under review has an individuality. Professor Riazul Islam has compiled documents, available in several manuscripts preserved in various institutions of the subcontinent and abroad on the particular subject.

This volume comprising 224 documents is divided into the following five sections:

1.	Correspondence of post-Aurangzeb period	.. 60
2.	Correspondence with the Deccan	.. 48
3.	Correspondence with Transoxiana	.. 60
4	Correspondence with Ottomans	.. 53
5	Miscellaneous correspondence	.. 3
		224

The 1st volume on the subject compiled by the same Professor brought out in 1979 contains 276 documents. With the addition of the present volume, as many as 500 documents stand catalogued in the two volumes. The important work *Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations Between the Mughal Empire and Iran* is also by the same author.

The present volume of the calendar contains *farmāns*, *raqams* (royal orders), *nishāns* (orders issued by the princes), *Nāmah-i Humāyūnī* (royal letters), *shuqqah*, *ruqqah*, *maktūb* (letters from princes, vazirs and high officials), *'ahadnāmahs* (agreements and treaties), *'arḍdāsht*, *'arīdah* (a letter or a petition from an inferior), *ta'ziyatnāmah* (condolatory letter), *tahniyatnāmah* (congratulatory letter), *dastak-i rāhdārī* (passport) etc.

The format of the calendar is as follows:

Class
From
To
Munshi
Bearer
Date
Place of issue
Rubric
Beginning
End.

The text is given in the form of a summary or comment.

In some documents the rubric or title of the document is not given and in some cases one document is available in more than one manuscript mentioning the rubric in different ways. The cataloguer has determined the class of the document after going through its contents or comparing the rubrics given in different manuscripts.

In the rubric if the addressee is simply the ruler of the Deccan (*Maktūb ba-Vālī-i Dakan*), the cataloguer has decided on the basis of the contents of the letter, whether the letter was addressed to the ruler of Golconda or Bijapur. If the date is not mentioned he has given the probable date according to the events mentioned in the document. In the column under 'Text given in' names of one or more than one manuscript preserved in the learned institutions have been mentioned. These are the manuscripts wherein the document which is being catalogued is available. As the author has a profound study of this topic he is able to offer expert remarks under the head 'comments' after giving the summary of the documents. All the salient features contained in the document, important from the historical and research point of view, have been well discussed under this head. He has also given the clear backgrounds of the events mentioned in the document and also described briefly the career of the nobles and important and high officials mentioned in the documents while referring to the original and standard secondary sources.

It is true that it is a calendar of documents of a particular period on the subject "Indo-Persian Relations" but it is invaluable and very useful for the study of many specialized research topics. For example, the following few letters included in this calendar are cited below which throw light on Golconda-Iran relations:

(1) Doc. No.296 at pp.126-27 is a letter of Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh in the form of *'Arḍdāsht* to Shah Ṭahmāsp I of Iran. In this letter Ibrāhīm Qutb Shāh writes in the manner of a vassal addressing his overlord.

(2) Doc. No.299 at pp.138-39 is a letter of Shah 'Abbās I to Muḥammad Qutb Shāh. In this letter the tone of authority of the Persian ruler is unmistakable. He rebukes Muḥammad Qutb Shāh over the detention of the Persian envoy and asked him not to do so in future.

(3) Doc. No. 316 at pp.181-82 is a letter of 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh to Shah 'Abbās II. In this letter 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh complains that the successor of Shah 'Abbās I including the addressee are not extending help to Golconda and he is therefore facing a difficult situation. 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh expresses his wish between the lines that the Persian forces should be deployed on the Kabul front in order to divert Mughal pressure on Golconda.

(4) Doc. No.316.1, pp.183-84 is the letter of 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh whose aunt was in Iran. This letter shows that 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh was planning his flight to Iran as he was under the impression that the Mughals were bent upon destroying his kingdom.

(5) Doc. No.316.2, pp.185-86, is the letter of 'Abd-Allāh Quṭb Shāh to his aunt in Iran. This letter clearly shows the secret contacts which 'Abd-Allāh Qutb Shāh maintained with the Persian kingdom through his own relatives and agents in Iran.

(6) Doc. No.319, p.192, is the letter of Shah 'Abbās II to 'Abd-Allāh Qutb Shāh. In this letter the shah of Iran says that Quṭb Shāh like his ancestors should cooperate with the 'Ādil Shāhs so that with their combined strength they can break the aggressive power of the enemy. He further conveys that he has given similar advice to 'Ādil Shāh.

A photographic album comprising photo copies of 22 documents is provided in the catalogue. Of these 22 photographs, 14 are those which were included in Volume I of the work. The inclusion of only 8 photographs of the original documents in the present volume appears to be fairly inadequate considering the important and varied information value of the calendar. A larger number of the photo copies of the documents would have added to the comprehensiveness of the catalogue which is otherwise quite a painstaking work.

This volume is a scholarly work of great importance and must find a place in every research library specialising in medieval Indian history. Prof. Riazul Islam deserves to be congratulated for his inspiring effort. The calendar will be extremely helpful to researchers conducting research on the Indo-Persian relations during the period 1500-1750.

SYED DAWOOD ASHRAF

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

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THE ROLE OF BELIEVERS IN PROMOTING MUTUAL TRUST AND COMMUNITY

SYED. Z. ABEDIN

[The following is an address given at the Euro–Middle East Christian–Muslim Colloquium, organized by the World Council of Churches. We are printing it for the readers of *Islamic Culture* as it discusses one of the very important issues in the world today. The author is presently Director of the U.K. based Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs and Editor of its biannual research journal *JIMMA*.—*Editors*]

I AM grateful to the World Council of Churches, in particular to Dr. Stuart E.Brown, Programme Secretary, Christian-Muslim Relations, for providing me the opportunity of attending this Euro-Middle East Christian-Muslim colloquium and of participating in its deliberations.

During the two days I have been here, I have benefited immensely from the discussions in this forum. Obviously, the scholars and specialists present here are experienced in inter-faith dialogue; their observations have focused on key issues; the distance they have traversed in this field is evident in not only *what* they said, but also (and from my point of view more significantly) in *how* they said it. They have evinced a scrupulous awareness of sensitivities and situations and of appropriate modes of discourse.

Let me at the very outset confess that I find myself at a disadvantage on all these counts. This is my very first experience of formal inter-faith encounter; I am at a loss where to start and what to say that may reasonably constitute an effort toward promotion of trust and community. My biggest difficulty is determining a mode of discourse appropriate to such occasions.

This predicament is perhaps traceable to the fact that I am, in a sense, still engaged in a dialogue with myself. Having said this, however, let me hasten to add that I have, as such, no particular problem with the topic assigned to me. The coming of people together in trust and community is, in our times, no longer a daunting idea. Anyone even remotely cognizant of the situation obtaining in the world today could with ease marshall arguments in favour of reducing mistrust and creating a climate of goodwill.

There are in these critical times countless economic, social and political reasons why we should encourage people of diverse racial, ethnic and national backgrounds to seek to understand and empathize with each other.

I have no problems with this.

However, the topic assigned to me includes the term "believers." This to me means that whereas it is the duty of every sane person to help reduce inter-communal tensions and promote trust, "believers" have ostensibly some extra or special reasons for doing so. So that if, for example, an economist or social scientist were to come forth with otherwise compelling reasons for inter-communal cooperation, for the purposes of our discussion here today, they may not be considered adequate or acceptable. There are presumably arguments that derive from our respective faith-positions which without compromising our faith-integrity require us to extend hands of friendship and cooperation across faith-borders. We are here to discover these arguments and share them among ourselves. In other words, we are, each one of us, searching for the religious imperative.

In terms of our specific situation here this morning one aspect of this imperative would be to discover Christian and Muslim reasons why we should promote, particularly among Christians and Muslims, the values of trust and community; in other words, to determine what role, if any, our respective religions recommend to us in the sphere of Christian-Muslim relations.

Insofar as the coming together of Christians and Muslims is concerned, I have no problem with that either. Both Christianity and Islam are religions of outreach. The Christian believer is required to carry the Gospel to the four corners of the earth. In Islam, *da'wah* (or call to Islam) is a duty incumbent on all believers.

> Call unto the path of your Lord through wise arguments and fair preaching, and argue with them (the non-believers) with

> arguments yet more fair, yet more becoming. (Qur'ān, 16:125)

Thus speaking as a Muslim, I would say that in Islam the coming together of Muslims and non-Muslims is encouraged, even required. (This even without the above textual reinforcement is inferable from the declared Islamic position that the Qur'ān is God's last and final message to mankind; the Prophet Muḥammad is a witness unto Muslims and Muslims are witness unto mankind.) However, it is equally clear that this coming together is with a clearly defined purpose: "Call unto the path of your Lord."

From the little I know of the Christian position, it is more or less similar: the purpose of mission is to invite non-Christians to accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Saviour.

Now, if our gathering here is this kind of coming together, then, regardless of the moral and spiritual merits of such an exercise, it is, if past experience is any guide, not likely to conduce to trust and community.

Hence if we are not here to undermine each other or to make each other the focus of mission or *da'wah*, we have to clearly define what we are here for? Ostensibly, we are here to promote trust and community. Such a goal would require us to concede that although mission and *da'wah* are legitimate exercises in their own right, under the exigencies of other factors (excluding the religious and spiritual) we are constrained to come together to promote trust and community. The alternative is common doom.

This is by all counts a legitimate and worthwhile goal. But we have to keep in mind that although our coming together is under constraints other than religious we are still obligated under the theme to discover spiritual and moral reasons for doing so (remember the caveat: the rôle of *believers*....).

If such a premise is agreeable to all of us then the next obvious question to ask is: do our respective religious beliefs allow for such a relationship? Obviously, this relationship in order to prosper has to be on a footing of equality. Are we ready to accept each other (religiously) with equal dignity and respect? Could we as Christians and Muslims, maintaining the primacy of our religious identity, work in amity and accord in pursuit of a goal that requires recognition by each other of our respective religious legitimacies?

Or, could a Christian or Muslim "believer," committed to witness or *da'wah*, suspend the witness and function outside the mission or

da'wah context? In order to fully understand the implications of this question we need to seek another definition. Who are we meeting here as a group? In order to fully answer this question there are a few facts that we need to examine first.

Lay Christians or lay Muslims do not ordinarily engage in organized missionary or *da'wah* work. So when we talk of *da'wah* or mission we usually have in mind a particular group in each religion which consciously takes upon itself the responsibility of sharing its vision of truth with people outside its fold. In my view neither of these terms – lay Christians or lay Muslims or conscious Christians (I was tempted to use the term born-again Christians, but this term, for one thing, is not applicable to the Muslim context and even in Christian circles has acquired rather specific connotations) and conscious Muslims – quite fully describes the group gathered here. In my estimation this group has chosen for itself a role quite distinct. The aptest description of this role is the one that is to be found in the Qur'ān.

> Let there arise from among you a group that invites people to all that is good, enjoins *ma'rūf* (that which is generally regarded as right), and proscribes *munkar* (that which is generally regarded as wrong). (Qur'ān, 3:104)

Such a group continues to belong to the "lay" category in that it continues to be counted as a member in good standing of its *ummah*. Beyond this it is also part of a self-conscious or committed group in that it takes its religious responsibilities, as compared to the lay group, more seriously. But added to these two roles, it has voluntarily taken upon itself a third role: it has stepped out of the confines of its own tradition and committed itself to promoting what is generally regarded as good, in this case, promoting trust and community across faith-boundaries.

If we agree with this classification, then the question I have raised gains greater urgency.

It is incontestable that by coming together to join in this enterprise of promoting trust and community we have conferred legitimacy on these aims. That is, from both our different religious perspectives, we see this as genuine and worthwhile effort. But what about us: do we have legitimacy *vis-a-vis* each other? How do we see each other? Are we human beings drawn together in expediency? Or, are we specialists of some kind who have agreed to take on a professional challenge? The words of our theme clearly belie such classification.

To me, it clearly says that we are believers (in separate beliefs) who have come together to find ways to circumvent this separateness and

become one in a cause that transcends our "separatenesses" and belongs to the realm of our common humanity.

Now, what do our separate beliefs have to say about this? Am I as a *dā'ī* (vehicle of Islamic *da'wah*) permitted to function outside the *da'wah* context? Can I concede to you a religious legitimacy, accept you on a level of co-equality in belief? These are questions that both Muslims and Christians should answer for themselves before this joint enterprise can proceed and be genuinely productive.

The Muslim position with respect to these questions is, I am sure, known to most of us present here. It must, I presume, have been spelled out in other similar occasions elsewhere. And I need not go into it in any detail. Nevertheless, to underscore the relevance of the queries I have raised, allow me to touch upon a few salient points.

In the Muslim tradition human dignity and equality are basic rights of man *qua* man. Observe what the Qur'ān says:

> Verily, we have honoured the Children of Adam. (Qur'ān, 11:70)

Further:

> O mankind! we created you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (not that you may despise each other). (Qur'ān, 49:13)

This "oneness" extends into the sphere of man's spiritual and religious life as well:

> There is no people but that God sent them a prophet or a warner. (Qur'ān, 16:36)

All these prophets and messengers carried an identical message:

> Serve God and eschew evil.

The Qur'ān in its own words, is not a denial, but
> a confirmation of revelations that went before it. (Qur'ān, 10:37, also 2:89)

Hence, Muslims in order to be true Muslims are required to affirm:

> We believe in God, and what has been revealed to us, and what was revealed to Abraham, Ismail, Isaac, Jacob, and the Tribes, and in the Books given to Moses, Jesus and the Prophets from their Lord. We make no distinctions between one and another among them. (Qur'ān, 3:84)

No declaration of the Islamic faith is complete without this.

All men, then, came from the same source, they were all the beneficiaries of God's favour (guidance). This favour was in all cases identical in content. There, therefore, exists a valid basis of continuing relationship between them, especially those among them who practise what they believe. (Qur'ān, 3:110)

Also,

> Those who believe (the Muslims), and those who are Jews, Christians and Sabeans–all those who believe in God and in the Day of Judgement and work righteousness, shall have their reward with God. They shall have no cause for fear, nor for grief. (Qur'ān, 2:62)

The Qur'ān therefore keeps the door open for interaction at all levels among the children of Adam. Beyond this, the Qur'ān lays down another general principle to guide Muslims in their choice of conduct:

> Help one another in righteousness and piety, but help not one another in sin and rancour. (Qur'ān, 5:2)

This principle allows Muslims as believers to cooperate in any effort toward the promotion of the good (in our particular case, the promotion of trust and community) with a view to creating a climate conducive to the survival of mankind and the attainment of peace and harmony and enrichment of the quality of life – goals which, I assume, we all share and are ultimately the end of our endeavour, more than simply strengthening Christian-Muslim relations.

In fact, in defining Muslims as an ideological group and in giving reasons for their status in the eyes of God, the Qur'ān clearly states:

> You are the best of people, raised up for mankind (because) you enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency and you believe in God. (Qur'ān 3:110)

Hence, participation in the promotion of the good is not merely an option open to Muslims; it is not a concession they condescend to make to the exigencies of particular situation; it is a *sine qua non* of their faith-existence and their faith-status (*the best of people*). And this participation is in the context of humanity ("raised up for mankind") and not for themselves alone. And it is to be undertaken under the impetus of their religious belief; in fact derives from it (*you believe in God*).

These general principles I have briefly referred to seem to clear the

way for Muslim participation in inter-religious and inter-group endeavours on a level of equality in origin and legitimacy in faith and moral status.

But what about *da'wah* and mission: the irrevocable obligation that rests with all believers? Isn't there a possibility, one may ask, that Muslims and Christians coming together on a precise platform (banning nuclear arms, for example; or promoting trust and community, as we are gathered here today) may yet unwittingly or in simple good faith, make each other the object of *da'wah* or mission and thus endanger the ends of trust and community? For, frankly speaking, we can promote trust only if we, each one of us, is assured that we do not have designs (however well-meaning) on each other.

Here, I think it is indicated that we look a little closely into these oft repeated terms *da'wah* and mission.

Given my limitations, I can only venture to say a few words on the concept of *da'wah* as I understand it.

Generally speaking, the meaning that the word *da'wah* conjures up in the minds of many non-Muslims is that it is a device for conversion to Islam. It takes multiple shapes and forms: at times it is a theological argument, at other times (and such instances, in the perception of our non-Muslim friends, are or have been far more frequent) it involves coercion as well – economic, political, social, even corporeal (the sword theory for example). Naturally, therefore, non-Muslims are wary of the word *da'wah*.

As an aside let me state that I hold no brief for all Muslims, past or present. Nobody's interests would be served, neither of Islam nor of Muslims or non-Muslims, if we made past or present Muslim conduct the basis of our inferences about Islamic doctrine. God did indeed guarantee the incorruptibility of the Qur'ān, but I have yet to come across any textual reference that would even remotely suggest that Muslim conduct has also been thus guaranteed. Muslims, particularly those who exhaust their energies and fritter away goodwill in defending everthing "Muslim" should make a clear note of this. The Qur'ān is *al-furqān* (criterion). It, rather than history or any other measure, should be used to judge Muslim conduct itself. The Qur'ān was not irrevocably or unconditionally given to any particular nation or tribe. It is a legacy which like other spiritual bequests of man belongs to the race.

> (The message) is the grace of God, which He will bestow on whom He pleases. (Qur'ān, 5:57)

Now going back to our discusssion, even if *da'wah* is accepted as an instrument for conversion in the hands of Muslims, a closer examination of the term would reveal that this could be only one of its aspects.

In the truest sense of the term, *da'wah* is primarily self-directed. It is essentially a means by which an individual Muslim ensures the vibrancy of his *īmān* (faith), marshalling to himself arguments "ever more fair and ever more becoming." This process in the widest sense has been termed as *tafakkur* (reflection) which is described by the Qur'ān as a salient and ever-present attribute of the believer:

> In the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the alternation of night and day – there are indeed signs for men of understanding – those who celebrate the praises of God, standing, sitting and lying down on their sides, and contemplate the wonders of creation in the heavens and the earth (and as a result they cry out): Our Lord not for naught have you created all this! Glory to you. Save us from the punishment of the Fire. (Qur'ān, 3:190 – 91)

Da'wah in this sense is a witness that each individual Muslim presents in the practice of his daily life.

The second aspect of *da'wah* is interactive in its connotation – it relates to others; not *all* others, but Muslim others. After having become a witness to the truths of Islam in his own life, a Muslim's next concern is to see this witness in the lives of his fellow-believers, his peers, friends, the social environment in which he lives. This process is akin to what the Americans call a "home mission" — setting your own house in order.

The third and final aspect of *da'wah* is the one that relates to outsiders. We have already touched upon this aspect. Its purpose is other-directed. But certain connotations that have in time come to adhere to this process in the perception of many non-Muslims (especially the notion that the faithful *en masse* have been given free rein to target by any means available those outside the pale of Islam) have, despite confirmed or unconfirmed Muslim lapses in this regard, absolutely no basis in doctrine.

Behind bearing witness to the truths of Islam through a life dedicated to its precepts in all walks of life, the idea undoubtedly is that the picture thus presented would be so attractive that those not in the fold of Islam would be drawn toward it. And this is exactly the manner in

which Islam actually spread in *most* regions of the world. I concede that there are parallel examples based on a different kind of testimony. But apart from the fact that they are now recognized by impartial observers as not as frequent as previously believed, they stand condemned as an aberration by the clear testimony of the Qur'ān.

According to one contemporary writer the expansion of Islam beyond the initial 7th century spurt was the work of traders and itinerant Sufis. This they achieved by learning "to live lives of submission to God and to His Messenger in a pluralistic, sometimes even unsympathetic environment. What eventually contributed to that environment changing to a 'realm of Islam' (*dār al-Islām*) was not the militancy of the Muslim minority but the religious interest of the non-Muslim majority in what they came to recognize as a peaceful and attractive form of faith." (Patric Ryan,"Islam and Politics in West Africa: Minority and Majority Models," *The Muslim World*, Jan. 1987, p.6.)

The Qur'ān has been very careful in laying down clear guidelines for this third aspect of *da'wah*. All of us, I am sure, are familiar with these Qur'ānic statements:

> There is no compulsion in religion. The right direction is now distinct from error. (Qur'ān, 2:256)
>
> He (man) has been shown the two paths. (Qur'ān,90:10)
>
> Whosoever will, let him believe, and whosoever will let him disbelieve. (Qur'ān,18:29)
>
> No bearer of burdens can bear the burden of others. (Qur'ān,17:15)

Man's success or failure rests on how he exercises his freedom of choice. In the absence of this freedom there is nothing to judge: there is then no meaning in this entire enterprise. Muslims are thus persuaded against coercion not so much for humanitarian or other considerations, but in order to retrieve and preserve meaning in life.

Other examples of how Islam desires the process of *da'wah* to remain within certain bounds are:

> God forbids you not with regard to those who war not against you on account of your religion, nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing with them kindly and justly. For God loves those who are just. (Qur'ān, 60:8)
>
> And argue not with the People of the Scripture unless it be in a

> way that is better, save with such of them as do wrong; and say: We believe in that which has been revealed to us and revealed to you; our God and your God is one, and to Him we surrender. (Qur'ān 29:46)
>
> Call you unto the path of your Lord through wise argument and fair preaching and argue with them (the non-believers) with arguments yet more fair and yet more becoming. (Qur'ān,16:125)
>
> Turn not your face in scorn toward men, nor walk with insolence in the land for God does not love any arrogant boaster.
>
> And be modest in your bearing, and subdue your voice, for the harshest of all sounds is without doubt the sound of an ass. (Qur'ān, 31:18–19)

However,there is one crucial aspect of the process of *da'wah* that most people, even Muslims, overlook or fail to recognize: and this relates to the actual process of conversion. This would presumably reinforce our contention that *da'wah* is primarily inner-directed.

The argument is rather lengthy, but the gist of it is that in Islam *da'wah* has no relationship to actual conversion. The process of *da'wah* and its results are not subject to body count or cost-effectiveness. Theoretically, the *da'wah* process can proceed *ad infinitum* without "saving a single soul," and still fulfill its purpose. The reason for this is that, according to the Qur'ān, *da'wah* belongs to the domain of man, whereas conversion or change of heart belongs to the domain of God. And if the Qur'ān is testimony, God is quite anxious to protect His domain. So much so that He repeatedly intervened in the case of the first *dā'ī* of Islam, the Prophet Muḥammad, to underscore this truth. The tone of these interventions is sometimes that of a reminder, sometimes of caution and sometimes of even admonishment. Note the following:

> Had your Lord willed it, all the people of the earth would be believers (but He did not) would you then compel the people to believe? (Qur'ān, 10:99)
>
> It is true you will not be able to guide every one whom you love; but God guides those whom He will, and He knows best those who receive guidance. (Qur'ān, 28:56)
>
> Say: O men, the truth has now come to you from your Lord. Whoever wills may be guided by it, whoever does not will, may

> not. And I am not sent over you to arrange your affairs (make decisions on your behalf). (Qur'ān, 10:108; see also 6:104)
>
> We have revealed to you the Qur'ān that you may convey it to the people. It is the truth. Whoever accepts it does so to his own credit. Whoever rejects it does so to his discredit. You are not responsible for their decisions. (In case people reject the revelation) say, I am only a warner to warn you. (Qur'ān, 39:41)
>
> It is not required of you (O Muḥammad) to set them (unbelievers) on the right path. But God sets on the right path whom He pleases. (Qur'ān, 2:272)
>
> And say to the people of the Book and to those who are unlearned: "Do you submit your whole self to God?" If they do they are on the right path, but if they do not, your duty is (only) to convey the message, and God watches over all His servants. (Qur'ān, 3:20)

Thus we see that a Muslim's responsibility ends with the presentation of the message. Conversion cannot be the stated or measurable goal of *da'wah*. Because conversion, which implies a change of heart, is the prerogative of God. It goes against the very essence of freedom of choice which Islam wishes to protect and preserve even at the cost of war. (Muslims are permitted the use of militant means in two situations: one, when they are the object of hostile aggression, and two, when a people's freedom of choice is being curtailed.)

Of course, as I noted earlier, violations have occurred in the course of history; at times Muslims have arrogated to themselves the power and authority that belongs to God alone. But it must also be considered that violations have occurred of all aspects of Islam, even of those which relate to Muslims themselves and the dire consequences of which they alone have suffered. The point I am trying to make here is that a clear doctrinal base, an unambiguous textual reference, exists so that Muslim conduct may at any time be adjudged with reference to their own sources. This should be somewhat reassuring to those who are disturbed by the historical evidence.

Hence, even if we equate dialogue with *da'wah* (the reservations I have to this will come later), we find that these clear guidelines should rule out the possibility of any hidden Muslim agenda.

Insofar as the present dialogue form is concerned the credit for it goes entirely to our Christian friends. It is they who first recognized the

urgent necessity of inter-faith trust and community. Particularly, the Catholic Church which through Ecumenical Council II very courageously and imaginatively broke the ice of centuries and opened up the possibilities of dialogue between followers of different faiths. This step must undoubtedly reckon as one of the most significant landmarks in world religious history. Protestant churches soon followed suit. Even today, a quarter of a century after Vatican II, it is mainly Christian bodies that are in the forefront of this effort and are guiding it forward. The Muslim side, despite its hoary tradition of outreach, is still locked in reluctance, caution and a degree of timidity.

It is necessary at this point to examine briefly the factors behind this Muslim hesitance. If there is nothing in Muslim tradition, doctrinal or operational, as Muslims aver, to encourage them to turn inward and exist in a spiritual ghetto, why are they averse to grasping the hand of inter-faith exchange and discourse?

To my mind, there are two reasons for it. One relates to the history of the past four hundred years or so, in which Christianity failed to perform its natural function of acting as a critique of culture, rather than forming up to it. The internal consequences to the Church of this failure is not our business today and have now been valorously analyzed by numerous serious Christian scholars themselves. But its external consequences touch directly upon our concerns here today. I do not wish for a moment to suggest that in this respect only the Christians are to be placed in the dock of history. The Muslims too erred, but perhaps because of their own adverse tradition, or because of the lack of opportunity, their record of inter-faith hostility and aggression is not quite at par.

In the modern period,it was the Christians who were the dominant power; they had the means, the resources, the education, the will and the dreams. They are the ones who stepped out and made contact. They are the ones who rode roughshod over the enlightened elements of their own noble tradition and made inter-faith dialogue a dire prospect for followers of other, "lesser" religions. Is this chapter now closed? Only our friends can supply the correct answer. Insofar as the layman is concerned, one still hears of the phenomenon of "Rice Christians" in parts of the world today. Or so it is alleged.

If all this history is to be interpreted and understood in terms of a power syndrome, then the world of Islam is now catching up. In comparative terms it now has more power, more resources and a clearer will to exert itself. In parts of the world, religiously speaking, where there was no challenge, there is now a challenge. No one now is on the

defensive, regardless of what each side would want to believe or want others to believe.

In this emerging scenario what guarantee is there that the Muslim side would not encounter the same pitfalls as the Christians experienced in their days of ascendence, or use the same rationalizations (civilizing the savages) and commit the same violations of their own enlightened traditions and the human ideals of tolerance, justice and equality? Perhaps soon a parallel new term may have to be coined and gain currency, if it has not been already: "Rice Muslims."

In consideration of such a frightening prospect, it is absolutely essential, and especially for Muslims, to seek ways of inter-faith communication and dialogue and mutual consultation and cooperation. If they (the Muslims) find themselves disinclined to take these steps for the sake of the Christians or followers of other religions, they still need to do it for their own sakes. For the religious attitude described above is fatal not so much for the people at the receiving end (victims do survive) but for the perpetrators themselves.

At this point let me clearly state that dialogue is not as I see it an invitation to suspend *da'wah* or mission. Christianity as well as Islam would strongly resist this. The idea here is that proudly acknowledging our differences, we learn to work together. Let me repeat something that was noted elsewhere: there are certain salient characteristics that define our identity. These should not be in jeopardy in our coming together. But given these distinctions there are wide areas of belief and action wherein we can fruitfully cooperate and work for the betterment of mankind and in service to our common Lord and Creator.

Identifying such areas and the rationale of such an approach needs to be briefly discussed, but before I do this there is one little point that I have skipped. In a way I ran ahead of my analysis of why Muslims even today experience a certain reluctance in participating in such inter-faith endeavours.

In the earlier part of my presentation I have noted that Islam not only encourages inter-faith contact and dialogue, it provides it with a firm doctrinal base. It is my considered opinion that if this form is to proceed meaningfully and gain genuine legitimacy, a similar statement of purpose, a definition, and clearly spelled out guidelines need to be forthcoming from all participating parties. This would go a long way in creating mutual confidence and a more forthcoming attitude on the part of Muslims. This point cannot be over emphasized.

I have already confessed at the outset that my experience in formal inter-faith encounter is very limited My familiarity with Christian literature on the subject is even more so. But in the cursory attempts I have made to understand the accepted Christian concept of dialogue, its meaning and purpose, I have been struck by two salient features.

One, despite the much longer Christian experience in inter-faith contact and their precedence in the recognition of such need, there is a striking absence of clear definitions and explicit expression of purpose. For one thing there is an interchangeable (and rather confusing) use of terms like dialogue, mission, and evangelism. Each of these then comes out with varying connotations. For example:

> To evangelise is so to present Christ Jesus in the power of the Holy Spirit that men shall come to put their trust in God through him, to accept him as their saviour, and serve him as their King in the fellowship of his Chruch. (John Stott, *Christian Mission in the Modern World*, quoted in *International Bulletin of Missionary Research*, July, 1987, p.97.)

In similar vein, David Bosch in his very penetrating analysis on the subject titled "Evangelism: Theological Currents and Cross-Currents Today" (IBMR, *op. cit.*) treats evangelism and mission in the same category and then conceding that "evangelism is understood differently by different people," sets about describing the various meanings of evangelism/mission. In the several meanings discussed one emphasis common to all is "winning souls for eternity."

With regard to the ecumenical movement it is averred that the use of mission, witness and evangelism is interchangeable, because ecumenism represents a total Christian ministry to the world, including coversion.

Later in the study, when a distinction between evangelism and mission is made, it turns out to be a territorial rather than a conceptual difference. Evangelism in this context is preaching the Gospel in Western society, i.e. among those who are nominal Christians or are estranged from the church. And mission is communicating the Christian faith in the Third World, i.e. among strangers.

Now since "Evangelism that stops at calling people to accept Christ is incomplete and truncated" (*ibid.*, p.102), one would expect a more distinct definition of dialogue to be forthcoming. But here too the issue is not quite clear. The following belongs more in the ambivalent category:

> Inter-religious dialogue would be unnecessary if all men believed in Jesus Christ and practised only the religion which He established. (Vatican Secretariat for Non-Christians, *Bulletin*, vol. 22:2, 1985.)

However, this is not the whole story. Tucked away in the background, but most assuredly there, is a parallel current of thought, a minority view, which has perhaps always been there and bears valid credentials. This current of thought has distinctly different emphases:

> ...evangelism cannot be defined in terms of results; it is simply the preaching of the gospel whether any one gets converted or not. (IBMR, *op.cit.*, p.97)

Or, again

> Evangelism is invitation; it should never deteriorate into coaxing, much less threat. (*Ibid.*, p.101)

It cautions, however, that:

> Both these–coaxing and threat–are often used in so-called evangelistic campaigns.

The early Christian community, the founding fathers, so to speak, did not have to say "Join us." Their "conspicuously different life style became in itself a witness to Christ." Evangelistic campaigns in our times are thus used to make-up for the lack of a "conspicuously different life style" in present-day Christian communities.

Or, again, in a more recent reaffirmation:

> In inter-religious dialogue the Church discovers the working of God in the other religions, elements of truth and grace, seeds of the Word,... precious things both religious and human, and ways of the truth which illumines all mankind.
>
> Fruitful inter-religious dialogue presumes that the partners participate in a spirit of openness, sincerity and involvement.... It is built on respect and love for one another. (Francis Arinze [President of the Secretariat for Non-Christians], "Prospects of Evangelization, with Reference to the Areas of the Non-Christian Religions, Twenty Years after Vatican II," *Bulletin*, vol. 20:2, pp.114-15)

To reconcile these parallel currents, whether in Christianity or Islam, we need sincerely to re-examine our religious ideals, a process that would in itself, by its own internal logic lead to a re-examination of our

past performance in the realm of inter-faith contact and conduct.

Such an excercise, I am convinced, will lead to a clearer doctrinal affirmation of religious pluralism and a recognition of the diversity of faith-beliefs and faith-practices.

It would also, and this a wish, come up with a definition of inter-faith dialogue that distinguishes it from evangelism and mission and represents a more forthright recognition of the equal identity and dignity of all participants in the process. Dialogue may then be defined as a

> Process wherein people with diverse faith-backgrounds come together and recognizing each other's confessional identity and integrity, join hands in equality and respect to resolve a common and mutually perceived threat to all.

In time, with the experience thus gained, understanding (even at the theological level) may very possibly result.

The mention of the theological component of dialogue raises in my mind another question. As I see it, the current form of dialogue has so far been rather overly burdened with theological content. Why do we have to necessarily start with ponderous issues like Jesus in the Qur'ān and Jesus in the Gospels, or the Christian estimation of the Prophet of Islam or their views on the divine origins of the Qur'ān? What immediate purpose would be served? We come together, if my understanding is correct, under the constraints of not theological but mainly extra-theological factors: humanity is threatened with extinction, planet earth has become or is likely to become the arena of perpetual strife. Those who subscribe to the belief in a higher life and have faith in the transcendent potential of human nature owe it to themselves to join hands and stem this drift toward extinction. Unless, of course, the purpose of dialogue is to convert all Christians to Islam or all Muslims to Christianity. Then, of course, the theological discourse becomes imperative and unavoidable. Even then I cannot altogether overlook the Qur'ānic reprimand:

> If God willed it, He could have brought them all together to the guidance. So do not be among the foolish ones. (Qur'ān, 6:35)

There are numerous vital issues that in our present world constitute a cause of mutual provocation and tension between our two sides (or all sides). A better approach would be that we identify such issues – social, political, economic, attitudinal – one by one and make them the focus and the *raison d'etre* of our coming together (something that

my Catholic friends tell me was tried at Colombo) and see what working relationship we can develop in resolving them to our mutual satisfaction. Success in such a piecemeal enterprise would build confidence and encourage further interaction. Theological issues, on the other hand, by their nature strike at the roots of our self-identity; they challenge our very being as Muslims and Christians.

I regret that I find myself extremely reluctant to be carried away by sentiments like: since the Catholic Chruch has at last granted partial religious legitimacy to those outside the Chruch, or that there is revival in the Muslim world of the truly Islamic ethos, an era of spiritual cordiality or religious *bonhomie* is around the corner for the followers of different faiths as followers of different faiths. A lot more water has to flow under this bridge. But as I suggested above there are ways of working toward that end.

Before I end my submission, I would like briefly to introduce a limited experiment in dialogue (of the kind I mentioned above) that we at the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs have carried on for some time.

First, for those who are not familiar with our work, let me briefly state that this Institute was set up in 1976 to monitor the conditions of life of those Muslim communities which reside in non-Muslim states.

Although from its very inception the Institute pursued a policy of discourse and not dissension, encouraging and promoting opening up of channels of communications between the minority Muslim communities, their majority non-Muslim compatriots and their national governments, a few years along the way we came to the realization that just as we (as Muslims) are concerned with the status of our co-religionists in countries where they are at a numerical disadvantage, other religious communities could legitimately have similar concerns for their co-religionists residing in states where they suffer a numerical disadvantage.

Consequently, a dialogue forum was inaugurated in our periodical publication, *Journal of the Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs (JIMMA)*, and we sent out invitations to scholars and specialists of diverse religious affiliations to come forward and express the aspirations of their minorities living under Muslim auspices. The first to respond was the Vatican Secretariat for Non-Christians, from where Father Thomas Michel contributed as an inaugural piece a remarkably lucid and balanced statement of the religious and civil aspirations of Christian minorities in Muslim states.

Several very interesting and challenging contributions followed and are continuing. The section has become now a regular feature of each issue of *JIMMA*. I do not wish to suggest that this fruitful experiment has led to a successful resolution of any particular minority problem on either side. But doors have been opened on a very sensitive, but very real issue; a rapport has been established. On an issue on which there is mutual commitment and concern, some listening across the borders has taken place. An understanding is in the process of developing that this issue is a reciprocal issue: you listen to us, we listen to you and together we try to create a climate that from academic discussion and responsible airing of views just might lead to some impact on the spheres of social and political action.

As suggested earlier, this discussion of real, shared issues has inexorably, but naturally, led to a discussion of substantive conceptual issues, of the doctrinal roots of our attitudes in this particular domain (religious minorities). But since such discussion followed rather than preceded focus on real issues, many of the roadblocks that one encounters when one launches forth directly into doctrinal issues have been avoided.

We have often been asked, especially by our side, what do we hope to gain by this limited experience: by this venture into a domain where angels fear to tread? Not much, at least not yet, perhaps never. We have no representative capacity, no sanction behind our effort. We speak on behalf of no one. We are frequently advised that the polarization that has taken place especially in modern times makes such efforts akin to a wild goose chase. We are also painfully aware that if the present is any index man seemingly possesses an almost inexhaustible capacity for intransigence and selfish contumacy.

But let's once again look at our theme for today: the role of *believers* in promoting trust and community.

"Indeed," reassures God in the Qur'ān, "We have created man in the best of moulds." It is only when he rejects faith and good works, that man is "reduced to the lowest of lows." (Qur'ān, 95:4–6)

We ākhiru da'wānā ani'l-hamdu lillāhi rabbi'l-'ālamīn.

SOME ASPECTS OF MUSLIM REVIVALIST MOVEMENTS IN INDIA DURING THE 18TH CENTURY: THE ACTIVITIES OF SHĀH WALĪ-ALLĀH OF DELHI

MUHAMMAD AL-FARUQUE

THE death of Awrangzīb in 1707 was a turning point in the history of Mughal rule in India. Events following his death tell a new story of incompetence, short-sighted policy making, selfishness and treachery, producing anarchy, weakness, and a rapid decline in political power, and inhibiting social progress.[1]

The foremost cause of this decline was a crisis in the Muslim character itself. Muslim rule in the Indian subcontinent had endured for so many centuries that it was hard to believe that it could ever decline. The earlier Muslims had faced many dangers and had had to struggle for sheer existence. The little community was conscious of the consequences, if they failed to be vigilant. The frequent invasions from the north-west kept this feeling alive. This produced a sense of responsibility and the qualities of leadership necessary to ensure the survival of the community. With the coming of the Mughals such dangers disappeared because of their strong leadership. Under the Mughals the community prospered but their life became so soft that they lost the grit of their character. In the absence of major issues, like the question of survival, over an extended period of time, the community lost its political sense and became engrossed in petty matters, which sharpened its capacity for intrigue and selfishness, but deprived it of the qualities which alone could keep it politically alive. As a result, the nobles went on quarrelling among themselves, spending their energy and wealth in unproductive endeavours.[2]

The wave of decline touched every sector of the society. The quality of the Mughal army deteriorated. Tomb worshipping, the celebration of *'urs* at the *mazārs* (graves) of the Sufis became a common practice. Moral corruption increased among the people. There were several large brothels in Delhi and homosexuality was prevalent among a sector of the population.[3] The Marathas, the Sikhs, and the Jats took full

advantage of the weakness of the central government. Their atrocities struck terror into the hearts of the people.[4]

In 1739 Nādir Shāh invaded India and for two months kept Delhi under his control. Thirty thousand men were killed in one day in Delhi at the time of his invasion of the city.[5] The army of Nādir Shāh plundered the houses of Delhi one after another. People were thrown in such a state of anarchy that life itself became a burden for them. As a result many people decided to perform *jawhar* in Rajput style, and it was Shāh Walī-Allāh who, through his preaching, dissuaded the people from such an action.[6] The prestige of the Mughal Empire was gone forever and the source of the glory and wealth of the country had dried up.

To this long list of calamities which befell the Mughal Empire was added the gradual expansion of the European colonial powers. The Portuguese, Dutch and French tried to establish themselves in southern India, where the Muslim rulers of Deccan fought partly with them and partly against them; whereas the English East India Company consolidated themselves in Bengal and, after the Battle of Plassey in 1757, slowly extended their rule over the larger parts of the subcontinent.

Shāh Walī-Allāh (1703-1762), whom the crisis of the age had produced, observed all these disruptive forces at work in the Muslim nation of post-Awrangzīb India. Through his foresightedness and intelligence he had realized that the Muslims of India needed to be reformed at their roots in order to revive the past glory of Indic Islam. He himself undertook the task as he was ordained, according to his claim, as the reformer of his age and tried to diagnose the disease the Muslims of India were suffering in his time.

The family of Shāh Walī-Allāh were the descendants of 'Abd-Allāh ibn 'Umar, the famous Companion of the Prophet and the son of the Second Caliph of Islam. One of Shāh Walī-Allāh's ancestors, Shaykh Shams al-Dīn Muftī, migrated from Arabia to India and settled at Rohtak, about thirty miles west of Delhi. He was recognized as the *muftī* of the place and his descendants continued to hold this position until one of them, Shaykh Maḥmūd, joined the public service. Shāh Walī-Allāh's grandfather, Shaykh Wajīh al-Dīn, [6] was in the army of Awrangzīb at the time when the latter was engaged in the war of succession. Because of his valour and extraordinary service at the Battle of Khajwah, Prince Awrangzīb honoured him with a higher rank and an estate; but the pious Wajīh al-Dīn declined to accept these rewards. After his retirement from active service he was killed by robbers on his way to Deccan.

Walī-Allāh's father, Shāh 'Abdal-Raḥīm (1644-1718), changed the

professional course of the family when, unlike his father, Wajīh al-Dīn, he sought to earn his livelihood from private sources. Immediately after the completion of his formal education, he was invited to join the committee responsible for compiling the *Fatāvā 'Ālamgīrī*. Initially he joined the committee on the insistence of his mother. But later on his name was dropped from the list by Awrangzīb, who disliked the presence of a mystically inclined *faqih* in his legal department.[7] This action of the Emperor pleased both Shah 'Abd al-Rahim and his *pīr* Khalīfah Abu'l-Qāsim. The Shāh also declined to accept the *madad-i ma'āsh* grant of the Emperor and engaged himself in teaching in his own established *madrasah* named *Madrasah-i Raḥīmīyah* after himself. At the age of sixty, Shāh 'Abd al-Raḥīm married for the second time and was blessed with a son by his second wife,[8] whom he named Quṭb al-Dīn Aḥmad, with the surname Walī-Allāh and the boy became famous in history with this name.

Shāh Walī-Allāh was born, according to his autobiography, on 4th Shawwāl 1114 A.H. (February 21, 1703).[9] He completed his education at the *Madrasah-i Raḥīmīyah* at the early age of fifteen. His education was comprehensive and he studied almost every discipline of Islamic learning.[10] At this time he was initiated into the Naqshbandīyah branch of Sufism by his father, who also initiated him into the Qādirīyah and Chishtīyah orders, but Walī-Allāh remained predominantly a Naqshbandī of Khwājah Khurd's school. With his initiation into Sufism he studied *tawajjuh* (meditation), *talqīn* (instruction), the conduct of religious rites, and putting on the garment of the Sufis.[11] Soon after he graduated, his father engaged him in teaching in the same *madrasah* and celebrated the occasion.

After the death of his father in 1718, Walī-Allāh devoted himself for almost twelve years exclusively to teaching in the *Madrasah-i Raḥīmīyah*.[12] This was the formative period of his reformist ideas. During this time he observed closely the decline of Mughal power and Muslim society in India. He was convinced that Islam and the Muslims of India were entering upon a new and critical era, both politically and spiritually. To save Indic Islam from this downward trend he realized the need to re-interpret Islamic values without breaking with the past. In this regard he was the first Indian Muslim "who felt the urge of a new spirit in him."[13] Before undertaking such an important task of reform he decided to visit the two holy cities of Islam (Mecca and Medina) and to perform the religious duty of *Ḥajj* (pilgrimage). He left India for this purpose in 1730. After performing the *Ḥajj* he stayed for more than a year in Hijaz and studied under leading scholars of Mecca and Medina. In Mecca he attended the lectures of Shaykh Muḥammad Wafd-Allāh, a Malikite

scholar, on the *Muwaṭṭaʾ* of Mālik b. Anas. Another teacher from whom he received instruction was Shaykh Tāj al-Dīn Qalaʿī al-Ḥanafī (d. 1734), a *muftī* of Mecca. In Medina he sat at the feet of Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Kurdī al-Madanī (d. 1733), the most outstanding scholar and mystic he met in Hijaz. He not only studied *Ḥadīth* with his Medinan tutor but also Sufi works, like *Ḥizb al-Bahr* by al-Shādhilī and the *Qūt al-Qulūb* of Abū Tālib Makkī. His Medinan Shaykh also initiated him into the Shādhilīyah order, the Shaṭṭārīyah order, the Najīb al-Dīn Buzghush branch of the Suhrawardī order, and the Sayyid ʿAlī Hamadānī branch of the Kubrāwīyah order.[14] It is interesting to note that at this time his great Arab contemporary, Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb, was also studying in these holy cities and with these very teachers among others. The two systems of these two great reformers of the 18th century had the same source of inspiration. Although one had advanced, unlike the other, under the shadow of the mystical path, both of them took their inspiration from the study of the *Ḥadīth* in unmystical Hijaz and the orthodox discipline of Ibn Taymīyah, and insisted that their followers depend on this source of *Sharīʿah* along with the Qur'ān. But there is no evidence that they ever met or influenced one another.[15]

In Hijaz Shāh Walī-Allāh had not spent his time only studying and enriching his knowledge through contact with scholars from various parts of the Islamic world; but had thought deeply about the solution to the various problems of the Muslim society: its disintegration created by differing legal schools *(madhhabs)*; the divergent religious opinions of Muslim scholars, and many other similar things. He was trying to find out the most reliable opinion among all offered choices. His mental state at this time is best reflected in the visions he experienced during this period.[16] For example, on one occasion he asked the Prophet which school of the *fiqh* he preferred, in order to follow strictly that school. The Prophet replied to him that all schools were equal to him and that he did not prefer any one over the other.[17] On another occasion the Prophet instructed him not to give preference to ʿAlī over Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthmān.[18] On still another occasion Shāh Walī-Allāh sought the Prophet's permission to argue with the *ʿUlamāʾ* of *Ḥaramayn* (two holy cities) who had objections against the Sufis, but the Prophet did not permit him to do this.[19] The most important aspect of these visions is that they reflect his awareness of his position and responsibilities. In one dream Walī-Allāh received the pen of the Prophet from his grandson Ḥasan.[20] He believed that, whatever he wrote after this vision, was written by the pen of the Prophet. In another vision he saw himself as the *qāʾim al-zamān* (the religious pivot of the age) by which he meant that

"when God desires to institute a new order in the world He makes me an instrument for the realization of that purpose." [21] As a result of these experiences and his training in Hijaz, Shāh Walī-Allāh determined his future line of action.

After a stay of fourteen months in the holy cities of Islam, Shāh Walī-Allāh returned to Delhi at the end of December 1732 and devoted himself mainly to research and writing, leaving the responsibility of teaching in the *Madrasah-i Raḥīmīyah* to others. Until his death he pursued his literary activities and produced about ninety books in Arabic and Persian on almost all branches of Muslim religious learning, of which forty-six have survived.[22] Of all his works, the *Hujjat-Allāh al-Bālighah*[23] is the most outstanding and has been compared to the *Ihyā'* of Imām Ghazālī. In this work he outlined the model Islamic society, for which he worked throughout his life. Nature had lavishly endowed him with excellent qualities of head and heart which he fully utilized in bringing about the intellectual renaissance of Indic Islam.[24]

Shāh Walī-Allāh witnessed the decline of Mughal power and of the Muslim society of 18th-century India and he was deeply shocked by it. But he was not the man to allow things to go their way. With a fixed target and clear vision he took up the burden of changing the course of the tide and began to search out the source of all the troubles, which he soon discovered. It was as if he looked at the suffering of the human race and read clearly every wound and every cut, then put his finger on the place and said: your illness is here and here.

The fundamental cause of the moral decline of the Muslim society of the Indian subcontinent, according to Shāh Walī-Allāh, was the people's ignorance of Islam itself. The basic teachings of Islam are contained in the Qur'ān. The Delhi scholar realized that most of the Indian Muslims did not understand the Qur'ān directly because of their ignorance of the Arabic language. For the understanding of the principal aspects of Islam they depended on the explanations of the various legal schools. Consequently sectarian differences had rapidly increased among them. Muslim society was divided into various camps, and encouraged by the ignorant *mullās*, they took up arms against one another even for very minor differences. Therefore, he emphasized the teaching of the Qur'ān and, in order to make it accessible to the educated classes, he undertook the project of translating the Qur'ān into Persian, the *lingua franca* of the educated Indian Muslims of that time. He started the translation work before he went to Hijaz and had completed the first three chapters by that time. A few years after his return from Hijaz, he resumed the project but

did not complete it until December 1738. The translation, entitled *Fath al-Raḥmān*, was popularized by one of his disciples, Khwājah Muḥammad Amīn, in 1743-44 and became acceptable to his contemporaries.[25] This has endeared him to every reader, and more important is the fact that he laid the foundation for the Urdu translation of the Qur'ān that was undertaken later by two of his four sons.[26] In the margin of his translation he discussed everything that was basic to his reform movement.[27] With the great confidence that he was gifted with the understanding of the secret of the Qur'ān, the Delhi scholar wrote a treatise on the principles of the Qur'ānic exegesis, called *al-Fawz al-Kabīr fī Uṣūl al-Tafsīr*. In this work he summarized the basic Qur'ānic teachings and discussed the technical aspects of the science of *tafsīr*. The basic starting point for a correct *tafsīr*, says Shāh Walī-Allāh, is "to let the Qur'ān narratives speak for themselves and leave out one's own views." He advised the scholars of the Qur'ān to introduce their pupils in the beginning directly to the text of the Qur'ān, without any help from translations or *tafsīrs*, so that a student could familiarize himself with the true spirit of the Qur'ān.[28] Regarding the controversy of *naskh*, he went into detail, and, through the application of *tawjīh*, which he used as a new art, Walī-Allāh came to the conclusion that there are only five *mansukh* (abrogated) verses in the Qur'ān.[29]

Shāh Walī-Allāh laid equal emphasis on the study of *Ḥadīth*, a study that had been peripheral for most of the *'Ulamā'*. Inspired by his Hijazi teachers, especially by Shaykh Abū Ṭāhir al-Madanī, he made *Ḥadīth* his major academic interest to the extent that he commonly became known as *muḥaddith*, the scholar of *Ḥadīth*. He went deeply into all aspects of the *Ḥadīth* science and in his various works discussed elaborately its technical aspects and its importance in the life of the Muslim community.[30] He not only laid emphasis on the study of *Hadīth* but established the principle of its primacy over the rulings of legal schools. He clearly mentioned that, if a ruling of any *madhhab* was shown to be in conflict with a *ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth* (authentic tradition), precedence should be given to the authoritative *ḥadīth*. His work, along with that of his family in this field, placed the seal on India's reputation in *Ḥadīth* and decisively set the emphasis for many *'Ulamā'* who were to follow.[31]

As mentioned earlier, through a number of vocational visions Shāh Walī-Allāh became convinced that he was entrusted with the divine task of reforming the deteriorating condition of India by means of special endowments and capacities conferred upon him for this purpose. Many a time he claimed himself to be the *mujaddid* (the reformer of his century)

and *qā'im al-zamān* and felt that God had called him to be 'the Prophet's vicegerent in blaming' Frequently he claimed that he received instructions from God for a particular work. In his capacity as *mujaddid* of the age he invited people to follow him to attain salvation. Such claims made by the Delhi scholar were criticized by some of the modern scholars. A leading Indian scholar M.Mujeeb remarks that,

> While there can be no doubt about his immense learning and deep sincerity, his claim to have received knowledge of certain truths directly from God or the Prophet is most embarrassing for anyone who wishes to make a critical appraisal of his teaching.[32]

Another Pakistani scholar, about whom it was said that he was the most outstanding leader of the 20th century Islamic movements, attempted a thorough analysis of the activities of Shāh Walī-Allāh. At one time, by way of answering a question directed to him regarding the claims of Mujaddid-i Alf-i Thānī and Shāh Walī-Allāh as being the *mujaddids* of their respective times, he remarked:

> Asserting themselves to be the *mujaddids* and referring time and again to their 'Divine inspirations' was one of the few mistakes committed by these great men. Indeed it was such mistakes of theirs that encouraged and prompted so many lesser men after them to put forward tall claims and create new schisms in the *Ummah*.[33]

He added that *tajdīd* was not an office to which one might be appointed or to which one might lay claim for himself; rather, it was merely a title which was given to a person on the basis of his achievements. If one had rendered some valuable service for revitalizing Islam, he might be called a *mujaddid*. He then concludes,

> I have sincere regard for the work and achievements of Shah Waliullah and the Mujaddid and my love for them is in no way less than that of any of their followers. But this is the one thing about them which I have never been able to appreciate. As a matter of fact, I have never accepted anything from them because it had the support of their 'Divine inspirations' but because it was supported by a strong argument or appeared to be reasonable and well authenticated. Similarly I hold them to be *mujaddids* on account of the opinion that I have formed on the basis of their work and not on account of my belief in their claims.[34]

It was not only Shāh Walī-Allāh who made such claims, but his

father, Shāh 'Abd al-Rahīm, also had made similar claims. He believed that he had obtained a very high mystical level and was the *qayyūm* (the topmost level in the hierarchy of the *walīs*, who obtains inspiration directly from the Prophet) of the universe and that every particle of matter was connected to him.[35] Most probably Walī-Allāh inherited the making of such claims from his father.

However, as the *qā'im al-zamān* of his particular age, Shāh Walī-Allāh considered it to be part of his mission to restore the solidarity of the *ummah* by creating a formula of compromise between various groups, especially between the four *madhhabs* of Sunnī Islam. In making that new formula of religious thought and juristic analysis he relied on the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. He also took care to build it in agreement with the spirit of Islam and in the light of the exigencies of the situation. Then he made a thorough survey in all areas of tension and conflict in contemporary Muslim thinking and earnestly tried to bridge the gap between the externalist and the esoteric scholars (the *'Ulamā'-i Ẓāhir* and the *'Ulamā'-i Bāṭin*), the jurists and the mystics, the followers of *ahl al-ḥadīth* and the followers of *ahl al-ra'i*, the believers in *waḥdat al-wujūd* and the advocates of *waḥdat al-shuhūd*. This sort of *taṭbīq* (resolving and uniting religious approaches and interpretations) which Shāh Walī-Allāh called *jam' bayn al-mukhtalifāt* (combining of opposites) was essential, in his view, for the evolution of a consolidated, coherent and compact religious ideology, and for creating a healthy moral order in the society.[36]

The most important reconstructive work of Shāh Walī-Allāh was that he presented a balanced and moderate view of *fiqh*, clear of all extremes and without showing inclination towards or disfavour for any one school. In order to synthesize the basic principles of four schools he wrote a treatise entitled *al-Inṣāf fī Bayān Asbāb al-Ikhtilāf* in which he also traced the historical background of these schools. He criticized those scholars who were interested in *fiqh* and theoretical sciences only in order to secure governmental posts and the controversies which raged among them. He also criticized those who held fast to a particular *madhhab* and undermined others. In order to break such a rigid mentality, which gave birth to sectarianism among the Muslims and closed the door to social integrity, he developed a method of interjuristic selection recommending that on any particular point of doctrine or ritual a Muslim can follow the rulings of any one of the four *madhhabs*. He strongly criticized the tendency of *taqlīd* by the Muslims of his age and compared unquestioning *taqlīd* with the habits of ants.[37] He says,

> Another thing which appeared among them was that people were satisfied with *taqlīd*. ... *Taqlīd* consists in this, that the

> expositions of the ancients should be accepted and the *ijtihād* of contemporaries should not. One of the reasons for the prevalence of *taqlīd* was the injustice of the *qāḍīs*, for when the *qāḍīs* began to be unjust, only those judgments of theirs which were in accordance with the views of the ancients were accepted. Another reason for increasing the prevalence of *taqlīd* was the ignorance of the masses. ...Then followed many generations believing in *taqlīd*. They could not distinguish between falsehood and truth, disputations and deductions. The jurist then was he who was loquacious and blunt, a man who memorized opinions without distinguishing between the strong and the weak and opened his mouth as wide as he could to utter them.... After this there followed generations which went further in dissension and *taqlīd*, for people had lost integrity, so that they were satisfied with not exercising their minds in matters of religion, saying that they had found their fathers and forefathers following a certain path and that they were just following in their footsteps....[38]

The great advantage of the moderate approach of Shāh Walī-Allāh towards *fiqh* was that on the one hand it attempted to put an end to all kinds of prejudice, narrowmindedness, rigid conformity and fruitless discussions and wrangles, and on the other hand it opened new ways for research and *ijtihād* with a broad outlook. *Ijtihād*, to him, is an exhaustive effort to understand the derivative principles of the canon law. In every age *ijtihād* is an obligation of the scholars, because with the advancement of time the Muslim society faces new types of problems for which either there is no answer in the works of past scholars, or on which their opinions vary widely. Under such circumstances the new research *(ijtihād)* alone can solve the problem of the society, and can prevent it from becoming static. It is through *ijtihād* that the prophetic mission can materialize in every age.[39] In his renewed emphasis on *ijtihād*, Shāh Walī-Allāh did not deny the great worth of the *imāms* of various *madhhabs*, but rather urged that they should be used in the light of *Ḥadīth*. An *'Ālim*, emphasized the Delhi scholar, should know the judgementsof all *madhhabs* and scrutinize them with the authentic *ḥadīth* to see which one accords best. It should not be understood that he invited all Muslims or even all educated Muslims to engage in *ijtihād*. Rather he insisted that it is the duty of the religious elite to undertake such enterprises. For ordinary Muslims his advice was to follow the Hanafī school, as a divine revelation had indicated to him that Ḥanafī law should be followed in India.[40] Shāh Walī-Allāh not only stressed the necessity of *ijtihād*, but also laid down its basic principles and the conditions

necessary for its undertaking. He composed a monograph specifically on the subject of *ijtihād*, entitled *'Iqd al-Jīd fī Bayān Aḥkām al-Ijtihād wal-Taqlīd*,[41] and there are allusions to and lengthy discussions on this subject in his other works.[42] At one place he mentioned that the time had come for the religious law of Islam to be brought into the open fully dressed in reason and argument.[43]

There was great tension in Indian Sufism between the theories of *wahdat al-wujūd* (ontological monism) expounded by Muḥyi al-Dīn Ibn 'Arabī, and *wahdat al-shuhūd* (phenomenological monism) advanced by Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhindī. Shāh Walī-Allāh tried to reconcile the two theories. First of all he argued that *wahdat al-wujūd* and *waḥdat al-shuhūd* are terms referring to two different matters, and that the differences between the two are not major, but rather a question of mere semantics. He further argued that Ibn 'Arabī's idea of *wahdat al-wujūd* has certain aspects very similar to the concept of *waḥdat al-shuhūd*.[44]

In the course of his reformist activities, Shāh Walī-Allāh criticized all sectors of the society and pointed out their misdeeds and advised them of the Right Path. Addressing the *'Ulamā'*, the heirs of the Prophet in guiding the society, he called them fools, preoccupied with Greek learning and the mastery of grammar. The aim of the majority of them was to obtain a post in the service of the government, or else to engage in hairsplitting debates on unimportant matters. They forgot the duties bestowed upon them by the Prophet. He argued that the real knowledge is the knowledge of the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, and earnestly urged the *'Ulamā'* to study the Qur'ān and devote their time to understanding its complex terminology and controversial verses. They should try to realize the real spirit of the Qur'ān and its appeal to human society. They should preserve the authentic *ahādīth* of the Prophet and try to achieve a proper understanding of his *Sunnah*. He also blamed the *'Ulamā'* for lacking the qualities of religious leadership. Muslims may be predisposed to accord this authority to the descendants of the Prophet or the descendants of some Sufis or to those of noble origin, but the true basis, insisted the Delhi scholar, of authority has been the standard of personal knowledge.

Criticizing the nobles and the aristocracy for their extravagancies, love of luxury and idleness, he mentioned that they lavishly spent money on palatial buildings, baths, gardens, horses, handsome slaves, food, drink, and clothing. Consequently agriculturists, merchants and artisans were taxed most cruelly to supply them with money. They did not take care of the people over whom they were placed in authority. They ignored the winehouses, gambling dens and brothels installed in their

realms, and instead supported the individuals involved as long as they paid their revenues.

He equally criticized the soldiers, Sufis and the general masses. The soldiers had lost the spirit of *jihād* and were too busy enriching themselves. The false Sufis wore the Sufi garment to deceive the common people. They took disciples in order to earn money from them. They left the Path of God and His Prophet and established, instead, their own leadership, thereby challenging God's. Many modern Sufis, he continued, led their disciples away from God. He called them bandits, thugs, imposters and enemies of the faith. He advised the general population to be aware of the Sufis who failed to attract people to the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*. For the general population his criticism was also equally sharp. He condemned them for losing their morals and courage and for not following the *Sharī'ah*. He abhorred most the tomb-worshipping and declared :

> Everyone who goes to the country of Ajmeer or to the tomb of Salar Mas'ud or similar places because of a need which he wants to be fulfilled is a sinner who commits a sin greater than murder or adultery. Is he not like those who call to Lat and 'Uzza? Only we cannot call them infidels because there is no clear text in the Koran on this particular matter.[45]

He also advised the general population to take only lawful foods, and to support themselves without becoming parasitic on community or state.[46] This long address clearly shows the area in which Shāh Walī-Allāh was mainly interested: to purify the Muslim community of India for a better life in this world, but even more, to prepare them for a successful position in the life hereafter. He 'revolutionized' the idea of social reform by appealing to all sectors of society–commoners, soldiers, artisans, merchants, *'Ulamā'*, nobles, etc. Of the Muslim reformers none before him had looked at the bottom level of the society, nor considered the vital position this level held in giving shape and strength to the socio-political system of the day.

The age of Shāh Walī-Allāh had witnessed the bitter rivalry between the Shī'ahs and the Sunnīs. The extent of this animosity can be realized from the fact that Mirzā Mazhar Jānjānān, a Sunnī Sufi poet and a close friend of Shāh Walī-Allāh, was assassinated in Delhi at the instigation of Najaf 'Alī Khān, the Shī'ah *Vazīr* of Shah 'Ālam II. The Delhi scholar tried to provide a sense of balance in this poisoned atmosphere of Delhi. With this aim in mind he wrote his *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'*.

In the field of political thought the Delhi scholar left an equally important imprint. In fact, he never separated religion from politics, but rather considered one incomplete without the other. In discussing the social evolution, he distinguished four *irtifāqāt* (stages) required for the ultimate establishment of a society as it ought to be in fulfilment of God's plan The first stage is the primitive society where men fulfil their basic needs of food and sex, but which is higher than animal life because of the additional qualities of purity, communal sense, civilization and culture. The second stage is the communities of sedentary people and townsmen flourishing in temperate zones. As the complexity of life increases at this stage, as compared to the first stage, there arises the need for suitable institutions and prudent measures. Therefore, people need to follow five kinds of wisdom:

1) the wisdom pertaining to the way of living;

2) the wisdom of earning a livelihood;

3) the wisdom of domestic life;

4) the wisdom of mutual dealings; and

5) the wisdom of cooperation.

Under this second stage human society develops into a city-state *(madīnah)*, consisting of small towns that have joined together and formed an organic whole with each group of people and each family forming the constituent parts thereof. With the establishment of the city-state mankind has passed to the third stage of social development. To maintain the unity of the various groups and families in the city-states a powerful and strong leader (*imām*) is essential. For the progress of the city-state and in order to maintain peace and order therein, the *imām* must have several officers assisting him, such as the *qāḍī*, the *vazīr*, the police officer, the army commander, an officer for religious and moral instruction, etc. The fourth and final stage of social development is the result of quarrels arising between various city-states and causing heavy loss of life and livelihood. Under such circumstances the society needs a very powerful and strong authority, the caliph, whose duty it is to see that the heads of the city-states do not quarrel or do not wage war one against the other, and that they administer justice properly in their domains. There should be some form of symbolism which demonstrates the people's loyalty towards the caliph, such as uttering his name in the *khuṭbah* (the Friday sermon), inscribing his name on the currency, etc. With the establishment of this final stage human society reaches its highest level of development and God's plan is fulfilled.[47]

Shāh Walī-Allāh divided the caliphate into three categories: a) the *Khilāfat-i Khāṣṣah;* b)the *Khilāfat-i 'Āmmah;* and c) the *Khilāfat-i Jābirah*. The *Khilāfat* was originally related to the Prophethood to guide mankind when they were lost in sin and chaos. After the death of the Prophet Muḥammad, the last Prophet, his mission was continued by his immediate successors. This is the *Khilāfat-i Khāṣṣah,* which Shāh Walī-Allāh restricted to the first four caliphs of Islam. The *Khilāfat-i Khāṣṣah* is not a rank that can be acquired, nor is it inherent. It is a role for which selection from among the Companions of the Prophet was inspired by God.[48] This category of Caliphate has two basic components: a) the actual presence of the caliph in the position of authority; and b) his exclusive control over the community and the community's unanimous acceptance of his rule. Of the first four caliphs of Islam (the *Khāṣṣah* caliphs) 'Alī lacked the second component. In spite of that, Walī-Allāh did not exclude him from the *Khāṣṣah* caliphate because of his other virtues, but he gave the first three caliphs superiority over him.[49] He maintained that the *Khilāfat-i Khāṣṣah* collapsed because of the disorder which led to the murder of 'Uthmān, the cessation of the holy war *(jihād)* and the division of the *ummah* under 'Alī.[50]

The *Khilāfat-i 'Āmmah* is necessary for the Muslims for defending the *Dār al-Islām*, for the elimination of tyranny in the Islamic state, for enforcing the *Sharī'ah*, for mobilizing the people for *jihād*, and for the collection of *jizyah* from the non-Muslims.[51] This category of Caliphate is the fourth stage of socio-economic development as outlined by the Delhi scholar. He elaborately discussed the duties and obligations of the caliph, his qualifications and the procedure for his selection. Shāh Walī-Allāh largely depended for his discussion of the *Khilāfat-i 'Āmmah* on the 11th-century theoretician al-Māwardī.[52]

The *Khilāfat-i Jābirah,*[53] the oppressive and tyrannical Caliphate, is that Caliphate which neglects or acts contrary to the binding obligations of establishing the *Sharī'ah* and organizing *jihād*. If a caliph enforces some tenets of Islam but does not care to revive religious sciences, or applies religious law erroneously, he is a *jābir* caliph. It is also a *jābir* Caliphate if an individual who has no claim to that rank because he does not have the required personal qualities ascends to it.[54] But Walī-Allāh advised Muslims not to rise against a caliph even if he were a *jābir* as long as religious laws could be observed under his rule.[55]

Jihād is an essential element for the dynamic nature of the Muslim society. Shāh Walī-Allāh time and again stressed its importance. At one stage he mentioned that, if the situation required it, he would undertake *jihād* of the reformation of Muslim society.[56] But the situation was not

so, and therefore the Delhi scholar encouraged his contemporary leaders to undertake *jihād* for the revival of Indic Islam. He pointed out that *jihād* is like a surgical operation on a festering sore. Its neglect would amount to the neglect of essential self-defence and self-preservation. *Jihād* is much more important in India, stressed the Delhi scholar, as the anti-Islamic forces are much more active here.

Shāh Walī-Allāh was much concerned with the preservation of Mughal rule in India, not for the sake of the Mughal Empire itself, but in order to preserve through it the Muslim political authority and social integrity in the subcontinent. Through his deep study and observation he discovered the reasons for chaos and disintegration in the society:

> The ruin of the country these days is due to two reasons: Firstly, pressure on the Public Treasury which is due to the fact that the people have developed a habit of obtaining money from the Exchequer without performing any corresponding duty. They either come out with the excuse that they are soldiers' or ulama and have therefore a claim on the treasury, or they claim to belong to that group of men to whom the King himself presents rewards.... These people diminish the source of other people's income and are a burden on the country. The second cause ... is: heavy taxation on peasants, merchants and workers and cruel dealing with these groups. The result is that all those who are loyal to the state and obey its orders are going on the way to destruction....[57]

Shāh Walī-Allāh advised the King to appoint a just *amīr* at every distance of a three or four days journey, whose duty it would be to protect the rights of the oppressed against the oppressors, and to enforce the law of the *Sharī'ah*. He would be responsible for seeing that rebellion and disturbances did not occur in his realm and that people did not commit apostasy and other major sins. Each such *amīr* should have a considerable force at his disposal to help him in his work of reform, but he should not be allowed to strengthen his power so much that he could rebel against the Emperor. The other matters relating to economic affairs should be critically studied after doing all this.[58]

In one of his political letters Shāh Walī-Allāh addressed the King, the *Vazīr* and the nobles of the Mughal Empire and pointed out to them the basic cause of chaos and decline and offered them suggestions on how to control disruptive elements. One of his suggestions was that: a) The are of *Khālişah*(the Crown Land)should be increased, especially around Delhi, from Akbarabad to Sarhind, because the weakness of the administration was caused by the decrease in *khālişah* land and the

resulting deficit in the treasury. b) *Jāgīr* (land grant) should be given only to big Manṣabdārs not to petty ones, as the latter fail to establish control over their *jāgīrs* and farm out the revenue to contractors. Thus they increase the poverty of the peasants and create problems for the state. c) Traitors and miscreants should be severely dealt with. Their supporters should be given exemplary punishments by depriving them of their *jāgīrs* and *manṣabs*, so that others would not dare to follow them. d) The practice of farming the *khāliṣah* land should be stopped, because the farming system ruins the land and brings distress to the cultivators. e) The Emperor and his nobles should not indulge in the pursuit of pleasure and they should repent (*tawbah*) for their past misdeeds and preserve themselves from future sins. If all these suggestions were followed, concluded the Delhi scholar, the Empire might hope to receive divine help for its survival.[59]

But the Mughal rule was so inefficient and paralyzed that Shāh Walī-Allāh's call was not heeded. As a result the Delhi scholar began to look to other forces to buttress the collapsing edifice of Mughal rule. He planned to write letters to important political figures of the day and started with Niẓām al-Mulk Āṣaf Jāh,[60] "the only one among the senior Mughul nobles who was imbued with the right ideals and had sufficient strength of character to rise above the surrounding corruption and short-sightedness,"[61] but because of his disappointment with the situation in Delhi the latter had withdrawn to the Deccan and established order in his administration there. He paid little attention to the appeal of Shāh Walī-Allāh, probably because of his conviction that Delhi was beyond reform and he should not waste his energy there.

Then in his despair, Shāh Walī-Allāh turned to the Rohillas, a force formidable in number and in its military organization. "Their fine control, disciplined ardour of fight and active working of the individual soldier's intelligence were unrivalled in India in the age....They have united to oppose a common enemy more often and more effectively than the Rajputs ever did in their long history."[62] One of their shortcomings, however, was that they were fond of too much independence, which prevented united action even in a time of crisis. Furthermore, they were extremely intolerant of sectarian differences and regarded even minor deviations from their conception of orthodoxy as heresy.[63] Shāh Walī-Allāh was not unaware of these shortcomings, but his choices were limited. He wrote several letters to the Rohilla chief Najīb al-Dawlah,[64] and addressed him as *amīr al-umarā', ra'īs al-mujāhidīn* and *amīr al-ghuzāt*. He inspired Najīb al-Dawlah to take arms against the Jats, Marathas and the Sikhs. While Najīb was mobilizing his forces, the Delhi scholar made contact with the Afghan ruler Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī and

tried to persuade him to attack India in order to crush the power of the Marathas.[65] In 1756 two Maratha leaders, Malhar Rao Halkar and Ragunath Rao, came to northern India in order to establish Maratha supremacy in that region. In their effort they made an alliance with the Jats and upset the Mughal Empire. They also made contact with some ambitious Mughal nobles at the court. They defeated Najīb al-Dawlah and compelled him to make peace on terms dictated by them. Delhi was now under the control of the Marathas. The Marathas then proceeded to Punjab where Adina Beg was appointed governor of the province. After Adīna Beg's death in October 1758 the Peshwa appointed a Maratha, Shibaji Sindhia, to rule over Punjab. Thus Punjab became a part of the Maratha territory.[66]

When Najīb al-Dawlah was ousted from Delhi he also appealed to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī to come to his assistance, for the cause of Islam. Abdālī's preoccupation with the Baluch rebellions delayed him for some time from advancing to India for the sixth time.[67] By the end of October 1759, Abdālī crossed the Indus and advanced towards Delhi. The capital was plundered by stray Afghan bands. In January 1761 Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī fought a final battle against the Marathas at Panipat and crushed them almost totally. A whole generation of Maratha leadership disappeared in a single combat. After staying for a couple of weeks in Delhi, Abdālī returned to Afghanistan and Najīb al-Dawlah became a dictator in Delhi. Before his departure Abdālī appointed Shah 'Ālam II as the Emperor, but the Emperor preferred to lead a life of exile in Awadh under the protection of its Nawwāb and proceeded to Delhi only after the death of Najīb al-Dawlah in October 1770.

Historians differ in assessing Shāh Walī-Allāh's part in bringing Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī to India in 1759 in order to crush the power of the Jats and the Marathas. Most of them give credit to the Delhi scholar for his role in inviting Abdālī to India in order to save the country from Maratha aggression.[68] But to assess his contribution one must take into consideration several aspects of Abdālī's Indian invasion. First of all, Abdālī invaded India nine times and the "Walī-Allāh-sponsored one" was the sixth in the series. If Walī-Allāh's invitation inspired him to come to India in 1759, what inspired him in the eight other cases? Secondly, the letter which is said to have been written to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī is without any date or addressee. It is simply addressed: "To some kings." Therefore one cannot say with certainty that it was really addressed to Abdālī and was written before the latter marched towards India for the sixth time. Irfan Habib is right when he says that there is "no proof that they [Abdālī and Najīb al-Dawlah] fought them [the Marathas and the Jats] because they had been asked to do so by the saint."[69] A more

important fact is that "there is no single independent contemporary work which so much as hints at Shah Waliullah's part in getting Ahmad Shah to India."[70] In fact Ahmad Shāh Abdālī's interest lay in another direction. It was neither the religion of Islam nor sympathy for the Indian Muslims, but the wealth of India that inspired him to undertake nine invasions of this country, as it might have inspired Maḥmūd of Ghazna in the 11th century to lead seventeen invasions. Before leaving India in 1761, Abdālī made a peace settlement with the local Indian authorities: he himself would keep the Punjab from Satlaj westward and content himself with an annual tribute of forty lakhs of rupees for the rest of the Mughal Empire, payable by the regent minister of Delhi. "In short, Ahmad Shah's sole interest in India was to get his tribute punctually year after year without having to send an Afghan army for its collection."[71] Therefore, there is no historical significance in searching for the inspiration for the third battle of Panipat in the vague letter of Shāh Walī-Allāh.[72]

Even if we accept the fact that Shāh Walī-Allāh had invited the Afghan ruler in order to have a better future for Indian Muslims, the question still remains of how wise was his choice. It was Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī who invaded Indian five times before this event. In 1757 when this Afghan ruler captured Delhi, he and his army inflicted unbearable suffering in the form of torture on the citizens of the capital in order to exact money. His name was read in the *khuṭbah* while the Emperor of the age was living in the citadel of the capital. No farsighted politician could rely on a person whose mind was only occupied with acquiring the wealth of India, and not with its welfare. In fact this act of Shāh Walī-Allāh had hardly made any contribution to the glory of Indic Islam.[73]

Another important shortcoming of Shāh Walī-Allāh's political consciousness was his concentration on Delhi. As the centre of his activities, Delhi captured his whole mind, and there was little room in it for other parts of India. His political awareness centred around the welfare of Delhi. As Delhi was threatened by the Marathas and Jats he, therefore, worked to destroy them. But it is really surprising that the Delhi scholar did not take due notice of the European imperialists. Bengal was captured by the English in 1757 after the battle of Plassey and Shāh Walī-Allāh survived for four years after that, by which time the English had extended their authority up to Allahabad. But the Delhi scholar did not utter a single word against the danger of this aggressive power.[74] Although Nizami warns his reader not to suppose that Walī-Allāh was ignorant of the danger of the European powers,[75] he does not cite a single line from the scholar's works to support his supposition. It was not the Marathas but the English who were the most important

enemy of Muslim political authority and the sovereignty of India at that time. It is more surprising that, not only Shāh Walī-Allāh, but half a century after him his grandson Shāh Ismā'īl Shahīd, and the executer of his political ideas, Sayyid Aḥmad Shahīd, also fought, and sacrificed their lives, against the Sikhs, an enemy of secondary importance, leaving aside the English, who had by that time captured almost the whole of India.

Shāh Walī-Allāh was the greatest Islamic scholar India had ever produced. He was well versed in all branches of Islamic knowledge. His depth of knowledge in the field of *Ḥadīth* and *fiqh* gave him a permanent position in Islamic scholarship. On being asked which of the four *madhhabs* he belonged to, he replied:

> I try my best to combine all the points of agreement in all the schools and in matters of variance I adhere to what is proved by the genuine *ḥadīth* – which, thank God, I can do. If anybody asks me for a *fatwā*, I give it according to whatever school he wishes.[76]

This was the first step towards the breaking of rigidity of later Muslim thought. In this way he paved the way for *ijtihād* with a new outlook in order to prove Islam effective in solving the problems of all ages. Nawwāb Ṣiddīq Ḥasan Khān rightly remarked that, if Shāh Walī-Allāh had lived in an earlier period, he would have been regarded as the *imām* of his age.[77] The differences between the history of Islam and the history of the Muslims was (and is) not clear even to many Muslim scholars. Shāh Walī-Allāh was the first scholar in the history of modern Indic Islam who understood and distinguished these differences. He studied the history of the Muslims from the viewpoint of the history of Islam and ascertained the condition of Islam among the communities that followed it in different times. To check the spiritual decadence of Indian Muslims he completed the work begun by Shaykh Aḥmad Sarhindī.

It is to the credit of Shāh Walī-Allāh that he led the first modern revivalist movement in Islam at the time of its decadence in India. Through his rational thinking he shaped Indic Islam in such a way that he served as a source of direction for the following centuries. Gibb rightly remarked that Shāh Walī-Allāh is one of those scholars who have contributed essential elements to the present current of thought in Islam.[78]

The Delhi scholar realized that the life of the ordinary Muslims of India could not be changed until the intellectual life was re-oriented in line with this new spirit. With this aim he tried to build up a strong group

of dedicated *'Ulamā'* to convey his teachings to the younger generation. Several hundred branches of his school were established in various parts of India[79] by the group he built up and which preached his teachings in every corner of India. The movement he created was a living force in the subsequent reform movements in the subcontinent and influenced not only Sayyid Aḥmad Khān and Muhammad Iqbāl, but also the *'Ulamā'* of Deoband, the leading centre of traditional learning in India, "both through his sober mysticism, and through his moderate, sane, yet progressive attitude to *fiqh*."[80] His invitation to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī to come to India if proved was perhaps not a wise choice and his ignorance of the degree of danger posed by Eurpoean powers in India perhaps reflects his shortsightedness in political affairs. But this does not in any way cloud his glorious activities in reawakening the Muslims of the subcontinent and in purifying Indic Islam. In him Muslims will find guidance and inspiration for centuries to come.

NOTES

(1) For details, see Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire* (Calcutta, 1964), vol.i, p.4; Zahiruddin Malik, *The Reign of Muhammad Shah 1719-1748*, quoted by Parshotam Mehra, *A Dictionary of Modern Indian History, 1707-1947* (Delhi, 1985), p.471; Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court, 1707-1740* (Aligarh, 1959); Ishtiaq Husain Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947)* (The Hague, 1962), p.173.

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. 172-73.

(3) See Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *Shah Wali-Allah and His Times* (Canberra, 1980), p. 178. For details of Maratha invasions, see J. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-99; Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp.185-239.

(4) Annemarie Schimmel, *Islam in the Indian Subcontinent* (Leiden, 1980), p. 151.

(5) Khaliq Ahmad Nizami, *Some Aspects of Religion and Politics in India During the Thirteenth Century* (Aligarh, 1961), p.81, note 1; *idem*, "Shah Wali-ullah Dehlavi and Indian Politics in the 18th Century," *Islamic Culture*, 25 (1951), p. 135.

(6) It is not certain when the ancestors of Walī-Allāh moved from Rohtak to Delhi; but, as his grandfather Wajīh al-Dīn was born in Delhi, the family had probably moved to this city by this time.

(7) Hafeez Malik, *Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan* (Washington, D.C., 1963), p.124.

(8) He had another son by his first wife. (S.A.A. Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p.212)

(9) Shāh Walī-Allah, *al-Juz' al-Laṭīf fī Tarjamat al-'Abd al-Ḍa'īf*, in M. Hidayat Hussain, "The Persian Autobiography of Shah Waliullah bin 'Abd al-Rahim al-Dihlavi: Its English Translation and a List of His Works," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, 8/iv (1912), n.s., p.428.

(10) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *al-Juz' al-Laṭīf*, pp.163-65.

(11) *Ibid.*, p.163.

(12) The *Madrasah-i Raḥīmīyah* was originally located in a building associated with Fīrūz Shāhī Mosque in the Kotla-i Fīrūz Shāhī (Tughlaqabad) area. Emperor Muḥammad Shāh donated a big building for the *Madrasah* and it was moved to the new building at the centre of Delhi, not far from the Jami' Mosque. For almost a century and a half it was the principal educational institution in Delhi where the socio-political situation of the Muslims of India was discussed. The *Madrasah* was demolished during the War of Independence of 1857 and no trace of it is visible today. Cf. J.M.S.Baljon, *Religion and Thought of Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi, 1703-1762* (Leiden, 1986), p.2.

(13) Sir Muhammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* (London, 1934), p.92.

(14) J.M.S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought*, pp. 5-6; see also John O.Voll, "Hadith Scholars and Tariqahs: An Ulama Group of the 18th Century Haramayn and Their Impact in the Islamic World," *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 15 (1980), p.266; Aziz Ahmad, "Political and Religious Ideas of Shah Wali-Ullah of Delhi," *The Muslim World*, 52 (1962), p.22.

(15) See Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment* (Oxford, 1964), p.201; *idem*, *An Intellectual History of Islam in India* (Edinburgh, 1969), p.8; John Voll, "Muḥammad Ḥayya al-Sindi and Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb: An Analysis of an Intellectual Group in Eighteenth Century Medina," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, University of London, 38 (1975), pp. 32-39.

(16) He recorded these visions some time after his return from Hijaz in a monograph called *Fuyūḍ al-Haramayn*. The references are to the Urdu translation of the work entitled *Mushāhidāt wa Ma'ārif*, by Muḥammad Sarwar (Lahore, 1947).

(17) *Fuyūḍ*, pp.123-24.

(18) *Ibid.*, p.228. This was an instruction given against his usual inclination, as he preferred Alī over the other caliphs. This perhaps also clarified for him the position of the Shī'ahs who emerged as a separate sect on the principle of upholding 'Alī's claim over that of the first three caliphs.

In the same vision he was instructed not to go out of the circle of four schools of *fiqh* and to reconciliate among them as far as possible.

(19) *Fuyūḍ*, p. 179.

(20) *Ibid.*, p.99.

(21) *Ibid.*, p.297.

(22) K.A. Nizami, "Shah Waliullah of Delhi: Thought and Contribution," *Islamic Culture*, 54 (1980), p.144.

(23) 2 vols. Dār al-Ma'rifah, Beirut (n.d.). There are several other editions of this work available. It was translated into Urdu and Bengali. For an English translation, see Marcia K.Hermansen, "Shah Wali Allah's Theory of Religion in the *Hujjat Allah al-Baligha* with a Translation of the *Hujjat Allah*, vol.I," Ph.D. Thesis, University of Chicago, 1982.

(24) The term "Indic Islam" is often used by Hafeez Malik. See his *Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and Muslim Modernization in India and Pakistan* (New York, 1980), p.255 *et passim*; *idem* (ed.), *Political Profile of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan: A Documentary Record* (Islamabad, 1982), p.xiv; *idem*, "Shah Wali Allah's Last Testament," *The Muslim World*, 63 (1973), pp.105-18.

(25) S.A.A. Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p.231. Mawlānā Raḥīm Bakhsh, the author of *Ḥayāt-i Walī*, and some modern scholars hold the opinion that Shāh Walī-Allāh was the first Indian Muslim after Shihāb al-Dīn Hindī (d.A H 849) to translate the Qur'ān into Persian. He agitated the conservative *'Ulamā'* who accused him of innovation and aroused strong opposition against him. Some people even went so far as to hire the *rāfiḍīs* to beat him up. But this statement seems not to be correct as Shāh Walī-Allāh himself in the

Preface of the *Fatḥ al-Raḥmān* mentioned that he was divinely inspired "to examine the existing translations of the Qur'ān He began to examine them in order that he might introduce and popularize the best one among his contemporaries.... Finding none satisfactory he decided to make a new translation himself." Qur'ān *[Fatḥ al-Raḥmān]* (Kararchi, n.d), pp. alif-bā, quoted by S.A.A. Rizvi, *op. cit.*, p.231. This clearly indicates that several translations of the Qur'ān were available at that time, and Shāh Walī-Allāh undertook the project only to make available to the public a standard translation of his choice.

(26) A. Schimmel, "The Golden Chain of 'Sincere Muhammadans,' " in Bruce B.Lawrence (ed.), *The Rose and the Rock* (Duke University Press, 1979), p.113

(27) 'Ubayd-Allāh Sindhī, *Shāh Walī-Allāh awr Unkī Siyāsī Taḥrīk* (Lahore, 1952), p.40.

(28) Cf. J.M.S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought*, p 141.

(29) *Ibid.*, p.149.

(30) For details on Wali-Allāh's discussion on *Ḥadīth*, see J.M.S Baljon, *Religion and Thought*, pp. 152-59; G.N Jalbani, *Teachings of Shah Waliyullah of Delhi* (Lahore, 1967), pp.29-43; S.A.A. Rizvi, *op. cit.*, pp.242-45.

(31) Barbara Daly Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India. Deoband, 1860-1900* (Princeton, 1982), p.37.

(32) M Mujeeb, *The Indian Muslims* (London, 1967), pp 280-81.

(33) Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, *A Short History of the Revivalist Movement in Islam*, translated by al-Ash'ari (Lahore, 1972), p.128

(34) *Ibid.*, p.129.

(35) S.A.A. Rizvi, *op.cit.*, p 210.

(36) K.A. Nizami, "Thought and Contribution," p.143; Harlan Otto Pearson, "Islamic Reform and Revival in Nineteenth Century India: The Tariqah-i Muhammadiyah," Ph.D. Thesis, Duke University, 1979, pp 9-40.

(37) See Muin-ud-Din Ahmad Khan, *History of the Fara'idi Movement in Bengal (1818-1906)* (Karachi, 1965), p.xliv.

(38) Shāh Walī-Allah, *al-Inṣāf Fī Bayān Asbāb al-Ikhtilāf*, quoted by M. Mujeeb, *op.cit.*, pp.281-82.

(39) Cf. Sir M.Iqbal, *op.cit.*, p.163.

(40) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Fuyūḍ*, pp.175, 220; B.D. Metcalf, *op.cit.*, p.39.

(41) Karachi, 1960. For a partial English translation, see Muhammad Daud Rahbar, "Shah Wali Ullah and Ijtihad," *The Muslim World*, 45 (1955), pp.346-58.

(42) Especially his *Ḥujjat-Allāh al-Bāligha, Budūr al-Bāzigha, Izālat al-Khafā, al-Inṣāf, al-Muṣaffā*, etc. For a detailed discussion, see Muin-ud-Din Ahmad Khan, "Shah Wali-Allah's Concept of Ijtihad," *Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society*, 7 (1959), pp.165-94.

(43) *Ḥujjat-Allāh al-Bāligha*, p.4; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, p.205.

(44) For a detailed discussion of Shāh Walī-Allāh on the problem of *Waḥdat al-wujūd* and *waḥdat al-shuhūd*, see his "The Medman Letter," English translation by S A.Ali, in R.Arnaldez and S.Van Riet (eds.), *Recherches d'Islamologie* (Louvain, 1977), pp.1-19; see also J.M.S. Baljon, *Religion and Thought*, pp 59-63; Mir Valiuddin, "Reconciliation Between ibn al- 'Arabi's Wahdat-i Wujūd and Mujaddid's Wahdat-i Shuhūd," *Islamic Culture*, 25 (1951), pp.43-51

(45) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Tafhīmāt-i Ilāhiyah*, vol.ii, p.54. The translation is from A. Schimmel, *Islam*, p.157.

(46) This long address to all sectors of the society was recorded in his *Tafhīmāt*. For discussions, see K.A.Nizami, *Shāh Walī-Allāh ke Siyāsī Maktūbāt* (Delhi, 1969), pp.32-34; A.Schimmel, "The Golden Chain"; *idem*, *Islam*, pp.156-58; H. Malik, *Moslem Nationalism*, pp. 136-37. For further instructions to the general population,

see the advice of Shāh Walī-Allāh in his *Maqālat al-Waḍīyya fī'l-Naṣīḥah wa'l-Waṣīyah*, English trans by H Malik, "Shah Wali Allah's Last Testament"

(47) For details on social development, see Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Ḥujjat-Allāh al-Bālighah*, vol i, pp. 38-48; see also Mahmood A. Ghazi, "State and Politics in the Philosophy of Shah Waliy Allah," *Islamic Studies*, 23 (1984), pp.353-71; J M S Baljon, *Religion and Thought*, pp 193-96

(48) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Izālat al-Khafā' 'an Khilāfat al-Khulafā'*, Urdu trans by 'Abd al-Shukūr *et al*. (Karachi, 1960?), vol.i, pp 121-22.

(49) *Ibid*, vol.i, pp 98-99

(50) *Ibid*., vol.i, pp 299-300

(51) *Ibid*., vol.ii, pp.422-23.

(52) For al-Māwardī's discussion, see his *al-Aḥkām al-Sultānīyah* (Cairo, 1983), pp 14-15.

(53) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Izālah*, vol i, p 271

(54) *Ibid*, vol.i, p.508

(55) *Ibid*, vol i, p 325, see also Aziz Ahmad, "An Eighteenth-Century Theory of Caliphate," *Studia Islamica*, 28 (1968), pp 135-44.

(56) See K.A Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, p.39.

(57) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Ḥujjat-Allāh al-Bālighah*, vol.i p 45, the translation is taken from K.A Nizami, "Indian Politics," pp.137-38.

(58) Shāh Walī-Allāh, *Tafhīmāt*, quoted by K.A Nizami, "Indian Politics," p.138.

(59) In the original letter ten items were mentioned. See K.A. Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, pp. 79-82

(60) *Ibid*, letter nos 28, 29 and 30, pp.140-44

(61) I H. Qureshi, *Muslim Community*, p.179.

(62) J Sarkar, *Fall*, vol i, p.34

(63) I H Qureshi, *Muslim Community*, p.180.

(64) K.A Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, letter nos. 4-10, pp.101-10.

(65) See his long letter possibly written to Aḥmad Shāh Abdālī (who later became known as Durrānī), *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, letter no.2, pp.83-98.

(66) For details of Maratha activities of this time, see J.Sarkar, *Fall*, vol.ii, pp 133-78.

(67) Mohammad Yasin, *A Social History of Islamic India, 1605-1748* (New Delhi, 1974), p 155; K.A Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, p.227.

(68) See, for example, K.A. Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, pp. 43ff; *idem*, "Indian Politics," pp.143-45; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies*, p.209; A. Schimmel, *Islam*, p.159; I.H.Qureshi, *Ulema*, p.113; *idem*, *Muslim Community*, p.182; H.Malik, *Nationalism*, p.118.

(69) Irfan M. Habib, "The Political Role of Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi and Shah Waliullah," *Indian History Congress, Proceedings*, 23 session, Aligarh, 1960, Section II, p. 219.

(70) *Ibid*.

(71) J.Sarkar, *Fall*, vol.ii, p.274.

(72) Irfan M Habib's comments, though rude to some extent, reflect the truth when he says "When a modern writer declares that 'the (third) Battle of Panipat was a turning point in the history of this subcontinent,' he falls into the same error as Shah Waliullah. When he adds to this that 'Shah Waliullah was the chief agent in bringing it (the battle) about,' he is no longer in the realm of history, but of legend." "The Political Role," p 219.

(73) Cf.W C.Smith, "The 'Ulamā' in Indian Politics," in his *On Understanding Islam* (The Hague, 1981), p.206. [The article originally published in C.H. Phillips (ed.), *Politics and Society in India* (London, 1963); pp.39-51].

(74) Sayyid Abul A'la Maududi, *Revivalist Movements*, p.113; Irfan M.Habib, "The Political Role," p.219.

(75) K A Nizami, *Siyāsī Maktūbāt*, p.45
(76) Quoted by M G Zubaid Ahmad, *The Contribution of Indo-Pakistan to Arabic Literature* (Lahore, 1968), pp.22-23
(77) *Ibid*, p.22
(78) *Ibid*, 'Preface' by H A R Gibb
(79) H.Malik, *Nationalism*, p.138
(80) Erwin I J Rosenthal, *Islam in the Modern National State* (Cambridge, 1965), p.187, see also A Schimmel, *Islam*, p 159

REFLECTIONS ON THE ISLAMIC RENAISSANCE IN THE MODERN ARAB WORLD: SOME METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS

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THIS article deals with the problematic of the *Nahḍah* (Renaissance) in modern Arabic/Islamic thought.[1] The *Nahḍah*, as a movement of thought starting in the 19th century, serves as an essential background to our discussion of contemporary liberal intellectual trends in the Arab world. 'A. Laroui defines the *Nahḍah* as a political and cultural movement that dominates the period from 1850 to 1914. Originating in Syria and flowering in Egypt, the *Nahḍah* sought through translation and "vulgarization to assimilate the great achievements of modern European civilization, while reviving the classical Arab (Islamic) culture that antedates the centuries of decadence and foreign domination."[2]

Laroui and a good number of Arab liberal and nationalist thinkers take it for granted that there was a sharp religious and cultural decline in the state of Islam in the period preceding Western penetration into the Arab world: Islam was static – "...it remained fixed in the molds created for it by the scholars, jurists, doctors, and mystics of the formative centuries and, if anything, decayed rather than progressed."[3] Was there in reality a decline?

The problematic of the *Nahḍah* outlined above, has been a subject of much debate. The "orientalist"[4] position towards "Islamic decline" is best expressed by R. Brunschvig in "Probleme de la decadence,"[5] and by L. Gardet in "De quelle maniere s'est ankylosee la pensee religieuse de l'islam?"[6] both published in *Classicisme et declin culturel dans l'histoire de l'islam*.[7] Another "orientalist" interpretation is given by H.A.R. Gibb in *Modern Trends in Islam* and by W.C. Smith in *Islam in Modern History*. Yet, a third interpretation "from an Arab Marxist perspective" is given by 'A. Laroui in his two controversial works: *L'Ideologie arabe contemporaine*, and *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?*[8] A serious treatment of the subject of "the revival and decline" of the indigenous Islamic culture of Egypt in the 18th and 19th centuries is given by P. Gran in *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt From 1760 to 1840*.

The modern period of Islamic history, says Smith, "begins with decadence within, intrusion and menace from without; and the worldly glory that reputedly went with obedience to God's law only a distant memory of a happier past."[9] Smith discusses the alleged decline of modern Islam without exploring its causes. He says that Muslim society ceased to advance, and by the 18th century it was in serious decline. There was enfeeblement of commercial and other economic life. Intellectual effort stagnated. Smith argues that an effete decadence infected art, and that religious vitality ebbed. The writings of the great masters elicited commentaries rather than enthusiasm; and the classical systems were used to delimit the road that one must travel rather than to provide the impetus to one's journey. The Muslim world seemed to have lost the capacity to order its life effectively; Muslim society was losing its once firm, proud grip on the world. At about this time "Western civilization was launching forth on the greatest upsurge of expansive energy and power vastly accumulated. With them the West was presently reshaping its own life and soon the life of all the world."[10]

One thing that Smith is certain about is that "the West" has nothing to do, directly or indirectly, with "the decline" of Islam in the modern wrold. Yet, modern Islam suffers from a fundamental malaise. How can we then explain this malaise? The only justifiable explanation in view of Smith's argument is that the cause for the decline of modern Islam are internal to Islam and the Muslim way of life.

How does then Smith reconcile this conclusion with his statement that "Islam could never have become across the centuries one of the four or five great world religions had it not, like the others, had the quality of having something profound and relevant and personal to say directly to all sorts of conditions and men, of every status, background, capacity, temperament, and aspiration."[11] Smith does not attempt to overcome this contradiction. It was left to L. Gardet to enumerate "the real causes" behind the decline of modern Islam.

Gardet divides the long and complex history of Islam mechanically into three periods.[12] He argues that the symptoms of decline began to appear with the beginning of the second period. In his view, the first period (extending roughly from the 1st to the 3rd century of H.) includes the formulation of the religious sciences. These sciences took on their "authentic" shape and substance. The second period (from the 3rd to the 7th century) includes major theological, philosophical and mystical debates, as Greek philosophy influenced Islam.

The third phase began with the fall of Baghdad in the 11th/13th

centruy. Gardet calls this period, "the period of the fixation of the religious sciences."[13] The religious sciences, Gardet claims, became rigid and void of substance. Consequently, they were not able to adapt to a changing world. The real reason for this rigidity, in Gardet's view, was "the absence of a living and a doctrinal authority,"[14] like that found in the Catholic church. Gardet assumes that since the religious language of Islam became ossified in ancient structures, modern Muslims were less creative in developing philosophy and the sciences of *fiqh, kalām, tasawwuf* than were their predecessors of "the golden age."

Brunschvig agrees with Gardet's general thesis, and argues that the real problem was that the Muslims situated their historical ideal[15] in the past: "A resolute rejection of innovation marks modern Islamic thought."[16] *Taqlīd* (blind imitation) replaced *ijtihād* (rational exertion) as the basis of thought. Furthermore, Brunschvig does not draw any connection between the West's rise to power and the Ottoman Empire's political, military and economic decline in the 17th and 18th centuries. Again, he relates the decline of the Ottoman Empire to Islam having lost its grip on the order of things in the modern world.

In his classical and highly acclaimed work *Modern Trends in Islam*, Sir Hamilton A.R. Gibb sees his task as that of "explaining what he sees as the clearly anomalous and disintegrated character of the religion of Islam."[17] Islam is the product of an Arab and/or Islamic mind that cannot come to terms with rationalism: "The Arab mind, whether in relation to the outer world or in relation to the processes of thought, cannot throw off its intense feeling for the separateness and individuality of the concrete events."[18] This, according to Gibb, explains the aversion of the Muslims from the thought-processes of rationalism.[19]

The real cause of decline, according to Gibb, is the inability of the "atomistic"[20] Muslim mind to catch up with the rationalist modes of Western thought. One can conclude that Gibb's explanation of decline offers the implicit argument that the only criterion of progress is Western.

This implicit supposition is shared by G. von Grunebaum who advocates that modern Muslims should adopt Western political and cultural models. Grunebaum describes the difference between "Islam" and the "West" in the 19th century, by saying that whereas the individual in the East was subordinate to family and tribe, the West represented the primacy of the human being and his integration into the organic state: The formal restraint of thought, in which the preservation of the known was at stake, collided with the West's passionate devotion to scientific

progress, to domination of nature, to knowledge as unending process. To the cult of the inherited, the West opposed the active interference in social conditions and problems. Loyality to persons was opposed by loyalty to an impersonal whole, to institutions. Whereas the Arab was prepared to satisfy himself with a suprational interpretation of the real, the European insisted upon rationalist criticism.[21]

Grunebaum shares Gibb's basic contention that the foundation of the Arab mind needs to be radically reoriented towards rationalism.

In contrast to the historians of thought discussed above, P. Gran emphasizes the role of religion and religious culture played in Egyptian society, as the main centre of Islamic intellectual activity in the modern Arab East, from 1760 to 1840. Gran contends that there was a great Sufi revival in the 18th century Egypt that "took the form of a renewed involvement in Ṭarīqa Sufism. Old, established orders experienced a sudden burst of energy, grew in membership and played important roles in cultural and social life."[22] The major Sufi orders of the time, notably the Bakrīyah-Khalwaṭīyah and the Sādāt al-Wafā'īyah, revived their interest in *Ḥadīth* studies. By the revival of *Ḥadīth* studies it is not meant that al-Azhar and other centres of Islamic learning had been neglecting fundamental works in *Ḥadīth* such as the *Ṣaḥīḥ* of al-Bukhārī, but rather that in this period there occurred a burgeoning of scholarship based on *Ḥadīth* sources as data. A comparison of the writings in *Ḥadīth* studies in the 17th and early 18th centuries shows that previously *Ḥadīth* studies had played a far more limited role. In the later 18th century, writings in the field of *Ḥadīth* not only were directed to devotional or liturgical purposes, but also branched out seeking to clarify points of historical, philosophical, or literary importance. *Ḥadīth* had become the point of reference, the primary approach to the truth.[23]

Gran argues that Islam as a religion and a way of life, was dynamic, since it interacted with Egyptian society and shaped its entire cultural and intellectual activities. Islam's dynamism gave its adherents the flexibility of explaining it in the light of their conditions. The revival of the *Ḥadīth* studies reflected a deep interest in the revival of *ijtihād* as a means to deal with a new reality. Likewise, there was a general interest in *fiqh* studies. Gran says: "*Fiqh* as it was studied in the eighteenth century Egypt was based on *kalām,* that is, ultimately, on Aristotelian logic, which, unlike the logic of context and unlike positivism, is grounded in the absolute, in the eternal."[24] Mahmud addressed the relevance of Aristotelian logic to Islamic philosophy and he came to a different conclusion from that of Gran. *Fiqh* studies were first systematized by al-Shāfi'ī in *al-Risālah.* He developed an alternate Islamic system of logic

to Aristotle's. Nevertheless, Gran's basic thesis of religious revival in the 18th-century Egypt has merit. The indigenous Islamic culture of Egypt was neither dormant nor "obscuranist" nor anti-rational. It was based on inherently rational Islamic criteria, at the basis of which was *ijtihād*.

In the light of this dynamic relationship between religion and society, how can we understand the movement of the *Nahḍah* in Egypt? In order to answer this question it is necessary to mention the French invasion of Egypt and its impact on the country and its culture.

France occupied Egypt from 1798 to 1801. This occupation brought Egypt into direct military, economic, and cultural contact with the West for the first time in several centuries.[25] The effect of the French presence was of incalculable long term significance. It represented the first large scale incursion of a modern, secular, European nation-state into an Islamic society still unwavering in its historicism, its adherence to traditional values and its unquestioning view of self. The occupation of the country by a foreign power so manifestly superior in military and technological terms, and at the same time non-Muslim, generated subtly repercussive responses of a very complex nature, which weave themselves into the history of the emergence of Egypt as a modern state.[26]

Egypt became part of the Ottoman Empire in 1517,[27] and it became the centre of attraction for Europe after the industrial revolution. Egypt's significance for the rising European powers was determined by two main factors: 1) Europe witnessed an upsurge in its economic production and industrial capacities after the Industrial Revolution. The local European markets were not able to meet the increasing requirements of the rising entrepreneurial elite. Foreign markets were able to provide this class with both cheap labour and affordable raw material. Moreover, 2) some European powers – mainly England and France – needed trade routes to connect Asia with Africa. Egypt's strategic location became even more important to Europe after the Suez Canal opened in 1860.

The first Egyptian challenge to the influence of the West came in the form of a national state built by Muḥammad 'Alī who ruled Egypt from 1805 to 1847.[28] Muḥammad 'Alī, who was Albanian in origin, gained full control over Egypt after he arranged a mass slaughter of the Mamlūk elite[29] who were in power before him. Soon after he declared the autonomy of Egypt from the Turkish Empire, and followed an independent policy of building a strong central government. Perhaps, more importantly, Muḥammad 'Alī embarked on a comprehensive programme of industrialization – which he saw as ultimately the only way

to become independent of Europe. The Muḥammad 'Alī phase (1805-1847) has been called the phase of a state commercial sector. The state introduced basic changes into the economy by imposing its monopoly on internal and external trade, and by completely controlling the agricultural system. A state bureaucracy both in the countryside and the cities was created to run the new system. The Muḥammad 'Alī period saw, on the one hand, the attempted consolidation of Egypt under a centralized industrial state which dominated both the Delta and upper Egypt; and on the other, the development of perennial irrigation for cotton cultivation in the Delta and the formation of an estate system of landed elites in both regions of the country.[30]

These deep economic and structural changes in the Muḥammad 'Alī era were not accompanied by parallel religious and cultural changes. Whereas in the second part of the 18th century there was a great revival in the *ḥadīth* and *fiqh* sciences, no similar revival in any religious science took place. Muḥammad 'Alī did not follow a systematic cultural and religious policy. His major concern was to reduce the influence of the *'Ulamā'* as a class in Egyptian society. He did this by secularizing education.

One aspect of Muḥammad 'Alī's secularization programme was to send Egyptian students to European universities, mainly French, to learn about the latest advances in medicine, science, and technology.[31] However, the Anglo-Turkish coalition of 1840 put a halt to Muḥammad 'Alī's attempt at an industrial renaissance. A contemporary Egyptian economic historian, S. Amin, evaluates this period (1800-1840) by saying that no one can say what Egypt might have become without this European intervention. The material progress achieved during the first forty years of the century was prodigious. Egypt had launched on a process of modern industrialization and economic diversification. The state workshops employed hundreds of thousands of workers; they produced more cotton goods than most European countries. All this was achieved with exclusively indigenous national managers in national industries.[32]

Muḥammad 'Alī's phase gave rise to some major cultural questions of the *Nahḍah* movement. These questions were mainly formulated in the first phase of *Nahḍah* by Rifā'ah Rafī'al-Ṭahṭāwī.[33] He spent six years in France as the religious advisor to one of the Egyptian students' missions. Al-Ṭahṭāwī often comments on the apparent physical and cultural advance of the French over the Egyptians.[34] This observation was the corner-stone of the *Nahḍah* problematic: Why are we as Arabs and Muslims not as advanced and strong as the West?

Ṭahṭāwī identified with Western progress, and hoped that Egypt would follow the same road. Ṭahṭāwī's fascination with the West brought about a critical re-evaluation of tradition. Nevertheless, he did not abandon Islam entirely. In short, the thinkers of this period "were not able to overcome the contradiction between their desire to preserve their own individual characteristics and their will to catch up with Europe.[35] The main reform desired was moral and cultural rather than economic and military. European technology was acceptable provided it was stripped of all cultural implications. This compromising attitude, in both theory and practice, is a characteristic of contemporary Arabic thought.

This cultural compromise was delayed[36] because Muḥammad 'Alī failed to build a strong Egypt that could compete with the West[37] because of the British occupation of Egypt in 1882. A major segment of Egyptian society became dissatisfied with the West and its political, economic, and cultural policies in Egypt after the military revolt of 'Urābī.[38] A major consequence of the British occupation was the subjugation of the Egyptian economy to Britain. The industry created by Muḥammad 'Alī was demolished and Egypt was transformed into a British agricultural colony, providing cheap cotton to the factories in England.

The British occupation of the country motivated a deep confrontation between two different systems of values and ethics. Europeans stressed individual initiative and other ideas of *laissez-faire* capitalism. The traditional Islamic system, incorporated into popular Egyptian culture, stressed other values.

The historical phase beginning after 1882 marked the second phase of the *Nahḍah*. It was characterized by a total colonial hegemony over Egypt by the West. The major question asked in this phase was the following: How should we as Egyptians with a distinct Muslim cultural heritage confront the European cultural hegemony and challenge? This question was evident in the speeches and writings of the two major Muslim intellectuals of this period: Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī[39] and Muḥammad 'Abduh.[40] Both of them saw the need for a total revitalization of Islam in the face of the encroaching Western culture, since "the attack of the West on the Arab World (including Egypt), aside from its political effects, was also a direct attack against Islam as a religion."[41] Both al-Afghānī and 'Abduh sought to revitalize Islam in a modern setting.

Reason[42] was the first instrument by which the thinkers of the second phase of the *Nahḍah* sought to fight both the apparent decadence of the Muslims and Western cultural and political encroachment. They

believed that Islam was inherently rational. The reasons for the Muslims' decline had to be sought for elsewhere —there were external factors to explain the decline.

Historical continuity of tradition in all its aspects was claimed to be an answer to historical, cultural, and religious rigidity and stagnation. In fact, two different alternatives were in sight: 1) The Islamic model, which took its historical shape in the experience of the Prophet and his Companions; its theoretical foundations were derived from both the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah*, 2) the "Western model," that stressed the ideas of liberalism, rationalism, and secularism. The *Nahḍah* thinkers considered it to be a concrete hegemonic reality.

Both decadence and colonization brought about a conflicting and often explosive situation in the second phase of the *Nahḍah*. In terms of theory, the problem of the *Nahḍah* can be viewed in terms of three major interrelated types of discourse:

1) Doctrinal discourse

2) Philosophical discourse

3) Historical/political discourse.

The doctrinal discourse concerns the purification of the fundamentals of religion. As Laoust puts it: "No doctrinal reform is possible without return to an original source."[43] *Islāh* is the return to the just form of religion, and the affirmation of transcendent truth in a modern setting. This reformist programme has dominated Arab intellectual activity up to the present time. It revolves around the affirmation of "a traditionalist method and language" in a modern setting.

The comparison between the *Nahḍah* of the *Salafīyah* and the European renaissance comes to mind. Both of them presuppose either a return to or a rejuvenation of the past. The renaissance, which is generally regarded as a series of cultural changes which began in Italy in the 14th century and spread to the rest of Europe later, was a reaction against the legacy of the Middle Ages. Viewed as "the discovery of the world, the discovery of man,"[44] the renaissance involves a "disparagement of the Middle Ages."[45] The Greek heritage was considered durable and creative: Its authority was appealed to as the main criterion of culture in the renaissance.

The Salafīyah movement, on the other hand, sought, under totally

different circumstances, to revive Islam in the modern world by re-embodying the early experience of Islam in the present. In both cases a historical past is appealed to, the result of which is a historical rupture. The Salafīyah attempted to translate normative Islam in a modern language without laying much emphasis on the internal and external causes of its decadence. The causes of decadence are not searched for in the immediate present; nonetheless, the solutions given are based on the distant past – the early phase of Islam. The concept of "history"—a concept that has an immense and subtle philosophical meaning— is in fact peripheral to modern Salafīyah. As a result, the two basic declared positions of the Salafīyah – the return to an original and unadulerated Islam and the opening of "the gate of reasoning " – are subject to many problems. The representatives of the modern Salafīyah – from Muḥammad 'Abduh down to Rashīd Riḍā and Ḥasan al-Bannā' – have approached religious problems independently of a new world context – a context in which industrialization, with its accessory problems, has strongly shaped the rise of new ideas, and new socio-economic and political relations.

Unable to comprehend the strong connection between religious reform and socio-economic change, the Salafīyah

> thought of the Muslim world to be following a certain pattern of stabilization although it was facing a shock resulting from the confrontation with colonialism and industrialization. The reign of the *faqīhs* (jurists and theologians) was substituted, for better or worse, by that of the (technical) experts and the leaders of the masses. This new situation necessitated a new mental attitude and new criteria.[46]

Contemporary Muslim intellectuals find themselves face to face with a set of social and historical questions that await a theological answer. Muslim intellectuals remain faithful to their vision of past Muslim history–a vision based on the significant role revelation plays in the process of history. In this sense, their thought is historicist.[47] Muslim intellectuals, representing their society, cannot seek refuge in isolation; they are required by revelation to participate in the making of present history. How can history be made in the image of Islamic revelation when the historical vision of the ever-present "other"–the West – has been imposed on the modern Muslim world? No proper answer has been given to this question yet.

Iṣlāḥ, then, is what defines the Salafīyah movement[48] in the modern Arab world, be it the neo-Mu'tazilism of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh

and Aḥmad Amīn[49] or the neo-Hanbalism of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb[50] and Rashīd Riḍā.[51] One of the major goals of the modern Salafiyah is to rebuild Islam in the present.

The objective of philosophical discourse, as it appears in the early writings of the famous Egyptian philosopher, Shaykh Muṣṭafā 'Abd al-Rāziq,[52] is to show the authenticity of traditional Islamic philosophical discourse. To do so he attempted to demonstrate that modern philosophy was in a position compatible with the claims of those orientalists who assumed that Muslim philosophy did not reflect the genius of Muslim thought; it was just Greek philosophy written in Arabic.[53]

The historical/political discourse of the *Nahḍah* describes the religion-state relationship. This relationship has undergone many transformations since the 19th century. In the first phase of the *Nahḍah*, Islam assumed a nationalistic meaning; the purpose of which was to build a strong state to compete with the West. In the second phase, Islam was expressed by both al-Afghānī and 'Abduh in pan-Islamic terms. The goal was to reinstitute the *Ummah* in the image of the failing Ottoman Empire.[54]

The third phase of *Nahḍah* began roughly at the beginning of the 20th century[55] with the rise of an Egyptian Western-educated and liberal-minded elite who saw the need to liberalize Egyptian politics by creating a parliamentary system. In this period (1900-1952), different political parties arose and the ideals of liberalism spread. Many in the Westernized elite interpreted religion as an individual relationship between man and God. Furthermore, "Islamic fundamentalism" rose under the name of the Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn*) movement. One of the major goals of the founder of this movement – Ḥasan al-Bannā' – was to establish an Islamic state. Al-Bannā' 's programme attempted to assert the sacred law in all walks of life. Politics, as a result, dominated philosophy and theology. A rupture between the *'Ulamā'*, as the defenders of the classical Sunnī tradition, and the Ikhwān was inevitable. The Ikhwan looked on the *'Ulamā'* with great suspicion. In the Ikhwān's view, the *'Ulamā'* were upholders of the same *status quo* that the Ikhwān attempted to abolish.

In short, this is the period of triumphant imperialism. The image of the West, as the "other," takes on a new dimension in this age. The West ceases to be perceived as the antithesis of the indigenous Muslim culture.

The *'Ulamā'* felt endangered. As preservers of tradition, they rose against "imported ideologies," and attacked modern culture. 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq published *Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm* in 1925. In this book, he advocated a democratic Western solution to the state-religion relationship, which aroused the *'Ulama"s* opposition. For the *'Ulamā'*, Westernization signified an alienation, a way of becoming other, an avenue of self-division. For the Arab liberal, Westernization meant competition, democracy, social and economic progress, and, above all, the separation of politics from religion.

The 1952 revolution of the Free Officers in Egypt marked the end and the failure of both the liberal[56] and the Muslim Brotherhood's answer to the problematic of the *Nahḍah*. This revolution marked the beginning of the fourth phase of the *Nahḍah*, which some Arab thinkers call the "revolution phase."[57] The Nasser regime that came to power after the "revolution"[58] steered the country toward an Arab socialism formulated by Nasser in *al-Mīthāq*.[59] The "revolution phase" of the *Nahḍah* ended in failure with the 1967 war that exposed some major problems in the political, economic, as well as the cultural structures of the regime. One of these was the way the regime dealt with Islam. The symbols of cultural Islam were crushed and replaced by those of socialism and Arab nationalism. But the vital aspects of Islam as a cultural force resurfaced after Nasser's death in 1970.[60]

After Nasser died, an internal power struggle followed. Islam was popularly expressed by both the Muslim Brotherhood and al-Azhar. The Ikhwān's goal was to create an Islamic state. Al-Azhar's, on the other hand, was to secure the application of the *Sharī'ah* as the supreme law in the country. Al-Azhar's scholars centred their intellectual activity around the following principles:

1. The autonomy of al-Azhar as the major Muslim institution in the country.
2. The application of the *Sharī'ah*.
3. The creation of an Islamic education system.
4. The *Jihād* against the enemies of Islam.

To conclude, any intellectual reflection on the state of the *Nahḍah* in modern Arabic/Islamic thought has to take into account the present meaning of tradition, the problematic of the state-religion relationship, and the current situation of Islamic culture. It seems to me that any economic, political and social analysis of the current state of affairs will be methodologically deficient if a proper treatment of Islam and Islamic culture is lacking.

NOTES

(1) Literally speaking, this term means renaissance. It has acquired deeper philosophical and historical meanings since its use in Arab intellectual circles in the modern period.

(2) 'A. Laroui, *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (Los Angeles, 1976), p.vii

(3) H A R Gibb, *Modern Trends in Islam* (Chicago, 1947), p.1.

(4) "Orientalism" is now used as a pejorative term for a type of knowledge constructed about the East. E Said (*Orientalism*, 1979) defines the term as a number of interdependent things. 1) It is an academic tradition. This refers to institutions and scholars who study the East be they historians, philologists, or theologians. 2) It also refers to a style of thought based on distinction made between the Orient and the Occident – that the Orient is the "other." 3) It is also used as a Western type of knowledge for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient. In our work, we use the term "orientalists" to refer to those scholars of Western origins who write about Islam in its various aspects. This term is not used in a pejorative sense.

(5) R. Brunschvig, "Probleme de la decadence," in G. von Grunebaum and R. Brunschvig (eds.), *Classicisme et declin culturel dans l'histoire de l'islam* (Paris, 1957), pp. 29-53.

(6) *Ibid.*, pp.93-109.

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) The *Nahdah* question has been widely discussed in modern Arab intellectual circles. 'A. Laroui has written two books on the subject: *L'ideologie arab contemporaine* (Paris, 1967), and *The Crisis of the Arab Intellectual: Traditionalism or Historicism?* (Los Angeles, 1976). In both books, Laroui argues that contemporary Arab society, as a whole, is still faithful to the ancestors' vision of history and, therefore, it suffers from "historical retardation." The problem of Arab society, as he defines it, is that it can no longer seek refuge in isolation, and that it can no longer remain satisfied with its own vision, still less impose this vision upon others. Arab society is confronted with the vision of the history of the industrial society. Laroui's solution for the problem is "the acceptance of the modern vision of history and the rejection – for the present at least – of the classical vision. To remain, faithful – as do the majority of the Arabs – to the ancestral vision, and to hope in spite of everything to change the meaning and weight of past events, is to indulge in fatuously wishful thinking" (*The Crisis*, p.29). The solution is, then, to break from the traditionalist Islamic vision of history since, according to Laroui, it has failed to come to terms with the complex conditions of the present.

Furthermore, Laroui argues that "tradition" as a theme and a living reality in the modern Arab and Muslim world, has become subject to ideological debates only with the Western advance into the Arab world. He says that tradition is born in opposition to something; to ideas accompanying foreign merchandise, or to universally decried liberalism. According to Laroui, the Arab intellectuals of the 19th century posed the question: What is the West? The opposing other – the West – according to Laroui developed two forms of hegemony. In the first instance, the West began to impose its arms, gods, and laws and cultures on the orient. The indigenous cry against "the imported ideologies of the West" was a last attempt to assert tradition in the face of the invader. Tradition became part of the ideological conflict between East and West. The second form of hegemony, according to Laroui, began with the

development of the industrial revolution, and attained its apogee in the mid-nineteenth century. The world was rounded into final shape, divided among the principal European powers, Asia was said to be sleeping, the East was decadent, and Trukey a sick man. The world went to school – the school of Europe.

The first systematic opposition to the cultural and religious penetration of the West in the Arab world came from the side of the *'Ulamā'* class in Algeria as well as in Egypt. Laroui calls this the phase of "cultural nationalism," for it was not two nations or two races that the class of the *'Ulamā'* sought to confront, but what were in essence two cultures. The *'Ulamā'* class espoused "traditionalist reformism." In Laroui's words, the essential reform of the *'Ulamā'* was not "military or political, but moral; the great ancestral qualities must be regained. .. With a few exceptions, however, European technology is not rejected. Provided that it is stripped of all cultural implications, the adoption of this technology is adjudged necessary." (*The Crisis*, p.16.)

In the context of the deepening interest in Western technology, the indigenous liberal intellectual is born. Laroui mentions that the passage to liberalism in Egypt took place when an influential segment of Egyptian intellectuals sought to translate the cultural aspects of Europe in the indigenous setting. Laroui argued that in his *al-Islām wa Uṣūl al-Ḥukm*, 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāziq turned the notions of the *shūrā* (consultation) and *ijmā'* (consensus) into being synonymous with democracy. In this sense, tradition becomes liberalized.

Laroui contended that contemporary Arab intellectuals think according to two rationales. Most of them profess the traditionalist *salafī* rationale. The rest profess an eclecticism. These two rationales are ahistorical. Since they succeed in abolishing the historical dimension, they fail to see the real. The Salafiyah movement used the language of the past to exacerbate "historical retardation." The selective approach of electic writers makes every thought a passing fashion. The only way to do away with these two modes of thought, Laroui argued, consists in strict submission to the discipline of historical thought and the acceptance of its assumptions.

Laroui did not provide much analysis of his alternative to "the crisis" of both the Salafiyah movement and eclecticism in modern Arabic thought. He was content to give this simplistic answer to the complex problems he posed. His complete rejection of Islam as the basis of culture in Arab society was indicative of his lack of understanding of the role religion and philosophy played in contemporary societies.

(9) W.C. Smith, *Islam in Modern History* (New York, 1956), p 16

(10) *Ibid.*, pp. 45-46.

(11) *Ibid*, p 17

(12) L. Gardet, "De quelle maniere," pp. 93-94.

(13) *Ibid*, p. 96.

(14) *Ibid.*, p.97.

(15) W.C. Smith comments on the idea of the historical ideal in a different fashion than Brunschvig does. Smith says that "the early phase of Islamic history takes precedence over all others simply because it came first. The original becomes the normative; the classical period becomes classical in the sense of exemplary, standard.... The first historical expression of the movement is felt to be the right expression – or not even as an expression at all, but as the movement in its pure form." (*Islam in the Modern World*, p.43)

(16) R Brunschvig, "Probleme de la decadence," p. 35.

(17) G. Pruett, "The Escape from Seragho. Anti-Orientalist Trends in Modern Religious Studies," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. 2, no.4, Fall 1980, p. 304.

(18) H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends*, p.17.

(19) *Ibid.*

(20) Gibb uses the term "atomistic" in reference to the Arab/Islamic mind.

(21) G. von Grunebaum, *Modern Islam: The Search for Cultural Identity* (New York, 1964), p. 176.

(22) P. Gran, *Islamic Roots of Capitalism. Egypt From 1760 to 1840* (Austin, 1979), p. 35.

(23) *Ibid.*, p 49.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 50.

(25) The major Egyptian historian of this period was 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī (1754-1825) Al-Jabartī recorded the main events of Egyptian history from the years 1700 to 1820. Those years witnessed three distinct political phases The first is the reign of the Mamlūks, which extended to 1798. The second was the phase of the French occupation of Egypt that ended in 1801 The third, the Muhammad 'Alī period, extended roughly from 1805 to 1847 Al-Jabartī's historical work, *'Ajā'ib al-Āthār fī'l-Tarājim wa al-Akhbār* presented a full account of Egyptian cultural, religious, social and political life. Being an enlightened member of the *'Ulamā'* class, al-Jabartī commented on the cultural and religious conflict of his age

Al-Jabartī outlined two basic religious problems in the Mamlūk phase that ended in 1798. The first revolved round the role of Sufism in society, and the second round the alliance of some of the *'Ulamā'* with the ruling elite Though he came from a strong Sufi background, al-Jabartī condemned many Sufi practices that he considered foreign to the religion of Islam Such practices as saint-worship, the belief in superstition, and seclusion from society represented, in al-Jabartī's view, a deviation from the authentic philosophy of Sufism. Many *'Ulamā'*, he said, took part in these corrupt practices, and were concerned, above all, with their material well-being. Many of these *'Ulamā'* neglected learning, and became rigid in their understanding of religious sciences. *Taqlīd* (blind imitation) replaced *ijtihād* (rational exertion). Most *'Ulamā'* dealt with commentaries and supercommentaries that had no relevance to real life.Al-Jabartī's description of the decline of the men of religion and his condemnation of erroneous practices was, in fact, a reflection of a society in transition

The French occupation intensified the conflict in Egyptian cultural and religious life . This conflict took two forms during this period. In the first instance, the *'Ulamā'*, who were highly destabilized by the foreign invader and who were afraid of losing their social and economic position in society, were united in their religious and cultural resistance to the French troops. They rallied the people around the *'aqīdah* (doctrine) that symbolized the unity of Islam. In the second instance, Western technology brought by the French troops was appreciated by a good number of the intelligentsia, including al-Jabartī who, at the beginning of the invasion, escaped to Upper Egypt away from the French. Al-Jabartī did realize the importance of Western technology and science as a necessary element for Egyptian advance. The problem facing him was how to reconcile the Western methods of thought and behaviour with the Islamic ones.

This was not the concern of Ḥasan al-'Aṭṭār, the major intellectual of the Muhammad 'Alī period, who found it necessary to adopt Western science, technology and the utilitarian ethics accompanying them Al-'Aṭṭār's strong secular bent of mind did offer a solution to the place of Islam and its philosophy in society. His student, al-Tahṭāwī, attempted a synthesis of Islam and Western science

For some sources on al-Jabartī and this period see. A I. 'Abd al-Karīm(ed), *'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī: Dirāsah wa Buḥūth* (Cairo, 1976); D. Ayalon, "The Historian al-Jabartī and His Background," *BSOAS*, XXIII, 2, 1960; C.K. Mansour, and G Nicolas, *Merveilles biographiques et historiques du Cheikh Abd el-Rahman el Djabarti* (Cairo, 1888-96). For a general book on the period see: R Mantran, *L'egypte au XIXe siecle* (Paris, 1982)

(26) M Jones, "The First French Proclamation and al-Jabartu," in A I. 'Abd al-Karīm (ed), *'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī*, p. 31

(27) See A.K. Rafīq, *al-'Arab wa al-'Uthmānīyūn* (Damascus, 1974)

(28) There are numerous scholarly books on the reign of Muḥammad 'Alī Of a particular importance for us see A.R al-Rafī"s *'Asr Muhammad 'Alī* (Cairo, 1951).

(29) The Mamlūk elite came to power in Egypt in 1760 and lasted until the French invasion in 1798. Gran says that the Mamluk beys "emerged as the political elite in alliance with a number of rich merchants who formed the economic elite after a series of internecine struggles between their rivals, the Janissaries and other feudal groups" (*Islamic Roots of Capitalism*, p 11) The Mamlūks retained the official position of the Ottoman Wali as a means of legitimizing their rule They attempted to modernize the country with the help of the European-linked merchant community. After the French withdrawal from Egypt in 1801, the Mamlūks resumed their rule for a brief period. Muhammad 'Alī terminated their rule in 1805

(30) R Hammami, "Gramsci's Theory of Oppressed Regions Implications for Egyptian Historiography" (Unpublished paper, Department of Anthropology, Temple University, 1984), p. 14

(31) For a detailed study of this aspect of Muḥammed 'Alī's rule, see A. Abdel-Malek, *Ideologie et renaissance dans l'egypt moderne* (Paris, 1969), especially chapters 3 and 4. See also A I 'Abd al-Karīm, *Ta'rīkh al-Ta'līm fī'Asr Muḥammad 'Alī* (Cairo, 1924)

(32) S. Amin, *The Arab Nation* (London, 1983), p.30.

(33) Al-Tahtāwī was born in 1801 just as the French departed from Egypt. In 1819, he was admitted to al-Azhar Ṭahtāwī fell under the intellectual influence of Shaykh Hasan al-'Aṭṭār, the head of al-Azhar at the time. Tahtāwī played an important religious and cultural role during the Muḥammad 'Alī rule. He was appointed the rector of al-Azhar and the editor of the daily paper *al-Waqā'i' al-Misrīyah* In 1841, he was appointed the director of Madrasat al-Alsun (The School of Languages) A historian of the period, J Crabbs, noted that, "just as al-Jabartī seemed to tower over his contemporaries, the reputation of al-Tahṭāwī had virtually eclipsed that of all other early nineteenth century Egyptians ... It was he who, more than any other single individual, laid the ground for Egyptian achievements in historiography." (J. Crabbs, *The Study of History in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Study in National Transformation* (Detroit, 1984), pp 68-69

P. Gran argued that al-Ṭahtāwī was not the only influential figure in the 19th-century Egypt. "The main writers of the period (in the second half of the 19th century) were Shaykh Husayn al-Marsafi in language sciences, the prose writer Ibrāhīm al-Muwaylihi, the poet Sami al-Barudi, 'Ali Mubārak in history, and al-Ṭahtāwī. All these writers contributed formally to educational and cultural reform; all opposed the kalām of the Muḥammad Ali period, all tended in varying degrees towards the nascent

positivism now embodied in hadith studies, although this development was blocked by the imposition of Aristotelianism in aesthetics" (Gran, 1979, p. 164) Al-Ṭahtāwī was not a theologian in the strict sense of the word Nevertheless, his strong Azharite background allowed him to examine theological issues in the light of his Parisian experience (1825-1831) Al-Ṭahtāwī's theological ideas were spelled out in his *Manāhij al-Albāb* (1869), in *al-Murshid al-Amīn* (1872) and in *Nihāyat al-I'jāz fī Sīrat Sākin al-Ḥijāz* (1872).

Tahtāwī treated the life of the Prophet as the foundation (*aṣl*) and the example (*qudwah*)of ideal behaviour In his discussion of revelation, he highlights the important rôle reason plays in Islamic theology, and the fruitful intellectual role reason can fulfil in the absence of Qur'ānic stipulations on certain issues Ṭahtāwī tried to revive the science of fiqh since this science would accord reason its proper place in the theological discourse

Ṭahtāwī did not put an end to Islamic dogma His starting point in treating the novel conditions of Egyptian life was this dogma For some important works on al-Ṭahṭāwī, see A. Badawī, *Rifā'ah Rafī' al-Ṭahṭāwī* (Cairo, 1959); L. 'Awad, *al-Muthīrat al-Ajnabīyah fī'l-Adab al-'Arabī al-Ḥādith* (Cairo, 1962); J.D al-Shayyāl, *Ta'rīkh al-Tarjamah wa'l-Ḥarakah al-Thaqāfīyah fī'Asr Muhammad 'Alī* (Cairo, 1951), M. 'Imārah, *al- A'māl al- Kāmilah li-Rifā'ah Rāfī 'al- Ṭahtāwī* (Beirut, 1972), and J. Crabbs, *The Writing of History in Nineteenth Century Egypt: A Study in National Transformation* (Detroit, 1984).

(34) R.R.al-Tahtāwī, *Takhlīs al-Ibrīz fī Talkhīs Barīz* (Cairo, 1954).

(35) S Amin, *The Arab Nation*, p. 32.

(36) The tension between Islam and the West is still a major theme in Arab intellectual circles A good book on the subject is H. Djait, *l'Europe et l'Islam* (Paris, 1974).

(37) This is the argument Abdel Malek presented in his essay, "The Occultation of Egypt," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol. I, number 3 (1979), pp. 177-200. Abdel Malek contends that the West is never tolerant of allowing strong Third World countries to emerge

(38) The majority of Egyptian historians consider this revolt to be the starting point of the rise and development of modern Egyptian nationalism. See S. 'Īsā, *al-Thawrah al-'Urābīyah* (Beirut, 1978).

(39) See N. Keddi, *Sayyid Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī: A Biography* (Berkeley, 1972).

(40) Several important studies have appeared about 'Abduh. They include Rahīd Ridā, *Ta'rīkh al-Ustādh al-Imām* (Cairo, 1925); U. Amin, *Mohammad Abduh: essai sur ses idees philosophiques et religieuse* (Cairo, 1944); C.Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt* (New York, 1969), and *Risālat al-Tawhīd*, translated into French by Shaykh Mustafā 'Abd al-Rāziq and M. Bernard.

(41) S.H. Nasr, *Islam and the Plight of Modern Man* (London, 1975), p. 90.

(42) In the eyes of al-Afghānī and 'Abduh, reason is pot subservient to revelation. Both are tools that can be employed in creating a rational ideological system to explain reality without appealing to the metaphysical sources of Islam. See S.H. Nasr, "Revelation, Intellect, and Reason in the *Qur'ān*," in his *Sufi Essays* (New York, 1972), pp. 52-57.

(43) Concerning this issue see L Gardet, "De quelle maniere s'est ankylose la pensee religieuse de l'islam," in G.E.v. Grunebaum and R. Brunschvig (eds.), *Classicisme et declin culturel dans l'hustoire de l'islam* (Paris, 1957).

(44) See. W Ferguson, *The Renaissance* (New York, 1940), chapters 1 and 2.

(45) N. Gilbert, "Renaissance," in the *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, vol.v, p. 174.

(46) M. Lahbabi, *Le personnalisme musulman* (Paris, 1964), pp. 100-101.

(47) The term "historicity" or "historicism" is used in two ways. First, it is used by Hegel, Marx and Popper to deduce historical patterns or laws on the basis of which future historical events can be predicted. In that, the conflation of both history and metaphysics is involved. Second, the term is used by Marxists to express how the material foundations of a society can determine the historical stage and evolution of that society. See K. Popper, *The Poverty of Historicism* (New York, 1957). In this work, the term is employed in the first sense. There are certain distinct patterns of *al-Nahdah* according to which we can predict the rise of several theoretical issues in the future Arab world.

(48) The literal meaning of the term *Salafiyah* is the ways of the ancestors, i.e. the way of the Prophet and his Companions. The Qur'ān mentions the word *salaf* in many of its verses. *Sūrah* II: 275, and V: 95. It is believed that Ibn Hanbal (the second century A.H.) was the first salafi to stress the idea of the return to an early state of Muslim society established by the Prophet where doctrinal controversy would be absent. In the modern period, many religious Arab scholar define themselves as salafiyūn or those who follow in the footsteps of the ancestors. For example, Ridā, Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, and Ibn Badīs in the Arab world are classified as these. See H. Laoust, "Le reformisme orthodoxe des salafiay et les caracteres generaux de son orientation actuelle," *Revue Des Etudes Islamiques*, vol. VIII, 1932, pp. 175-224, M. 'Imārah, *Tayārāt al- Fikr al-Islāmi* (Cairo, 1984), and A. Merad, *Le reformisme musulman en algerie de 1925 a 1940 · essai d 'histoire religieuse et sociale* (Paris, 1967).

(49) On the resurgence of the Mu'tazilite thought in the Arab world, see Caspar, "le Renouveau mu'tazilite" *Mideo*, no.4, 1957, C. Bouamrane, *Le Probleme de la liberte humaine dans le pensee musulman. solution mu'tazilite* (Paris, 1978), and L. Gardet, "Signification du renouveau mu'tazilite dans la pensee musulman contemporaine" in *Hommage a Richard Walzer* (Oxford, 1972).

(50) The Wahhabiyah is a puritanical movement that appeared in Arabia in the 18th century. The founder of the movement, Muḥammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb, opened "a revivalist campaign based on the puritan Hanbalite school and the anti-Sufi polemic of Ibn Taimia and his followers in the fourteenth century. Directed in the first instance against the laxity of manners and corruption of religion in the local settlements and tribes, the Wahhabi movement condemned saint-worship and attacked the Sufi 'innovations' as heresy and infidelity, and finally attacked the other orthodox schools for their compromises with these abominations" (H.A.R. Gibb, *Mohammedanism* [London, 1973], p. 114). Gibb emphasized that the Wahhābīyah was one of the few modern Islamic movements that stressed the transcendence of God as a basic theological principle. As opposed to Sufism, that lays emphasis on God's immanence and closeness to man, the Wahhābīyah sought to revitalize some prominent aspects in the Hanbalite theology by going back to the Qur'ān and *Sunnah* as the only two authentic sources of Islam. The Wahhābīyah downplayed the importance of philosophical and theological debates throughout Islamic history. Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhāb declared that there was no place for Sufism, philosophy and theology in Islam. Any imitation of the philosophers, the Sufis and the theologians (both the Ash'arites and the Mu'tazilites) was condemned. Al-Wahhābīyah sought to reassert the position of consensus at the expense of reasoning.

It is hard to understand the modern history of Saudi Arabia without understanding the role the Wahhābīyah played in shaping the culture of the country. The Wahhābī alliance with the current monarchy, which dates back to the 18th century, is one of the main features of the country. For some studies on the Wahhābīyah, see W. Smith, *Islam*, pp. 48-51; H.A.R. Gibb, *Modern Trends*, pp. 26-38; and A.M. Siddiqi, "Muḥammad bin 'Abd al-Wahhāb and His Movement," in

M.M. Sharif, *A History of Muslim Philosophy* (Wiesbaden, Germany, 1966), pp 1446-56

(51) On the life and thought of Rashid Rida, see M H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform. the Political and Legal Theories of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Ridā* (Berkeley, 1966).

(52) No definite study has been made of the philosophical contributions of Shaykh Mustafā 'Abd al-Rāziq See 'Alī 'Abd al-Rāzaq, *Min āthār Mustafā 'Abd al-Rāziq* (Cairo, 1957), and G Anawati, *Tendances et courants de l'islam arabe contemporain. egypte et afrique du nord* (Munchen, 1982), pp. 30-35.

(53) This claim was advanced by E Renan in *l'islamisme et le science* (Paris, 1883), where he said that Islam is not compatible with positive science

(54) Before his exile following the 'Urābī revolution of 1882, 'Abduh raised the political banner of pan-Islamism as defined by al-Afghānī.

(55) A. Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment* (Berkeley, 1977)

(56) There are several prominent Egyptian intellectuals who still argue that liberalism has not failed in Egypt. See Tawfīq al-Ḥakīm, *'Awdat al-Wa'y* (Beirut, 1970). In response to this book see M. 'Awdah, *al-Wa'y al-Mafqūd* (Cairo, 1972).

(57) M. Arkoun, *la Pensee arabe* (Paris, 1975), pp. 90-121.

(58) Many object to the use of the term "revolution" to describe the coup d'etat of 1952. See J.A. Hamamsi, *Hiwar min Warā' al-Aswar* (Cairo, 1977); and L. 'Awad, *Aqni'āt al-Nāsiriyah al-Sabā'ah* (Cairo, 1977)

(59) For a complete translation of this document, see N. Rejwan, *Nassirist, Ideology: Its Exponents and Critics* (New York, 1974), appendix 1.

(60) See. H. Hanafi, "The Relevance for the Islamic Factor in Egypt," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, vol.4. nos. 1 and 2, pp. 54-75; and S. Ibrahim, "Egypt's Islamic Militants" *MERIP REPORTS*, no. 103, Feb. 1982, pp. 5-14.

BĀZĀRS IN MUGHAL INDIA AN ESSAY IN ARCHITECTURAL STUDY AND INTERPRETATION

K.K. MOHAMMED

IF the city is viewed as a system entity, comprising interacting independent parts,[1] then the market should be treated as one of its important architectural members. It is the commercial hub and cultural cauldron of the city linking its various components such as habitational areas *(muhallah), sara'is,* schools, places of worship, market places and places reserved for gardens, crematory and burial. Its plan, layout and organization imparts a defining feature to the city. Hence a change in city scape and urban texture is an expression of cultural and economic change of its inhabitants.

The advent of the Mughals in India did not result in any 'heterogenetic transformation' of Indian cities, where "the existing local cultures are disintegrated and a new integration of mind and society are developed."[2] Such a transformation had registered its presence in India when Quṭb al-Dīn Aybak established his first capital in Delhi. A detailed study of the layout of Indian cities in the wake of the establishment of the Mughal dynasty would reveal that the new transformation of Indian cities was "orthogenetic" where the existing culture is carried forward.This should not lead us to develop a myopic view of Mughal cities as a mere extension of earlier urban centres. On the contrary, the Mughals carried forward to its logical climax some of the recently introduced system entities of cities like *chahār-sūq* (four square market) and implanted fresh ones like *kaṭrahs,* and *ganjs.*

The most striking example of Mughalization of this kind is Agra, which was the capital of the two last Lodi sultans, part of the layout of which recalls the early Lodi style, while the city scape and urban texture is dominated by *kaṭrahs* and *ganjs,* terms unknown in the lexicon of urban planners of the Sultanate India.

A market with a running veranda in front of the shop proper from the beginning till the end, intersected by a *chahār-sūq* in the middle was

a physical urban component introduced in India by the Lodis. Sultan Sikandar Lodī had established such a *chahār-sūq* in Agra.[3] But the Lodis did not get time to develop it to a major monumental architectural idiom of the time. As the early Mughal kings, Bābur and Humāyūn, were also entangled with conquests and consolidation, they could not pay much attention to this aspect. Thus, the task of planning Mughal cities, making *chahār-sūq* as the commercial hub with its majestic architectural expression, was left to Akbar.

The Sultanate *bazārs* were also alien to the sort of scene setting that characterizes the Mughal town plan with its perspective designed to give the feeling of extended vistas. Such a grand *bazār*, the length of which is one kilometer, traded in precious stones and silk cloths, has been recently excavated at Fatehpur Sikri by a team of archaeologists, the present writer being one of them.[4] On the right side, when one faces west, there are 175 shops. The shops rectangular in shape, each having a door in front anda niche in the back,have two descending platforms,separated by a height of 40 cms. from one another.[5] An exploration of the area by the author has helped him to form a fairly good idea about the *bazār*. From the broken fragments of pillars, brackets and lime chunks lying around, it appears that the whole *bazār* was roofed by stone slabs, over which there was a thick lime concrete slab. The thickness of all the twenty-seven roof lime chunks, lying in the field, measured by the present writer, recorded a uniform 45 cms. This large roof was supported by innumerable pillars and brackets with beautiful carvings. It can be reasonably argued that the room was a store house, the platform closest to it was used by the owner for display and the last one was meant for the customer. The description of *Delhi Bāzār* by Bernier supports such an interpretation of the excavated *Fatehpur Sīkrī Bāzār*. The traveller observes, "the costly merchandise is generally kept in a warehouse and the shops are seldom decked with rich or showy articles."[6] More vivid is the description of *Chāndnī Chawk* given by one of the English ladies in the 19th century; "the *Chandni Chawk* jewellers and silver smiths never displayed their wares in public, all their valuables being kept in boxes in the back rooms of the house, the front room being open to the street, without doors, carpeted with white cloth on which one or two men would be sitting.... If a European stopped at the shop he generally sat on the edge of the floor which was always raised a few feet above the road."[7]

The *bāzār* on the left side of the road when one faces west (Fatehpur Sikri) has not been excavated to any appreciable length. But the exposed portion amply makes it clear that the market on this side has not been divided into shops, like the *bāzār* rooms on the right side, except a few near *Nawbat Khānah*.

Regarding the imperial order for the construction of this *bāzār*, 'Ārif Qandhārī records that "From the imperial court (*Darbār-i Pādshāhī*) to the gate towards Agra excellent shops should be built of red sandstone, gypsum and lime."[8] The hustle-and-bustle and the brisk trade that went on in precious stones and silk cloth in this *bāzār* has been attested by Father Monserrate. He says, "the *bazar* which is more than half a mile long and is filled with an astonishing quantity of every description of merchandise and with countless people who are always standing there in dense crowds."[9] As the whole *bāzār* was roofed including the two platfroms, even in hot summer and heavy rainy season the customer could purchase goods without being mindful of it. Lahore also had such a *bāzār* within the citadel, the roof of which was made of wood.[10] Monserrate observes: "within the citadel is a *bazar*, which is protected against the sun in summer and the rain in winter by a high pitched wooden roof,a design whose clever execution and practical utility should call for imitation."[11]

Fatehpur Sikri was the first Mughal town to have a running covered veranda in front of the shop proper right from the beginning to the end of the *bāzār* as a part of city planning. The scorching heat of Fatehpur Sikri necessitated such an arrangement. This *bāzār* intersected 674 meters away from Agra gate end of the market to form a *chahār-sūq*. The 35 meter square market approached by a paved road with a width of 18.60 meters at the road shoulder passes from east to west under a beautiful arch flanked by two smaller arches on its sides. This has been veneered by red sandstone contrasted by buff coloured stone to impart a beautiful effect. The north and south sides of the *bāzār* have two smaller gates of the Lodi style. All the four gates have been linked by a boundary wall against which shops have been constructed, before which there are two platforms in descending order like the *bāzār* we have mentioned earlier. *Chahār-sūq* was neither the innovation of the Lodis nor that of the Mughals. Any how, the contribution of the former in introducing it in India has already been dealt with. Such covered square markets at the major intersection of the roads were known in Islamic countries by a variety of names such as *Qayṣarīyās* in Egypt, Syria, Spain and North Africa and *Bedesten* in Turkey.[12] The Ottoman towns usually have a single *bedesten* while the towns of Damascus and Aleppo were studded with *Qayṣarīyās*.[13] In Trasnoxiana the *bāzār* ran along the principal streets and intersected the town at right angles, often there being domes at the cross roads.[14]

From the point of view of townscape, this market marks an important innovation in India. The Sultanate cities were devoid of grand approach, extended vistas and scene setting. The Mughals, on the other

hand, laid emphasis on effective spatial modulations within the market, often using split levels in response to an undulating site, in order to provide a grand approach especially on ceremonial occasions and to create larger space than can actually be made available on a single level. They moulded the existing land form which rises at some places, and at others, steps down, to form turfed functional terraces. The micro enclosures of the individual shops progress into macro enclosures of the whole *bāzār* around a beautifully built *chahār-sūq*. One of the two kiosks that flanked the *chahār-sūq* still stands like a solitary sentinel. Thus a variety of covered areas, semi-covered pavilions, courts open to the sky and arcades, framing distant views enact a drama of space and light. This strange combination of architecture and antitectonic arrangements creates a spectacular impression on the mind of the beholder.

This grand *bāzār* at Fatehpur Sikri with its extended vistas, lofty gates and split level architecture was also used for ceremonial reception of the highly honoured guests. On 18th October, 1575, Akbar arranged such a reception in honour of his uncle Mirzā Sulaymān. Badā'ūnī states, "on that day five thousand elephants, some with housings of European velvet, and some with Turkish cloths of gold, and some with chains of gold and silver, and with black and white fringes held on their necks and heads, were drawn up in line on both sides; also Arabian and Persian horses with golden saddles of like splendour. And between each pair of elephants they placed a car of *cheetahs* with gold collars and covering of velvet and fine linen, and an ox car with fillets of embroidered gold. And the whole face of the wilderness, in this manner, became like a vision of spring, and the desert and hill country like the reflection of a Tulip bed."[15] On another occasion, when Akbar's aunt, Gulbadan Begam, came back after performing *Hajj*, the whole road was carpeted with silk shawls and the king himself escorted her to the palace in a gorgeous litter, scattering largess meanwhile to the crowds.[16]

Many Islamic cities had this kind of grand approaches for ceremonious welcome. At Samarra, the Caliph al-Mutawakkil built *Shāri' al-A'zam* as an approach to his new palace city the Ja'fariyah (A.D 861), and the Ghaznavid palace complex at Lashkari Bazar (11–12th century) was similarly connected to the town of Bust.[17]

There was another market behind the said *bāzār* at Fatehpur Sikri which has unfortunately escaped the attention of archaeologists. Part of it has been explored by the present writer where the road from *Dīwān-i 'Āmm* to Agra Gate bifurcates to the modern Dak Banglow. The cells of this market are bigger than those of the main *bāzār*. Neither contemporary nor later accounts throw any light on it. It is possible that

it might have been the market of arms. A letter writter by Fr. Monserrate makes an oblique reference of the preoccupation of Prince Jahāngīr in the armour shop at Fatehpur Sikri.[18] Only an extensive excavation of the area can reveal the real nature and organization of this market.

The second important stage in the development of *bāzār* architecture was the construction of *Tripolia*–a place where three *bāzārs* converged from various directions. We are not sure whether the meeting point was marked with any monumental structures like *chahār-sūq* and *chawk* gates. The first reference about the construction of the *Tripolia* market goes back to the period of Jahāngīr. The king sanctioned twenty lacs of rupees for the construction of a mosque and a tripolia market attached to it at Lahore.[19] Each of the three streets in this market comprised two hundred and seventy shops and the income out of the rent of these shops alone amounted to Rs.2,500 a month.[20] The fact that the cost of the mosque at Fatehpur Sikri was rupees five lac [21] would enable one to form an idea about the grandiose scale on which this *bāzār* was constructed. In one of the plans of the Agra City prepared in the 19th century, presently housed in the Archaeological Survery of India office, Northern Circle, Agra, a *Tripolia* market has been shown in front of the Delhi Gate of the Agra Fort. The houses of Shagunchand Sahu, *mandī Gul-Farūshān*, *Mumtāzgunj* and the habitation of *Gārībanānān* (cart-makers) were located in the *Tripolia Bāzār* of Delhi. [22]

During the time of Shāhjahān, 'Alī Mardān Khān built a covered market and *chahār-sūq* at Peshawar.[23] When Shāhjahān visited this market he was so much impressed by it that he desired to send its plan to Mukarramat Khān, the superintendent of the construction of the Delhi Fort, to build a similar market inside the fort.[24] This covered *bāzār* (*bāzār-i musaqqaf*) which stretched from Lahori Gate of the fort to *Jilaw Khānah* was two hundred and seventy feet long and twenty-seven feet wide. Moreover, this was a double storied market with arcaded shops on both levels.[25]

From the point of view of city planning this palace *bāzār* marks another important innovation in Delhi and its surroundings. It is true that the first market with a running covered veranda was introduced in Mughal India at Fatehpur Sikri. There the customer could go from one end of the market to the other end without being exposed to sun and rain. But the street of the Fatehpur Sikri that linked shops on both sides was not roofed as the Palace Market in Delhi. So, in Delhi the customer could go not only from one end to the other, but even cross and recross the street without being mindful of the natural elements. The introduction of the double storied market was another refreshing departure from the

earlier single storied markets. It is exactly the reason why a contemporary chronicler says that "a building like the covered *bāzār*, which the people of Hindustan had never before seen, was a new idea produced by the ruler of the seven lands with effortless attention and unique building talent."[26]

The genesis of such markets goes back to Rome where the emperor Trajan had constructed a covered market, along with a road flanked by shops on both sides.[27] In course of time it became part of the Islamic town-plan. Marwān I, the Umayyad caliph, was the first to introduce it at Fustat[28] in Egypt. Al-Muqaddisī attests the existence of such a market in the famous Iraqi town, Mosul.[29] Similarly Ibn Jubayr noted the market at Harran as roofed with wood.[30] Although the covered market had become part of the Islamic townplan, strangely such *bāzārs* were not constructed in India during the Sultanate period.

Anyhow, neither *chahār-sūq* nor covered *bāzār* survived as the permanent idiom of the *bāzār* architecture. We do not hear of the construction of a second covered *bāzār* in any part of India. During the time of Shāhjahān, though *chahār-sūq* persisted for some time, it was replaced by *chawks*, an expression of the changed cityscape and urban texture. According to Manrique the *chawk* is an open square in the centre of the town.[31] The most important of such new *chawks* were *Chāndnī Chawk* and *Chawk Sa'd-Allāh Khān* in Delhi,[32] *Chawk Akbarābād* at Agra,[33] the royal spare at Ahmedabad,[34] and *Chawk Bāzār* and *Mānak Chawk* at Lahore.[35] *Chawk Dārā*, outside the Delhi Gate, on the site of *Londa Bāzār* and *Sultān Sarāī* was entered by a lofty gateway of enamelled tiles. On either side of it were rows of two-storied shops, in which merchants and traders transacted their business.[36]

The town square *(chawk)* was not a new feature in the East. The earliest example of it comes from Nineveh in 676 B.C.[37] Appian says that in the public squares of Persia people assembled to seek justice or to learn law.[38] In A.D. 985, Al-Muqaddisī wrote about a great town square *(Rahbah)* at Fīruzabad in Iran.[39] The Friday mosque built in the suburbs of Nishapur by 'Amr bin Layth, the Saffarid, in 895 faced the public square called the Review ground, while the governor's palace faced the adjacent square.[40] In Samarqand, there is the eminent *Registan square*, on one side of which is the *Madrasah* of Ulugh Beg built in 1420 and on the other side is *Shir Dhar* (*Madrasah* 1648) of Jālangtāsh Bahādur of the Astarkhanid dynasty and on the third side is the *Tilla-Kari Madrasah*.[41]

In 1640, Princess Jahān Ārā Begam built a market in Delhi before *Lahori Gate* and christened it *Chāndnī Chawk*.[42] It was 1520 yards in

length and 40 yards in breadth and was divided into three parts. The part from Lahori *Darwāzah* to *Chawk Kotwālī* (Kotwali chabutra) measured 480 yards and was known as *Urdū Bāzār*. This *bāzār* catered to the needs of the members of the imperial household, soldiers, servants and others who lived around the palace. The *Chawk Kotwālī* octagonal in shape, measured 80 × 80 yards. From this *chawk* another market known as *Jawharī Bāzār* or *Ashrafī Bāzār* ran 400 yards and terminated at a second *Chawk* on the western side. This *chawk*, octagonal in shape and measuring 100 × 100 yards, had a large pool in the centre. On full moon nights the moonlight reflected in the central pool and the area was known as *Chāndnī Chawk*. In course of time, this name acquired such currency that it replaced all others and the whole *bāzār* right from *Lahori Darwāzah* of the Fort to the Fatehpuri Masjid was known as *Chāndnī Chawk*. After the *Chawk* proper (Chawk pool) the *bāzār* ran 460 yards, further upto Fatehpuri Masjid and accommodated the *Fathpūrī bāzār*.

A canal flowed through the whole course of both *Chāndnī Chawk* and *Fayḍ Bāzār* and the shops along the road on both sides were beautifully built. The facade of the shops were adorned with arches over which terraces were built for the sake of fresh air. The road was straight and 25 to 30 paces wide.[43] It seems that the Mughals were influenced by the town plan of the Transoxianan city Yarkand, which had a water channel running through its midst. The roads of Yarkand like those of Shahjahanabad were lined with avenues of white popar.[44]

The portion from *Akbarābādī Gate* of the Fort (Delhi Gate) to the *Akbarābādī Gate* of the city accommodated another *bāzār* of 888 compartments. This *bāzār*, about 1050 × 30 yards was built by Nawwāb Akbarābādī Begam in 1650. A branch of *Nahr-i Bihisht* flowed through it.[45] During the time of Muḥammad Shāh, Rawshan al-Dawlah, one of his important nobles, put up rows of lights on both sides of the canal.[46] Originally known as *Akbarābādī Bāzār* its real name was soon replaced by the name *Fayḍ Bāzār*. Immediately outside the *Akbarābādī Gate* of the Fort Sa'd-Allāh Khān constructed *Khāṣṣ Bāzār* or *Khānam Bāzār*,[47] and *Chawk Sa'd-Allāh Khān*. Other prominent *bāzārs* of Delhi were *Chūṛī Bāzār*, *Jawharī Bāzār* and *Rājā Bāzār*.[48]

Bernier who was generally critical of Indian *bāzārs* was full of praise for its fruit market. It was well supplied with all kinds of fruits from Persia, Balkh, Bukhara and Samarqand.[49]

At Agra *Kanārī Bāzār*, *Jawharī Bāzār* and *Naichandā Bāzār* [50] were famous for various articles. The widely known *bāzārs* of Lahore

were *Lakhī Bāzār*, [51] *Ṭibbī Bazār*,[52] *Begampūrā Bāzār*, [53] *Parvez Bāzār*[54] and *Rarra quarter*. [55]

The Friday bāzār in front of Masjid-i Akbari Mahal dealt in books, poetry, letter writing and painting. This was frequented by the scholars of the time for rare books which often might have led to prolonged discussions on issues troubling the mind of the intellectuals of the day. Thus, the whetted appetite for intellectual discussions were quenched at *qahwah-khānahs* [56] of Delhi *bāzārs*. The closing years of the 17th century had witnessed the opening of many *qahwah-khānahs* where scholars and poets met and exchanged views and appreciated the poems of each other. The changed mood of *bāzārs* of Delhi has been aptly recorded by Dargāh Qulī Khān who wrote *Muraqqa'-i Dihlī* in 1738-9. In his graphic description of the *bāzār* the traveller says: "Here one saw enormous crowds comprising an amazing variety of people. There were boys dancing, preachers sitting on improvised pulpits, discoursing on themes suitable for the day and the month and making a fair collection of coins from fools who listened and were affected; there were astrologers making pleasing prophecies, quacks impressively dressed with colourful bags full of medicines advertising their aphrodisiacs, tonics and remedies for veneral diseases, there were buffoons and wine sellers."[57] Thus the informative discourses in its various *bāzārs*, learned assemblies at *qahwah-khānahs* and varied other literary and semiliterary activities imparted a new direction and dimension to the Indian cities. Till this period the imperial palace was the nucleus round which scholarship, art and literature thrived. Since they were the possession of a favoured minority attached to the court, there was no question of it reaching the ranks of the less privileged section through the law of cultural seepage.[58] The *qahwah-khānahs*, new intellectual corners which were open to all, enabled the cities to assume the role of cultural leadership. Henceforth the Mughal *bāzārs* did not remain as mere arteries of economic activity but also served as the cultural hub of the realm. The credit for the new cultural effloresence in the 18th and 19th centuries and of the development of Urdu to a large extent, goes to the new role played by the Mughal *bāzārs*. The fact that the new poets were not from the traditional segments of society but from the class of craftsmen and merchants further strengthens this point of view. The names of some like Ḥusayn Vakshī, a cloth merchant, Madansing Shaguftah, a goldsmith, Shambu Nath 'Azīz, a banker, and Mīr Ṣādiq 'Alī Ṣādiq are important in this connection.[59]

Another significant addition to the town planning during Akbar's era was the emergence of *katrahs*, a square structure in which either the stocks were kept or transaction was made in wholesale. There is *nishan* of

Nūrjahān Begam, presently housed in National Archives, ordering officers not to interfere with merchants stocking their merchandise in the *kaṭrah*.[60] Sometimes *kaṭrahs* were named after merchants of a particular commodity such as *kaṭra bazzāzān* (cloth merchants), *Kaṭrah Roghan zard, Ghī kā Kaṭrah* (clarified butter) or *Kaṭrah nīl* (Indigo) etc. But quite often it was named after the builder or owner such as, *Kaṭrahs Adīna Beg Khān* or *Kaṭrah Munshī Kanwal Nain* [61]etc. Important *Kaṭrahs* in Delhi were *Nīl Kaṭrah, Kashmīrī Kaṭrah* and *Kaṭrah Fidā'ī Khān*.[62] At Lahore there was a *kaṭrah* situated within the *chawk* of Dārāshikūh, comprising many houses.[63] This point is significant as it suggests accommodation as part of its function. Agra was full of *kaṭrahs* such as *Ṣābūn Kaṭrah, Kaṭrah Āghā Bāqar, Kaṭrah I'tibar Khān, Kaṭrah Shā'istah Khān* and *Kaṭrah 'Alī Mardān Khān*.[64] Recently Mrs. Naheed Khan has made a study of the *kaṭrahs* around Tajganj. The survey and plan made by the scholar are revealing in many respects.

What does the advent of *kaṭrahs* reflect? If the innovation is in response to certain demands, then, what were the factors and forces which gave birth to the design concept of *kaṭrahs*. The emergence of *kaṭrah* was a natural corollary of the development of Agra as a 'generative town,' the resultant accumulation of merchant capital and the corresponding capacity to purchase merchandise in bulk.

A city is generative, if its continued existence and growth are factors accounting for the economic development of the area in which it is located.[65] In other words, such a city would be able to stand on its own and develop further, due to the economic activity going on in and around the city. If the city exerts an opposite impact and its existence is accountable to factors other than the economic activity in and around it, it is parasitic.[66] Most of the Mughal cities were generative. The city of Agra can be pointed out as an example of this, for it was one of those towns around which much of the economic activity of the Mughal India revolved. Agra produced extremely good cloth,[67] silks, carpets,[68] and quilts. The industry of metallurgy like silver, gold, copper and iron made extraordinary progress.[69] Apart from industry of lapidary, there was brisk trade in precious and semiprecious stones, inlay, stone carving and embroidery. Abū al-Faḍl observes: "the masterpieces of workmanship of Agra astonished experienced travellers."[70] This view has been testified by Jahangir who says that the inhabitants of Agra exert themselves greatly in the acquirement of crafts.[71]

Besides the craft goods, the hinterland of Agra yielded much of the cash crops. Agra was the chief emporium of indigo[72] which was in

high demand all over the world. The English Company sent a large quantity of indigo from Agra to Persia and Turkey. Other important items of export were sugar,[73] gumlac,[74] saltpetre,[75] quicksilver, vermilion,[76] and coral.[77] It has been recorded that Ralph Fitch went from Agra to Satgaon by Yumuna river with one hundred and sixty boats laden with salt, opium, asafoetida, lead carpets and many other commodities.[78]

Besides these economic activities, Agra was directly connected with Kabul, Qandahar, Lahore, and Southern and Eastern India. The trunk route to foreign lands like Central Asia and China ran through it. All goods moving between different parts of the country were required to make a halt here. So, the city, apart from having its own products, acted as an entrepot of many goods coming from different parts.[79]

It was this generative character of Agra that guaranteed its continued economic growth. Both Bernier and Tavernier held Agra larger than Delhi even after the capital was shifted from Agra to Delhi.[80] The shifting of the imperial court did not affect Agra, for it could stand without crutches, being an important centre of trade and commerce. On the other hand, Fatehpur Sikri died down within a few years of the shifting of the imperial capital from there to Lahore in 1585, as it was a parasite town. Carpet weaving and stone cutting were the only two occupations (industry) the town could boast of. In 1595, barely ten years after the desertion of Fatehpur by Akbar, Fayḍī saw the one time fabled capital in a state of desolation.[81] The ruined state of the town has been recorded by William Finch who visited the city in 1610-11.[82]

Another useful method to understand the nature of the town is the study of the existing pattern of land use. The pattern of land use in every town is the direct result of the economic and social forces at work in the town. In generative towns because of their premier position in manufacturing, trade and commerce, more land would be devoted to productive uses. Areas assigned to public and semi-public uses like public gardens, fountains etc. would be comparatively less. A survey of Agra would reveal that the city with its eighty *sarā'is*, innumerable *kaṭrahs*, *kārkhānahs*, *bāzārs*, *chattahs*, *manḍīs*, and *ganjs*, used more land for production, trade and commercial purpose and hence could be called a generative town. On the other hand, the survey made by the author at Fatehpur Sikri so far has brought forth only two *sarā'is*, two *manḍīs*, and one *ganj*.

Thus the generative nature of Mughal cities immensely helped the trading class in amassing wealth. At Agra, Fr. Sebastian Manrique,

who visited the country during Shāhjahān's time, saw money being piled up in the houses of merchants "like heaps."[83] Virjivora possessed an estate worth eight million rupees [84] Khwājah Mīnās, who often competed with Virjivora, was another wealthy merchant.[85] 'Abd al-Ghafūr, who owned twenty ships, conducted trade equal to that of the English East India Company.[86]

This enormous merchant capital enabled the traders to make wholesale buying, keep them in *kaṭrahs*, and control the market of the stuff by manipulating supply and prices. The example of Shā'istah Khān, a premier noble of Shāhjahān and Awrangzīb, suggests such a line of argument. Charnock writes on 3rd July 1664, that "Shaista Khan's intentions were to get the whole trade of peeter [saltpetre] into his own hands, and so to sell it again to us and the Dutch at his own rates."[87] Pelsaert's observation of the behaviour of the Armenians in the indigo market further strengthens the author's contention. The traveller records: "In the Indigo Market they behave just like that making as if they would buy up the whole stock."[88] Khwājah Mīnās a prominent Armenian merchant based at Surat, often made such wholesale purchases.[89] The tough competition in the indigo market has been noted by Bernier too.[90] As a result the English Company often kept a buffer stock of three or four years.[91]

The question was where to keep the products, thus purchased in bulk. *Kaṭrahs* or enclosed structures with one opening, which could be closed at night or at the time of emergency, offered the best solution. Safety and security were its two pronounced objects. Products could be kept in these internal strong rooms waiting for the appreciation of the prices or till a higher bidder came. The *nishān* of Nūrjahān Begam ordering officers not to interfere with merchants stocking their merchandise in a *kaṭrah* should be viewed in this context.[92]

Although we do not have any evidence about the existence of *kaṭrahs* in the Sultanate town plan, it was one of the important architectural members of the Islamic town planning in other countries and was known as *khāns*. Architecturally it varied from an oblong hall, roofed and colonnaded, often domed with a door at one of the short sides that was securely locked at night.[93] Generally *khāns* were two or three stories high and merchandise was kept in the upper floors. Living rooms were also on the upper floors while the ground floor was originally used for stables and shops together with large scale storage.[94] Later on, stables were removed elsewhere in the market.[95] Excavations in the gulf port of Siraf have proved that originally shops were not part of the architectural component of *khāns*.[96] Architecturally Indian *kaṭrahs* are not very

different from its other Islamic counterparts, but functionally it varied from the other in the sense both wholesale and retail business was transacted in the former, whereas, the latter restricted itself to only wholesale commerce. Hence, the *kaṭrah* was an important development in the business transactions of Mughal India and a significant expression of the commercial growth of the city.

In Mughal military aristocracy elephants and horses were prized possessions. Horses were imported by ship from Arabia and Iraq.[97] Bullocks, asses and camels were used for moving goods from place to place. The increasing volume of inland trade demanded a corresponding growth in draught animals. Such a situation resulted in the establishment of a separate *bāzār* for the sale and purchases of cattle. The existence of such a *bāzār* in pre-Mughal India has been attested by the author of *Wāqi'āt-i Mushtāqī*.[98] Peter Mundy who refers to the *nakhkhāṣ* of the Mughals does not include slaves in the commodities of the *bāzār*.[99] Delhi had more than one *nakhkhāṣ*; Ghulām Muḥammad Khān in his travels refers to an old as well as a new one.[100] In the *nakhkhāṣ* of Agra which was held in every morning, camels, horses and oxen along with tents and cotton goods used to be sold.[101] This was housed in a covered building called *'Imārat-i Nakhkhās*.[102] Similarly the *nakhkhāṣ* of Lahore was held in a building belonging to the state with finely decorated gates, embedded with glazed tiles.[103] Such a long *nakhkhāṣ* with beautifully built structure has been located and identified by the author at Fatehpur Sikri, near *Chawgān Bāgh*.

Manḍī was a place where commodities like corn, pulses, vegetables, sugar and salt were sold. It was named either after their founders or the chief commodity sold there. *Ḥajjām Manḍī* at Agra is an exception to the above mentioned rule. Among the *manḍīs*, known after the commodities sold there, *ghallah manḍī* (grain market) exists in almost every city and town. The *ghallah manḍīs* of Surat,[104] Lahore,[105] Cambay[106] and Sherpur are famous. Agra had a number of *manḍīs* like *hīng kī manḍī*, *dāl kī manḍī* and *lohā manḍī*.[107]

As the population increases, it spills over the old city limits and slowly absorbs the surrounding areas within it. The spatial expansion of economic activity was dictated by two major factors, viz. the topographical constraints and the transportation arteries. Since most of the Mughal cities were located in plain land topographical constraints did not operate in any pronounced way: But since Fatehpur Sikri was not very far from Agra, during Akbar's time, Agra city had a linear pattern of growth. A *bāzār* grew on both sides of the road connecting Agra with Fatehpur Sikri. Ralph Fitch who visited both Agra and Fatehpur Sikri

during Akbar's time observes:"Between Agra and Fatehpur are twelve miles and all the way is a market of victuals and other things."[108]

Mughal towns, especially Agra, had turned into a vast cumbersome single centred city. A city becomes too large when it ceases to meet the most urgent needs of its inhabitants and to fulfil the purpose for which they have chosen to live in it. Shelter, availability of food, residence near the working area are such basic needs. These basic needs are met when the city growth is planned in a modular manner, with each nodule of city node containing places of work and residential areas for all classes of people. Such polynodal cities minimize the need for people to move from one part of the city to another and greatly reduce the pressure. Since Mughal Agra was not a planned city, this problem could not be tackled effectively. But every city would devise its own means and ways to meet such a problem.

It was this particular situation which gave birth to *ganjs*, which traded in food provisions both wholesale and retail. In *mandīs*, business was transacted only wholesale. The term *ganj* was usually employed for the grain market. In Delhi Paharganj, Fatehpuri,[109] and Shahdara[110] were the principal grain markets. Taj Ganj besides being a grain market was one of the chief places for piece goods wanted by the English.[111] Some towns like Agra had more than one *ganj* which traded in a single commodity. The important *ganjs* that traded in grain at Agra were *Mubārak Sulṭān Ganj, Dhoria Ganj* and *Fateh Ganj*.[112] In such places the principal *ganj* was *shāhganj* or *ganj-i sarkārī* supervised by functionaries and tax collectors.[113] The growth of subsidiary *ganjs* at different parts of the city was a characteristic of a generative city like Agra, which resulted in the complex nodal system of economic organization.

The word *ganj* for markets or habitations does not occur either in the Sultanate literature or in Mughal literature of pre-Akbar period. From the time of Shāhjahān, there are definite examples of *ganjs* emerging as an architectural component of the city. Peter Mundy, who visited India in 1630-34, is the first to give the name 'Tāj ganj' to the area around Taj Mahal. [114] Subsequently, the English Factory records [115] and Tavernier [116] also use this term for the area.

NOTES

(1) For cities as system entities in general, see Brian J.L Berry, "Cities as system within systems of cities" in John Friedmann and William Alonso (eds.), *Regional Development and Planning* (Cambridge, M.I.T Press, 1964), p. 132.

(2) For definition of heterogenetic and other orthogenetic towns in general, see Robert Redfield and Miltan Singer," The Cultural Role of Cities," *Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science*, CCXLII (Nov) 1945, p. 7-17

(3) *Wāqi'āt-i Mushtāqī*, MS British Museum, London, Add. 11633 Add. 11, f. 15b. I am beholden to Professor Iqtidar Husain Siddiqui for giving me this valuable information.

(4) *Indian Archaeology, A Review 1980-81* (New Delhi, 1983), pp. 66-67

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 67

(6) F. Bernier, *Travels in the Mogul Empire*, 1656-68, tr A. Constable, 2nd edition (New Delhi, 1968), p. 48.

(7) M.M. Kaye, *The Golden Calm, An English Lady's Life in Mughal Delhi, Reminiscences as by Emily Lady Clive Bayley and by Her Father Sir Thomas Metcalfe* (Great Britain, 1980), pp 210-11.

(8) 'Ārif Qandhārī, *Ta'rīkh-i Akbarī*,ed Mainuddin Nadwi, Azhar Ali Dihlawi and Imtiaz Ali Arshi (Rampur, 1962), p. 150.

(9) Monserrate, S.J , *The Commentary*, tr. J S. Hoyland, annotated by S.N. Banerji (Cuttack, 1922), p 37.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

(11) *Ibid.*

(12) G. Michell,*op.cit.*, p 107

(13) *Ibid.*, p.107.

(14) W. Barthold, *Turkistan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, 2nd ed (London, 1949), p. 78.

(15) Badā'ūnī, *Muntakhab al-Tawārīkh*, p. 219.

(16) Monserrate, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

(17) Michael Rogers, *The Making of the Past, Spread of Islam* (Oxford, 1976), p. 57.

(18) Correa Afonso, *Letters From the Mughal Court, the First Jesuit Mission to Akbar, (1580-83)* (Bombay, 1980), p. 37.

(19) S. Muhammad Latif, *Lahore, Its History, Architectural Remains and Antiquities with An Account of Its Modern Institutions, Inhabitants, Their Trade and Customs* (Lahore, 1892), p.97.

(20) *Ibid* , p.97.

(21) *Tuzuk-i Jahāngīrī*, tr. Rogers and H. Beveridge, voLi (London, 1909-14).

(22) S. Nurul Hasan, "The Morphology of a Medieval Indian City, a case study of Shahjahanabad in the 18th and early 19th century," in *Proceedings of Indian History Congress* (Kurukshetra), 1983-84, p.313.

(23) 'Abd al-Ḥamīd Lāhorī, *Pādshāhnāmah*, vol. ii, Bib. Ind. (Calcutta, 1866-72), p.504; Muhammad Ṣādiq Khan, *Shāhjahānnāmah*, MS. Or. 174. f. 63 (a).

(24) *Ibid.*, f. 63 (a).

(25) Stephan Blake in *Delhi through the Ages, Essays in Urban History and Culture* (Delhi, 1986), p.173.

(26) Muhammad Sālih. *'Amal-i Sālih*,ed. G. Yazdani, vol.3 (Calcutta, 1870-73), p.44.

(27) G. Michell, *Architecture of the Islamic World* (London, 1978), p. 96.

(28) R.M. Riefstahl, *"Mercati e fonachi coperti nell" "Oriente Islamica"* in Rome, X. 1932. pp. 159-70, also *Parnassus*, IV, No. 6 (1932), pp. 17-19.

(29) Muqaddasī, *al-Muqaddasī*, tr. G.S.A. Ranking and Arzoo (1897), p. 225.

(30) M. Siroux in *Melanges Islamologiques*, I (1954), pp. 23-17.

(31) Marique, *Travels of Sebastian Manrique, 1629-1643*, vol ii, Hakluyt Society (Oxford, 1927), p.191, n.3.

(32) Bernier, *op. cit.*, p. 245.

(33) Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ Kanbūh, *Bahār-i Sukhan* (1663-64), MS. Add. 5057, f. 161a-b. Also see M.P. Singh, *Town Market, Mint and Port in the Mughal Empire 1556-1707* (New Delhi, 1985), p. 139.

(34) Mandelslo, *Mandelslo's Travels in Western India 1638-39*, ed. Commissariat (Oxford University Press, 1931), p. 22.

(35) Manrique, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p.191.

(36) Muhammad Latif, *op.cit.*, p.96.

(37) A. Heldel, in *Sumer*, XII, 1956, nos. 1,2, p.15. Also see R.A. Jairazbhoy, *Outline of Islamic Architecture* (Bombay, 1972).

(38) *The Roman History of Appian of Alexandria*, tr. H.White (1899), II, p.167.

(39) G. Lestrange, *Land of the Eastern Caliphate* (1905), p.256.

(40) *Ibid.*, p.383.

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CIRCUMCISION : THE CLITORAL INFERNO

MUNAWAR A. ANEES

In one of the Latin American countries, El-Salvador, it is still not old-fashioned for a mother to inscribe the sign of the cross with a razor blade on the clitoris of her young girl in order to "make her a better worker and keep her from getting ideas."[1] The court physician at Byzantium, Aetius of Amida, is known to have recommended the use of excision in case of clitoral enlargement.[2] Some private doctors and nursing homes on London's Harley Street admit that they perform female circumcision for immigrant women against fees as high as $1,700.[3]

What is the motivation behind female genital and sexual mutilations across such a wide historical and geographical continuum that now affect anywhere from 30 to 80 million women all over the world?[4] Invariably, there is an intricate web of religious, social, cultural and medical pretexts for these notorious practices. However, these traditions are not limited to one religion. According to Morgan and Steinem:

> They are practiced by some Islamic peoples, some Coptic Christians, members of various indigenous tribal religions, some Catholics and Protestants, and some Fellasha, an ancient Jewish sect living in the Ethiopian highland.... The overt justifications for genital mutilation are as contradictory as theories about its origin. Explanations include custom, religion, family honor, cleanliness, protection against spells, initiation, insurance of virginity at marriage, and prevention of female promiscuity by physically reducing or terrorizing women out of sexual desire.[5]

These authors further argue that, regardless of the supposed justifications, the real reasons for these heinous customs must be explored within the social context:

> ...control of women's bodies as the means of reproduction, and resulting fear of the independent power of women's sexuality – both motives enforced by socioeconomic rewards and punishments. If marriage is the primary means of economic survival for a woman, then whatever will make her marriageable becomes desirable. If a bride who lacks virginity literally risks death of renunciation on her wedding night, then a chastity belt forged of her own flesh is a gesture of parental concern.[6]

Similarly one cannot fail to observe a congruence of thought between these authors and Bouhdiba when the latter comments on the social context of female circumcision across Muslim cultures:

> The operation carried out on the genital organs cannot be considered in isolation from a set of social, sometimes a-religious, even frankly anti-Islamic practices. From the cradle to the grave, or rather, 'from the uterus to the cumulus', and at every moment of life, the Arab female personality is ruthlessly, systematically, irremediably denied. The 'drama' of Arab frigidity that has all too often been observed clinically is to be inferred from a sexual life, physiological and psychological, that is a series of traumata that bring with them insurmountable fears and anxieties. Sometimes excised to begin with, but always brought up in the cult of necessary virginity, deflowered almost publicly on her wedding night, transformed into a child-producing machine, the Arab girl comes in the end to lose even what is biological in the act of loving. Having become resistant to orgasm, an Arab woman needs, if she is to be satisfied, a husband who is prepared to make ever increasing proof of his prowess and try to acquire marvels of virility by resorting to artificial means.[7]

It is not easy to ascertain when clitoridectomy and other variations on the same theme originated in human society. However, ethnographic and anthropological data point to a mix of mythologies and religious beliefs. For instance, Meinardus has argued that a belief in the bisexuality of the soul, as held by many African tribes and the Egyptians, was a corollary of their belief in bisexuality of their deities. Numerous Heliopolitic, Memphitic and Thebaic Pantheon may be counted among such hermaphrodite gods. For example, the Heliopolitic Atum, who engenders Shu (the god of the air) and Tefnut (the god of moisture) through masturbation and then generates them through this expulsion, possesses discrete androgynous ingredients. Since certain gods are

)elieved to be bisexual so it is maintained that every human being is)equeathed with both feminine and masculine souls. These beliefs extend :o circumscribe the location of the respective souls. "Thus, the feminine 'soul' of the man... is located in the prepuce, whereas the masculine 'soul')f the woman is situated in the clitoris."[8]

It would be erroneous to assume that the hermaphroditic ittributes of divinity were simply the relics from ancient myths. One of he great Sufi masters, Shaykh Muḥyi al-Dīn ibn 'Arabī (d.637/1240), surmised that God is both feminine and masculine. He also believed that Eve and Adam "both partook of both sexes":

> From this knowledge [that is, intuitive knowledge which comes from God's light rather than discursive reason] we know that women are exact moieties of men. Do you not see that Eve was created from Adam? Thus she possesses [like Adam] two characteristics, being masculine in her origin and principle and feminine derivatively. Thus, her nature [like that of Adam] is ambiguous. All humanity is thus a melange of masculinity and femininity.[9]

Were the bisexuality of deities or Eve and Adam to remain a metaphysical notion, it would, perhaps, create little or no stir. Nevertheless, the ancient belief in the divine hermaphroditism and its extrapolation to distinct human genital organs meant that the clitoris is he price for initiation into femininity and so is the prepuce for masculine nduction. Hence the circumcision for both sexes.

According to Huber, an ancient Egyptian papyrus describes the)peration of female circumcision in detail and a female mummy from 6th century B.C., shows signs of clitoridectomy.[10] Similarly, there is urther evidence that the practice was in vogue in ancient Egypt. Chabas as shown a scene of Pharaonic circumcision dating back to 1350 B.C.[11] The female circumcision is known to have remained a pre-marital ritual n the 2nd century B.C. Egypt. Moreover, the Greek geographer, Strabo, vho was visitor to the Upper Egypt during 24-25 B.C., found that female ircumcision was a custom among the Jews.[12]

In the words of Tannahill:

> Though circumcision may have been perfectly common place in Egypt — as it was later to be among the Maya, the Aztecs, the Incas, and in some parts of Polynesia — it was not practiced in Mesopotamia until the Hebrews made it an article of faith. Possibly they brought the idea back from Egypt at the time of the exodus. Israel's lawgivers, however, transferred it from

> adolescence to infancy, made it mandatory, and represented it as an eternal symbol of God's covenant with the Jewish people, thus turning a pagan rite into an index of grace.[13]

Thus, the successive transition from primordial myth and folklore towards organized religion ossified the circumcision into a sacrificial rite. Invariably, the Biblical verdict:

> And God said to Abraham, 'As for you, you shall keep my covenant, you and your descendants after you throughout their generations. This my covenant, which you shall keep, between me and you and your descendants after you: Every male among you shall be circumcised.... So shall my covenant be in your flesh an everlasting covenant. Any uncircumcised male who is not circumcised in the flesh of his foreskin shall be cut off from his people: he has broken my covenant.' (Genesis 17:9-14)

Circumcision in Judaism, therefore, became a surrogate for a more fanatical human sacrifice. On the other hand, Christianity rejected circumcision. With the exception of the Church of Ethiopia, all Christian factions renounced it for both sexes. Following the decree of St. Paul – "neither circumcision counts for anything, nor uncircumcision, but a new creation"[14] — it adopted baptism instead. Mazaheri is of the opinion that:

> Christianity rejected this Semitic custom and replaced it by baptism, which is of Zoroastrian origin; but Islam, believing that it is following in the supposed footsteps of the prophet Abraham, preserved the practice of circumcision for both sexes.[15]

On the contrary, the Copts in Egypt believe that the practice of female circumcision spread among Christians on account of 'the victory of the circumcised,' i.e. Jews. In this regard, Burmester has provided the following narrative for the adoption of this practice by the Copts, as noted by Michael, 12th-century Metropolitan of Damietta:

> After Sarah had driven away Hagar from her house and her son Ishmael with her, as the Law affirms, Hagar withdrew to Yathrib of the country of the Higaz and to Faran. And Ishmael grew up, and God beautified him in the eyes of the women of the people of Yathrib, and they asked his mother to give him in marriage. And she said: 'We are a circumcised people, both the men and the women of us, and we do not marry, except with those like us.' And when they (the women) had circumcised themselves, Ishmael married them, and God fulfilled his

> promise to him, and granted to him twelve princes. And circumcision spread in that country and in that which was neighbouring to it, and it became firmly established among the Copts of Egypt.... And when the Apostle mark evangelised them, he did not disapprove it for them, and they continued it.[16]

Furthermore, it is known that a 16th-century religious testimony by the emperor Claudius, submitted to the Emissary of the Pope, made note of female circumcision It is mentioned not as a religious rite, as with the Jews, but as a custom of the people. As a grotesque display of hypocrisy, Catholic missionaries did not interfere with the "local customs" and permitted a continuation of female circumcision. This was done with the approval from Rome. In other words, circumcision may be a ritual prohibition by the Church, nonetheless, if it comes in way of winning converts, then abandon it. Interestingly enough, Dr. R.T. Ravenholt, a Director of the United States Agency for International Development (US-AID) Population Bureau, did not also want to disrupt the tradition of female circumcision "because it is aimed at reducing female sex desire [clitoridectomy/infibulation] undoubtedly has fertility control as part of its motivation."[17]

At least four types of female circumcisions can be identified. According to Verzin, these types are:[18]

1. *Circumcision proper*: The circumferential excision of the clitoral prepuce. In certain Muslim countries, it is generally known as *sunnah* circumcision.
2. *Excision*: Removal of the glans clitoridis or even the clitoris proper and may include part, or the whole, of the labia minora.
3. *Infibulation:* This is also known as Pharaonic circumcision. It leads to partial closure of the vaginal orifice following excision of a varying amount of vulval tissue. Under the most radical circumcision, all or part of the mons veneris, labia majora, labia minora and the clitoris are removed.
4. *Introcision:* This is the severest form of female genital mutilation. This is the cutting into the vagina or ripping the perineum by means of a sharp device. This type of female circumcision has been recorded among the tribes in Australia.

Verzin has also noted that members of a Christian sect in Russia Skoptsi (or Circumcisers) – employ circumcision in order to pledge for the state of the so-called "perpetual virginity." Their inspiration comes from St.Matthew (19:12): "there be Eunuchs that have made themselves

Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven's sake."

The biomedical implications of female circumcision are numerous, complex, well-documented, and above all, dreadful. For instance, Daw has listed both immediate and chronic complications:

> *Immediate* :
>
> Shock may be neurogenic, or may follow haemorrhage; haemorrhage, which may be fatal, may be primary from the perineal branches of the external pudendal artery and the dorsal artery of the clitoris or secondary following infection of the wound; injury to adjacent structures, urethra, bladder, vagina, perineal and anal canal, may be sustained; infection, such as urethritis, cystitis and abscesses may occur; chronic pelvic infection may eventually follow; retention of urine may be caused reflexly immediately after operation.
>
> *Chronic*:
>
> Infertility due to chronic pelvic sepsis and inability to have sexual intercourse; implantation dermoids; menorrhagia as a result of chronic pelvic sepsis; dysmenorrhoea due either to chronic pelvic sepsis or to obstruction of the menstrual flow by a pinhole introitus; cryptomenorrhoea may lead to haematocolpos or haematometra; Keloid scar formation; vaginal calculi may be rarely seen; delay in the onset of menarche.[19]

Similar observations have been reported by Verzin.

The geographical incidence of female circumcision involving one or more of the aforementioned types has been described from a number of African, Asian and Latin American countries. There are field reports on the occurrence of female sexual and genital mutilations in countries as diverse and distant as Egypt and Brazil, Mali and Indonesia, or Peru and Malaysia.[20]

In recent years, investigations by the World Health Organization into the spread of clitoridectomy and infibulation have raised the specter that these practices are indigenous to Muslim culture. Sheehan, confounding such assumptions, has observed that the fanfare surrounding these studies

> ...has served to arouse controversy while at the same time allowing Westerners, including otherwise detached social

> scientists, to view such a practice as being rooted in ideologies totally foreign to those of the West.[21]

The hyperbole over female circumcision by the militant feminist factions and other assorted groups (Orientalists included) may make it appear as though clitoridectomy is an exclusive function of the so-called under-development, since it is more visible in some Latin American, African and Asian countries. Imbued with a sense of ethical superiority, they do not hesitate to camouflage their cultural arrogance when discussing these issues with reference to Muslim social milieu.

Conversely, investigative studies into the history of gynophobic Western biomedical practices reveal a horrid picture. For example, Sheehan has described one of the procedures for clitoridectomy as employed by Isaac Baker Brown (1812-1873), a Victorian surgeon, who enjoyed the confidence of numerous members of the royal family, including one of Queen Victoria's daughters:

> Two instruments were used; the pair of hooked forceps which Mr. Brown always uses in clitoridectomy, and a cautery iron such as he uses in dividing the pedicle in ovariotomy.... The clitoris was seized by the forceps in the usual manner. The thin edge of the red-hot iron was then passed around its base until the organ was severed from its attachment, being partly cut or sawn, and partly torn away. After the clitoris was removed, the nymphae on each side were severed in a similar way by a sawing motion of the hot iron. After the clitoris and nymphae were got rid of, the operation was brought to a close by taking the back of the iron and sawing the surfaces of the labia and the other parts of the vulva which had escaped the cautery, and the instrument was rubbed down backwards and forwards till the parts were more effectually destroyed than when Mr. Brown uses the scissors to effect the same result.[22]

Elected president of the Medical Society of London, Brown's basic argument was that masturbation was the cause of all illnesses he deemed specific to women: hysteria, insanity, catalepy and epilepsy. His recipe for cure: excision of the clitoris![23]

Sheehan has observed that clitoridectomy was propagated as a "harmless operative procedure" and was in tune with the Victorian biomedical theory of biological determinism. It was practised in England despite its doom as a remedy for the alleged feminine disorders. The medical profession, for a long time, did little to ameliorate health care for women in Victorian England. In her own words:

> The fact that the operation is described in literature published well after the 1860s lends support to the idea that... clitoridectomy in and of itself remained an acceptable medical technique.... Some doctors claimed that promiscuous women could be known by the size and shape of their genitals, particularly the clitoris. Masturbation led to madness, some said even to death. The tremendous freedom with which such beliefs were applied to patients' lives and the basis they formed for operating procedures are incredible when one realizes that throughout most of menstruation remained largely misunderstood.[24]

In America, the medical establishment not only held ideas similar to that of Victorian medicine-female genital mutilations as normative treatment for masturbation, nymphomania and hysteria–but introduced chemical clitoridectomy! Several textbooks by famous gynecologists recommended the technique. For instance, in 1859, one Charles Meigs prescribed the use of a silver nitrate solution on the clitoris of female children who indulged in masturbation. Echoing the Byzantian tradition, clitoral enlargement was considered as the cause of nervous disorders and, therefore, amputation of the clitoris was made a medical necessity.[25] Moreover, until 1925, training in clitoral surgery and infibulation continued to be offered by a medical group known as the Official Surgery Society. These "official" excisions of the clitoris were carried out as late as 1940s.[26] That the last (?) American clitoridectomy was performed in 1940s upon a five-year old girl to relieve her of emotional disorders[27] may no longer be a valid statement in light of the fact that:

> John Money, professor of pediatrics at John Hopkins, and his colleagues have for many years treated young girls who are born with "ambiguous" genitalia – that is, enlarged clitorises and sometimes foreshortened or closed vaginas. Few people realize that this procedure has routinely involved removal of the entire clitoris and its nerve supply – in other words, total clitoridectomy – in addition to the usually described reconstruction of a vagina when that is necessary.[28]

And, a bizarre twist to the hideous excisions comes through the so-called "Love Surgery" that penetrated some of the American medical practice during the 1970s. It was cunningly named as "clitoral relocation." Only less than a decade ago, James Burt, a gynecologist from Ohio was reportedly promoting the "Mark Two" surgery: for $1,500, there was a promise to reconstruct the vagina in order to "make the clitoris more accessible to direct penile stimulation."[29]

For Western woman, the onus of owning a clitoris did not finish with clitoridectomy. For her, apart from the overtly masculine culture that takes pride in desecrating femininity, genital mutilation came under many and varied masks. Psychic clitoridectomy, as promulgated by Freud, is one of those:

> In the phallic phase of the girl, the clitoris is the dominant erotogenic zone. But it is not destined to remain so; with the change to femininity, the clitoris must give up to the vagina its sensitivity, and, with it, its importance, either wholly or in part. This is one of the two tasks which have to be performed in the course of the woman's development; the more fortunate man has only to continue at the time of his sexual maturity what he has already practiced during the period of early sexual expansion.[30]

Since the dawn of Freudian analysis of female psychosexual development, the question has been furiously debated between feminists and gynophobics whether sexual response in the human female is clitorally-evoked or vaginally-evoked. Of course, feminists have vehemently attacked Freud, and rightly so:

> In their jokes and in their pornography, in their theories and in their marriage manuals, men treat the clitoris as simply one more erogenous zone like the breasts, underarms, or ears, to be used to arouse a woman sexually so that she will permit intercourse. They may remember the clitoris in foreplay, but for real sex, back to the vaginal[31]

Sherfey is, therefore, pertinent in saying that:

> To reduce clitoral erotism to the level of psychopathology because the clitoris is an innately masculine organ or the original libido is masculine in nature must now be considered a travesty of the facts.[32]

In her highly controversial study, Sherfey has compared human female sexuality with that of other mammalian species in an evolutionary context. Discussing role of the clitoris, there is, invariably, a reference to female orgasmic achievement. Sherfey has argued that:

> With full sexual arousal, women are normally capable of many orgasms. As many as six or more can be achieved with intravaginal coition. During clitoral-area stimulation, when a woman can control her sexual tension and maintain prolonged

> stimulation, she may attain up to fifty or more orgasms in an hour's time.[33]

From these observations, that are, by and large, based upon studies by Masters and Johnson on the sexual behaviour of volunteer couples engaging in coition under laboratory conditions, she concludes that:

> Consequently, the more orgasms a woman has, the stronger they become; the more orgasms she has, the more she can have. To all intents and purposes, the human female is sexually insatiable in the presence of the highest degree of sexual satiation.[34]

It is obvious that Sherfey is yet another Freudian wolf in disguise. This denunciation may not be unpretentious when we see Sherfey present herself as an architect of a theory on the genesis of human civilization, based entirely upon the premise of asphyxiation of feminine sexuality:

> The rise of modern civilization, while resulting from many causes, was contingent on the suppression of the inordinate cyclic sexual drive of women because (a) the tremendously increased supply of hormones of early human females associated with the hypersexual drive and the prolonged pregnancies was an important force in the escape from the strict heat-cycle sexuality and the much more important escape from post-pregnancy diminished sexual desires. Women's uncurtailed continuous hypersexuality would drastically interfere with maternal responsibilities; and (b) with the rise of settled agriculture economies, man's territorialism became expressed in property rights and kinship laws. Large families of known parentage were mandatory and could not evolve until the inordinate sexual demands of women were curbed.[35]

Since women are capable of "insatiable" orgasmic experience and much more so through clitoral eroticism, with the potential for ultimate destruction of human society, therefore, clitoris must be regarded as the arch enemy of human civilization. In other words, Sherfey, while first appearing to be a defender of clitoral sexuality, turns out, in the long run, to be a protege of gynophobes and misogynists.

It is rather amusing to see that Western academicians and sex volunteers (a legitimized title for those who consent for coition in the

name of High Priest of Objective Science) continue to wrestle with the question of anatomical basis of female sexuality, without achieving much by way of resolution. For example, during a recent study of twenty-seven coitally experienced volunteers,[36] vaginal eroticism could be elicited in 89% of the subjects by means of systematic digital stimulation of both vaginal walls. This study supported previous findings; however, it did not support the existence of the discrete anatomical structure called the Grafenberg Spot (G Spot, for the common). The author concludes that this study supports the contention that there are two distinct types of orgasms — vaginally-evoked and clitorally-evoked. Moreover, it also supported the finding that some women expel, during orgasm, a fluid through the urethra. In this study, the fluid was chemically indistinguishable from urine.

In Islam:

> Canonically and theologically, circumcision has no privileged status. It is not one of the five pillars of Islam.... It is merely a *sunna*. The ritual surrounding it is loose, imprecise, and more spontaneous than organic. It is accompained by no prayer. The age at which the operation is performed is not fixed in any strict way and may take place any time between one and twelve years. The fiqh is hardly concerned with it and the Quran not at all. Furthermore there is a systematic concern on the part of Muslims to distinguish themselves from the Jews on this matter.[37]

Indeed, the Qur'ān does not make mention of circumcision for either sex. Quite a few *aḥādīth* are, however, cited on this subject. For example, the oft-quoted *ḥadīth* – "If the two circumcised parts have been in touch with one another, *ghusl* is necessary,"[38] – is interpreted to be an approval by the Blessed Prophet for both female and male circumcision. Certain *fuqahā'* were of the opinion that in light of this *ḥadīth*, female circumcision was not forbidden by the Prophet but he just disapproved total clitoridectomy. In the judgement of al-Māwardi: "the excision limits itself to removal of the kernel-shaped skin of the upper tip of the organ. One should cut, therefore, merely the protruding epidermis without removing the organ as such."[39]

According to another *ḥadīth*, the Prophet is said to have addressed a woman, Umm 'Aṭiyah, who was reportedly operating on a girl: *idhā khafaḍti fa-ashimmi wa-lā tanhaki fa innahū adwā li'l-wajh wa-ahzā 'ind al-zawj* – i.e., just touch the surface lightly and do not cut deep; her face will grow beautiful and her husband will rejoice.[40]

Moreover, *aḥādīth* alluding to *khifāḍ* (female circumcision) and *khitān* (male circumcision) are quoted as: "Circumcision is my way for men, but is merely ennobling for women," and addressing a newly converted woman to Islam on the subject of circumcision, the Prophet said, "Do not inflict trouble on yourself, because that is painful to a wife, but pleasing to a husband."[41]

The historical evidence is that the female circumcision was prevalent in pre-Islamic Arabia.[42] Common expressions like *Ibn al-Bazrā'* and *Ibn al-Lakhmā'* indicate the perceived social meanings of circumcision relative to its absence. For instance, Khālid ibn 'Abd-Allāh al-Kasrī, whose mother was a Christian from Greece, had her circumcised to absolve himself of the satirical title of *Ibn al-Bazrā'*.[43]

The Muslim juridical opinion on *khitān* differs from total prohibition to the practice being considered *makrumah*, an act of piety, or *wājib*, an obligation. Imām Nu'mān bin Thābit bin Zūṭā Abū Ḥanīfah (81-150/701-68) does not accept female circumcision.[44] However, it is also believed that both Imām Abū Ḥanīfah and Imām Abū 'Abd-Allāh Mālik bin Anas (d. 179/795) did not consider either female or male circumcision as obligatory acts. They deemed them praiseworthy.[45] According to Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal (164-241/780-855), circumcision is imperative for the males but a commendable act for the females.[46] In the opinion of Imām Muḥammad bin Idrīs al-Shāfi'ī (150-204/767-820. both *Khifāḍ* and *Khitān* represent a duty. Imām Muḥy al-Dīn Yahyā al-Nawawī (631-76/1233-78), in his commentary on *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, presents the following opinion about the Shāfi'ī verdict on female circumcision:

> Circumcision is obligatory (*wādjib*) according to al-Shāfi'ī and many of the doctors, *sunna* according to Mālik and the majority of them. It is further, according to al-Shāfi'ī, equally obligatory for males and females,...As regards females, it is obligatory to cut off a small part of the skin in the highest parts of the genitals.[47]

In essence, in the absence of the Qur'ānic injunction on circumcision, *aḥādīth* became the sole source to enact the permissibility of this practice. In its social context, the circumcision came to be recognized as the emblem of inclusion in Muslim society, at least for the males. Compared to the festivities attached to the male circumcision that are observed in almost every Muslim country, female circumcision, wherever it is prevalent in the Muslim world, is devoid of such fiesta.

The Western critics of clitoridectomy, as it is practised in certain Muslim countries, fail to differentiate between the act proper and *khifād*. Granted that female circumcision is permitted according to *aḥādīth*, there is overwhelming evidence that it is not an obligatory act. In its social context, it is neither synonymous nor analogous to *khitān*–male circumcision. Moreover, the authorization for *khifād*, as derived from certain *aḥādīth*, in no way, tantamounts to total clitoridectomy. As a matter of fact, the *ḥadīth* makes a specific prohibition for the same. Thus, the Western diatribe over clitoridectomy that characterizes it as an indigenous Islamic dictum is false.

The historical evidence on female circumcision and its variants does not attribute its genesis to Islamic teachings. On the contrary, it was the mythical beliefs and later Judaic practices, combined with the Christian compromises, that helped spread this loathsome practice through many cultures. It is the spectrum of the covenant of Judaism stretching to the perpetual virginity of Christianity that forge the social context for these crimes against women. Furthermore, it is the misogynic Western culture that deceptively reinforces these practices at many other societal levels. If the *Sunnah* of the Blessed Prophet accorded a recognition to circumcision (more so to the male one), it was in the pervasive Qurā'nic spirit of emulating the Abrahamic tradition, that is not necessarily synchronous with the Judaic facade as we know it today.

The reported incidences of clitoridectomy and infibulation in Muslim countries (such as Egypt, the Sudan, South Yemen, Nigeria, Malaysia and Indonesia) are definitely in defiance of the Islamic verdict. Yet, there are a number of Muslim countries – Afghanistan, Pakistan, Algeria, Morocco, Libya, Tunisia – where such genital mutilations are unknown. Nevertheless, a statistical differential does not exonerate those who indulge in these un-Islamic pursuits. In so doing, they are no different from the gynophobes of Western culture. Ironically, by calling clitoridectomy the *Sunnah* circumcision, they are making a mockery of the teachings of the Blessed Prophet. Apart from biopsychological maladies (including orgasmic insensitivity or extremely delayed threshold) that women have to suffer through these mutilations, men are condemned to seek endless virility. Little wonder that addiction to *ḥashīsh* and other "aphrodisiacs" has been a corollary of clitorophobia, at least in Egypt.

Islam, unlike any other religion, bestows upon woman an inalienable right to sexual gratification. Whatever may be intricacies of the purported clitoral and vaginal orgasms, the clitoris remains the

biological basis for sexual pleasure in women. To deprive a woman of her fundamental right to sexual bliss — through total clitoridectomy, Pharaonic circumcision or infibulation — is to ostracize Islamic dictates. In this context, Bullough has made a succinct observation:

> In Muslim countries one of the contradictions inherent in female circumcision...is that the Muslims believe and teach that the clitoris is the source and wellspring of all female passion. This implies that clitoral excision is more or less deliberate attempt to make women less sensuous and, is, therefore, contrary to the Koran.[48]

Bouhdiba voices a similar opinion, except that he unwittingly falls into the Freudian trap of the "castration complex"

> But for the young Arab girl in the Middle East excision is hardly less traumatic. Excision, which, despite the canonical regulations, is very often quite simply a clitoridectomy, is merely the first step in 'a veritable plot intended to frustrate the woman of her share of fulfillment'....This 'blinding' felt by men. In both cases one can speak of a castration complex inherent in all Muslim child rearing.[49]

Definitely, in his search for the social context of circumcision, he is at loss to declare both male and female circumcision a generic Muslim cultural trait. This is not true even of the Arab culture *per se*, what to relate to the extremely diverse Muslim societies.

It would be a folly to assume that Islamic moral order is contingent upon a pair of scissors that excises the clitoris of a young girl. The pre-Islamic pagan rituals of clitoridectomy and infibulations must come to a halt in Muslim countries. The dignity, honour and right to sexual fulfillment that Islam guarantees to all women must be restored by a total ban on all non-medical surgical manipulations of female genitalia.

NOTES

(1) See *Ms*, 7, January (1980).
(2) *Biblia Iatrika*, volume 16, chapter 106; *vide* W. V. McKay, *History of Ancient Gynecology*, London, Baillière, Tindall and Cox, 1901, p. 197.
(3) Cited in *Newsweek* (U.S. Edition), November 1, 1982, p. 55.
(4) This figure has been reported at the United Nations Decade for Women Conference, held in Nairobi, Kenya; see, *New York Times*, July 29, 1985, p. 18.

(5) Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem, "The International Crime of Genital Mutilation, *Ms. 7* (March), 66 (1980).
(6) *Ibid*., p. 67.
(7) Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, *Sexuality in Islam*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985, p 184.
(8) Otto Meinardus, "Mythological, Historical and Sociological Aspects of the Practice of Female Circumcision among the Egyptians," *Acta Ethnographica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 16* (3-4), 388 (1967)
(9) See, Fazlur Rahman, *Health and Medicine in the Islamic Tradition: Change and Identity*, New York, Crossroad Publishing, 1987, pp. 119-20 for a full translation of this "very curious passage from this highly enigmatic and extraordinarily influential Sufi's magnum opus, *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiya*."
(10) A. Huber, "Female Circumcision and Infibulation in Ethiopia," *Acta Tropica, 23* (1), 87-91 (1966)
(11) F.J. Chabas, "De la Circoncision chez les Egyptiens," *Revue Archeologique, 3,* 289-300 (1861)
(12) See, *The Geography of Strabo*, tr. by Jones Horace, vol. viii, London, 1932.
(13) Reay Tannahill, *Sex in History*, New York, Stein and Day, 1981, p. 68.
(14) *Galatians*, 6.15.
(15) A. Mazaheri, *La Vie Quotidienne des Musulmans au Moyen Age*, Paris, Hachette, 1947, p. 4.
(16) O. H. E. Burmester, *Orientalia Christiana Periodica, 2* (1-2), 123 (1936); vide Otto Meinardus, *op cit.*, p. 391.
(17) Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem, *op. cit.*, p.67
(18) J. A. Verzin, "Sequelae of Female Circumcision," *Tropical Doctor, 5* (October), 163 (1975).
(19) Edward Daw, "Female Circumcision and Infibulation Complicating Delivery," *Practitioner, 204*, 561 (1970).
(20) See Fran P Hosken, *Genital/Sexual Mutilation of Females*, 2nd ed., Lexington, Massachusetts, Women's International Network, 1979; and the quarterly updates as they appear in *WIN News*. For earlier reports from Africa, America, Asia, Australia and Europe, refer to J. H. Sequeira, *Lancet, II*, 1054 (1931).
(21) Elizabeth Sheehan, "Victorian Clitoridectomy: Isaac Baker Brown and His Harmless Operative Procedure," *Feminist Issues, 5* (1), 39 (1985).
(22) *Ibid.*, p.42.
(23) One is amazed to discover a tremendous parity between Brown's ideas and those of a layperson from the Sudan: "circumcision of women releases them from their bondage to sex, and enables them to fulfill their real destiny, as mothers. The clitoris is the basis for female masturbation; such masturbation is common in a hot climate; the spiritual basis of masturbation is fantasy; in fantasy a woman broods on sexual images; such brooding inevitably leads a woman to spiritual infidelity: since she commits adultery in her heart, and this is the first step to physical infidelity, which is the breaker of homes;" quoted from George Allgrove, *Love in the East*, London, Anthony Gibbs and Phillips, 1962, pp. 128-29.
(24) Elizabeth Sheehan, *op. cit.*, p. 44,
(25) See *A System of Gynecology*, ed. by Thomas Allbutt and W. S. Playfair, New York, Macmillan, 1897, p. 97. It may be noted that there is clinical evidence that sustained masturbation does not lead to clitoral growth except in a few instances of measurable increases in glans diameter in women using mechanical means of stimulation, such as electric vibrator; see William H. Masters and Virginia Johnson, "The Sexual Response Cycle of the Human Female.iii. The Clitoris : Anatomic and Clinical Considerations," *Western Journal of Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynecology, 70*, 248-57 (1962).

(26) Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem, *op. cit.*, p. 67.
(27) Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English, *Complaints and Disorders: The Sexual Politics of Sickness*, Old Westbury, New York, Feminist Press, 1973. p 34
(28) Patricia Farnes and Ruth Hubbard, *Ms, 9* (10), 9-10 (1981).
(29) Robin Morgan and Gloria Steinem, *op. cit.*, p 67.
(30) Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis*, London, Hogarth Press, 1946, pp. 151-52.
(31) Alix Shulman, "Organs and Orgasms" in, *Woman in Sexist Society: Studies in Power and Powerlessness*, ed by Vivian Gornick and Barbara K. Moran, New York, New American Library, 1972, p. 294.
(32) Mary Jane Sherfey, *The Nature and Evolution of Female Sexuality*, New York, Vintage Books, 1972, p. 47.
(33) *Ibid.*, p. 143.
(34) *Ibid.*, p. 112.
(35) *Ibid.*, p 144.
(36) Heli Alzate, "Vaginal Eroticism: A Replication Study," *Archives of Sexual Behavior, 14* (6), 529-37 (1985).
(37) Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
(38) *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī: Ghusl, Bāb* 28; *Ṣahih Muslim: Ḥayḍ*, ḥadīth 88; and *Sunan Abū Dāwūd: Ṭahārah, Abwāb* 81 and 83.
(39) See Ibn Hajr al-'Asqalānī (773-852/1372-1449), *Fatḥ al-Bārī fī Sharḥ al-Bukhārī; vide* Youssef El-Masry, *Die Traqodie der Frau im Arabischen Orient*, Munchen, 1963, p 39.
(40) This *ḥadīth* is not mentioned in *al-Ṣiḥāḥ al-Sittah*. It is, however, quoted by Imām al-Ghazālī, *q.v., Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*, Cairo, volume 1, 1302/1885, p. 132; see also, Mahmoud Karim and Roshdi Ammar, *Female Circumcision and Sexual Desire*, Cairo, Ain Shams University, 1965, p. 4.
(41) Mahmoud Karim and Roshdi Ammar, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
(42) *Sunan Abū Dāwūd: Adab*, 167.
(43) See, *Khafḍ, Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., Leiden, E. J. Brill, volume iv, 1978, p. 913.
(44) Fazlur Rahman, *op. cit.*, p. 120-21.
(45) Youssef El-Masry, *op. cit.*, p. 38.
(46) See Ibn Qudāmah (540-619/1146-1223), *al-Mughnī 'alā Mukhtaṣar Abū al-Qāsim 'Umar b. Ḥusayn b. 'Abd- Allāh b. Aḥmad al-Kharqī*, ed., by Muḥammad Rashīd Riḍā, Cairo, 1947, volume 1, p. 85.
(47) See, A J.Wensinck, *Khitān, Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., Leiden, E.J. Brill volume v, 1979, p.20.
(48) Vern L. Bullough, *Sexual Variance in Society and History*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1976, p. 219.
(49) Abdelwahab Bouhdiba, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

THE ISLAMIC ROOTS OF CULTURAL CLUBS IN BAHRAIN

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THE purpose of this paper is two-fold. The first is to discuss the historical as well as cultural foundations of the social clubs which arose in Bahrain late in the 19th century. The second purpose is to outline the role of those who contributed to the overall modern cultural history and cultural change of Bahrain.

In 1892 the American Mission officially opened a bookshop in al-Manama. The bookshop started its functioning by introducing some books and newspapers for its visitors and readers. The two most influential newspapers in the Arab world at that time, namely, *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* and *al-Ahrām* (of Egypt), were available at the American library.[1] A group of young educated Bahrainis, representing prominent families such as al-Khayrī, al-Arrayed. al-Mu'ayyed. al-Tājir, and Kanoo, began to visit the bookshop on a regular basis . There they found reading material not available elsewhere in Bahrain.

In 1913, however, these young Bahrainis decided to start their own bookshop and gave it the name Maktabat Iqbal Awal.[2] They rented a shop and furnished it with a few chairs and tables and with whatever books and newspapers they could provide. Later on, they changed the name of the shop to Nadi Awal al-Layli [3] (Awal's Evening Club), adding the word *Laylī* because club activities were only in the evening.

One of the new club's activities was the establishment of a cultural and intellectual bridge between Bahrain and the Arab world.[4] It seems that the American bookshop had put these young Bahrainis in touch with their fellow Arabs, especially with Rashīd Ridā, editor of *al-Manār,* and with Muḥammad 'Abduh and al-Afghānī through *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā.* The president of the club, Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣālih. wrote to Rashīd Riḍā in Cairo suggesting "an Islamic conference in the near future for the benefit of Islam." He even went so far as to suggest to Riḍā the opening of a club in Makkah, Nadi al-Ta'aruf (The Get-Acquainted Club).

Moreover, the club began to organize a series of cultural activities with emphasis on religiously and philosophically oriented lectures which expressed the club's "reformation" policy, to face "the deeply rooted *salafī [sic]* thought."[5] However, such activities were "received with strong opposition" which was launched by a "group of religious men." The *Qāḍī* (judge) of al-Bahrain, al-Shaykh Mihzā, protested against the young men's activities by saying, "They (the young men) bring to their club the *munkar* (abominables) from reading the Christian newspapers."[6]

This opposition gained momentum when certain members of the club decided to perform the Pilgrimage to Makkah. The club president, Nāṣir al-Khayrī, wrote to Rashīd Riḍā, editor of *al-Manar*, asking for information on "certain rites of the Pilgrimage which they seem to have misunderstood, such as kissing the black stone and circumabulating the *Ka'bah* and other matters." Rashīd Riḍā answered them through *al-Manār*, a copy of which reached the Judge of Bahrain. When he read it, he got angry and issued an order to close the club immediately.[7] Since then, the members of the club were called *al-tis'a al-raht al-mufsidūn fī'l-arḍ* (the band of the wicked nine).[8]

In 1928 another group of "the few educated Bahrainis" decided to establish a private literary club in Manama. They found in such a move "the only solution to solve their cultural worries which focused on their inability to participate in the activities of the Literary Club of al-Muharraq."[9] The group, whose members did not exceed six persons, continued to meet in the home of Muḥammad al-Wazzān to discuss the idea of organizing the club. On the 23rd of February of the same year, the group approved the by-laws of the new club which was approved by the British Resident in Bahrain, Sir Charles Belgrave.[10] These were called "The By-Laws of the Islamic Club *(al-Muntada al-Islāmī)* in Manama, Bahrain."

In a few weeks, after its official launching, the club's activities became the community's talk. One member had the following to say:

> The club used to hold a monthly party when a scholar in religion or culture delivered a public lecture, or on certain religious occasions such as the Prophet's birthday, the Hijra new year... in addition to receptions for guests. For each party the club sent out more than two hundred invitations but many more attended without invitation....[11]

In the same year, a prominent Kuwaiti historian, 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Rashīd, arrived in Bahrain. His arrival seems to have added a new dimension to the club's activities and goals. He agreed to deliver lectures on every evening on Islamic jurisprudence, *fiqh*, and Qur'ānic interpretation. In fact, he used the club as an office where he edited the journal *al-Kuwayt*. Thus, he found himself involved in the editing of the journal and in teaching in al-Hidāyah School.[12]

By the end of 1932, or four years after its birth, the club began to encounter problems. During that period, Bahrain had begun to undergo socio-economic transformation and cultural changes. The industry of natural pearling began to decline as a result of the challenge of Japanese artificial pearls which invaded Bahrain's pearl market in addition to the discovery of oil in Bahrain as well as in other Gulf states.[13] Bahrain seems to have witnessed one of the most powerful socio-economic change, namely, the tranformation of the Bahraini society from the age of diving for pearls to the age of drilling for oil. The age of oil had already polarized the energy and the ambitions of young Bahrainis. Their parents were the backbone of the expanding new trade and business. Naturally, they utilized their sons in their businesses which, in turn, paralyzed the club's activities. Early in 1936 the members decided to close down the club. It would be safe to say that the Bahraini society at that time was searching for some kind of identity. Young men were exploring ways and means of fulfilling their dire need for self-realization. Within the framework of their cultural realities, social as well as athletic clubs were the only alternatives.[14] When literary clubs failed to realize the hopes and ambitions of young Bahrainis, they turned to a new idea, the combination of athletics and literary activities in one club. This idea was the product of a healthy educational climate which radiated from al-Hidāyah School in al-Muharraq.

Unitl 1941, literary activities seem to have failed in filling the socio-cultural gap which existed in Bahraini society. The board of the athletic club was searching for an alternative. Its president, 'Īsā al-Hādī, states:

> At that time World War II reached its climax. As a result, all means of entertainment and socialization were almost non-existent. Movie films imported from Egypt came to a standstill. This is why we began to think of the necessary steps in order to fill this (cultural) gap. It was decided that the club should stage certain famous Arabic plays, such as *Majnūn Laylā* and *Kleopatra* by Aḥmad Shawqī, as well as other well known plays. This would utilize the knowledge and experience which

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some (club) members had acquired in their study at al-Hidāyah School.[15]

The new pattern of the athletic-cultural club encouraged other young, educated Bahrainis to follow the same path. They were confident of the survival and continuity of such clubs, considering the "changes which began to show their signs as a result of the discovery of oil, the rise of new social categories, and the spread of education and other factors."[16]

One model of this conception was *al-Ahlī* club (the National Club) which was formed in 1936 by a group of prominent young Bahraini men. They decided to make it an absolutely literary and athletic club which "has nothing to do with politics or religion."[17] But such a policy, adopted perhaps for political reasons, seems to have contributed to the formation of a more nationalistically oriented club. It was in 1939 that such a new club was formed under the name *Nādī al-'Urūbah* (The Arabism Club).[18] One of the most prominent and illustrious members of that club was Ibrāhīm al-'Urayyad, who used "to come very early to the club before anyone else, sitting for long hours reading or preparing translations for the radio broadcasting of Bahrain, during the Second World War."[19]

This club distinguished itself by certain unique activities. In 1940, one year after its birth, the club launched the first *Maḥw al-Ummīyah* (abolishing illiteracy) programme in Bahrain, a step which left its mark on the Bahraini society. Moreover, the club gained momentum and prestige whcih encouraged its members to extend its activities beyond what its charter had spelled out. It even went as far as extending its arms to the rest of the Arab countries, showing more Egyptian movies and even thinking of a news bulletin.[20]

Thus far, these internal activities by young Bahrainis could be interpreted as the genesis of "social reform awareness." It is suggested that "although there are many ways of structuring a system of human relations, there is only one way which, for whatever reason, is especially sensitive to the humane or welfare or stewardship aspects."[21]

We consider Bahrain part of the Arab world and the Bahraini society to be one such system. We would expect, therefore, to find in Bahrain, as it has been found in the contemporary Arab world, "a sensitivity, a receptivity, to these basic values of humaneness."[22] Thus, we could expect the present day, nation-building people of Bahrain to introduce a strong humane thread in their fabric of modernization.

In order to pursue this matter, there is need for a full set of materials which would illustrate the particular quality and concern of Bahraini social awareness and reform, reaching back through modern times to certain young Bahrainis and their efforts to modernize their society.

What kind of men led the social reform and modernization movements? What happened? Where from did they get these new ideas? Unfortunately, we canot offer a full explanation at this time. We must content ourselves with offering, as a beginning, the bits and pieces of information which are available.

Our attention is focused on two important centres of higher learning: Cairo, where the great citadel of Islamic learning, al-Azhar, is located, and the American University in Beirut. The first contingent of young Bahrainis seeking higher education went to the American University in Beirut in 1928.[23]

The most significant result of being in Cairo or Beirut during the period 1928–1946 was the formation of the Bahraini Students' Association, the first of its kind in the Arab Gulf region.[24]

It was natural for a group of this kind of educated young men to take a step further. They decided to launch a newspaper which would "express their views, to sound their voice and to create an Arab awareness toward their unknown homeland, al-Bahrain."[25]

The cultural and literary clubs which arose in Bahrain in a period of fifteen years represented a new dimension in the process of societal modernization which was taking place in the Bahraini society at the end of the 19th century and early 20th century. As mentioned earlier, two clubs preceded the new Islamic Club: the Iqbal Awal Club, which was established in 1913, and the Literary Club, established in 1928. These three clubs represent the most crucial period of modern Bahraini society and culture. Furthermore, they tell us the continuing story of restless, but ambitious young Bahrainis who insisted on keeping and maintaining their strong drive towards modernization. These cultural clubs may rightfully be called the socio-national alternative which, through different historical periods, fulfilled the Bahrainis' urge for cultural reform and national identity. More interesting is the fact that both the first club (Iqbal Awal in 1913) and the third club (the Islamic Club), which were separated by only fifteen years, were the product of certain political, cultural and societal pressures which were felt only by young Bahrainis who, in turn, found in these clubs the solution for their growing concerns. Both clubs started with the ideas of Islamic reforms

which were championed by Muhammad 'Abduh, al-Afghanī and Rashīd Rida. The goals of both clubs were the same, even borrowed from the reformation movement at that time. We have discussed the role and function of the Awal Club especially during the time of Judge al-Mihzā. Nevertheless, although these two clubs originated from the same thought of Islamic reform, the fact is that both were separated by a fifteen-year period, a long enough period which brought drastic changes to the Bahraini mind and thought. These were the products of the continued supply of ideas which were conveyed by very powerful vehicles of communication and which influenced the entire Arab world at that time.

The Islamic Club, in order to survive, seems to have adopted the ideology of Islamic reformation which was forcing its way into Egypt and other Arab countries, namely, the Salafīyah school of thought led by Rashīd Ridā, 'Abduh and al-Afghānī.[26] The first club, Awal, was more secular in its ideology; the young men who initiated it were "liberal," who were highly influenced by the American bookshop. Their "thinking" model was not "religious" as such. On the other hand, the Islamic Club, although almost a replica of the Young Men's Muslim Association of Egypt, did not make its Islamic purpose quite clear. Let us compare certain variables in the two religious clubs. The preamble of the Egyptian club reads as follows:

> Praise be to Him who created us into nations and tribes that we may know each other....[27] Among God's laws in creation is that the people who live as neighbours to united and active groups and who persist in their laziness and disunity, will lose their character and identity... even if they outnumber them.... This is what drove us, as a group of young Muslims to form an association by which we may possess the power to perform religious duties, as well as social rights.[28]

The Bahraini Islamic Club's preamble is as follows:

> Praise be to God who guides us. In view of the contemporary developments which are taking place all over the world, as well as the daily discoveries of knowledge, the gradual increase of *belle lettrists* and their progressive outlook, and considering that they (the belle lettrists of Bahrain) are separated from each other, a group of thinkers among them (*ba'd ahl al-fikr minhum*) have met and decided to establish a club which would bring them together and unify their thought in order to exchange views, and opinions and to revive what they had

missed in their education. Furthermore, it would seek elevating their religious, literary and moral standards.[29]

The difference between the socio-religious policy of both clubs is clear. The first is quite concerned with "how" to help Egyptian Muslim youth fulfil their religious as well as social obligations, whereas the second is more concerned with how to recapture the education and learning which its members had missed in order to catch up with the fast moving contemporary developments. These Bahrainis were concerned with religious aspects as well. But to them, certain things came first.

Further, and perhaps more interestingly, the Young Men's Muslim Association of Egypt was very likely an answer to the establishment of the Young Men's Christian Association (Y.M.C.A.) of Cairo, a new movement which aimed at serving young Egyptians, especially the Coptic youth of Egypt, socially, culturally, and perhaps politically. The Young Men's Muslim Association (Y.M.M.A.), on the other hand, was deeply concerned with the dangers of "the new melting pot," the American Y.M.C.A., which was also frequented by Muslim youths. This is quite clear in the preamble of the Egyptian club: "This is what drove us, as a group of young Muslims to form an association by which we may possess the power to perform religious duties, as well as social rights."[30] The Bahraini club, on the other hand, felt free to borrow only what it needed from its contemporary, the Egyptian club, with an accent on "contemporary developments all over the world."

The Bahraini Islamic Club, furthermore, was born at a time in the history of a newly emerging state when it was undergoing the process of social and economic transformation. One of the vigorous activities of the club, for instance, was to invite the well-known Kuwaiti social reformer, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Rashid, to become a permanent speaker in the club as well as a teacher in al-Hidāyah school.[31]

The literary circles and lectures in the club attracted the educated youth. During the day, they conducted their own business and in the evening met in the club to hear al-Rashid and discuss current issues and problems such as the exploration of oil by British authorities, the competition of natural Bahraini pearls with the cultured Japanese pearls, whose market gradually buried the pearl trade of Bahrain, the clashes between the British Commissioner and Bahraini nationalists, and the like.[32]

As time went by, the Bahraini Islamic Club, became the beehive of Bahrain's modern poets and writers. In addition to its "Islamic" tone, it

acquired a nationalistic character as well as an intellectual image. With their obviously different backgrounds, prominent familial ties and religious convictions, all these pioneers worked and served together and projected a solid and well-integrated image of the Bahraini society at that time.[33]

NOTES

(1) Khālid al-Bassām, *Tilka al-Ayyām* [The Good Old Days] (Bahrain, 1986), p.12. *Al-'Urwat al-Wuthqā* was founded by Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghānī (d.1897), one of the most remarkable figures in the Muslim world in the 19th century. See Sami A. Hanna and George Gardner, *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1969), p.266. See also Muḥammad Jābir al-Anṣārī, *Lamḥāt min al-Khalīj al-'Arabī* (1st ed., Bahrain, 1970).

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 7.

(3) Six years later (about 1919–1920?), another group of fourteen Bahraini businessmen, led by 'Abd-Allāh bin 'Īsā al-Khalīfah (the eldest son of Bahrain's ruler) and two elderly men, Ibrāhīm bin Muḥammad al-Khalīfah and 'Abd al-Wahhāb al-Zayyānī, thought of a new project, namely introducing modern education to Bahrain, Muḥammad Jābir al-Anṣārī, *Lamḥāt min al-Khalīj al-'Arabī* (Bahrain, 1970), pp.78–90.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

(5) *Ibid.*, P. 8. See also Sami Hanna and George Gardner, "Muḥammad Abdu and Khayr al-Dīn: Did They or Didn't They?" *American Journal of Arabic Studies*, vol. iii, 1973, pp. 21–51.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 9

(7) Evidently, the Judge's angry response was followed by a chain reaction. Some of the club members apologized to the Judge on the plea that "they did not read the exact wording of the letter sent to Riḍā concerning the pilgrimage." The President of the Club, who sent the inquiry to Riḍa on behalf of his colleagues, tried to justify his position by saying that he wrote the letter with good intentions and that his personal relationship with Rashīd Riḍā himself was very strong (Al-Bassām, *op. cit.*, p. 9)

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 10. It is interesting to note that during their efforts to reopen the club, one member, Shaykh Muḥammad Ṣālih, wrote a poem to the Judge, al-Mihzā, in which he mentioned Rashīd Riḍā's quest for Islam. He stated that Riḍā and his friends had pursued the "path of truth" as straight and clear as the sun's, and had it not been for *al-Manār's* guidance to the true faith, they would have been lost.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 12.

(10) The group issued a statement of purpose as follows:

> Due to the contemporary developments which are taking place all over the world, the daily increase of knowledge (*inshā' al-ma'ārif yawmiyan*); the increase in the number of writers and their educated opinions; and due to their isolation from each other, certain intellectuals (*ba'ḍ ahl al-fikr*) had met and decided to establish a club for the purpose of rounding them up and unifying

> their thoughts in order to exchange views and ideas, to revive their knowledge, to raise their religious, moral and literary standard, to cooperate and act with solidarity in disseminating such spirit among the members of the Islamic nation and to follow the path which leads man to everlasting happiness... (*Ibid.*, p 12)

It is interesting to note that Sir Belgrave approved the club and its by-laws with the condition that "it should not interfere in political affairs." The by-laws were printed in Bombay, India, in 1928 in a "fancy" edition. Copies were distributed to the club members and their friends in Bahrain. Many copies were also sent to Egypt, Kuwait and other Arab countries.

(11) *Ibid*, p.13. The club's activities were in the evening. "It was the meeting place of the educated and writers where they found in its reading hall, good newspapers and magazines, coffee, tea, cold water and literary discussion groups."

(12) *Ibid.*, p. 14. This journal became the club's professional as well as its official publication, where al-Rashīd published club's important lectures, functions and news.

(13) For more details, see *al-Baḥrain... 'alā ṭarīq al-taqaddum* [Bahrain... On the Road of Progress]. (Ministry of Information, Bahrain, 1985), pp. 41-50. In 1923, the income from the pearl trade was estimated at 240,000 English pounds, and the number of ships which were involved reached 1500. In 1935, the income reached 400,000 pounds sterling. In 1948, pearls brought an income of only 65,000 English pounds. Today, diving for pearls is only a memory of Bahraini parents and grandparents. However, the pearl industry has left unforgettable and living traditions, arts, music, folklore, and legacies. But Bahrain's pearl dealers seem to have fought a tough battle with their competitor, the Japanese "cultured" pearl. This battle was highlighted by the ruler himself when he visited the United States of America. In a rare news item, the present writer found the following mention in the first Bahraini newspaper, *al-Baḥrayn*. In his address to American officials in New York, His Highness Shaykh Muḥammad bin 'Īsā al-Khalīfah said:

> Gentlemen, I am pleased to visit this great country.... Indeed, I have seen with my own eyes, heard with my own ears and touched in my own heart [your] true democracy and great character of the American people.... We the Arabs are democratic by disposition.... I have visited the exhibit and the jewelry section. I saw the various kinds of pearls, especially the pure and original pearls of my country, Bahrain.
>
> I am pleased to know that the United States government does not consider the Japanese pearls original. I am sure that your government has taken a decision for the interest of both the American and Bahraini people. It has testified to all the world to the worth of real pearls and assured the world that the Japanese pearl is false and useless, even a waste of money.... The pearls of Bahrain are of the highest quality and enjoy superior purity.

(*Al-Baḥrain*, vol. II, no.55, March 21, 1940. Translated by the present writer.)

(14) The last of these clubs was created on the heels of the collapse of the two previous literary clubs. Again, it was a group of young men, students at al-Hidayah school in al-Muharraq, who felt the need to "form an athletic team."

In September 1938, about one hundred members attended the new club's first meeting which was held in a small, sparsely furnished room. The chairs were borrowed from a nearby cafe and the room was lit by a kerosene lantern. (Al-Bassām, *op.cit.*, pp. 18-20).

(15) As quoted by Bassām, *op cit*, p.22 The first play was *Majnūn Laylā* by Aḥmad Shawqī. Evidently, the play was a success in spite of limiting the performance to two nights, one for men and one for women Two years later, the second play *Kleopatra* was performed Its success seems to have boosted the club's morale and determination to stay alive. It is interesting to note that in 1932 there was a club called *al-Muntada al-Islāmī* (The Islamic Club), which was ordered to be closed by the British Resident Belgrave as a result of a poem recited by an Iraqi poet in the club's memorial service for Shaykh 'Īsā bin 'Alī al-Khalīfah. Evidently, the poem was directed at the British Resident who considered it a personal attack. He expelled the poet and closed the club.

(16) *Ibid.*, p.26.

(17) *Ibid.*, p.27. Certain prominent families such as 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mu'ayyad and Aḥmad Kanoo donated popular Egyptian magazines such as *al-Dunya*, *al-Ithnayn* and *al-Lata'if* to the club. One should not underestimate the indirect Egyptian influence on these young Bahrainis, for Egypt, at that time, was struggling against the British for independence. This particular club is still functioning in Bahrain, but only as a football club.

(18) From its very name, the club was created as a result of al-Ahlī club's refusal to admit a number of Bahrainis from Manama (the heart of modern Bahrain) to its membership. The term *'Urūbah* suggests a much wider scope and outlook. It reflects a feeling of Arabism *vis-à-vis* local Bahrainism.

(19) *Ibid.*, p.33. Ibrāhīm al-'Urayyid is still alive at the age of eighty. He is one of the very few pioneers of modern literature in Bahrain.

(20) An Iraqi poet who was invited to the club's wrote to the members: "Thanks to Mr. Muhammad Doweighter who made me aware of your new sanctuary *(maʿqil)* in the inlet of the Arab countries... I appreciate your great efforts in hoisting the message of Arabism and culture." As a result of the expansion of the club's activities, its members decided to build a special centre for its activities. In 1950, the Bahraini government donated a piece of land for the site of the club, which was completed later in 1952. Its official opening was attended by the ruler of Bahrain, the late Shaykh Salmān, and the British Resident, Sir Charles Belgrave. *Ibid.*, pp. 33–35.

(21) Sami A. Hanna and George H. Gardner, *Arab Socialism: A Documentary Survey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1969), p. 203.

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 203.

(23) Between 1928 and 1945 a few Bahraini students went to study in Cairo and Beirut either on government scholarships or on their own. However, in 1943, the British Resident issued a decree to withdraw all Bahraini students from Cairo. All educational missions afterwards were directed to Beirut. The question now is: Why Beirut? It is interesting to note that the American University in Beirut was famous for its distinctive cultural as well as political climate. This unique climate was the refuge of many Arab students who came from almost every Arab country and who sought the best part of such a climate, namely, freedom. Moreover, the university's political climate was charged with nationalistic, as well as other political currents which arose as a result of certain events in the Arab world, such as the partition of Palestine and the independence of certain Arab countries after a long colonial period. The Bahraini students could not live in isolation from these currents. They looked around to see Arab student associations mushrooming everywhere. It was natural, in these unusual circumstances, that the Bahraini students seriously considered sharing activities with their friends, the Arab students. Soon the idea of founding a student association found

positive response from the Bahraini students who were on the A U B. campus On February 27, 1946, they met and decided to create *al-ḥalqah al-Baḥraynīyah fī'l-Baḥrayn* [The Bahraini Circle in Bahrain] (al-Bassām, *op. cit.*, pp.40-42.)

(24) *Ibid*, pp 40–42. One of the association's objectives was the "active participation and sharing with all the country's institutions in the cultural as well as social revival." The numbers of chartered members reached twenty-one, all of whom belonged to prominent families and all of whom are currently top national leaders and cabinet ministers. More interesting is the fact that the British Resident, Sir Belgrave, who thought that such an association would keep Bahraini students away from politics, granted them permission to officially launch their students associations in both Beirut and Bahrain

(25) *Ibid.*, p.44. The first issue appeared in May 1947 and was called *al-Ḥalqah*, following the name of the association Before that, there was a regular newspaper called *al-Baḥrayn* whose founder was 'Abd-Allāh al-Zā'id However, that paper was suspended for reasons unknown to the present writer. Fortunately, the present writer was able to locate a microfilm of the paper which begins with Number 12, May 25, 1939. The front page reads as follows: "*Al-Baḥrayn*, founded in 1939 (A D) - 1358 H Owned by 'Abd-Allāh b. 'Alī al-Sā'id A daily, political, literary, educational and universal newspaper. Published temporarily on a weekly basis." This issue included a variety of topics poetry, foreign news, an elegy by a Bahraini poet, 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mu'awdah, and another one by Ibrāhīm (no full name) However, his title as the most reputable poet suggests Ibrāhīm al-'Urayyid, who is considered a pioneer in Bahrain's modern intellectual and literary history, and who will be discussed in detail later On the other hand, the students' publication *al-Ḥalqah* reveals certain important trends: articles on young Bahraini women by an educated Bahraini lady, Inṣāf Hallāq, in which she praises Bahraini girls, encouraging them to pursue their education and free themselves from the "four wall jail or cage." There is also an article by 'Alī-Fakhrū (presently Dr. Ali Fakhru, Minister of Education) calling for the establishment of orphanages and shelters for the wayfarers, as well as free education for poor children. Unfortunately, only one issue appeared in spite of the members' efforts to keep the periodical alive.

(26) The club's by-laws were almost identical with the by-laws of *Jam'īyat al-Shubbān al-Muslimīn* of Egypt (The Young men's Muslim Association, very similar to the Y.M.C.A.) which was established in Cairo in 1927.

(27) Adapted from *Sūrat* "al-Hujurāt, verse 13.

(28) Mubārak al-Khāṭir, *al-Muntada al-Islāmī* (Bahrain: Markaz al-Wathā'iq al-Ta'rīkhīyah, 1st ed., 1981), p.51, translated by the present writer.

(29) *Ibid*, p. 51.

(30) There are those who believe that the Islamic Club of Bahrain was also a response to the American bookshop which was frequented by Bahraini youth as mentioned before. However, the American bookshop, or rather the Reading Room, was established in the late nineteenth century (1892), whereas the Islamic Club was established in 1928, after more than a quarter of a century.

(31) Al-Rashīd was also the founder and editor of his newly established journal, *al-Kuwayt*, just a few months before his arrival in Bahrain (*Ibid.*,), p.67. Although he was highly praised for his cultural contributions, he was also disfavoured on certain occasions. For example, in one of his speeches, al-Rashīd explained labour views in Islam as simply encouraging work *(al-'amal)*. He was severely criticized for ignoring the exploitation of Bahrain workers whether pearl divers or farmers or craftsmen.

> During the days of Shaykh al-Rashid... the labour relationship between the workers and the owners or between farmers and landlords was not good, nor was it financially or humanely rewarding. Mercy and compassion were rare coins in the *nawakhedha* (the captain of the sailing ships looking for pearls), diving market or landowners.

Moreover, it was also during that time that Bahrain Oil Company (BAPCO) began to employ local workers who "knew nothing about their labor rights or even their human rights." They were directly transformed from the darkness of being exploited in diving and agriculture to the darkness of work under the oppression of the oil company. Why, then, did al-Rashīd ignore these social conditions? The only answer, according to al-Khāṭir, lies in that al-Rashīd's education was so limited that he could not think of any labour problems, that he was very well-to-do in both Kuwait and Bahrain where he knew only three classes: the rulers, the educated, and the merchants, and "he lived in a society which had no respect for work, nor for workers." (*Ibid.*, pp.102–103.)

(32) Among the successful businessmen was Muḥammad 'Alī al-Tājir, who was from a well- known family in Bahrain. The case of Khālid al-Faraj was also a hot issue for discussion among the club members in 1928 and 1929. Also among the participants in the club's cultural and literary activities was Ibrāhīm al-'Urayyid, a living symbol of Bahrain's intellectual and literary heritage.

(33) The most prominent and respected member and contributor to the club's activities was Ibrāhīm al-'Urayyid (known as al-Arrayed), the father of one of the most influential families in Bahrain. His lectures gave the club a new character. Although other young poets arose such as Riḍā al-Mūsavī, Salmān al-Tājir and others, "only two became highly distinguished among the young poets at that period, namely, Ibrāhīm al-Arrayed (1908) and 'Abd al-Raḥmān al-Mu' awdah (1914)." (*Ibid.*, p. 119.)

THE QUR'ĀN: SOURCE OR ANALOGUE OF BEDE'S CAEDMON STORY?

ZACHARIAS P. THUNDY

BEDE tells us in his *Ecclesiastical History* (IV, 24) the charming story of Caedmon's remarkable gift of poetry. It is a more pleasurable experience to read it than to analyze it. Here I propose to do both before suggesting a new source for this miracle-story.

In the monastery of this abbess [St.Hilda] there was a certain brother who was specially marked out by the grace of God, so that he used to compose godly and religious songs.... He did not learn the art of poetry (*canendi artem*) from men nor through a man but he received the gift of song freely by the grace of God. Hence he could never compose any foolish or trivial poem but only those which were concerned with devotion and so were fitting for his devout tongue to utter. He had lived in the secular habit until he was well advanced in years and had never learned any songs. Hence sometimes at a feast when for the sake of providing entertainment, it had been decided that they should all sing in turn, when he saw the harp approaching him, he would rise up in the middle of feasting, go out, and return home.

On one such occasion when he did so, he left the place of feasting and went to the cattle byre, as it was his turn to take charge of them that night. In due time he stretched himself out and went to sleep, whereupon he dreamt that someone stood by him, saluted him, and called him by name: "Caedmon," he said, "sing me something." Caedmon answered, "I cannot sing: this is why I left the feast and came here because I could not sing." Once again the speaker said, "Nevertheless you must sing to me." "What must I sing?" said Caedmon. "Sing," he said, "about the beginning of created things." Thereupon, Caedom began to sing verses which he had never heard before in praise of God the Creator....

"Nu scylun hergan
Metudaes maecti
Uerc uuldurfadur
eci dryctin,
He aerist scop
Heben til hrofe,
Tha middungeard
Eci dryctin,
Firum foldu,
hefaenrices uard

end his modgidanc *haleg scepen.*
sue he uundra Gihuaes *Moncynnaes uard,*
or astelidae. *aefter tiadae*
aelda barnum *frea allmectig."*

"Now we must praise the Maker of the heavenly kingdom, the power of the Creator and his counsel, the deeds of the Father of glory and how He, since He is the eternal God, was the author of all marvels and first created the heavens as a roof for the children of men and then, the almighty Guardian of the human race. created the earth."... When he awoke, he remembered all that he had sung while asleep and soon added more verses in the same manner, praising God in fitting style.

In the morning he went to the reeve who was his master, telling him of the gift he had received, and the reeve took him to the abbess. He was then bidden to describe his dream in the presence of a number of the more learned men and also to recite his song so that they might all examine him and decide upon the nature and origin of the gift of which he spoke; and it seemed clear to all of them that the Lord had granted him heavenly grace.... The abbess, who recognized the grace of God which the man had received, instructed him to renounce his secular habit and to take monastic vows. She... ordered that he should be instructed in the whole course of sacred history. He learned all he could by listening to them and then, memorizing and ruminating over it, like some clean animal chewing the cud, he turned it into the most melodious verse.... He sang about the creation of the world, the origin of the human race, and the whole history of Genesis, of the departure of Israel from Egypt and the entry into the promised land and of many other of the stories taken from the sacred Scriptures: of the incarnation, passion, and resurrection of the Lord.... He also made songs about the terrors of future judgements, the horrors of the pains of hell and the joys of the heavenly kingdom.

...In all of which he sought to turn his hearers away from delight in sin and arouse in them the love and practice of good works.[1]

What is surprising about this miracle-story is not that Historian Bede dares include it in his historical work; a miracle appears on almost every page of the book. We should rather be surprised that there are not more of them in the book. As Bertram Colgrave puts it, "It was as natural for Bede to relate these marvels as it is for the modern historian to avoid them. As Dill says, dealing with the same aspect in the works of Gregory of Tours, 'had he not done so, he would have done violence to his own deepest beliefs, and he would have given a maimed and misleading picture of his age.'[2]

What is really intriguing about the Caedmon legend is simply that we do not know the authority for it either from Bede or from any other sources. For all miracle stories except the few associated with St. Hilda Caedmon belongs to this group–we have sources. "The Alban group is borrowed from an ancient life of St Albanus, of which only a few traces have come down to us. The miracles of St. Germanus are taken from Constantius' Life of St. Germanus.... For the miracles connected with Hilda he suggested no authority and we know of none. As he mentions no names of informants, it is possible that he was depending upon some life of the saint which would almost certainly exist at Whitby" (pp. 205-206).

There is truth in C. Grant Loomis's position that "without a previous pattern suggestion, we might not have had this utterly charming story at all."[3] Loomis points out various instances of divinely inspired intellectual creations.

According to Gregory, a certain Equitius, though not in holy orders, was the recipient of the miraculous gift of eloquent preaching. When questioned why he was preaching without training and authorization, he replied that in dream he had the vision of a youngman who touched his tongue with a blood-letting lancet and said: "Lo, I have placed my words in your mouth; go forth to preach." From that day forth, even though he wished it, he could not keep silent about God.[4]

Gregory also speaks about a boy who fell into a trance – somewhat like Chaucer's Hugh of Lincoln – and received the gift of glossalalia (*Dialogues*, IV, 26; Acts 2:4). According to the *Vita Sancti Gregorii* by the anonymous monk of Whitby (713), Gregory's great learning also was divinely inspired with a white dove dictating at his ear.[5] Bede also had other examples: Augustine (*De Doctrina Christiana, Prologus*), Isaiah 6:1-9, and Exodus 4:10-12.

But none of these analogues come as close to the Caedmon story as the traditional story told about Prophet Muhammad.

It was the custom of Prophet Muhammad to retire for a month every year to a cave in the desert for meditation. As usual he went to the hill, Hirā, during Ramaḍān. One night toward the end of the month, the first revelation came to him when he was 40 years old. He was asleep and a vioce said: *"Iqra'*: proclaim from the book." He said "I cannot read." The voice again said "*Iqra'*." He said: "I cannot read." A third time the voice commanded: "*Iqra'*." He said: "What should I announce?" The voice said: "Proclaim, in the name of the Lord who createth, createth man from a clot. Read aloud: It is thy Lord the most beautiful who

teacheth by the pen. teacheth man that which he knew not" (*Sūrah* 96:1-5)

When he awoke, the words remained "as if inscribed upon his heart." He went out of the cave on to the hillside and heard Angel Gabriel address him: "O Muḥammad, thou art Allāh's messenger, and I am Gabriel."... In great distress he returned to his wife Khadījah. She tried to comfort and reassure him. On their return to Mecca she took him to her cousin Waraqah ibn Nawfal, a very old man, "who knew the Scriptures of the Jews and Christians," who declared his belief that the heavenly messenger who came to Moses of old had come to Muhammad and that he was chosen as the Prophet of his people.[6]

Let us look at the similarities between the two legends: In both stories the protagonists are untutored, unlettered, and mature adults. Both receive the revelation in a dream or a trance. The angel commands Caedmon two times to sing; the angel orders Muḥammad three times to proclaim from the book. The subject matter of the revelation in both cases is creation. Both of them sing a verse on creation and remember the words after they have woken up. There is a woman behind the revelation in each case: Abbess Hilda in the case of Caedmon and Khadījah in Muḥammad's case. The women refer the matter to a third party who confirms the authenticity of the revelation. All the main topics Bede says that Caedmon sang about such as the revelation of God on creation, the origin of the human race, the story of Genesis, Exodus, and the story of Jesus are found in the Qur'ān and, of course, much more.

Is the implied literary allusion of Bede to the Prophet of Islam just another "miraculous" dream of mine or is it possible that Bede knew about Islam? I argue that Bede knew something about Islam, but how much we do not know.

R.W. Chambers in his essay on *Beowulf* printed as foreword to Archibald Strong's translation of *Beowulf* (London, 1925) – Tolkien thinks that Chamber's study is the best critical study on the poem of *Beowulf as a poem – contrasts Bede's life (673-735) with early spread of* Islam which more or less coincide. Bede lived during the time England became a member of the Christian commonwealth; elsewhere Christianity experienced terrible losses. The regnal years of Bede's greatest hero Oswald (634-42) coincided with those of Caliph 'Umar (634-44). When Northumbria with York was won for Christianity, Syria, Palestine, and Egypt were lost to Christianity with Damascus, Jerusalem, and Alexandria. Within a year of Bede's birth the Saracens had reached the gates of Constantinople; in the same year Theodore held the first joint Synod of the English Church at Hartford. Bede was a young man when

Africa was lost to Christendom, but Frisians and Saxons of Europe embraced the Christian faith at about the same time. The Muslim army captured Carthage the year Willibrord was consecrated the first Archbishop of Utrecht. Bede was in his middle age when Spain was overrun by the Moors When Bede was finishing his *History*, the Saracens had reached the centre of France from their headquarters in Narbonne. Many years before he had lamented the martial successes of the Saracens, the sons of Ishmael, in Africa.[7] At the end of the *History*, a year after it was finished, Bede inserted a reference to the victory of Charles Martel at Tours over the Saracens, which apparently saved Rome: "At this time a large army of Saracens ravaged Gaul with cruel bloodshed and not long afterwards they received the due reward of their deeds in the same kingdom" (HE, V, 23).

It is quite probable that Bede, the curious historian, who lived in those turbulent years of Christian-Muslim confrontation, must have gathered as much information about Islam as he could. It is possible that he heard a story about Prophet Muhammad or a holy man, who was enlightened by divine revelation. Bede perhaps heard the story of Prophet Muhammad's revelation as a "Christian" story; or he "baptised" a pagan story to suit his Christian purposes in the spirit of Pope Gregory's admonition to Abbot Mellitus which Bede himself quotes in his *History*. Bede's adoption of the legend could be very much like the earlier attempts of the Christian writers and preachers who made the Indian Gautama Buddha the Christian Josaphat. This "saint" was venerated all over the Christian world at least since the time of St. John Damascene (676-749) who allegedly made Josaphat a popular saint; in the Western church St. Josaphat's feast falls on November 27 and in the Greek Church on August 26.[8]

Perhaps the question: "Did Bede believe the story of Caedmon like the other miracles he had recorded is pertinent here; and, according to Colgrave (pp.228-29), who follows Delehaye closely, we must distinguish three men in Bede: Bede the theologian, the hagiographer, and the historian. As a theologian, Bede admitted in his homilies and commentaries that the age of miracles, necessary for the nascent church, was past and that they were no longer necessary since the Christian faith was well established in the land. Bede wrote his *Lives of St. Cuthbert* as a hagiographer; he recorded the miracles recounted by reliable sources to extol the glory of God and his saints and to testify to the trustworthiness of the gospel. When Bede wrote his *Lives of the Abbots*, he wrote them as a historian; naturally, he narrates their daily lives without any reference to the marvellous. In the writing of the *Ecclesiastical History*, Bede was

both a historian and a hagiographer. Bede's contributions to English Church history are invaluable. Even when Bede the hagiographer recorded miracles to exalt his heroes and to teach his lessons, the historian quoted his authorities, attributed responsibilities to them, and thus satisfied his historian's conscience.

I like to conclude this note by raising a question and some speculations. Can we distinguish in Bede's handling of the Caedmon story a fourth man: Bede the poet? The only certain thing we know about the whole episode is that Bede records a poem here. I suspect Bede is the author of the poem as it is found in the Anglo-Saxon versions of the *History* even though he ascribed it to Caedmon, the legendary poet. That Bede was skilled in the vernacular poetry we know from the letter of his pupil Cuthbert which describes the saint's death and from Bede's Death Song which appears in the St. Gall MS. 254.

Bede used the Islamic tradition to illustrate the nature of poetic inspiration which probably he himself experienced in his own life. Finally, how intriguing that Bede, the historian of the Anglo-Saxon, should confer the primal gift of poetry not on an Anglo-Saxon, but on Caedmon, the Briton!

NOTES

(1) Trans. Bertram Colgrave and R A B. Mynors, *Bede's Ecclesiastical History* (*HE*) (Oxford, 1969), pp. 415-19. Venerable Bede wrote the history of the English Nation in the eighth century.
(2) "Bede's Miracle Stories," in *Bede His Life, Time, and Writings* (Oxford, 1935), p 201.
(3) "The Miracle Traditions of the Venerable Bede," *Speculum*, 21 (1946), 410
(4) *Dialogues*, 1,4 *PL*, 77.169.
(5) Loomis, p. 411.
(6) See Marmaduke Pickthall, *The Meaning of the Glorious Qur'ān* (Hyderabad Govt. Press, 1938), I, 2-3.
(7) Chambers, p.xii
(8) See *Barlaam and Joasaph*, ed and trans. G.R Woodward and H. Mattingly; Loeb Classics (Cambridge: Harvard, 1967), pp. xx-xxxiv. See also G. Shepherd "The Prophetic Caedmon," *Review of English Studies*, N.S., 5 (1954), 113-22; Donald W. Fritz, "Caedmon· A Traditional Christian Poet," *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), 334-7, G.A Lester, "The Caedmon Story and Its Analogues," *Neophilologus*, 58 (1974), 225-37; P R. Orton, "Caedmon and Christian Poetry," *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen*, 84 (1983), 163-70.

BOOK REVIEWS

ISMAIL R AL-FARUQI

ISLAMIC THOUGHT AND CULTURE

International Institute of Islamic Thought, Maryland, U.S.A. 1982; 121 pp.

The sad and untimely death of Ismail al-Faruqi has left a vacuum in the Islamic academic circles of the United States. Dr. Faruqi was an indefatigable worker in the cause of Islam. The book under review consists of papers presented to the Islamic studies group of the American Academy of Religion. It consists of eleven papers dealing with diverse themes and the contributors too are from different backgrounds and nationalities.

Dr. Muzzammil H. Siddiqi of the Muslim World League discusses instructively what the *shahādah* means. On the basis of the *Ḥadīth* narrated by al-Bukhārī, the first proclamation of *tawḥīd* is known as *kalimat al-shahādah* which amounts to saying 'there is no God but Allāh' and that 'Muḥammad is the messenger of Allāh.' The writer elaborates the meaning of *shahādah* from its use in different contexts of the Qur'ān. The Muslim creed is enshrined in the short statement. The writer rightly rejects the views of some orientalists that in the beginning the *shahādah* was confined only to *Lā ilāh illa Allāh* and only later *Muḥammadi Rasūl-Allāh* was added. He further points out that in the Muslim call for prayer (*adhān*) the witness to the prophethood of the Prophet is already given and the historicity of the *adhān* has not been challenged by any one.

Mr. Victor Danner in his article makes some very interesting observations on the pilgrimage to Mecca. It is, as he says, the heart of Islam and a Muslim's daily prayers are all directed towards it. For us the spiritual significance which he brings to light is very interesting but for the non-Muslims it is more relevant. He quotes the famous Sufi Abū Yazīd al-Bisṭāmī who has this to say on this experience of the pilgrimage: "On my first pilgrimage I saw only the Temple; the second time, I saw both the Temple and the Lord of the Temple; and the third time I saw the Lord only." (p.24)

Mrs. Lois Lamya' al-Faruqi deals extensively with the Muslim juristic attitude to music in her highly informative article "The Sharia on Music and Musician." She has given an objective account of the controversy regarding music. Though one cannot but wonder whether our *fuqahā'* judging on the legitimacy of music have really understood its nature and its relevance for man's spiritual and physical health. Music in its highest reaches is indispensable for man's spiritual quest, while in its degenerate form, specially as it is prevailing today, cannot but bring harm to man's emotional needs.

Dr. J. Meric Pessagno's contribution on "Al-Maturidi's Notion of Human Acts" is very stimulating and deserves careful consideration. He draws attention to very significant parallels between Māturidī's philosophical perception and that of Thomas Aquinas with regard to the nature of human acts. He does not wish to suggest any causal connection between the two, though Thomas Aquinas could not have been ignorant of Muslim thinking. The problem of the relation between God's omniscience and human freedom has intrigued both Muslim and Christian theologians. The writer concludes: "It seems to me, then, that the two approaches of al-Maturidi and Thomas Aquinas on

human actions in relation to divine causality would well bear careful comparative reading" (p.64). It is interesting to see how the Muslim theologian tried to preserve the freedom of human acts through his doctrine of *Kasb*.

Another contribution to which we may draw attention is that of Mr. Muhammad A. Hamdan. He is concerned to define what 'Islamic' means in its application to literature, and he tries to show that the unity of the literatures of the Muslims transcends time and space. As the writer has pointed out Islamic literature will have to include not only pious writers but also sceptics like Abū al-'Alā' al-Ma'arrī, dissolute poets like Abū Nuwās and Sufis like al-Ḥallāj. The writer thinks that the unity of Islamic literature may be sought on different levels, the thematic level as well as the aesthetic. He declares: "Realization of aesthetic beauty in the sublime is, in Islam, never the perception of the Absolute which is God, but that of His infinity, i.e. of His imperceptibility." (p.71)

Mr. Michael Mazzaoui discusses the Islamic contribution to history. It is but natural to highlight in this context Ibn Khaldun's place in the historical studies undertaken by Muslims. His justly celebrated *Muqaddimah* marks a landmark in Muslim historiography. It was indeed the first attempt to consider history in a sociological perspective and thus to initiate a new branch of knowledge. Ibn Khaldūn laid emphasis on "studying the roots of custom, the foundation of politics, the nature of civilization, and the circumstances of human society, and without comparing far with near and past with present — then there will often be danger of slipping and stumbling and straying from the right road" (p 91). The historical orientation of the Qur'an itself must have inspired Ibn Khaldun whose concept of *'Aṣabīyah* proved very illuminating in the consideration of the rise and fall of nations and gave rise to great historical studies. The writer has given a good survey of the Muslim contribution and has rightly observed that in spite of many changes Muslim historical writings still harbour the Islamic spirit and a "powerful sense of continuity" is easily discernible.

Mr. Victor Danner's contribution deals with a subject which may seem controversial from the strictly orthodox stand point. The writer explains what is meant by *al-Insān al-Kāmil* in Sufism. He discusses the problem specially with reference to the 15th-century Sufi 'Abd al-Karīm al-Jīlī. The priority in this connection belongs to the great Sufi Ibn 'Arabi. Al-Jīlī's book on this subject is a classic. Though influenced greatly by Ibn 'Arabī he does not follow the master in all points. "The perfect man is the mirror that reflects the divine Reality, but he is not the divine Reality itself. He is the entire creation *(al-khalq)* as a reflection of God *(al-Ḥaqq)*, but he is not God." Sufis have distinguished between the historical and metahistorical dimension of the Prophet and it is his transcendent dimension which Sufis call *al-Ḥaqīqat al-Muḥammadīyah* (the reality of Muhammad) to which is attributed the "Capacity to assume different human guises in different epochs." This, however, does not amount to reincarnation which is explicitly excluded. It only means that the essence which is unique has the capacity to express itself in manifold forms. It is very difficult to make any comment on such speculations and in spite of the best attempts of the Sufis and their commentators some ambiguity will always remain in the relation between the historical and trans-historical Muhammad. Nevertheless the writer has introduced us to the Sufic perspective of al-Jīlī in a lucid manner.

We have not commented on all the papers only because the subjects they deal with, though important in themselves, cannot be treated in a single review. This small volume must serve as a tribute to the late lamented Prof. Ismail R. al-Faruqi. We hope his disciples and co-workers will continue his line of thought in a meaningful way.

S. VAHIDUDDIN

SYED HASAN AMIN

LAW AND JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY YEMEN

Royston, Glasgow, 1987

Some time ago I had reviewed in these pages Syed Hasan Amin's monumental work *Middle East Legal System* (Glasgow, 1985). The last two chapters in that book dealt with the peoples of the Democratic Republic of Yemen and the Yemen Arab Republic (chapters 11 and 12). These chapters, compared with the rest of the book, were rather brief and provided elementary information on the two Yemens and their law. His work for these two chapters in his 1985 book seems to have deepened his interest in the Yemens. Two years later he was ready with more materials on the two Yemens. Instead of waiting for a second edition of *Middle East Legal Systems* in which the relevant chapters could have been enlarged, he has come out with a separate book.

In his new book, Amin provides a combined general introduction to the two Yemens, concluding it with his observations regarding their "possible unification." Then, in two separate chapters he offers a detailed account of the constitutional, legal and judicial systems in their historical perspective — of the two countries. In his Preface the author describes his work as "inter-disciplinary and comparative" and expresses the hope that:

> Anyone interested in the operation and development of law in developing countries should find something of interest in this book, whether his or her main interest be law, politics, international relations, economics or development studies.

This book is a serious definitive legal study and a valuable book of reference. But it is far more than that. It offers an informed exposition of the history, traditions and economics of the Yemens.

I think that I would have accepted the claim made for the book in the Preface and the Foreword as justifiable had I not observed and been constrained to point out the following shortcomings:

(i) Nowhere in the book have Zaydiyah creed (which is dominant in North Yemen) and the *Shāfi'ī madhhab* (in vogue in both the Yemens) been adequately explained. For readers not fully familiar with the sects and schools of law in Islam this was very necessary; and it could have formed part of the 'general introduction' under chapter I of the book.

(ii) As regards history, the account of neither of the two Yemens is comprehensive. In respect of South Yemen, for instance, the focus is on the British colonial rule. No reference is found to the Qu'aiti Sultanate of Shihr and Mukallah where in 1942 the local law had been magnificently codified. Even important developments of the British regime — e.g. application of the British-Indian codes and enactments, extension of the Privy Council Jurisdiction, the controversy regarding family waqf resulting from a judicial decision of 1897 and culminating into the 1939 Waqf Ordinance — have been left out.

(iii) Certain important laws of the modern times have escaped the author's attention. For example, the chapter on North Yemen, although detailing some aspects of the *Qānūn al-Usrah* (Family Law) of 1978 makes no reference to an equally important law enacted two years earlier, viz., the Law on Inheritance 1976.

Chapters in a larger book were different matter and could not have been

expected to give all the details. But when an author of Amin's repute writes a full book exclusively devoted to a particular country, with such a comprehensive title as of the book under review, the readers certainly expect a complete, meticulous and all-embracing account of the subject matter.

I hope Amin will take notice of these friendly remarks and suggestions. If he is taking out from *Middle East Legal System* also the chapters on Afghanistan and Kuwait and turning them into separate books, I hope the new books will not simply be magnified forms of his present chapters in the *Middle East Legal System*.

TAHIR MAHMOOD

FAZLUR RAHMAN

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF AL-ZAMAKHSHARI'S COMMENTARY ON THE QUR'AN: AL-KASHSHAF

Dept. of Sunni Theology, Aligarh Muslim University, 1982; 576 +22+8 pp;Price: Rs.55/=

Abū al-Qāsim Maḥmūd b. 'Umar b. Aḥmad Jar-Allāh al-Zamakshari (b. A.H. 467/A.D. 1075 d.A.H.538/A.D. 1144) a Mu'tazilite by faith and practice and a distinguished scholar of theology, *Tafsīr*, philology, rhetoric and literature, was born in Khawarizm and died in Jurjania in the same district. He went to Baghdad in search of knowledge and travelled extensively in the Muslim world. (One of his legs had been seriously afflicted by severe cold during these itineraries and according to Ibn Khallikān it was replaced by a wooden leg. I am inclined to believe that when Rūmī says: *pā'i istidlāliyān chawbīn buwad/Pā'i chawbīn sakht be tamkīn buwad*, he is making a reference to Zamakhsharī.) He also remained for quite sometime in Makkah hence his title *Jār-Allāh*.

Zamakhsharī was a prolific writer. Prof. Fazlur Rahman has enumerated 73 works of Zamakhsharī of which 17 have been published, 18 are found in manuscript form and 38 are extinct. Worth mentioning among them are: *Asas al-Balāghah, al-Mufassal, al-Unmūdhaj, al-Mufrad al-Mu'allaf, Muqaddimat al-Adab, al-Fā'iq fī Gharīb al-Hadīth, Aṭwāq al-Dhahab*, etc. But his most important and much-discussed work is his famous *tafsīr* of the Qur'ān namely, *al-Kashshāf*, completed, according to Ḥajjī Khalīfah in A.H. 528/A.D.1134. Its full title is: *al-Kashshāf 'an Ḥaqā'iq Ghawāmiḍ al-Tanzīl wa 'Uyūn al-Aqāwīl fī Wujūh al-Ta'wīl*. The author of *Mufaṣṣal* (vol.ii) informs us that it was completed on 23rd of Rajab A.H.528 (19th May A.D.1133) in Makkah. *Al-Kashshāf* has been a subject of discussion right from the day of its compilation. Zamakhsharī obtained wide fame for his erudition during his lifetime, so much so that poets composed verses eulogizing him and distinguished theologians tried to obtain *ijāzah* from him to transmit his works. On the other hand, he was bitterly criticized by a group of *ahl al-Sunnah* particularly those who believed that *tafsīr bi al-ra'i* (purely rational interpretation of the Qur'ān) was unlawful. It is to be noted that a considerable portion of *tafsīr bi al-ma'thūr* (traditional exegesis) transmitted from the Companions or the *Tābi'ūn* does also reflect their opinions on certain issues.

Zamakhsharī had an extra-ordinary command over the Arabic language, its subtle qualities and philological sensibilities. He was equally well-versed in logic;

philosophy and *kalām*. His approach in *al-Kashshāf* is rationalistic and philosophical and he is so strong in his convictions that at points he oversteps all bounds in order to justify his stand. He is deadly against Sufis and refutes the very concept of 'love'—which is the cornerstone of Sufi ideology. According to him, 'love' can occur only between mortal and material beings. There cannot be a relationship of 'love' between God and mortal human beings. According to Zamakhsharī, love of a human being is the 'prayers' that he offers, and that of God the mercy and reward that He vouchsafes.

According to Ahmad Amin, Zamakhsharī was the last genius who advocated *I'tizāl* and wrote a commentary of the Qur'ān full of logical force. His *tafsīr al-Kashshāf* is based on the famous five principles of the Mu'tazilites, i.e. *Tawhīd*, *'Adl* (justice), *al-Wa'd wa al-Wa'īd* (promises & threats) *al-Manzilah bayn al-Manzilatayn* (the stage between two stages), *al-Amr bi al-Ma'rūf wa al-Nahī 'an al-Munkar* (the injunction to practise virtue and eschew vice). He was a staunch believer in the theory of *khalq-i Qur'ān* (createdness of the Qur'ān) a burning theological issue during the Abbasid Caliphate. Our sources say that he was a man of dignity who loved virtue and restrained himself from trivial things and silly conduct. Throughout his life he remained devoted to thinking, writing and imparting knowledge fearlessly and candidly.

Apart from being a commentator of the Qur'ān he was a scholar of no mean calibre in the fields of grammar, syntax, philology, rhetorics and literature whom none of his contemporaries could excell.

Professor Fazlur Rahman for the first time, not merely in Urdu but in any near eastern languages, has undertaken a detailed critical study of the *Kashshāf*. He informs us in the preface:

> The book, originally a doctoral thesis on which the author was admitted to the degree of Ph.D. in Islamic Studies by the Aligarh Muslim University in 1971, tries to analyze *al-Kashshāf* with reference to its adoption of the principle of *I'tizāl*, its exposition of the inimitability of the Qur'ān based on Arabic rhetoric, its attitude towards *tafsīr bi al-ma'thūr*, and its rationalistic approach to Qur'ānic exegesis. Besides, it deals in detail with the development of various schools of *tafsīr* until the 6th century of the Hijrah.

Speaking of the scope and treatment of the book the author states:

> "*Al-Kashshāf* is the only extant Mu'tazilite commentary on the Qur'ān. It is also the first and by far the most successful effort to apply the principles of Arabic rhetoric to Qur'ānic exegesis with a view to laying bare bases of the *I'jāz*, the inimitability of the Qur'ān.... He, for the first time in the history of Qur'ānic exegesis, produced an explication of the entire Qur'ān on the ground work of rhetorical principles exposing thereby the roots of the inimitability of the Qur'ān and establishing its *I'jāz* on literary grounds.

The book under review contains 606 pages of large size. The study has made use of 408 books in Arabic, English and Urdu, a detailed bibliography of which is appended at the end. It is divided into four major chapters. The first is on the life and works of Zamakhsharī, the second deals with *al-Kashshaf* and *I'tizāl*, discussing at length the five doctrines of the Mu'tazilite. The third chapter deals with *al-Kashshāf and I'jāz al-Qur'ān* while the fourth elaborates the exegetical trends of *al-Kashshāf*. In the concluding part of the book Prof. Fazlur Rahman has recorded the opinions of scholars on the merits and demerits of the *Tafsīr* and the work done on it from the 6th century to the present day.

The book is undoubtedly a research

work of the top quality. Footnotes and cross references have been cited profusely No significant source on the subject, whether primary or secondary, has been left unexploited. It can be said that such a thorough, analytical study of the *tafsīr* of Zamakhsharī is not available at the moment in any language including Arabic.

The author has not given the Urdu translation of Arabic passages quoted abundantly throughout the book and has tried to justify this lacuna in his preface. But, since the book is primarily meant for Urdu readers rendering of such quotations into the language of the book should be deemed necessary. Calligraphy of the book, printed in litho, is not of a good quality and printing is still more defective We would suggest to the learned author to render this highly scholarly research work into Arabic so that a larger group of scholars of Islamic studies may be benefitted.

NISAR AHMED FARUQI

I. P. GUPTA

AGRA : THE IMPERIAL CAPITAL (16TH AND 17TH CENTURIES): URBAN GLIMPSES OF MUGHAL INDIA

Discovery Publishers, Delhi, 1986; 159 pp.; Price Rs. 100/-

The work under review consists, besides a brief introduction, of five chapters of unequal length and two appendices. (Appendix 'A' mentions the dates of the Emperors' shifts from Agra to other places, and the duration of their absence from the city, whereas Appendix 'B' is a chart, containing the names of the officers posted in Agra to look after its affairs during the absence of the Emperor). As for the introduction, it briefly discusses the importance of the study of urban history and the nature of source material, pointing out, in particular, the defects in the accounts left by the European travellers. Like the "Introduction," the first chapter "Beginning" briefly describes the history of Agra town since ancient times. The author would have us believe that, in spite of its antiquity, Agra remained an insignificant place till Akbar made it his capital in A D 1565. That, with the construction of the Fort, royal palaces and other public buildings, Agra soon developed into an important centre of trade and culture in the Empire. It is a pity that no attempt has been made to explore evidence in the sources about the emergence of Agra as a metropolitan city under the fostering care of Sultan Sikandar Lodī. The Lodi sultan founded Agra at some distance from the old fortified town and then shifted his capital from Delhi to it. The ideal site, selected by the sultan, was situated between the villages of Poya and Basuh. For its rapid development, nine *parganahs* were separated from the fifty-two *parganahs* of the *sarkar* (territorial unit) of Bayana and included in the newly-constituted *sarkar* of Agra (Cf. Ni'mat-Allāh Harāvī, *Ta'rīkh-i Khān Jahānī*, ed. Imam al-Din, vol. 1, Dacca, pp 195-96). The incidental references available in the *Wāqi'āt-i Mushtāqī* to Agra of the Lodi Sultans shed interesting light on how Agra was planned under Sultan Sikandar Lodī The separate shopping centres, such as *bāzār-i chahārsū* (square) and *nakhkhās* (market for the cattle, war horses and slaves) were built separately There were also streets for different artisans; the specialists of a particular craft had their shops in a separate lane. For example, the darners, *sarrāfs*, (money-lenders and bankers) and jewellers had their establishments in separate lanes,

each known after their craft. The relevant evidence about the establishment of *kārkhānahs* (workshops) established by the sultan and his nobles in the new capital tends to show that skilled artisans turned from different places to Agra and got employment there. Moreover, the court-generated trade always provided incentive to the merchants to come to the royal capital with their commercial goods. It was Agra's importance as a city that made Babur choose it as his capital in place of Delhi. (Cf. Rizq-Allāh Mushtāqī, *Wāqi'āt-i Mushtāqī*, MS. British Library, London, Add 11,633, ff. 15a, 16a, 18b, 19b, 25b, 33b, 57a, 69b.)

Chapter 2, entitled "Growth of the City," gives a graphic description of the buildings, royal as well as private, in and outside the walls of the city. This chapter contains interesting details of the suburban expansion of Agra along with the characteristic features of beautiful mosques, residential villas, pleasure gardens etc. Of them *ḥammāms* (or public baths) seem to have been introduced by the Mughals in India after their conquest in 1526. Discussing the popularity of *ḥammām* in the Mughal city, the author correctly quotes the figures that by the end of the 17th century, the number of *ḥammāms* in Agra had increased to eight hundred. It may, however, be pointed out that the author fails to explain the different functions of the Mughal *ḥammām*. Had he utilized the contemporary Persian sources (not available in English translation), he would have known that people did not get into *ḥammām* for taking bath alone, but it served as a recreation centre as well. The relevant evidence contained in the *Wāqi'āt-i Bāburī* tends to reveal that the *ḥammāms*, constructed by the order of Bābur in 1527 in Agra and other places, were large mansions, consisting a number of rooms. They were kept cool or warm through the pipes of water according to the requirement of the season. Shaykh Zayn tells us that in India "people are much distressed by flies, heat, dust and swift-hot winds (during the summer) but *ḥammām* provided relief against these troubles. The Khurasanis, Samarqandis and others (foreigners), excluding Indians, benefit from the *ḥammāms* during the summer and winter alike" (Shaykh Zayn, *Wāqi'āt-i Bāburī*, MS British Library, London, Or. 1999, ff. 185b-86a). Mullā 'Abd al-Qādir Badā'ūnī's reference to the *ḥammām* in his *Najāt al-Rashīd* supplements the evidence when he states that *ṣalāh* (prayer) should not be offered inside a *ḥammām* for people visit it for merrymaking "Men and women stay there naked and indulge in the pleasure of flesh and wine." (*Najāt al-Rashīd*, ed. Syed Moin-ul Haque, Lahore, 1972, p. 364.)

Chapter 3, "Economic Profile" is invaluable as it provides insights into the progress of trade and commerce, different crafts and the role played by the merchants, both Indian and foreign. The court-generated trade had really turned Agra into an emporium of international status. The author has properly tapped the sources of information on various crafts and professions in Agra but it is strange that the evidence about the catering profession in the urban centres that absorbed a large number of people everywhere has escaped his notice. The caterers' shops were found in every important town and city. Similarly, the cooks, trained in preparing special dishes were in demand among the members of the ruling elite. The royal kitchen, described by Abū al-Faḍl in the *Ā'īn*, employed hundreds of cooks, each a specialist in preparing a certain dish. Likewise, there is no reference to the craft of darners. The darners of Agra had distinguished themselves as men of high skill in their profession. The costly fabric, damaged in accidents could be darned in such a way that the damage was not visible (*Waqi'āt-i Mushtaqi*, f. 95a). No work on economic profile of the metropolitan city of Mughal India can be thought complete without a reference to book trade which was a lucrative business since the foundation of the Delhi Sultanate. It provided means of livelihood, besides the booksellers, to innumerable persons, such as scribes and book-binders.

The remaining two chapters, entitled "Royalty and the Administration" and "Social Structure of the City," respectively, suffer at places either from the erroneous

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

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

INFLUENCE OF SUHRAWARDI ON ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

MEHDI AMINRAZAVI

SUHRAWARDĪ was born in a village near Zanjan, a northern Iranian city. His full name is Shihāb al-Dīn Yaḥyā ibn Ḥabash ibn Amīrak Abu'l-Futūḥ Suhrawardī, known as *al-Maqtūl* (the Martyr), who also received the title *Shaykh al-Ishrāq* (the Master of Illumination). The date of his birth is not certain. His most notable biographer, Shahrazūrī,[1] indicates that he was born in 545/1166 or 550/1171. At an early age he went to the city of Maragheh, where he studied *Ḥikmat* with Majd al-Dīn Jīlī, and then travelled to Isfahan, where he studied philosophy with Ẓāhir al-Dīn al-Fārisī and the *Observations (al-Baṣā'ir)* of 'Umar ibn Sahlān al-Sāwī.[2] He then set out upon a long journey through the Islamic lands to meet the Sufi masters while practising asceticism and withdrawing for long spiritual retreats. He tells us that he looked for a companion with a spiritual insight equal to his, but he failed to find one.[3]

While wandering through Anatolia and Syria on one of his journeys from Damascus to Aleppo, he met Malik Ẓāhir, the son of the famous Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn al-Ayyūbī (Saladin). Yāqūt ibn 'Abd-Allāh al-Ḥamawī[4] has put the date of this journey to Syria at 579/1200. Shahrazūrī, his contemporary and biographer, writes:

> ...Malik liked the Shaykh and he liked him. The *'Ulamā'* of Syria gathered around the Shaykh and heard his words. In discussions he clarified the thoughts of the *ḥukamā'* and their validity and weakened the opinion of the opponents of the *ḥukamā'*.[5]

Suhrawardī advocated a type of wisdom which was inconsistent with the views of the orthodox jurists, who finally asked Malik Ẓāhir to put Suhrawardī to death for advocating heretical ideas. When he refused they signed a petition and sent it to Ṣalāḥ al-Dīn, who ordered his son to have him killed. Malik Ẓāhir reluctantly carried out his father's order and Suhrawardī was executed in the year 587/1208. Taqhribirdī states[6] that Suhrawardī's death took place on the Friday of the month of July (Dhu'l-Ḥijjah).

Unlike earlier Sufis and gnostics in Islam, Suhrawardī maintained that philosophical discourse was necessary for the presentation of an argument or thesis. This was quite revolutionary since Sufis rejected rationalistic philosophy as exemplified by the Peripatetics, who in turn rejected Sufism.[7]

Suhrawardī's *Ishrāqī* school marked a turning point in the history of Islamic philosophy since it changed the direction and nature of philosophical thinking from a purely rationalistic approach to one that considered ascetic practices to be part of the epistemological paradigm. Most of the schools of philosophy that came after Suhrawardī in one way or another were influenced by him. Some of them, such as the *Shaykhiyah* movement, despite having *Ishrāqī* ideas, opposed Suhrawardī's school of illumination. The school of *Ishrāq* was not only instrumental in reconciling the two traditions of wisdom that thus far were in conflict with one another, that is Sufism and the Peripatetic philosophy, but also brought about a harmony between them. The result was that purification and asceticism became a necessary condition for philosophical speculation and ultimately the attainment of truth. In what follows, I wish to demonstrate how Suhrawardī's ideas spread in different parts of the Islamic world. The purpose is not to show specific links that exist between Suhrawardī and his successors, since that requires a close textual reading which is beyond the scope of this work. Any discussion of how Suhrawardī's *Ishrāqī* tradition influenced other philosophers requires extensive discussion. Therefore, my study of Suhrawardī's influence is merely a historical review and not a textual comparison between Suhrawardī and some of the other *Ishrāqī* philosophers.

While it was greater Persia and the subcontinent of India that by virtue of their historical, cultural and intellectual backgrounds became a cradle for the school of illumination, the influence of Suhrawardī's ideas

spread in five geographical areas. These areas are:

1) Greater Persia
2) The subcontinent of India
3) Syria
4) Spain and North Africa
5) The West

GREATER PERSIA

The Safavid Period

Suhrawardī's school of illumination left a profound and permanent influence on the tradition of wisdom in Persia. The influence erupted into a powerful philosophical movement that reached its zenith in the "school of Isfahān." The masterly expositions and commentaries upon the transcendental theosophy of Suhrawardī that issued from this movement are still being avidly studied today.

Suhrawardī and Persian culture are organically related in that the former's illuminationist school provided the basis upon which an esoteric interpretation of Shī'ite Islam could be formulated.[8] On the one hand, Shī'ite Islam puts a great deal of emphasis on intellect (*'aql*) as a means for the attainment of truth, while on the other hand, adherence to an esoteric knowledge that can be attained only through practising asceticism is a long-lasting tradition in Persia. Suhrawardī's school of illumination considers both intellectual discourse and the practice of asceticism to be necessary for the attainment of truth.

It is, therefore, no accident that Suhrawardī's philosophy, which emphasizes the elements of knowledge and practice, come into prominence during the Safavid period when Shī'ite Islam was adopted as the official state religion. Shī'ite Islam, with its emphasis on the twelve Imāms as a chain of initiators and the Muhammadan light (*nūr Muhammadī*) as the legitimizing factor in this chain of initiation, was naturally receptive to *Ishrāqī* doctrine.

Besides the religious elements that enabled Suhrawardī's ideas to take root in Persia, various commentaries and expositions that helped to consolidate his ideas have to be mentioned. The most important work was the commentary of Shahrazūrī on *Hikmat al-Ishrāq* and *al-Talwīḥāt*

(680/1281) that is considered by many to be a classic. Also the commentaries of such masters as Ibn Kammūnah (667/1269), 'Allāmah Ḥillī (693/1293), Qutb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, Athīr al-Dīn Abharī,[9] Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī and, finally, Mullā Ṣadrā were influential in spreading the ideas of Suhrawardī.

Abharī and Ṭūsī are known for their Peripatetic writings but they were, nevertheless, highly influenced by Suhrawardī. For example, Abharī in his work *Kashf al-Ḥaqā'iq fī Taḥrīr al-Daqā'iq,* which is a perfect representation of Suhrawardī's teachings, discusses a number of philosophical issues from an *Ishrāqī* point of view. Before the Safavid period, such figures as Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī and Ibn Abī Jumhūr and his major work *Kitāb al-Mujlī* played a major role in allowing the *Ishrāqī* school to reach its climax during the Safavid period.

The religious ambience of Persia, its historical and cultural characteristics, and the existence of an essentially gnostic element in the Persian *Weltanschauung,* helped to establish Suhrawardī as a figure with whom Persians felt at home. S.H. Nasr states:

> By the beginning of the eighth/fourteenth century the *ishrāqi* school had become definitely established in Persia and henceforth it remained as an important element of the intellectual life of not only Persians but also the eastern lands of Islam where the Persian Islamic culture has been dominant.[10]

The powerful political movement of the Safavids and the keen interest of the Safavid kings in nourishing the intellectual life of Persia brought about the culmination of the tradition of *Ishrāqī* theosophy. In what follows I will present an account of a number of theosophists whose works and commentaries have constituted the bulk of literature known as the school of Isfahan.

Ishrāqī Philosophers Before the School of Isfahan

Among the significant figures who emerged just prior to the Safavid period, and for all practical purposes are considered to belong to the school of Isfahan, are: Ṣadr al-Dīn Dashtakī and his son, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Manṣūr Dashtakī. Manṣūr wrote extensively on the Peripatetics, such as his commentary on the *Ishārāt* and a treatise on ethics. However, it is his commentary on Suhrawardī's *Hayākil al-Nūr* that shows the extent

to which he was influenced by Suhrawardī. His works offer a perfect presentation of *Ishrāqī* theosophy that particularly influenced Mullā Ṣadrā, with whom he was often confused. Manṣūr in a sense represents a successful attempt to bring about a rapprochement between the Peripatetic philosophy as represented by Ibn Sīnā and the *Ishrāqī* tradition. To bring about a union between the rationalistic philosophy of Aristotle and the spiritual message of Plato's philosophy has indeed been a long-standing goal of Muslim philosophers.

A number of other intellectuals of this period not only carried out an *Ishrāqī* reading of Ibn Sīnā, but also paid attention to the gnosis of Ibn 'Arabī who was introduced to the Persians through the works of his student, Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī. Ibn Turkah Iṣfahānī (8th/14th) is another figure whose attempt to bring together philosophy and gnosis, as represented in his major work, *Tamhīd al-Qawā'id*, influenced many of his successors, in particular Sayyid Ḥaydar Āmulī. Āmulī interpreted Shī'ite Islam in the light of the writings of Suhrawardī, Ibn 'Arabī, and Ibn Sīnā, and created a philosophical synthesis. Āmulī's important work, *Jāmi' al-Asrār*, exemplifies the type of spiritual hermeneutics *(ta'wīl)* that is practised by the *Ishrāqī* school even today. Among other figures of this tradition, besides Ibn Abī Jumhūr, who has been mentioned earlier, one can name Rajab Burṣī, who wrote *Mashāriq al-Anwār*. He was also engaged in the integration of *Ishrāq*, Ibn 'Arabī's gnostic doctrine, the works of the Peripatetics, and Shī'ite doctrines.

Concerning the attempt for a unified and well-integrated philosophical paradigm by the important figures of this period, S.H. Nasr states:

> The integration of *ishrāqī* teaching into Shi'ism was...rapid and profound, with the result that during later centuries most of the ishrāqī's have been Shi'ite. During the period pre-dating the Safavids, such Shi'ite theologians as Seyyed Haydar Āmulī and especially Ibn Abi Jumhūr prepared the ground for the integration of *ishrāqī* wisdom into the perspective of Shi'ism.[11]

Among the figures who were instrumental in the revival of the school of Isfahan, three well known theosophists can be named. First, there is Mīr Dāmād, who is the founder of the school of Isfahan. Then his most famous student, Mullā Ṣadrā, and his school of "transcendental

theosophy'' *(al-hikmat al-ilahiyah)* can be named. Finally, there is Mullā Hādī Sabzawārī, who once again revived the teachings of Suhrawardī in 19th-century Persia. Since the teachings of the above figures constituted a historical chain, I will consider their ideas at some length.

School of Isfahan

The founder of the school of Isfahan, Mīr Muhammad Bāqir Dāmād Husaynī Astarābādī, known as ''Mir Dāmād,'' and often referred to as the ''third teacher'' *(mu'allim al-thālith)*, was one of the most outstanding figures of this period. He was in a unique position to revive the *hikmat* since he was highly esteemed by the jurists as well as the court. In that capacity he attempted to revive and reconcile Ibn Sīnā and Suhrawardī.

> He may be considered as an ishraqi interpreter of Ibn Sīnā's metaphysics in the spiritual universe of Shi'ism.[12]

While Mīr Dāmād defended the rationalistic philosophy of the Peripatetics, he too, like Suhrawardī, made a distinction between rationalization and illumination. Whereas Suhrawardī placed emphasis upon the Orient versus the Occident, Mīr Dāmād distinguished between *Yamanī* and *Yunānī* (Greek) philosophy.[13] *Yamanī* is the same as the Orient and represents the illuminative, while *Yūnānī* stands for discursive philosophy.

While Mīr Dāmād commented on a number of philosophically significant topics, especially on the principiality of the essence *(asālat al-māhiyah)*, the thrust of his philosophy remained the problem of the *hudūth* (creation) or *qidam* (eternity) of the world. He attempted to synthesize Suhrawardī's philosophy of illumination and Ibn Sīnā's philosophy. Mīr Dāmād accepted Suhrawardī's principiality of essence over existence but contrary to the *Ishrāqīs* who consider the incorporeal world and the archetypes *(al-mujarradāt)* to have been created in the ''divine essence'' *(al-hudūth al-dhātī)*, he considers them to have ''corporeal creation'' *(hudūth al-dahrī)*. He argues that while the cause of the creation of these archetypes may be in the divine essence, the event or effect occurs in the created domain *(dahr)*.

In the *Qabasāt*,[14] Mīr Dāmād quotes Ibn Sīnā extensively and interprets him in a way that supports his own view of the corporeal createdness *(ḥudūth al-dhātī)*. There are those contemporary interpreters[15] of Mīr Dāmād who argue that some of his interpretations of Ibn Sīnā were purely from an *Ishrāqī* point of view and, therefore, are not entirely accurate.

Mīr Dāmād devotes a major portion of his *Qabasāt* to a discussion of the principiality of essence. His argument, a very complex one, roughly goes as follows: It is apparent that an existent being does not only exist by virtue of its own existence but because it has such a thing called "essence" *(māhīyah)*. Now, either the essence precedes the existence in the order of creation or vice versa. In either case, the order can not be only a conceptual one in our mind or a random arrangement made for the sake of convenience, but this order must be intrinsic or innate to the ontological structure of the universe.

From this Mīr Dāmād concludes that the essence of an existence being must be the principial element, since it is inconceivable to have an existent being which is made up of pure existence *(wujūd)*. What makes Mīr Dāmād's discussion unique in the tradition of Islamic philosophy is how he relates the above to his analysis of different types of time, which is perhaps the most important and complex part of Mīr Dāmād's philosophy.[16]

Among the fifty works of Mīr Dāmad which are committed to the revival of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy from an *Ishraqi* point of view, the following can be named: *Qabasāt, Taqwim al-Iman, al-Ufuq al-Mubin*, and *Taqdisāt*. Mīr Dāmād has also written a number of works in Persian, among which are *Jazawāt, al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm* and the collection of his works in Persian and Arabic titled *Mashāriq al-Anwār*.

As I mentioned before, despite Mīr Dāmād's contribution to Islamic philosophy and Shi'ite gnosis as the founder of the school of Isfahan, perhaps his greatest achievement was training a number of students, some of whom like Mullā Ṣadrā came to dominate the intellectual scene and overshadow the teacher. I will only mention the name of a few figures who played an important role in continuing the *Ishrāqī* wisdom of Suhrawardī.

Among such figures one can name Mīr Dāmād's son-in-law, Sayyid Aḥmad 'Alawī, the author of a commentary on Ibn Sīnā, Quṭb al-Dīn Ashkiwārī, who wrote a book on the history of philosophy called *Maḥbūb al-Qulūb*, and Mullā Khalīl Qazwīnī, who wrote a commentary on *Uṣūl al-Kāfī* of Kulaynī and is regarded as an authority on Shī'ite jurisprudence. There were many other figures who are less known, among whom Mullā Shams Gīlānī can be mentioned. He wrote extensively on Mīr Dāmād's view of creation and eternity and commented on Mullā Ṣadrā.

The second outstanding figure is Shaykh Bahā' al-Dīn Āmulī, whose influence goes beyond the sphere of philosophy and extends into architecture, jurisprudence, Arabic grammar and poetry. Āmulī, known as Shaykh Bahā'ī, is not only respected for the ninety works he wrote in all areas of the Islamic sciences, but also revered because he became the teacher of many scholars who went to Isfahan. While he is not particularly known for his works on *ḥikmat*, he nevertheless tried to reflect the spirit of *ḥikmat* in his architectural designs. His Sufi poetry, which is written in the style of Rūmī and is reflected in his book *Ṭūṭī-nāmah*, is perhaps the best representative of his mystical views.

The greatest achievement of Shaykh Bahā'ī is the fact that he trained such scholars as Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī, Sayyid Aḥmad 'Alawī, and Mullā Muhammad Taqī Majlisī. It is for this reason, as well as his unique achievements in architecture, that he has gained almost a mythical personality, so much so that performing miracles has been attributed to him.

The third figure of the school of Isfahan who, despite his eminence and far-reaching influence, is less known, is Mīr Abu al-Qāsim Findiriskī. He travelled to India and had extensive contacts with Hindu Masters to whom he alludes in a major work called *Uṣūl al-Fuṣūl*, along with his commentaries on other traditional fields of Islamic intellectual activities. Among his works are *Risālat al-Ḥarakah* and *Risālah Ṣanā'iyah*. A major theme in his works, besides theosophical ideas, is a summary of *ḥikmat* which appears in his book on poetry called *Qarīdah*. Mīr Findiriskī, like other members of the school of Isfahan who tried to express their experiential knowledge through Ibn Sīnā's philosophy, not only succeeded in doing so but also trained a number of fine scholars, among whom Mullā Rāfi'a Gīlānī and Āqā Ḥusayn Khuwansārī can be named. His

most famous student is Mullā Rajab 'Alī Tabrīzī, the author of *Kilīd-i Bihisht.*[17]

Another figure of great importance in the school of Isfahan is Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī (1598-1680), the best student of Mullā Ṣadrā, who wrote over 120 works. Beside writing on different religious sciences, he wrote extensively on such works as Ibn 'Arabī's *al-Futūḥāt al-Makkiyah* and Rūmī's *Mathnavī*. Kashānī's work represents Shī'ite gnosis at its best. His major work, *al-Mahajjat al-Bada' fi Iḥyā' al-Iḥyā'*, was based upon Ghazālī's *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al-Dīn*.

> In fact what Mullā Muḥsin did was to revive the work of Ghazzālī in the Shi'ite circle by "Shi'ifying" it.[18]

Kāshānī brought the integration of the school of illumination to its completion. He used the rationalism of Ibn Sīnā and the theosophical ideas of Suhrawardī to offer an analysis of the twelve-Imām Shī'ite Islam.

Other prominent figures of this school, Mullā 'Abd al-Razzāq Lāhījī and his student Qāḍī Qūmmī, can be mentioned. Lāhīji is best known for his contribution to the field of *Kalām,* which he carried out within the matrix of *ḥikmat*. Having been influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā, he wrote a number of works of a purely *Ishraqi* nature such as *Ḥudūth al-'Ālam,* commentary on *Hayākil al-Nūr*.

Qāḍī Sa'īd Qummī, who came to be known as the Ibn 'Arabī of the Shī'ite tradition, devoted his writing to the type of spiritual hermeneutics *(ta'wīl)* that was intended to elaborate on the esoteric meaning of the Qur'ān and other Islamic doctrine and rites. Towards the end of the Safavid period two events occurred. First, the Sufis, who had enjoyed relative freedom, began to be viewed as those who had deviated from the Islamic rites *(Shari'ah)* by the more exoteric elements *('Ulamā')* and therefore were persecuted. The second element was the weakening of the central government and the consequent prevalence of a more austere and orthodox atmosphere. Despite this change, however, there was a number of *ḥakīms* who emerged at the end of the Safavid period and provided a transition between the Safavid and the Qajar periods.

The first important figure who belongs to this period is Ḥasan

Lunbānī (13th/19th century) whose philosophical Sufism did not go well with the exoteric *'Ulamā'* and who was accused of being a Sufi. The second significant *ḥakīm* of this period was Mirzā Muḥammad Ṣādiq Ardistānī, who taught *ḥikmat* and carried on the tradition of Mullā Ṣadrā. During this period, such figures as Ardistānī and Mīr Sayyid Ḥasan Ṭāliqānī, began to use *Ishrāqī* texts in the *Madrasah*. Ṭāliqānī, for example, taught Ibn 'Arabī's *Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam* and Suhrawardī's *Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, while being influenced by Mullā Ṣadrā.

Despite an environment which was hostile to Sufism and *ḥikmat*, both flourished until the Qajar period when another upsurge of intellectual activities occurred, although it never produced as many outstanding figures as the Safavid period did. Before commenting on the status of the school of illumination during the Qajar period, it is necessary to say a few words about Mullā Ṣadrā and Suhrawardī. This is because, while Mullā Ṣadrā was influenced by Suhrawardī, his monumental philosophical synthesis nevertheless has shaped and in a sense determined the course of philosophical activities in Persia even up to the present day. Therefore, an understanding of the *Ishrāqī* tradition in general and Shī'ite gnosis in particular requires an understanding of these two giants, Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā.

Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā

Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā represent two distinct approaches to *ḥikmat*. Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophical system includes that of Suhrawardī but makes major changes so that it incorporates Ibn Sīnā's Peripatetic interpretations as well as Suhrawardī's *Ishrāqī* ideas. It is for this reason that Mullā Ṣadrā has dominated Islamic philosophy in Iran until today.

It is generally believed that Suhrawardī's dominance of Islamic philosophy was substantially curtailed by Mullā Ṣadrā whose criticisms and expositions of Suhrawardian doctrine established him as the foremost authority on transcendental theosophy *(ḥikmat al-muta'ālīyah)*.

The most important achievement of Mullā Ṣadrā, however, was to have reversed the Suhrawardian ontology that was based on light to Ibn Sīnā's gradations of Being. This important change took place in a way that the overall philosophical structure of Suhrawardī remained intact

with one exception, that is the pre-dominance of the principiality of existence *(aṣālat al-wujūd)* over Suhrawardī's principiality of essence *(aṣālat al-mahīyah)*.

Ṣadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī (980/1571), born in Shīrāz, left us with over fifty books which range from commentaries on *Ḥadīth* collections, such as the *Uṣūl al-Kāfī*, to his Peripatetic writings as in the case of *Kitāb Sharḥ al-Hidāyah*. There are also those works which defend the principles of illumination such as *al-Shawāhid al-Rubūbīyah*, *Kitāb al-Hidāyah*, *Ḥikmat al-'Arshīyah*, his famous commentary upon Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination* called *Sharḥ-i Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, and finally his *opus magnum*, the *al-Ḥikmat al-Muta'āliyah fī al-Asfār al-Arba'at al-'Aqlīyah*.

Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy is a synthesis of major intellectual currents in Islam. They are, as S.H. Nasr states:

> Kalām, Peripatetic philosophy, *Ishrāqī* theosophy, and Irfān. In Mullā Ṣadrā we find elements of Ghazzāli, Ibn Sīnā, Suhrawardi and particularly Ibn 'Arabi. Moreover, there is Sufism especially in its gnostic aspect which serves as the background for this whole synthesis.[19]

The central difference between Mullā Ṣadrā and Suhrawardī lies in their ontological views. According to Mullā Ṣadrā, who advocated the principiality of being *(aṣalāt al-wujūd)*, and the gradations of Being *(Tashkīk)*, each of the existent beings has a different ontological status. While Being itself is absolute, there is a unity amongst all the gradations of beings that are emanated from Being. So far, Mullā Sadrā's system is similar to that of Suhrawardī, the only difference being that Mullā Sadrā has substituted Being for Light.

What constitutes the major difference between them is their account of the hierarchy in which they believe. Mullā Ṣadrā argues that gradation is applicable to the realm of existence *(wujūd)* and cannot include anything else such as essence *(māhīyah)*.[20] Suhrawardī takes the opposite position by maintaining that gradation makes sense only if applied within the realm of essences. This difference stems from their attempt to account for the existing differences between things.

Mullā Ṣadrā, in the *Mashā'ir*, argues that the reality of every being lies in its actual and external existence. In other words, existing objects

are the externalization of the concept or the idea of that particular thing. He argues that the existence of Mr. Row indicates the actualization of existence as such. In order for a man to exist, his existence must be real; otherwise, his essence cannot be actualized without the presence of existence. Without existence, essence cannot manifest itself and will remain in its archetypal form. Therefore, in order to come into existence, existence must precede essence and not vice versa, as Suhrawardī maintained.

Seyyed Jalāl Āshtiyanī, in his book *Hastī az Naẓar-i Falsafah wa 'Irfān* [Existence from a Philosophical and Gnostic View],[21] offers a lengthy discussion of the contention between Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā's views of Being and Existence. He summarizes Mullā Ṣadrā's view as follows:

> The existent being that has an essence must then be caused and existence that is pure existence... is therefore, a Necessary Being.[22]

Therefore, for Mullā Ṣadrā, who advocates the principiality of existence *(aṣālat al-wujūd)* rather than essence *(aṣālat al-māhīyah)*, existence precedes essence. His general argument to this effect is that something has to exist first and then have an essence. It is primarily this argument which lies at the heart of Mullā Ṣadrā's view.

According to Āshtiyānī, there is another reading of Mullā Ṣadrā's argument and, in my opinion, a correct one, that goes beyond the classical distinction between essence and existence. Āhtiyanī maintains that both in the *Asfār* and the *Mashā'ir* Mullā Ṣadrā offers a middle road theory that is a rapprochement between those who argue for the principiality of essence and those who advocate the principiality of existence. It can be argued that according to Mullā Ṣadra existence as such is a category of different degrees. Each degree corresponds to one level of reality and this reality on the one hand is pure existence and on the other hand, since the extent to which a thing exists constitutes what a thing is, it also corresponds to an existent being. Therefore, at one level an existent being is pure existence *(wujūd)* and at another it is essence or *māhīyah*.

To put this differently, since all existent beings are essentially different in existence on the hierarchy of existence, essence and existence

become one and the same. The argument is fundamentally Suhrawardian since he also makes a correspondence between existent beings and their intensity of light on the basis of the ontological status. While the ontological structure of Mullā Ṣadrā and Suhrawardī remains the same, what differentiates their views is the basic constituent element of all existent beings, which for Suhrawardī is light and for Mullā Ṣadrā is existence.

It is, in fact, the above argument that demonstrates the extent of Suhrawardī's influence on Mullā Ṣadrā on the most fundamental level, which is their ontology. The argument can be called a "middle road position" which goes beyond the traditional essence/existence distinction by arguing that these are essentially the same. Therefore, Mullā Ṣadrā's answer to the classical problem of whether essence precedes existence or vice versa is that they are one reality in different aspects.

Suhrawardī argues that the essence of a thing constitutes its identity, and, therefore, gradation of the essence determines the nature and identity of that object. Existence for Suhrawardī is a universal concept that cannot have gradations, whereas "sweetness" can be sweeter or less sweet. Therefore, whereas something can be more or less sweet, something cannot "exist more" or "exist less." All things either "are" or "are not," and, therefore, the concept of gradation in this regard does not make sense. While there is a common element between all sweet things regardless of their intensity or weakness, such cannot be said to be true for all existing beings.

Mullā Ṣadra's argument against Suhrawardī's position goes as follows: When we say A is more black than B, we are not only talking in terms of their essence but we are making an ontological statement. If we consider absolute blackness to be X then A and B are different statuses of blackness in respect to X. In other words X already contains A and B within itself, and if A and B are to come into existence, they have to be regarded as different existential states of X.[23]

One can argue that Mullā Ṣadrā has not refuted Suhrawardī's view but expressed Suhrawardī's ontology, which is based on intensity and weakness of light, in an existential context. Therefore, something which is, for example, sweeter than something else belongs to a higher ontological status, since from Mullā Ṣadrā's point of view it "exists more," while for Suhrawardī it is the intensity of the sweetness that accounts for

the existing difference between them.

It is noteworthy that on the basis of the above, Mullā Ṣadrā develops the doctrine of the "Unity of Being" and its natural conclusion, the unity of the knower and the known *(ittiḥād al-'āqil wa al-ma'qūl)*, to which Suhrawardī also adheres. The way this unity can be achieved constitutes the main subject of the *Asfār*. In fact, Mullā Ṣadrā's epistemology, like Suhrawardī's, maintains that there are basically three modes of cognition: revelation *(waḥy)*, discursive reasoning *(ḥikmat al-baḥthī)*, and finally illumination *(ishrāq or dhawq)*. Illumination, which results in the attainment of "presential knowledge" *('ilm al-ḥuḍūrī)*, is a means of attaining knowledge available to man, and in this context, like Suhrawardī, his entire philosophical system is designed to demonstrate and argue for this type of wisdom.

A thorough discussion of the differences between the two giants of *ḥikmat* is beyond the scope of this work. It is known that both figures left a permanent effect on the intellectual fabric of Persia and the subcontinent of India and in particular on Shī'ism. In the foregoing discussion I have only alluded to their main difference, namely the context within which they have described their ontologies.

Mullā Ṣadrā's teachings, due to the hostility of the orthodox and esoteric jurists, were not taught in the intellectual centres for almost a century. Once they were revived, however, during the early part of the Qajar period, their study came to the forefront of scholarship.

THE QAJAR PERIOD

The Qajar period in Iran also was an active and prolific period of philosophical activity. These activities can be divided into two major trends, one that continued the tradition of Suhrawardī and of Sadrian teachings and the other which opposed it, the *Shaykhīyah*.

The teachings of Mullā Sadrā and the Shī'ah gnostic views did not receive the attention they deserved, perhaps, for political reasons, until Mullā 'Alī Nūrī devoted himself to teaching and advocating Mullā Ṣadrā's philosophy. Nūrī's commentary on the *Asfār* and *Mashā'ir* and his act of training so many scholars made him one of the most prominent figures of the Qajar period. Mullā Ṣadrā's teachings during this era became a perfect representation of the tradition of transcendental theosophy.

Sabzawari

Amongst the foremost authorities on *Ishrāqī* doctrine and Mullā Ṣadrā is Ḥājjī Mullā Hādi Sabzawārī (1288/1888) whose works, in particular *Sharḥ al-Manẓumah*, have become standard texts for students of Islamic philosophy in Iran. This work of Sabzawārī is a complete discussion of the philosophy and logic which raise objections against Mullā Ṣadrā's *Asfār*, in particular his doctrine of the unity of the knower and the known *(ittiḥād al-ʿāqil wa al-maʿqūl)* and the composition of form and matter. Sabzawārī, whose ascetic life style and intellectual acumen made him the best known philosopher of the Qajar period, sided with Mullā Sadrā's principiality of existence and criticized Suhrawardī.[24] Though he concentrated mainly on Mullā Sadrā's philosophy, his works are regarded also as expositions of the *Ishrāqī* doctrine, especially in his commentary upon Mullā Ṣadrā's *al-Shawahid al-Rubūbīyah* and his Persian work, *Asrar al-Hikam*.

Sabzawārī is the main expositor of the *Ishrāqī* doctrine during the Qajar period, and the revival of Suhrawardī's teachings is mainly due to his efforts. Sabzawārī, who adhered to Mullā Ṣadrā's teachings, studied with Mullā Ismā'īl Kushkī and Mullā 'Alī Nūrī in Iṣfahān. One of the characteristics which has made a legendary figure of Sabzawārī is his ascetic practices. His emphasis on asceticism as a necessary element in philosophical training is most evident in his poems[25] and is also important in the revival of the practical aspect of *Ishrāq* which was belittled by some of the post-Mullā Sadrian philosophers.

Sabzawarī's commentary upon the *Asfār* of Mulla Sadrā, which is one of the most comprehensive commentaries written on this work[26] along with his commentary upon the *Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb* of Mullā Ṣadrā, provides a valuable set of works for the students of Mullā Ṣadrā. Sabzawārī's interest in Sufism is most apparent in his commentary on the *Mathnawī* of Rūmī, which is the best known work of Persian poetry on Sufi and gnostic doctrines in Islam. It is also said[27] that Sabzawārī wrote a commentary on the *Ilāhīyāt* of Ibn Sīnā which was lost.

During his lifetime a number of learned scholars asked Sabzawārī for his views on some of the more difficult philosophical questions to which he provided written answers. In one of the lesser known replies Sabzawārī provided a brief answer to seven questions that were posed to him by Mirzā Abū al-Ḥasan Raḍavī, a contemporary philosopher.[28]

Since the seventh question deals with the subject of presential knowledge, and clearly demonstrates the extent to which Sabzawārī was influenced by Suhrawardī I will translate the entire section. This translation which appears for the first time in English, also demonstrates that the *Ishrāqī* theory of knowledge was of great interest among the intellectual community of the time.

Question Number 7:

> Is the method of presential knowledge,[29] which the sages of the Sufi tradition have promulgated, true or not? Is it accessible despite the differences among the followers of this method of discovery? How can certainty of the truth of this theory be attained? As it (Qur'ān) says: "If you do not know it ask the learned," and also "Remember that God gave birth to you through your mothers and you did not know anything." The prophetic *ḥadīth* says "God did not make it necessary for people to answer but He made it incumbent upon the learned to answer."
>
> I have dared to ask this while I am depressed, and my inner being is in a tumultuous state. I am thereby requesting that the answer be sent to me soon. May the prosperity of the two worlds be yours, your soul be enlightened, your intellect be well and your heart be free of every bondage.

Answer:

> "Beholding *(mushāhidah)* is an authentic principle and it is spiritual in nature. Spiritual discovery is a science through which knowledge of the self, knowledge of God and eschatological issues are known, and one becomes intellectually certain in a manner that is only attainable with regards to the domain of true knowledge. The mind proceeds from the knowledge of truth *('ilm al-yaqīn)*, to the beholding of the truth *('ayn al-yaqīn)* and finally becomes the truth *(ḥaqq al-yaqīn)*.
>
> God most high has expressed the levels of certainty within the context of "fire" and has said: "You will know soon, through *'ilm al-yaqīn*, you will see hell, and you will see it with the eyes of certainty." Elsewhere He says, "Hell can only be understood through knowledge by certitude."

Therefore, degrees of knowing the divine light are similar to the degrees of knowing fire. For example, if someone has never seen fire but has heard that whatever becomes united with it gains its attributes, he thereby makes it lose its identity. Every candle is luminous from it and if it loses some of itself, it is not reduced. Whatever departs from it becomes its opposite in nature, such as smoke which is dark. In darkness it is the master of all incorporeal lights.

It (fire) is like a luminous light that, if placed in a gathering, will illuminate everyone, while forms manifest themselves in lieu of this light. No precious pearl that is placed in a gathering can do the same thing. Just as in illumination and heat, the sun is superior to fire in that "there is no motion or power except through God," and they call that being fire.

There are those who believe in it on the basis of the those who know and some who seek to believe in it because of its signs (smoke from fire), such as those who believe in God on the basis of clear signs.

There are those who reach divine light and see existent beings through this light and see the essence of fire when the veil is removed for them. In having knowledge of God, these people are seeing the truth. People like burning iron, to whom the effects of fire appear when they understand it, are those who have interiorized the truth in their knowledge of God. Both of these types are men of true discovery and faith in what is obvious to them and are transcendental theosophers. There are different degrees amongst them and they know God but do not see God. Discovery of forms is the disclosure of forms as a particular to the senses and is divided in accordance with the five senses.

Therefore, discovery through vision, like seeing of incorporeal entities by the ascetics (who see) a variety of lights, is an extensive discussion fit for another occasion. There are forms, phenomena and hymns which are most sublime, and words that are pleasant and sounds that are fearsome and hopeful that are issued forth to the disciples. God said: "The days of their life is like the divine breath" and the Prophet has said "He shelters us,

feeds us and takes our thirst away" and also he said "God established balance between shoulders like the drink one has between meals."

A formal discovery of the principles (of philosophy) is the manifestation of the divine name who hears all, sees all, and understands all things. A spiritual discovery of the principles, however, is the disclosure of the divine name. Hardship and ease are therefore apparent and following the Muhammadan tradition is difficult and can only become easy through love and inner yearning.

The difference of opinion among the men of discovery and vision should not be regarded as obstacles on the path of those who seek knowledge and practical wisdom, since differences exist eveywhere. Are there not inconsistencies in the appearance of God's words who in the truth and in the appearance of the prophetic sayings as well as the sayings of the Imams?

May he who wants the attainment of knowledge and sciences be successful.[30]

Another figure of great significance is Āghā Muḥammad Riḍā Qumsha'ī. He, in the tradition of Sabzawārī and other great masters of this period, taught Mullā Ṣadrā and Ibn 'Arabī. In fact it was his attempt to integrate *Ishrāqī* tradition with Ibn 'Arabī's gnosis and Mullā Ṣadrā's metaphysics that made him one of the foremost authorities on Islamic philosophy in this period.

Towards the end of the Qajar period, Mullā 'Abd-Allāh Zunūzī and his son Mullā 'Alī Zunūzī, both of whom wrote commentaries on Sabzawārī and Mirzā Mehdi Āshtiyānī, came to be known as two of the most important proponents of *Ishrāq* and Mullā Sadrā. 'Alī Zunūzī is particularly important, not only because of this important commentary upon Mullā Sadrā's works, in particular the *Asfār*, but also because he represents the first encounter of traditional Islamic philosophy with European philosophy in Persia. 'Alī Zunūzī was asked by a Qajar prince to provide a reply to Kantian philosophy, which he did in his book *Badā'i' al-Hikam*. In this respect he has a special place in the Qajar period.

Mullā 'Abd-Allāh Zunūzī wrote an important book on *Ishrāqī* philosophy titled *Lama'āt-i Ilāhīyah*, which is a good example of how

Suhrawardī's teachings and that of Mullā Sadrā influenced the philosophers of the Qajar period.

Among other followers of Mullā Ṣadrā and his illuminationist foundation during the Qajar period who transmitted the wisdom of transcendental theosophy to the modern and contemporary *ḥakīms*, the following can be named: Muḥammad Ismā'īl Iṣfahānī, Mullā Muḥammad Ja'far Langarūdī, Mullā Ismā'īl Khajūī, Mirzā Mehdī Āshtiyānī and Mirzā Ṭāhir Tunkābunī. They constitute an intellectual trend that supported the ideas and doctrines of Suhrawardī and Mullā Ṣadrā. There were, however, individuals and movements who reacted to the teachings of the Sadrian school as well as against the thoughts of Suhrawardī, among whom the *Shaykhīyah* movement can be mentioned.

Shaykhīyah School

The Shaykhī movement, initiated by Shaykh Aḥmad Aḥsā'ī (1153/1753), is another continuation of the ideas of Suhrawardī and Mullā Sadrā during the Qajar period in Iran.[31] The Shaykhīs, who are more influenced by Mullā Sadrā's doctrine than they admit, reject many of Suhrawardī's ideas as expressed by Mullā Sadrā.

While they adhere to the hierarchical structure of the universe, they reject an ontology based on light. Despite this, they accept the existence of an intermediary realm between the angels and human souls, which they describe as the domain of pure light.

The Shaykhīs' attempt to reconcile their theosophical views with the more traditional theological themes is perhaps at the root of their conflict with Suhrawardī's *Ishrāqī* school. Whereas Suhrawardī envisages the existent entities as different intensities of light, Shaykhīs argue that both the corporeal and the incorporeal world, which they call *hurqalyā*, are real.[32]

Despite, points of disagreement, almost all the prominent figures in this movement, such as Shaykh Kāẓim Rashtī and Kirmānī, were influenced by the teachings of Suhrawardī and their reformulation by Mullā Ṣadrā.

The Contemporary Period

The golden age of philosophical activity during the Safavid period and its continuation during the Qajar period has not come to a halt in contemporary Persia. Despite the fact that most Western scholarship neglects

contemporary Islamic philosophical thought, this tradition is still active and alive. In fact, Suhrawardī and his chief expositor Mullā Ṣadrā became fully integrated into the fabric of Persian intellectual thought and have remained to this day the cornerstone of traditional philosophical teachings in Persia.

In contemporary Persia the teaching of *ḥikmat* has continued to flourish. Among the greatest masters of traditional teachings and *Ishrāqī* doctrine, one can name 'Allāmah Seyyed Ḥusayn Ṭabāṭabā'ī, the author of *al-Mīzān*, and *'Alī wa al-Ḥikmat al-Ilāhīyah, Nahāyat al-Ḥikmat wa Badāyat al-Ḥikmat*. He has written numerous commentaries on Mullā Ṣadrā and the *Ishrāqī* doctrine, including a new edition of the *Asfār*. Among other followers of the *Ishrāqī* tradition we can also name Seyyed Muhammad Kāẓim Assār, who has written a major work on transcendental theosophy titled *Thalāth Rasā'il fi al-Ḥikmat al-Islāmīyah*, and Abu al-Ḥasan Rāfi'ī Qazwīnī, who has been the main defender of Mullā Ṣadrā's school during the past half century. Qazwīnī has trained a number of fine scholars, such as Seyyed Jalāl al-Dīn Ashtiyānī, who is perhaps the most prolific writer in the field of traditional philosophy in Iran today. He has written extensively on a number of commentators and authors of the *Ishrāqī* tradition.[35] The list of contemporary scholars who have kept the fire of *ḥikmat* alive is a long one. However, the names given above are sufficient to indicate the presence and continuation of the *Ishrāqī* tradition in Iran.

In more recent years, with the establishment of universities in Iran, Islamic philosophy and *ḥikmat* began to be taught outside of the traditional *madrasah* for the first time. This was further facilitated by the appearance of scholars who have not only mastered the traditional teachings but have also become well acquainted with Western modes of thought. Among these scholars are Mirza Mehdī Ha'irī and Seyyed Hossein Nasr.

Ha'irī is a traditional master of Islamic philosophy whose extensive experience with the West marks one of the few examples of a serious encounter between traditional Islamic philosophy and Western philosophical paradigms. Such encounter is best represented in his work titled *Presential Knowledge*,[34] which is a comparative study in epistemology.

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, in this regard, is a unique figure in that, contrary to Ha'irī and some of the other figures, he first came in contact with Western ideas and philosophies and it was not until his return to Iran that he began to study with the traditional masters of gnosis. His thorough

familiarity with Western modes of thought and with traditional teachings has enabled him to present the *Ishrāqī* doctrine to the Western audience. Through his numerous writings and lectures, he has established himself as the chief proponent of the *Ishrāqī* doctrine in the West. Among his major works in the English language the following can be named: *Islamic Cosmological Doctrine, The Sufi Essays,* and, finally, his most important philosophical works, *Knowledge and the Sacred, Three Muslim Sages,* and *Sadr al-Dīn Shīrāzī and His Transcendental Theosophy.*[35]

Besides Nasr's major contributions in spreading the traditional teachings of Suhrawardi, Mullā Ṣadrā and other Shi'ite gnostics, he has trained a number of fine scholars, among whom W. Chittick and James Morris can be named. These scholars have become expositors of *ḥikmat* in the West by writing and by translating the traditional *Ishraqī* texts. Also, due to the efforts of S.H. Nasr to introduce the central themes of traditional Islamic philosophy in an accessible language to the younger Western audience and his collaboration with such eminent scholars as H. Corbin, he has stimulated interest among some individuals to translate the traditional texts of *ḥikmat*. The fine translation of *al-Ḥikmat al-'Arshīyah* by James Morris is a case in point.

INDIA

In India, Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination* was translated into Sanskrit and welcomed especially by the Zoroastrian community there. What aided the spread of the school of illumination, besides the *ḥakīms* and learned individuals who travelled to India, was perhaps the keen interest of Sultan Muhammad bin Tughluq (725-752/1325-1351) in philosophical and intellectual discussions. The sultan, who had allocated large sums of money for the building of a library, was particularly interested in the works of Ibn Sīnā. Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, in his book *A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnā 'Ashari Shi'ism in India,*[36] maintains that probably the works of Khwājah Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭusī and Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī were also acquired. If *Durrat al-Tāj*, the central work of Shīrāzī, was available in India as Rizvi indicates,[37] then it is reasonable to believe that other *Ishrāqī* works may have been available as well. Therefore, it is conceivable that the ideas of Suhrawardī may have been discussed amongst commentaries on the *Ishrāqī* doctrine.

Another example of the spread of Suhrawardī's ideas can be seen in

the fact that several theological centres were established by Sind Niẓām al-Dīn in the early fifteenth century. His interest in these matters made Jalāl al-Dīn Dawwānī, a prominent *Ishrāqī* scholar, consider moving to the area. However, Dawwānī died while he was waiting for two of his students who had gone to the area for further investigation. Dawwānī was a famous commentator of Suhrawardī and was the author of *Lawāmi' al-Ishrāq fī Makārim al-Akhlāq,* and *Shawākil al-Nūr fī Sharḥ Hayākil al-Nūr,* which is a commentary upon Suhrawardī's *Hayakil al-Nūr.* Although Dawwānī did not go to India, many of his students did. Such scholars as Mīr Mu'īn, Mir Shams al-Dīn, and in particular Abū al-Faḍl Kazirūnī continued on the path of their teacher by teaching the transcendental theosophy of Suhrawardī.

Suhrawardī's school continued to flourish in India, and with the rise of Akbar to power the spread of *Ishraqī* ideas reached its climax. Akbar's enthusiasm and tolerance for new ideas and religions provided the kind of environment that the *ḥakīms* needed to freely teach the *Ishrāqī* doctrine which had found a new home in the rich landscape of Indian culture. It was for this reason that a large number of *ḥakīms* moved from Iran to India where they settled in numerous intellectual centres. Badā'ūnī in his book, *Muntakhab al-Tawārīkh,* offers an account of some of these masters. He writes:

> Some of the physicians in this region were so learned in the theory and skilled in the practice of medicine that they performed miracles like those of Moses and brought to mind the wonder breath of the lord Jesus.[38]

Among the most notable masters of the *Ishrāqī* school in this period were: Khatīb Abū al-Faḍl Kāzirūnī who settled in Ahmadabad, Shaykh Mubāraḳ Nāgorī (905-993/1505-1593), his son Shaykh Abū al-Fadl, and finally Badā'ūni himself.

The tradition of *ḥakīms* has continued to flourish in India up to the contemporary period, even in the most orthodox centres.[39] In fact it was the result of the influx of so many *ḥakīms* that many works were written on Suhrawardī, the best example of which is the commentary of Aḥmad ibn al-Harawī, *Anwāriyah* [40] This commentary, which is a classical work on Suhrawardī written in Persian, provides an overall account of Suhrawardī's *Philosophy of Illumination.* Harawī, who lived in the 17th century in India,[41] made use of other commentaries such as those of Quṭb al-Dīn al-Shirāzī and

Shahrazūrī, which indicates that these commentaries must have been available in India at the time through the followers of Suhrawardī.

Suhrawardī's influence in India went beyond the circle of theosophists and had a profound influence on the Sufi tradition of the Chishtī order. There are a number of other mystical schools that were influenced by Suhrawardī such as the "Ḵhayrābādī" school, which had a strong logico-philosophical tendency. Also such grand masters as Shaykh Aḥmad Sirhindi and Shāh Walī-Allāh and their mystical schools came to be influenced by the illuminationist ideas of Suhrawardī, although the link between Suhrawardī and the above figures needs to be further explored.

The intellectual scene of Indian culture witnessed the influence of Suhrawardī in two separate periods. The first was in the first two centuries after Suhrawardī's death as stated above. The second encounter of India with the illuminationist ideas of Suhrawardī was through the sages of the Safavid period, generally known as the "School of Isfahan." India's encounter with the transcendental theosophy of the Safavid period was instrumental in constituting the educational curriculum of the traditional school which have survived to this day.

During this period many of the great masters of the *Ishrāqī* tradition travelled to India, some of whom wrote important works on the doctrine of illumination. Such figures include Qāḍī Nūr-Allāh Shūstarī, who authored two major books on the philosophy of illumination, *Majālis al-Mu'minīn* and *Iḥqāq al-Ḥaqq*, and Muhammad Dihdār Shīrāzī, the author of *Ishrāq al-Nayyarayn*. To these names one can add those of such notable scholars as Mīr Findiriskī and Bahā' al-Dīn Iṣfahānī, also known as Fāḍil-i Hindī, who not only taught the Peripatetic philosophy, especially the *Shifā'*, but also knew the works of other commentators on the *Ishrāqī* tradition. Gradually, the teachings of Mullā Ṣadrā and his teacher, Mīr Damad, became extremely popular, even overshadowing the works of Suhrawardī. For instance, Mullā Ṣadrā's book, the *Sharḥ al-Hidāyah*, became an official text in the traditional schools *(madrasah)*.[42]

The school of *Ishrāq* and the texts that deal with the illuminationist doctrine are being taught even today in the traditional centres of learning in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. In fact, outside of Persia the subcontinent is the only region that is to this day receptive to the teachings of Suhrawardī.

SUHRAWARDĪ IN SYRIA AND ANATOLIA

Suhrawardī's ideas have also become a permanent part of the intellectual landscape of Syria and Anatolia. While it is difficult to exactly trace the path that *Ishrāqī* doctrine took in these regions, nevertheless we see an upsurge of interest in it during the 7th century in that area. In examining the influence of Suhrawardī in Turkey and Syria, one has to consider the relatively short distance between Aleppo and Anatolia. Therefore, geographically it is plausible to conclude that Suhrawardī's ideas were propagated in that part of the world also.

Intellectually speaking, the city of Konyah was at the time a centre for gnostic teachings, and it was through this city that the intellectual milieu of Turkey became receptive to the ideas and doctrines of Suhrawardī. Numerous commentaries on Ibn 'Arabi by such scholars as Ṣadr al-Dīn Qūnawī were certainly instrumental in providing an intellectual ambience which was receptive to gnostic doctrines. This receptivity might have helped to prepare the ground for Suhrawardī's ideas to be studied.

While it is difficult to identify specific figures in the Turkish speaking world who identified themselves with Suhrawardī's works as Shahrazūri and Shīrāzī did in the Persian world, the existence of a large number of *Ishrāqī* manuscripts in Turkish libraries is an indication that Suhrawardī was studied by Turkish scholars. In fact, the Turkish libraries contain such an abundance of *Ishrāqī* texts of Ibn 'Arabī and others that such notable scholars as A.M. Schimmel and H. Corbin spent a number of years in Turkey to complete their research on Muslim gnostics and other *Ishrāqī* figures.

As far as the spread of Suhrawardī's ideas in Syria is concerned, it is obvious that the presence of Suhrawardī and his numerous students and companions in Syria must have been instrumental in spreading his ideas. Suhrawardī does not mention the names of these associates but alludes to them as those who repeatedly requested that the *Philosophy of Illumination* be written.[43] In fact, towards the end of this book Suhrawardī leaves a will asking the circle of his friends to safeguard its content.[44]

All this points to the existence of a circle of *Ishrāqīs* who benefitted from the esoteric teachings of Suhrawardī, and it is reasonable to assume that they must have continued his work after his death. One person who may have been among these associates of Suhrawardī was Shahrazūrī. Although the dates of his life make it reasonable to assume that he might

have known Suhrawardī himself personally, it is likely that he was a disciple of one of Suhrawardī's students.[45] Shahraxūrī's commentaries on the *Philosophy of Illumination* and *al-Talwīhāt* (680/1281) were certainly among the texts that were circulating in the group of *Ishrāqīs* in Syria.

Suhrawardī's influence in Syria precedes his influence anywhere else since it was there that he wrote most of his works and was unjustly killed for his ideas. The discussions and debates of Suhrawardī with the learned men of his time in Syria, the bulk of his writings, and the circle of his friends provide reasonable grounds to conclude that his ideas may have been studied by the intellectual community in Syria even though they were suppressed for political reasons.

SUHRAWARDĪ IN THE WEST

Suhrawardī, for reasons unknown, was not translated into Latin and therefore his philosophy remained unknown to the West. One could postulate three reasons as to why his works were not translated. The first had to do with the existing philosophical paradigm of the period, which was more Ibn Sīnian in nature. The rationalistic philosophy, which was the dominant school in the Western world, created an environment that was not receptive to Suhrawardī's ideas. The second reason could have been that the great age of translation in Spain and the creative momentum that existed in Southern Spain had come to an end. The translation houses *(dār al-tarjumah)* were no longer productive, and, therefore, Suhrawardī did not receive the attention that he deserved.

The third reason, in my opinion, could have been Suhrawardī's affiliation with Saladin's son Malik Zāhir. Although Suhrawardī was not favoured by Saladin, he nevertheless may have been viewed by the Christian West to have been a court philosopher at a time when Muslims and Christians were involved in the Crusades. For this reason his works may have been set aside and gradually forgotten, except by a group of close friends or initiates.

S.H. Nasr attributes the lack of interest in the West in the works of Suhrawardī to a more fundamental cause, namely the geographical and philosophical separation of the East and the West into the Suhrawardian 'orient' and 'occident.' As he states:

> The West which had been in many ways an 'orient' in the *ishrāqī* sense of the term and had passed a traditional civilization, which... resembled the great oriental civilizations, was now becoming an occident, not only geographically but also in the *ishrāqī* sense of concerning itself with the domain of rationalization.[46]

Despite these intellectual trends which continued on their analytical and rationalistic path, Suhrawardī may have influenced certain intellectual currents in the West. S.H. Nasr further argues that one of the intellectual circles that might have been influenced by Suhrawardī was the 13th-century Oxford school of Roger Bacon and Robert Grossteste. While both these men were proponents of an empirical method of observation, their experiment was such that it was not necessarily inconsistent with a gnostic interpretation of nature. In fact, Nasr draws a parallel between the Oxford school of the 13th century and Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī, the celebrated Muslim scientist who also pursued an empirical method. Bacon and Grossteste used the kind of experimental method that considers the observation of nature to be a necessary part of illumination. "Bacon wore the dress of the *Ishrāqīs* and lectured upon them."[47]

It is, however, more likely that Suhrawardī had influenced certain intellectual circles in Spain where the intellectual milieu might have been more receptive to his ideas. For example, it is likely that Jewish Kabbalists who came to know of the *Philosophy of Illumination* may have taken this text to Southern Spain. It was this very text, some have argued,[48] that played an important role in the further development of Jewish illuminationists and drew attention to people who wrote extensively on illumination.

The other indication that Suhrawardī's ideas did indeed travel into Spain is that Ibn Sab'īn (7th/13th), who was from Spain and who lived in Morocco *(Maghrib)*, in his book *al-Risālat al-Faqīriyah*, alludes to the *Talwīḥāt* of Suhrawardī. Although it is difficult to establish whether he came to know of Suhrawardī while he was in Spain or in Morocco, what it does demonstrate is the large geographical span that Suhrawardī's ideas reached.

While illuminationist movements have emerged from time to time, it is difficult to establish a definite relationship between them. Such

movements as the "Illuminated of Bavaria," founded by Adam Weishaput, which was essentially opposed to a religious hierarchy, or the ideas of Schelling and Franz Van Baadar, were not able to revive the illuminationist movement in its authentic and traditional sense, and their treatment of the subject matter remains on a superficial level.

In the contemporary Western world, while there is not illuminationist movement, the interest that the works of Henry Corbin have created in the West must be mentioned. Corbin, who was the foremost Western authority on the illuminationist tradition, had his early training in Western philosophy with a focus on medieval ontology. Although Corbin's interest in Islamic philosophy began with Ibn Sinā, the focal point of his scholarship remained the *Ishrāqī* tradition and the wisdom of ancient Persia. In the words of S.H. Nasr:

> Corbin has without doubt done more than anyone else, outside and even inside Persia, to revive the teachings of Suhrawardi [49]

Corbin, like many other masters of traditional wisdom, has contributed to the body of Islamic sciences not only by writing but by training a number of fine scholars. Among those who have either been trained by him directly or were influenced by his writings, the following can be named: G. Berger and J. Danielou, G. Durand and A. Faivre, who belong to the younger generation of scholars in France. Also, the well known Jewish scholar G. Scholem and biologist A. Portmann are among other important figures who came under his influence.

The success of Corbin in influencing so many scholars in France is due partially to the development of the school of phenomenology advocated by Husserl and Heidegger. In particular, Hiedegger and his phenomenological movement, which is based on "disengagement" and "letting beings-be," helped in preparing the intellectual milieu to be receptive to the ideas of Corbin. Corbin's exposition of "oriental ontology," in particular that of Suhrawardi, stimulated much interest among a philosophical group in France known as the "young philosophers." The main figure in this movement is Christian Jambet, who has taken interest in the oriental philosophy of Suhrawardi with emphasis on "oriental logic."[50]

Finally, Corbin's influence in the Arab world, in particular on the former French colonies, has to be mentioned. A number of Arab scholars

such as M. Arkhoun, the Algerian Islamicist, were directly influenced by Corbin's writings.

Suhrawardī's influence on Islamic philosophy cannot be overemphasized. He introduced a fresh outlook and approach to analyzing philosophical issues. The *Ishrāqī* school of Suhrawardī, which contained both mysticism and rationalism, was well received by both the Eastern and Western regions of the Islamic world. The Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, which had a well established mystical tradition, felt at home with Suhrawardī on that basis, whereas Persia and North Africa, which were centres of rationalistic philosophy, became equally receptive to Suhrawardī and his philosophy of illumination.

NOTES

(1) *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawḍat al Afrāḥ fi Ta'rīkh al-Ḥukamā' wa'l-Falāsifah*, ed. S. Khurshid Ahmad, 1976, pp 119-143. (From here on I shall refer to this work as *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ)*

(2) S H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages*, 1964, p. 60.

(3) Shahrazūrī, Introduction to Opera 3, pp. 23, 27.

(4) Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Udabā'*, vol. 19, no. 20, Ciro 626.

(5) *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ*, Introduction to Opera 3, pp. 27-28.

(6) Ibn Taqhrībirdī, Abū al-Maḥāsin Yūsuf, *al-Nujūm al-Zāhirah fi Mulūk Miṣr wa al-Qāhirah*, vol 6. 1936, p. 114.

(7) For more information on Suhrawardī, see: Shahrazūrī, *Nuzhat al-Arwāḥ wa Rawḍat al-Afrāḥ fi Ta'rīkh al-Ḥukamā' wa'l-Falāsifah*, ed. S. Khurshid Ahmad, 1976; Yāqūt al-Ḥamawī, *Mu'jam al-Udabā'*, vol. 19, no. 20, Ciro 626, and S.H. Nasr, *Three Muslim Sages* (Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1964). For a political biography of Suhrawardī, see H Ziai, "The Source and Nature of Political Authority in Suhrawardī's Philosophy of Illumination," Proceedings of *Conference on the Political Aspects of Islamic Philosophy*, ed. Butherworth (forthcoming)

(8) For more information on the influence of Sufism and the esoteric doctrine of illumination of Shī'ite Islam, see S.H. Nasr "The Relationship between Suhrawardī and Philosophy in Persian Culture," *Hamdard Islamicus*, vol. 6, no. 4, pp. 33-47.

(9) For a more complete discussion on Abharī, see H Corbin, Prolegomena to Opera 1, p. 21., note 29.

(10) S.H. Nasr, "The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardi," *Islamic Quarterly*, 1970, p. 113.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 114.

(12) S.H. Nasr, "Spiritual Movements, Philosophy and Theology in the Safavid Period," in *The Cambridge History of Iran*, ed. P Jackson, vol. 6, p. 672.

(13) For more information on this, see *Muntakhabāt az Āthār-i Ḥukamā'-i Ilāhī-i Īrān*, ed. S.J. Āshtiyānī, pp. 3-61.

(14) Mīr Dāmād, *Qabasāt*, pp. 2-4

(15) *Muntakhabāt az Āthār-i Ḥukamā'-i Ilāhī-i Īrān*, ed. S.J. Āshtiyānī, p. 9, footnote no.1.

(16) For more information on Mīr Dāmād's view of the relationship between time and existence, see *ibid*, pp. 40 ff.

(17) For more information on Tabrīzī and his students, see Lāhijānī, *Sharḥ-i Risālat*. Introduction by J. Huma, i and S.J. Ashtiyānī.

(18) S H. Nasr, "Spiritual Movements," p. 689.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 681.

(20) For more information on Mullā Sadrā's concept of *wujūd* and *māhiyah*, see *Muntakhabāt*, pp. 99 ff. and Āshtiyānī, S.J., *Hastī az Nazar-i Falsafah wa 'Irfān*, pp. 63-95.

(21) Āshtiyānī's work *Hastī az Nazar-i Falsafah wa 'Irfān* provides an excellent exposition of the two rival schools of Mullā Ṣadrā and Suhrawardī by a traditional master This work is particularly interesting because there Āshtiyānī provides different interpretations which can be made of the advocates of *aṣālat al-māhiyah* and *aṣālat al-wujūd*

(22) *Ibid.*, p. 67.

(23) For more information on Mullā Sadrā's criticism of Suhrawardī, see his *Sharh-i Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq*, p. 210.

(24) Sabzawārī, *Sharh al-Manẓūmah* (Naseri Edition, Tehran), p. 7.

(25) Sabzawārī in his poems has stated some of the profoundest philosophical issues in the traditional symbolic language of Persian poetry. Most of his poems are *ghazals* and the style is often that of *mathnawī* For more information, see Sabzawārī, *Dīwān-i Ash'ār* (Isfahan, Saqafi pr. 1959).

(26) Sabzawārī's commentary upon the *Asfār* does not include the sections on the "essence and accident."

(27) *Mumtakhabāt-i Ḥukamā'-i Ilāhī-i Īrān*, p. 14.

(28) Mirzā Raḍavī was a learned scholar and a contemporary of Sabzawārī who asked Sabzawārī seven questions known as the "Ajwibah Masā'il Mirzā abul-Ḥasan Raḍavī." For more information, see *Yādbūd-i Sadsīmīn Sal-i Ḥakīm Sabzawārī* (Mashhad University, 1969), pp. 35ff.

(29) The word here is *"kashf wa shuhūd,"* literally meaning "discovery and witnessing." This is another term that is often used to allude to this concept of "knowledge by presence."

(30) Sabzawāri, *Yādbūd-i Sadsīmīn Sal-i*, pp. 45-49.

(31) For a more complete discussion on Shaykhī doctrine and their differences with Suhrawardī, see H. Corbin, *L'Ecole shaikhie en Theologie Shi'ite* (Tehran, 1957).

(32) Mangol Bayāt, *Mysticism and Dissent*, pp. 44-45.

(33) Āshtiyānī has written numerous commentaries on Mullā Ṣadrā and Suhrawardī including an anthology on the great *ḥakīms* of the last four centuries. His collaboration with H. Corbin and S.H. Nasr has produced a number of texts on the traditional masters of Islamic philosophy.

(34) *Presential knowledge* is a comparative work on epistemology in which M. Ḥā'irī demonstrates the inadequacies of the existing epistemological theories He also discusses the history of the theory of knowledge by presence.

(35) For more information on S.H. Nasr's bibliography, see W.C. Chittick, *The Works of Seyyed Hossein Nasr Through his Fortieth Birthday*, Research Monograph, No. 6, Middle East Center, University of Utah, 1977.

(36) See Sayid Athar Abbas Rizvi, *A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnā 'Asharī Shi'ism in India* (Ma'rifat Pub. House, Australia, 1986).

(37) *Ibid*, p. 180.

(38) Translated into English by H. Lowe as cited by Rizvi in, *A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnā 'Asharī Shi'ism in India*, p. 320.

(39) For a more complete discussion on the history of *ḥukmat* in India, see Rizvi, *A Socio-Intellectual History of the Isnā 'Asharī Shi'ism in India*, vol. 2, and Badā'ūnī, *Muntakhab al-Tawārīkh*, vol. 1, pp. 323-25.

(40) H. Ziai who has edited this book has also written a valuable introduction to *Anwārīyah*. There he argues that this work is less significant than Shīrāzī and Shahrazūrī's commentary. However, Ziai maintains that the significance of *Anwārīyah* is because Harawī has compared the Indian traditions of wisdom with the *Ishrāqī* doctrine.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 15.

(42) The influence of Mullā Ṣadrā is still present in India and his works especially the *Asfār* is being taught in many traditional *madrasahs*. Suhrawardī's influence, however, is strong among the Zoroastrian community. This is because the *Ishrāqī* ideas were spread in India by the 12th-century mysterious Zoroastrian priest Āzar Kaywān who had gone to India from Iran.

(43) Opera 2, p. 16.

(44) Opera 2, p. 402.

(45) For more information on Shahrazūrī, see M. Mo'īn, *Ta'līqāt-i Charkh Maqālah* (Lyton Press), p. 211; *idem*, "Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq wa Farhang-i Īrān" in *Majmū'ah-i Maqālāt*, vol. 1, p. 436; and in *Kashf al-Ẓunūn*, vol. 1, p. 913.

(46) S.H. Nasr, "The Spread of the Illuminationist School of Suhrawardi," *Islamic Quarterly*, 1970, p. 118.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 119.

(48) For more information on the presence of *Ishrāqī* ideas in Aleppo and its influence on the development of Jewish illuminationist thought, see the work by Maimonides great-great grandson which is translated and commented by Paul Fenton, in *Deux Traites de mystique juive* (Paris, 1987).

(49) S.H. Nasr, *Jasha Nāmah-i Henry Corbin*, p. 100.

(50) For more information on the influence of Corbin on the young philosophers, see the introduction that Christian Jambet has written to Corbin's introduction of the *Hikmat al-Ishrāq*.

SAYYID TALIB AND THE THRONE OF IRAQ

ELIEZER TAUBER

IN the first year of the 20th century Sayyid Talib, son of the Naqib of Basra, became the key figure in Southern Iraq. By means of cunning and deceit he managed to get rid of various functionaries of the central government, gaining by this the support of the Sheikhs of Kuwait and Muhammara. The seizure of power by the Young Turks, following the revolution of 1908, and their recurring attempts to restrain his power or even to remove him from the scene, led to a very strained relationship between them and to his adherence to the reform and decentralization movement that began in that period in the Arab provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Contrary, however, to the aims of the other reform organizations that were founded in that period, Sayyid Talib regarded that movement only as a tool to strengthen his personal power in the region and to diminish that of the central government. In his activity to attain reforms and even autonomy for the vilayet of Basra, Talib was assisted by local notables, who sometimes supported him out of fear (he had his own methods to get rid of opponents), and by Arab officers who served in Basra. In their struggle against him, the authorities were assisted by Muntafik tribesmen under the leadership of 'Ujaymi ibn Sa'dun. In 1913 the confrontation between Talib and the Young Turks reached its climax. He established the Reform Society of Basra and supplanted the local branch of the Young Turks' Committee of Union and Progress. In a secret meeting of the leaders of the Committee of Union and Progress it was decided to eliminate Sayyid Talib. However, the plan to assassinate Talib failed and the man responsible for it, Farid Bek, the military commandant of Basra, was murdered by Talib's men. Then, the Young Turks decided that there was no other option but to become reconciled with Talib and to coexist with him. This situation did not last for long. A short while before the outbreak of World War I, the Vali of Baghdad received secret orders to capture Basra with a large military face and to arrest Talib. Talib, who at that time had started negotiations with the British in order to secure his future, decided to leave Basra, ostensibly to mediate between Ibn Sa'ud and the Ottomans. But the intensive negotiations he carried on with the British during the last three months of

1914 were not crowned with success. The British refused to comply with his demands as to his future (he wanted to be recognized by them as the Amir of Basra), and after they had occupied Southern Iraq they were no longer in need of his cooperation. Percy Cox, the Chief Political Officer of the Indian Expeditionary Force, informed him that for his own sake he had better to leave immediately for India and Talib was compelled to accept that recommendation.[1]

In January 1915 Sayyid Talib left Iraq for a five-year exile. He sailed to Bombay as a 'guest' of the British authorities and a month after he had arrived there he was transferred to Bellary, probably in order to deprive him of the opportunity to be in contact with the outer world and to carry out intrigues. While the British authorities granted him a monthly allowance of Rs. 1,200, their real attitude towards him was expressed in a memorandum by Bombay's Commissioner of Police. The latter defined him as "very corrupt in his administration... treacherous and cruel," mentioned the murder of Farid Bek, for which Talib was responsible, and concluded: "I should be glad to see the last of Talib Bey."[2]

It seems that Talib too was glad to leave India and during the next two and a half years he tried time and again to persuade the authorities to let him move if not to Iraq then at least to another Arab country. In November 1915, he wrote a long letter to the Viceroy in which he explained to him that he was the enemy of the Young Turks, and did not forget to mention that he had met in the past Lord Kitchener (who was then already the Minister of War) and Arthur Henry McMahon (who was then the British High Commissioner in Egypt). He told him that he always wanted to assist the British, but they refused his offers and, therefore, he did not have any choice but that of a coexistence with the Turks. On the eve of the World War he went to Ibn Sa'ud, ostensibly in order to persuade him to co-operate with the Turks, but in reality, explained Talib, only to have an excuse to leave Basra. Talib claimed that it was he himself who proposed to Percy Cox that he would move to India, unless his personal safety in Basra could be guaranteed. At the end of his letter, Talib complained of his poor health at Bellary and asked to be transferred to a city with a better climate, pointing out that he was "ready to labour in your interests, even at the cost of my life." The possibility that Talib would be allowed to return to Iraq was indeed suggested, a short while later, by the British in Egypt. It was the end of March 1916, when the Ottoman siege of the British forces at Kut al-

'Amara was at its height. The British in Cairo believed that the arrival of Talib at Basra could benefit the situation. But the Indian government rejected entirely the idea that Talib would return to Iraq and considered him *persona non grata* there.[3]

In June 1916, the Syrian press published a list of names of the Arab activists who were condemned to death in their absence by the military court at 'Aleyh, being accused of treachery and participation in the Arab societies. Among these names appeared also the name of Sayyid Ṭalib, as he was one of the strongest political rivals of the Young Turks in the period that preceded World War I. A writ of *habeas corpus* was issued against him as well, according to which he had to appear before the court within 10 days and give reason why he did not deserve to be punished for the assistance he rendered to the British. Should he not appear as aforesaid, he would be hanged the moment he was captured. When Talib learnt about this, he hastily sent the Viceroy another letter, in which he explained that on the eve of the War he was not able to assist the British because earlier he had reached an agreement with the Young Turks that he would not act against them if they would not act against him. The result of this agreement was that after the occupation of Southern Iraq by the British, the Turks believed that he had assisted the British, while the British thought that he had not assisted them because of his sympathy for the Turks. But then, after the Turks had condemned him to death, thus breaking their agreement with him, he felt himself no longer bound by the word of honour he gave them, and was ready to assist the British with a clear conscience. Talib pointed out that he was an old friend of Sharif Husayn and that he could assist the British in Mecca, Jidda or other places in the Arabian Peninsula, and even in Iraq. He finished his letter with the pledge: "Now I am not only a friend but ally willing to place myself and my resources for my service in the cause of Britain." Talib's appeal was forwarded to the British High Commissioner in Egypt in order to examine whether his services could be used in Cairo. Following a negative opinion of Gilbert Clayton, the Director of Intelligence in Cairo, the High Commissioner informed the Indian government that Talib could not be employed in Egypt or in Mecca for the time being.[4]

However, the British authorities in India at least granted Talib's request to be moved to city with a better climate, and he was transferred to Bangalore. From their he sent, in October 1961, a letter to Sharif Husayn of Mecca, who had started his Arab Revolt four months earlier. He

probably believed that through Husayn he could persuade the British to comply with his appeals. In the letter Talib expressed his happiness at the revolt Husayn had begun against the kinsmen of Tamerlane and Genghis Khan, "who did not believe in Islam and harmed the innocent" (he was referring to the Ottomans of course). He informed Husayn that as there were in India certain people who believed that his revolt might harm the world of Islam, he published articles in all the newspapers of India, in which he defended the Arab Revolt, and he promised to send him copies of these articles. He also told him that when he had met Ibn Sa'ud before the War, he had learnt that the latter was loyal to Husayn. (This last assertion was totally baseless.) Talib finished his letter expressing his hope to meet Husayn personally.[5]

In his letter to Husayn, Talib brought up the assumption that soon he would be allowed to go to Egypt. Several days after he had sent this letter, Talib sent another one to the British authorities that actually was a commitment by him to obey the instructions of the British should he be permitted to move to Egypt. He promised to stay in Egypt as long as he would be asked to do so, and not to go from there to Iraq without the approval of the British. "I promise to serve the British Government well and loyally. Only I request the Govt. to keep me in their service and to see to the safety of my relations and property in Basra after the war." Talib exploited this opportunity to ask the British to increase his allowance, pointing out that he was interested in bringing with him to Egypt two of his sons, so that they would be able to broaden their education in one of the colleges there. The British government of India referred Talib's appeal to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, noting that Talib's father, then living in Basra, could function as a hostage for Talib's proper behaviour in Egypt. The British in Cairo refused. The British in India applied again, emphasizing that in their opinion Talib was very anti-Turkish, pro-British and pro-Sharif Husayn. The British in Cairo refused again, probably as they were not prepared to accommodate in Egypt a problematical personality of Talib's sort, whatever his promises would be. Meanwhile, Talib's health began to deteriorate and following a doctor's recommendation that he should leave for Europe, the Persian Gulf or Egypt, the British in India applied in July 1917 once more to the British High Commissioner in Egypt, asking that he be permitted to move to Egypt. At first the British in Cairo persisted in their refusal, but eventually, at the beginning of September, they complied with the request, on health reasons, and in the middle of the same month Talib sailed for Egypt.[6]

In Egypt, Sayyid Talib tried to prove to the British his good-will and urge the Arabs to fight against the Turks. Moreover, a short while after his arrival, he offered to mediate between Ibn Sa'ud and Husayn (both allies of the British) in order to end the hostility between them. His plan was to bring to Egypt 'Abd al-Latif Mandil, Ibn Sa'ud's agent in Basra, and Sulayman Faydi—both were supposed to be ardent supporters of his—and to discuss this issue with them. Then the two would go to Husayn with a letter from him, and from Husayn would continue to Ibn Sa'ud. According to Talib, Ibn Sa'ud was supposed to agree to every proposal brought up by him, and he claimed as well to have influence on Husayn. (The last two assertions were, of course, baseless.) Talib's proposals were not accepted by the British. The British Arab Bureau in Cairo, however, forwarded him regularly allowances for "miscellaneous war services" and "diplomatic and consular services."[7]

Talib kept a low profile in Egypt until the end of the War and in the year after it, probably being aware of his complete dependence upon the British as long as he stayed in Egypt. However, in October 1919, he decided that the time was ripe for his return to Iraq and applied to the authorities for this, committing himself in writing to devote his life to serving British interests. The British in Cairo forwarded his appeal to Baghdad recommending that it should be granted. At first Baghdad responded in the negative, pointing out that rumours being spread in Iraq about the possible return of Talib caused some of Basra notables to say that they would leave the country should this possibility materialize. They remembered Talib's pre-War behaviour, and since their relations with him then were not of the best, they were probably afraid of revenge on his part. However, on second thoughts, the Civil Commissioner of Iraq said that he would consent to Talib's arrival in Iraq, if this would be delayed until after the beginning of the next year, in order to give the British authorities time to explain their consent to the notables of Basra. Naturally, Talib's return was made conditional upon his commitment not to take any part in local politics.[8]

In the beginning of 1920, Talib and his sons sailed from Suez and, on 8 February, they arrived in Basra. Immediately after his arrival in Iraq, Talib opened contacts with the British authorities there in order to convince them of his good will. For several days he stayed in Baghdad as the guest of Arnold T. Wilson, the British Civil Commissioner, who described his impression of him as following: "He is not a man who can be easily fitted into local representative institutions, but he appears to be well disposed and genuinely anxious to cooperate." At the same time Talib was in cons-

tant contact with his pre-War friend, the Sheikh of Muhammara, and it seems that he also asked him to persuade the British of his good intentions. Sheikh Khaz'al indeed expressed to the British authorities his faith in Talib's loyalty to them and his suitability to cooperate with them. According to him, "Talib would work whole heartedly on behalf of Government when employed." Shortly after his arrival in Iraq, Talib met Gertrude Bell, who was employed then as Oriental Secretary of the British Government in Baghdad. Her impression was that he was "the cleverest and perhaps the greatest rogue unhung," yet she estimated that "he's a back number and I expect he'll find that out pretty soon." The coming future was about to prove that Talib did not at all share this feeling of hers.[9]

At the end of June 1920 the Iraqi revolt against the British broke out. At the same time as the military suppressed the revolt, the British decided to set up a committee that would be composed mainly of Iraqi ex-Deputies in the Ottoman Parliament and would discuss the proper way to hold elections to an Iraqi General Assembly. Sayyid Talib, himself an ex-Deputy, who expressed, at that time, his complete conviction of the need for British power and guidance in Iraq, was invited to participate in the committee. In mid-July he arrived again in Baghdad and met Gertrude Bell. At this stage Talib was already suspected by many of the Iraqi nationalists of being ready to cooperate with the British in order to strengthen his position. Therefore, he tried to extract a promise from her that if he would succeed in consolidating a moderate party around him, the British would support his candidature for the most senior office. A few days later he held a conversation with Wilson about the British policy in Iraq and stated that he was ready to take the risk and to enter anew the political life of Iraq, on the lines laid down by the British, but on condition that the British would undertake to secure his life and to support him and his family in the same way that they were supporting the Sheikh of Muhammara. He also expected some financial support. In an interview he had later with a British officer, Talib declared that he was willing to become the Amir of Iraq, but he preferred to reach that position "at our request and not as elected by the people." He even made a proposal that in case there would be difficulties in organizing the new government of the country, it might be better to separate the vilayet of Basra from the vilayets of Baghdad and Mosul. It was obvious that Talib wanted to secure himself at least Basra, in case he would not be able to effect his influence in the rest of the Iraqi vilayets.[10]

On 6 August 1920, the first meeting of the Elections Committee

was held and Talib was elected its president. It seems that he did not manage to conduct its discussions as he wished, or at least in an orderly manner. Sulayman Faydi, a member of the committee who before the War had been Talib's right-hand man, started now to look after his personal future and he and his circle opened their own election campaign in order to secure the election of their men to the future Iraqi Assembly. At a certain stage, when it was decided not to include a speech of Faydi in an offprint of the committee's debates since it was too strong, Faydi tried to fool the committee's president, Sayyid Talib, and smuggled the speech into the rest of the records of the debates, that were brought to Talib for approval before being printed. It was only after he had handed over the records for printing that Talib discovered that they included Faydi's speech. The Civil Commissioner summed up the situation as following: "The Committee of ex-Deputies, with co-opt members, under the presidency of Saiyid Talib, to discuss the electroal law, is not going very well; much quarrelling, much jealousy and the public showing some hostility to it, apparently because they have accepted a British invitation and are consequently considered under our influence."[11]

However, Talib's main problems developed in his relations with the nationalist circles, relations which became more and more strained. In a conversation he held with one of their leaders, Yusuf al-Suwaydi (a member of the secret society "The Guard of the Independence," *Haras al-Istiqlal),* the latter tried to persuade him to join the national movement. According to Talib, he even proposed to him to become its leader. Talib asked him what were the goals of the movement and al-Suwaydi answered: "No foreigners, no mandate, no interference from without." Then Talib asked him what the lines of their operation were. To this al-Suwaydi answered that they had not as yet drawn up a programme. Hearing this, Talib responded: "Then you are no better than outlaws and thieves." One could not start a revolt without a detailed programme. The British could bring 70,000 men to Iraq "before you know it" and suppress the revolt. He asked al-Suwaydi mockingly, "Where are your troops and where is your artillery? Can the tribes fight the British army?" At this stage al-Suwaydi clapped his hands to his head crying out: "Ai, ai! what have I done?!" Comprehensive now that Talib would not be an ally to the national movement, al-Suwaydi refused to answer Talib's questions regarding the identity of his partners in the movement and, according to Talib, he "continued to beat his forehead like a mad man." After that Talib informed him that he was ready to join his

movement only if they would agree to drop at once their methods of propaganda and incitement to revolt. Otherwise, he would not have anything more with their movement. He also warned al-Suwaydi that proceeding in their present course would bring Iraq to ruin.[12]

After he had been elected president of the Elections Committee, Talib invited some of the nationalist leaders—al-Suwaydi among them—to join it, but they refused. In the early morning of 12 August the authorities carried out a large scale attempt to arrest the leaders of the national movement, al-Suwaydi and others among them (most of them managed to escape). There were those who believed that this attempt was made in accordance with the advice of Sayyid Talib. Indeed, in July Talib had already rebuked the Civil Commissioner "for not taking drastic action during or before Ramadhan (May-June) against Baghdad subjects." In any case, among those whom the British managed to arrest during August was 'Abd al-Majid Kanna, who was a member of the secret society "The Guard of the Independence" and who led a gang of assassins that was under the influence of the society. He was suspected of planning to murder Talib, was tried by a military court and was executed by hanging. In September 1920, Talib published a public notice in the press, in which he announced that in contrast to the British readiness to reach an understanding with the Iraqis, the leaders of the national movement were concentrating only upon inciting tribes, rebelling and causing disorder, disregarding the consequences.[13]

With the suppression of the Iraqi revolt and the return of Percy Cox to Iraq as High Commissioner, it was decided to form a provisional local government in Iraq. Naturally, Talib considered himself the right person to be the premier of this government. However, the only one among the British officials who looked favourably on this possibility was Philby. Gertrude Bell detested Talib. Percy Cox mistrusted him. The Baghdadi population in general feared him owing to his history imbued with murders. The fears increased when he recruited in Basra 50 men to be his body-guard in Baghdad. Therefore, when the preparations for the establishment of the provisional government were made, Miss Bell's office was flooded with many Iraqis, who expressed to her their negative opinion concerning Talib's appointment to any government office. At the head of Talib's opponents stood, of course, the nationalist circles, whose hostility towards him has been discussed. Opposition was also ex-

pressed by the Indian government, which recalled "the intense dislike and suspicion" felt by Ibn Sa'ud towards Talib, whom he accused of conspiracies against him together with the Sheikhs of Muhammara and Kuwait. Therefore, appointing Talib head of the Iraqi state would cause Ibn Sa'ud to conclude that all the British were against him, i.e. the British in Egypt were supporting the Sharifs and the British in Iraq were supporting Talib. In the light of all this Cox and Bell reached the conclusion that appointing Talib premier of the provisional government would be an "almost fatal error." On the other hand, they were of the opinion that it would be very difficult for such a government to function if Talib were altogether excluded from it. They, therefore, decided to assign him the office of Minister of the Interior, as they understood he would not agree to accept a lesser position. Talib himself tried his best to persuade the various British officials of his fitness to become prime minister. His reasoning was quite interesting "What's needed in this administration is experience. I've got it. A doctor before he learns his trade will kill at least two hundred people. I've killed my two hundred."[14]

Yet, eventually, the Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, was chosen and in the last days of October he formed the first Iraqi government. Sayyid Talib was appointed Minister of the Interior and Philby was nominated to be his adviser on behalf of the British. When Talib learnt that he had been appointed only to the office of Minister of the Interior he immediately informed Gertrude Bell that it was beneath his dignity to accept such secondary position. Philby, who believed that Talib would anyhow become the dominant figure in the government, hurried to persuade him to be patient and to accept the office he was offered. Even after he was reconciled, Talib still tried to extract a promise from Bell and Philby that he would be second only to the Naqib, and in case the latter fell sick or died he would replace him. The two evaded giving him any such promise. Talib was not the only one to be discontented. The Minister of Defence, Ja'far al-'Askari, told Bell that he was ready to join the government only in order to curb Talib, and added that it was a shame that such a man should become one of the leading figures in Iraqi politics.[15]

The functioning of Talib as Minister of the Interior did not satisfy the British (except Philby). In November, after a threat of resignation, Bell remarked that "no doubt there will be a great advantage in getting rid of him." At a certain stage Talib demanded that the government

should decide to increase his financial allocations, so they would be larger that the rest of the Ministers' allocations. The other Ministers agreed between them before the meeting that was supposed to discuss this issue that they would oppose Talib's request, and they encouraged one another to stick to this decision. However, soon after the meeting began, Talib directed a murderous look at the Minister of Finance, Sasun Hasqayil, and made his proposal. Hasqayil shrank from Talib's looks and hastened to say *muwafiq* (I agree). The same was done by the rest of the Ministers, who said *muwafiq, muwafiq,* each one in his turn. The only exception was the Minister of Awqaf, 'Abd al-Majid al-Shawi, that when his turn to respond came ironically said *munafiq* (hypocrite). In this state of affairs it is not surprising that Talib did not succeed in gaining the sympathy of the population, despite his attempts. At the end of 1920, he still tried to win the nationalists over (he donated Rs. 1,500 to the periodical *al-Lisan*, owned by 'Ali Rida al-Ghazali and administered by 'Izzat al-A'zami). But, at the beginning of 1921, he already tried to bring about the closing down of the nationalist newspaper *al-Istiqlal,* since this newspaper was supporting the candidacy of Faysal or 'Abdallah for the throne of Iraq, a position he desired for himself. He pressed the British to close down the paper, arguing that it had Bolshevik and Kemalist inclinations. The newspaper was closed in February 1921 and the British arrested some of those who were connected with it, among them its owner, 'Abd al-Ghafur al-Badri, and the future historian Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Basir. A few days after that, Talib published an announcement in the official newspaper *al-Iraq* in which he warned that "those who create secret parties or hold secret meetings or spread false rumours... will be punished severely."[16]

Talib's desire to become the ruler of Iraq was the cause of his decisive collision with the British, which brought about his permanent removal from Iraq. During the years 1919-1920, the British discussed the possibility of appointing an Arab amir or king for Iraq and looked for an appropriate candidate for this position. These discussions became more intensive following the outbreak of the Iraqi revolt. Wilson, the Civil Commissioner, thought at first that Talib could be the right man. Then he proposed Faysal as an alternative, but it seems that he still preferred Talib. Talib himself tried of course to encourage opinions of this sort and to persuade the British and the locals "that Faisal failed in Syria because he was a foreigner, and would also fail here for the same reason." During

a conversation held with local notables in his *diwan* in October 1920, he told them that the Iraqis should demand an Iraqi king and not "an outsider." To Philby he explicitly said at that time that his amibition was to be King of Iraq, and he even was interested that King George V would grant him the title of a British prince. However, the arrival of Percy Cox in Iraq as High Commissioner, and the consequent increase in Gertrude Bell's influence on the government, nullified Talib's hopes in this direction. The two were convinced that Talib was the last man suitable for this position. In mid-December Talib discussed this matter with Bell and frankly told her that he was aspiring to be the Amir of Iraq (he exploited this opportunity also to complain about Philby, his adviser in the Ministry of the Interior, that he did not give him enough freedom). Talib was probably aware of the lack of enthusiasm that existed among some of the British officials regarding his candidature, and at the end of that month he notified the High Commissioner "that he has definitely determined to abandon his ambition to the Amirate." But the future was about to prove that it was only tactics on his part.[17]

The more Faysal's name was mentioned as a real candidate for the kingdom of Iraq, the more Talib's anxiety grew. Being aware of his dim prospects of winning this position for himself, Talib started to canvas in favour of the Naqib of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Rahman al-Kaylani, probably out of the hope that after his death—he was old—he would succeed to his position. Talib's men started to circulate petitions in this spirit in Basra and Baghdad, and an anti-Sharifite group, that counted Talib himself, the Naqib, Hikmat Sulayman and several other notables, began to be organized. They preached the idea of "Iraq for the Iraqis," intended to establish a newspaper that would express their views, and even summoned from Jerusalem for this purpose the Iraqi poet, Ma'ruf al-Rusafi. One who vigorously refused to join this group was Talib's pre-War friend, Sulayman Faydi, who told Talib that he had no chance against Faysal When Talib insisted that he had a chance, Faydi told him straight in the face that it was well known he was hated by the people of Baghdad, and that he, Faydi, was not ready to persuade them to support someone they hated. To this responded Talib: "It seems that you have turned against me," and he left Faydi furiously.[18]

In March 1921 the Cairo conference was held, with the participation of the British Minister for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, in which, among other issues, Iraq's fate was to be decided. According to

Philby, Talib was then "wild with anxiety." His anxiety increased even more when letters from the Minister of Defence, Ja'far al-'Askari, who attended the Cairo conference, reached Baghdad, in which the latter wrote that business was going well, according to the wishes of Faysal's adherents. Talib then decided to exploit the fact that Cox and Bell were at the Cairo conference in order to organize for himself a vast propaganda campaign in the whole area South of Baghdad. The propaganda campaign was opened on 8 March on the Tigris and during it he passed Kut al-'Amara, reached Basra and returned northwards by the Euphrates, passing through Nasiriyya, Diwaniyya, Najaf, Hilla and Karbala. During his campaign Talib spent huge amounts of money for propaganda purposes, and at each place he arrived, his followers organized elaborate receptions for him. Ostensibly, the propaganda campaign was in the name of the Naqib, but it was quite clear what its real purpose was, and it caused anxiety among the circles of Talib's opponents. In Kut, Talib told his audience that in the coming elections "Any of you is free (to elect) according to his own will." In Basra, Muzahim al-Amin al-Pachachi made a speech in his honour, in which he reminded his audience of the great services rendered by Talib, "the most important man these abnormal days begot to serve the fatherland in its critical days." Talib visited various prisons and promised the political detainees there that their time of release was close. When he arrived in Najaf he met the religious leaders and promised them to strive for the repatriation of the political exiles, as well as the Iraqis who were then in Syria. He told them that he was striving for an amnesty to be granted to all the political detainees in Iraq. On 21 March, Talib returned to Baghdad and was welcomed by his followers with great honour. They took care that Ministers, officials, policemen and gendarmes would wait for him at the railway station. Talib detrained, inspected a guard of gendarmes and shook hands with the Minister and the officials. One of the officers made a speech in his honour, in which he expressed the pride of the Iraqis to see the momentous deeds done by "the leader of Iraq."[19]

At the Cairo conference it was decided to appoint Faysal as the King of Iraq. On 11 April, Cox held a long conversation with the Naqib of Baghdad and Talib and informed them of the decision arrived at in the Cairo conference. The Naqib "could not agree that the Sharif or his family had the slightest claim to concern themselves with Iraq." Talib

stated that although he would continue to serve his country, he had no more interest in the government. Yet it seems that Talib had other intentions. On 14 April, he gave an evening party in honour of the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent, Percival Landon, with the attendance of the French and the Persian Consuls, the tribal chiefs, Salim al-Khayun and Amir al-Rabi'a and several British businessmen and local notables. At the end of the party, Talib asked Landon if he was right in assuming that the High Commissioner and the British government would remain totally neutral regarding the question of choosing the ruler of Iraq. Landon answered in the positive. Then Talib remarked that there were certain British officials who exerted improper influence in favour of one of the sides, and asked him if in his opinion it was proper to complain of this to the High Commissioner or even to King George, so that these officials would be removed from Iraq. On this Landon responded that as it was known that there were also certain British officials who supported the Naqib, then if the officials who supported one side would be removed, one should remove also the officials who supported the other side. Talib blushed and for several minutes changed the subject. But then he turned towards the Sheikhs Salim al-Khayun and Amir al-Rabi'a, and declared that the Iraqis were determined that Britain should maintain strictly her neutral policy regarding the choice of the future ruler of Iraq. He warned: "If any attempt is made to influence the elections, here is the Amir al-Rabi'ah, with 30,000 rifles, to know the reasons why, and the Sheikh of Chabaish (Salim al-Khayun) with all his men." And he added: "The Naqib will appeal to Islam, to India, Egypt, Constantinople and Paris." Talib's threats were futile. Salim al-Khayun was one of Talib's sworn enemies (in 1913 he was involved in the unsuccessful attempt to murder Talib), and also Amir al-Rabi'a moved uncomfortably when Talib spoke. The British, however, could not overlook his words. They considered them an instigation to revolt, and maybe even a hint of *jihad*[19]

Landon and other British subjects who attended this event reported Talib's words to Bell. In the morning of 16 April, Bell reported it to Cox, not failing to mention to him that Talib had already began to gather around him a "band of cut-throats," whom he had employed while he had been in Basra in the days of the Young Turks, among them one who had assassinated Farid Bek in 1913. She wanted thus to warn Cox that Talib might try to arrange the assassination of Faysal, when he arrived in Iraq Cox understood that the two above mentioned tribal chiefs, as well

as the Naqib, were not partners in Talib's threats. However, he decided that such expressions on the part of a man who held the position of a minister were unbearable, especially as Talib's past career was well-known to him. He immediately turned to the G.O.C.-in-Chief, General Aylmer Haldane, and ordered him to arrest Talib at once. The latter decided not to rely on the local police in carrying out this operation and that the arrest had to be made by British officers. But an unforeseen problem had arisen. On that very day at 4:30 Talib was invited to a tea-party with Lady Cox. Arresting him during the tea-party would be interpreted as an intolerable breach of hospitality on the part of Lady Cox, and maybe even as a stratagem on her side, although in fact she knew nothing about what was to happen On the other hand, it was not possible to cancel the party lest Talib should suspect that something was going to happen. Therefore, it was decided that Talib would be arrested after the tea-party, and as far away as possible from the Residency house. At the appointed time Talib came to the tea-party and found there Lady Cox and Bell (who probably did not know either about the details of the scheme to arrest Talib). Cox himself was absent and left a message of apology. After Talib had left the party, he entered his car and drove towards the river. He barely managed to move forward a short distance when he found that a truck was blocking his way. He was about to protest against this impudence when another truck blocked him from behind. At the same moment two British officers accompanied with armed soldiers appeared and informed him that he was under arrest He was transported in an armoured car to a ship that waited for him in the river, was transferred immediately to Basra and Faw, and from there was exiled with his family to Ceylon. Philby was appointed Minister of the Interior in his place, not before he had strongly protested to Cox against the way in which Talib was arrested Two days later, Cox published an official notice, in which he announced the removal of Talib from Iraq and the grounds for this Talib's disappearance from the scene was received with open satisfaction by the populace, especially by several of his enemies in Basra. The High Commissioner received congratulatory letters, and in one of the telegrams cabled from Baghdad about this event it was said: "The dog is dead."[21]

Talib stayed in Ceylon until the beginning of March 1922 when he was permitted to move to Italy on health grounds In September 1924, he appeared in Amman stating his intention to return to Iraq Baghdad

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demanded vigorously to inform him that wherever he would apply for a visa he would be refused. Talib went to Damascus where he was informed of the ban against his entrance into Iraq. It seems that it was hinted to him that he was not *persona grata* in Syria and at the beginning of October he sailed from Beirut to Alexandria.[22]

At the beginning of November 1924 Talib received an invitation from 'Ali, the King of Hijaz (the eldest son of Husayn), to visit Jidda. Talib intended to exploit this visit to make peace between 'Ali and Ibn Sa'ud and thus perhaps to renew his former prestige. But when he arrived in Jidda he learnt that the task was too heavy for him. 'Ali demanded that the territorial integrity of his kingdom should be preserved, while Ibn Sa'ud refused to enter into any negotiations before 'Ali and his father would leave Hijaz. Ibn Sa'ud demanded as well that an Islamic congress would be convened to decide on the fate of Hijaz, under his presidency and influence of course. Talib, who did not want to entangle himself with either of the Arab rulers, decided at the end of December to return to Egypt, the more so as his health began to deteriorate. Before he left for Egypt Talib managed to meet the writer Amin al-Rihani, and over a glass of whisky and soda he told him about his adventures. Al-Rihani relates that at a certain stage Talib put the glass on the table and patted his head saying: "We have here a thing which cannot be defeated! cannot be defeated!" He told al-Rihani about his plans to return to Iraq and to politics, and promised that when he would realize them he would appoint him Minister of Education.[23]

In 1925 Talib was permitted to return to Iraq, undertaking not to interfere any more with Iraqi politics. In January 1927 the historian 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani met him in his palace near Basra and tried to draw information from him regarding the struggle between him and Faysal over the Iraqi throne. Talib made it clear that he had definitely retired from politics and that he could not express any political view whatsoever concerning Iraq or Britain. Yet, Talib did not want to completely reject his plea and, therefore, whispered in his ear: "Who has more right in my country than me? Is it not permissible that Iraq should be governed by an Iraqi?!" Talib was now already at the end of his path. His health deteriorated further and he left for Germany for medical treatment. He stayed there for the next two years and on 14th June 1929, at the age of 61, he died in Munich. His body was brought to Basra for burial and the event was exploited by the inhabitants for a mass demonstration.[24]

NOTES

(1) For the history of Sayyid Talib until the end of 1914 see Eliezer Tauber, "Sayyid Talib and the Young Turks in Basra," *Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 25:1 (1989), pp. 3-22.

(2) India Office, Library and Record (London), L/P&S/10/535: Memorandum by Commissioner of Police (Bombay) 5 February 1915; Office Memo. 443-W, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department (Delhi) to Finance Department (Delhi) 3 March, 1915.

(3) *Ibid*, letter, Sayyid Talib (Bellary) to Viceroy 24 November 1915; The Public Record Office (London), Foreign Office Records (hereafter FO) 882/15: letter from Cairo to T.E. Lawrence (Basra) 26 March 1916; John Presland (Gladys Skelton), *Deedes Bey: A Study of Sir Wyndham Deedes 1883-1923* (London, 1942), p. 254.

(4) *Arab Bulletin*, no. 13 (Cairo) 1 August 1916, p. 128; L/P&S/10/535: letter, Sayyid Talib to Lord Chelmsford, Viceroy of India [n.d.], enclosed with letter 58-S; L. Davidson (Acting Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras) to Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign and Political Department [FSI] 15 August 1916; FO 141/607/3635 t[=telegram] 5678; Foregin (Simla) to High Commissioner (Ramleh) 24 August 1916. t, High Commissioner to Foreign 27 August 1916; t5918, Foreign to High Commissioner 29 August 1916, letter, Gilbert F. Clayton (Cairo) to Residency 8 September 1916. L/P&S/10/535: t, High Commissioner to FSI 11 September 1916; t 1042W, Deputy FSI to Davidson 15 September 1916.

(5) FO 686/34: letter, Sayyid Talib [Bangalore] to Husayn 25 Dhu al-Qa'dah 1334 (25 October 1916).

(6) FO 141/607/3645: letter, Sayyid Talib 28 October 1916; t874DS, Foreign (Delhi) to High Commissioner (Cairo) 14 November 1916; t91, High Commissioner to Delhi 10 February 1917. t2718, Foreign to High Commissioner 2 March 1917; t 8028, same to same 13 July 1917; t540M, High Commissioner to Foreign 29 July 1917, L/P&S/10/535: t946-S, FSI to Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department (Bombay) 6 September 1917; FO 371/3048: t6226-W, Secretary to the Government of Bombay, Political Department to FSI 20 September 1917; FO 141/607/3635: t9808, Foreign to High Commissioner 21 September 1917. It is interesting to note that Sayyid Talib had two other sons, who during the whole of this period stayed at Beirut together with one of his supporters, a lawyer from Basra named 'Umar Fawzi. They all were under the auspices of some Americans. See FO 371/3048: tP1722, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf (Baghdad) to FSI 19 May 1917.

(7) FO 882/14: letter, K[inahan] C[ornwallis] (Cairo) to Clayton 7 October 1917, and minute by Clayton 7 October 1917; L/P&S/10/535: letters, FO to Under Secretary of State (India Office [IO]) 25 February, 5 March and 24 November 1920.

(8) FO 141/607/3635: tPOL1213, Political, Egyptforce (Cairo) to Civil Commissioner (Baghdad) 15 October 1919, L/P&S/10/535: t12325, Civil Commissioner to Political, Egyptforce 16 October 1919; FO 371/4152: t13281, Civil Commissioner to IO 27 November 1919.

(9) FO 141/607/3635· tPOL1449, Policy, Egypforce to Political (Baghdad) 6 January 1920, L/P&S/10/535 t2481, Civil Commissioner to IO 25 February 1920; FO 371/5074: Memorandum 69/C, Gillan (Basra) to Civil Commissioner 7 April 1920, FO 371/5227. t, Trevor (Bushire) to Baghdad 29 June 1920; Elizabeth Burgoyne, *Gertrude Bell From Her Personal Papers 1914-1926* (London, 1961), p. 130.

(10) FO 371/5227: t, Trevor to Baghdad 29 June 1920; FO 371/5228: t8976, Civil Commissioner to IO 25 July 1920; FO 371/5230· Note by Captain I.N. Clayton 22 August 1920, Arnold T. Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920 A Clash of Loyalties* (London, [1931] 1936), pp 265-266; Burgoyne, p. 149.

(11) Wilson Papers (The British Library, London), Add 52456A. letter, Arnold T. Wilson (Baghdad) to G.C. Stephenson (London) 9 August 1920; FO 371/5079: Mesopotamian Police—Abstract of Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 36 (Baghdad) 4 September 1920; FO 371/5081. Mesopotamian Police—Abstract of Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 37 (Baghdad) 11 September 1920; Mesopotamian Police — Abstract of Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 38 (Baghdad) 18 September 1920; Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920,* p. 266.

(12) L/P&S/10/761: Note by Gertrude L. Bell (Baghdad) 28 July 1920.

(13) FO 371/5228· t8976, Civil Commissioner to IO 25 July 1920, Wilson Papers, Add 52455C: letter Wilson to Arthur Hirtzel (London) 26 July 1920; Archives du Ministere de la Guerre, Service Historique de l'Armee de Terre (Vicennes), 6N196: t308, Edouard-Louis Chauvet (Baghdad [via Beirut]) to Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres (Paris) 15 August 1920; t272-273, same to same 27 September 1920. L/P&S/20/C199: *Personalities Baghdad and Kadhamain* (Baghdad, 1920), p. 43; *al-Sharq,* 18, 7 Muharram 1339 (21 September 1920), cited in Wamidh J.O Nadhmi, "The Political Intellectual and Social Roots of the Iraqi Independence Movement, 1920" (Ph D. Dissertation, Durham University, 1974), p. 357. Wilson, *Mesopotamia 1917-1920,* p. 266.

(14) FO 371/5231: t, Viceroy to IO 11 October 1920, and minute by Cornwallis 18 October 1920; FO 371/5082: Mesopotamian Police — Abstract of Intelligence, vol 2, no. 42 (Baghdad) 16 October 1920 L/P&S/10/839: Mesopotamian Police — Abstract of Intelligence, vol 2, no 43 (Baghdad) 23 October 1920; Philip Graves, *The Life of Sir Percy Cox* (London, 2nd imp. [1941]), pp. 268-69; H. St. J.B Philby, *Arabian Days* (London, 1948), pp 189, 192. Burgoyne, pp. 157, 174.

(15) 'Abd al-Razzāq al-Hasanī, *Ta'rīkh al-Wizārat al-'Irāqīyah* (Sidon, 1353/1933), vol.1, pp 9-10; Philby, pp 193-194, Burgoyne, pp 177-178.

(16) The Public Record Office, Colonial Office Records [hereafter: CO] 730/1: Intelligence Report No 4 (Baghdad) 31 December 1920, enclosed memorandum 73, Bell to Under Secretary of State (IO) 15 January 1921; *al-Sharq*, 24 February 1921, cited in Nadhmi, p. 360, Khayri al-'Umari, "Al-Sira' al-Siyāsi hawla al-'Arsh al-'Irāqi (1920-1921)," *Dirāsat 'Arabīyah*, 3:4 (1967), p. 33, 'Ali al-Baxirkan, *al-Waqa'i' al-Haqiqiyah fi'l-Thawrat al-'Irāqīyah* (Baghdad, 1954), p. 202; Burgoyne, pp 185-86

(17) FO/371/5228: t, Civil Commissioner to IO 10 August 1920. FO 371/5266· "Note on the Causes of the Outbreak in Mesopotamia" by the Political Department (IO) n d [August 1920]; FO 371/5082: Mesopotamian Police — Abstract of Intelligence, vol. 2, no. 42 (Baghdad) 16 October 1920; CO 730/1. Intelligence Report No 4 (Baghdad) 31 December, 1920; Philby, p. 189; Burgoyne, p. 192.

(18) Al-'Umari, pp. 33-35; Burgoyne, p 192.

(19) CO 696/4: "Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner on the Finance, Administration and Condition of the 'Iraq, for the period from October 1st 1920 to March 31st 1922," (Baghdad, 1922), p. 6; al-'Umari, pp 36-37, citing *al-'Iraq* 16, 22, 23 and 24 March 1921; al-Hasani, *Ta'rikh al-Wizarat*, vol. 1, p 16; *idem*, *al-Thawrat al-'Iraqiyah al-Kubra* (Sidon, [1952] 2nd ed. 1385/1965), p. 269; Graves, p. 288, Philby, p. 196; Burgoyne, p. 212.

(20) *The Times*, 23 April 1921; CO 696/4· "Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner," p. 7; Graves, pp 288-289; Philby, p 197; Burgoyne, pp. 213-14; Aaron S. Klieman, *Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World. The Cairo Conference of 1921* (Baltimore, 1970), p 146, H.V.F. Winstone, *Gertrude Bell* (New York, 1978), p. 236; al-Hasani, *al-Thawrat al-'Iraqiyah*, p 269.

(21) FO 371/6352: Intelligence Report No. 14 (Baghdad) 1 June 1921, CO 696/4: "Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner," p. 7, and announcement about "Withdrawal of Saiyid Talib Pasha from the Government and Baghdad," cited in *ibid.*, p. 88; *al-'Iraq* 19 April 1921, cited in al-'Umari, p. 38, Graves, pp. 289-92; Philby, pp. 197-99; Burgoyne, p. 214; Klieman, p. 146; al-Hasani, *al-Thawrat al-'Iraqiyah*, pp. 269-70; *idem*, *Ta'rikh al-Wizarat*, vol 1, pp. 16-17, Muhammad al-Mahdi al-Basir, *Ta'rikh al-Qadiyat al-'Iraqiyah* (Baghdad 1342/1923), pp. 336-37.

(22) FO 141/607/3635: t, Governor (Ceylon) to High Commissioner (Cairo) 2 March, 1922; t427, Baghdad to High Commissioner 22 September 1924; d[= despatch] 151, Russell (Damascus) to FO 25 September 1924; d124, Harold E. Satow (Beirut) to FO 1 October 1924; CO 696/4: "Report by His Majesty's High Commissioner," p. 7.

(23) FO 141/607/3635: t219M, High Commissioner (Cairo) to Baghdad and Jidda 8 November 1924; t121M; Bullard (Jidda) to Edmund Allenby (Cairo) 27 December 1924; t, same to same 3 January 1925; letter, Sayyid Talib (Alexandria, to Cox 10 January, 1925; Amin al-Rihani, *Faysal al-Awwal* (Beirut, 1934), pp. 42-43.

(24) FO 141/607/3635: d33, J.B.M. Carvell (Munich) to FO 18 June 1929, and minute 18 July 1929; 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Hasani, *al-'Iraq fi Dawray al-Ihtilal wa'l-Intidab* (Sidon, 1354/1935), vol. 1, p. 206; Arnold T. Wilson, *Loyalties· Mesopotamia 1914-1917* (London, [1930] 1936), p. 18.

THE *KITĀB AL-HIND* OF AL-BĪRŪNĪ AS A SOURCE FOR THE LATER HISTORY OF ANCIENT INDIA*

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IT has to be stated at the outset that the *Kitāb al-Hind*[1] of Abu al-Rayḥān Muḥammad bin Aḥmad al-Bīrūnī (d. 442/1050) is not a record of wars and battles, invasions and conquests and the rise and fall of kingdoms and dynasties in India in chronological order. The social and cultural history of India, specially the history of Indian science was far more important for al-Bīrūnī than political and military history. Al-Bīrūnī has dealt with Indian astronomy, zoology, geodesy, mathematics, medicine, pharmacology, mineralogy and other natural sciences in substantial detail and his book may be considered a concise encyclopedia outlining the history of Indian sciences about the middle of the 11th century. But a historian of society and culture of the calibre of al-Bīrūnī could not completely neglect the connections between social, cultural and political matters. The science of a country can be written, understood and comprehended only against the background of its social history. For this reason, some facts about the political history of India can also be gleaned from al-Bīrūnī's books dealing with India especially from the *Kitāb al-Hind*.

Al-Bīrūnī mentions a Hindu king who was killed by enemy who marched from what he calls "our land." His son named Sagara succeeded him and attacked that land and slaughtered a large number of people by way of revenge.[2] These statements are vague indeed as neither the name of the Hindu ruler nor the name of his enemy or his country has

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been specified. Sachau has identified Sagara as the son of Bahu mentioned in the *Vishnu-Purāna*, who killed all the Haihayas.[3] It is evident that there are similarities in the two accounts; but the statement of al-Bīrūnī seems to be confused. For the present it is not possible to identify Sagara's father or his enemy or name the country of the Hindu ruler.

Al-Bīrūnī has not only recorded the correct date of the conquest of Somnath by Sultan Maḥmūd, but has also noted its exact original site and the legend as to how that temple came to be built. He placed the invasion of Somnath by Sultan Maḥmūd in the year 416/1026 or 947 Saka[4] which is confirmed by Gardīzī, Ibn Zāfir and Ibn al-Athīr. Only al-Dhahabī and al-Yāfi'ī have stated that it took place in the year 418/1027 which does not seem to be correct.[5]

The *Kitāb al-Hind* contains information about the Hindushahiya dynasty[6] of Afghanistan and north-western India. Al-Bīrūnī states that a Turkish Shahiya family of Tibetan origin ruled at Kabul for about sixty generations, which is a vague statement.[7] He records some traditions and legends regarding the origin and early history of the dynasty[8] adding that such historical traditions of the Hindus do not deserve credit. Lagturman, the last ruler of this dynasty, was overthrown by his Brahman minister, Kallar, or Lalliya Shahi. Al-Bīrūnī does not state that Mihir Bhoja perhaps supported Kallar, and that Ya'qūb bin Layth al-Ṣaffār conquered Kabul in 256/870-71,[9] which compelled Kallar to transfer his capital to Udabhanda on the Sindhu near Attock in the north-western Punjab, a region that the Arab geographers and historians called Vaihind.[10] After Kallar ruled the Brahman kings Samand (Samanta), Kamalu (Toramana), Bhim (Bhima), Jaipāl (Jayapala), Anandapal, Torojanapal (Trilochanpal). The last was killed by Sultan Maḥmūd in 412/1021, and his son Bhimpal five years later in 417/1026. These statements are correct at least about the last seven rulers of this dynasty as they are corroborated and confirmed by coins[11] and a contemporary written source, the *Rajatarangini*, a chronicle of the kings of Kashmir, by Kalhana, a book that is still available. This chronicle gives an account of a battle between Maḥmūd and Raja Trilochanpal of the Hindushahiya dynasty who was helped by the Raja of Kashmir. It is correct that Trilochanpal was killed in 412/1021.[12] Kalhana also confirms that Bhimpal died in 417/1026 and the Hindushahiya dynasty came to an end after his death.[13]

It has to be stated that Jaipal who transferred his capital to Bhatinda now in the Patiala State has not been mentioned in the *Rajatar-*

angini, which mentions another Shahi king called Thakkana in the reign of Abhimanyu (A D 958-972).[14]

Showing extreme impartiality al-Bīrūnī pays a glowing tribute to the rulers of this dynasty stating that in spite of their power they always performed virtuous and good deeds. He relates an anecdote about Anandapal, who was his contemporary, showing that he was not only a learned man himself but also patronized the learned and encouraged learning. This anecdote concerns Ugrabhuti, the Sanskrit grammarian, who was the teacher of Anandapal and the popularity of his book *Sishyahitavrtti* among the students and scholars of Sanskrit at Kashmir.[15]

It may be remarked that al-Bīrūnī's account is independent and trustworthy but it is confined more or less to only a list of the rulers.[16] Since he was living in Ghazna and Kabul for several years, he could have given details of the contemporary history of the Hindushahiya dynasty. He did not record them because his major interest was not the political history of India as stated above Some of the details left out by al-Bīrūnī are supplied by Kalhana.

As Sultan Maḥmūd did not conquer Kashmir, al-Bīrūnī could not enter into the valley Although he visited only its border areas he is well informed about its history and geography The account of Kashmir given by him is much more detailed than that of other parts of India. He writes: "The south and east of the country belong to the Hindus, the west to various kings, the Bolor Shah, and the more remote parts upto the frontiers of Badakhshan, to the Wakhan Shah. The north and part of the east of the country belong to the Turks of Khotan and Tibet The distance from the peak of Bhoteshar to Kashmir through Tibet is nearly 300 *farsakhs* "[17]

Al-Bīrūnī, however, does not mention the names of the Hindu rulers. Most probably Bolor Shah, Shughnan Shah and Wakhan Shah are not actually the names of the kings of western Kashmir but only titles of the rulers of the principalities of Bolor, Shughnan and Wakhan which were all situated in the east of the eastern marches of Transoxiana. Here Bolor or Po-lu-lo of Hiouen-Thsang (A D 629-645) is to be identified with Great Bolor or Bolorian Tibet or Baltistan as opposed to Lesser Bolor which included Gilgit and other towns.[18]

Al-Biruni records a tradition which mentions the Kashmirian king

Muttai's victory gained over the Turks. This king was Lalitaditya Muktapida[19] (*c.* A.D. 724-760) and al-Bīrūnī's statement is correct. Though the account of Lalitaditya's *digvijaya* (universal conquest) may be exaggerated, his victory against Yasovarman of Kanauj about A D 733, the conquest of a portion of the Punjab and his campaigns of Tukharistan (the Upper Oxus valley) and Daradadesa (Dardistan, north of Kashmir) are certainly based on facts.[20]

There are several other later rulers of ancient India who are mentioned by al-Bīrūnī. He refers to Gangeya the ruler of Dahala whose capital was Tiauri which can be identified as Tripuri in the Jabalpur District. There is no doubt that this Gangeya is Gangeyadeva Vikramaditya (*c.* A.D 1015-41) belonging to the Kalacuri dynasty of Tripuri. He not only ruled Allahabad and Banaras but also exercised a loose control over the Doab.[21]

Al-Bīrūnī states that from the tree of Prayaga southward, towards the coast was the territory of Uwaryahar. This ruler may be identified as Candihara alias Yayati Mahasivagupta II of the Somavamsa of south Kosala in modern Orissa.[22]

Al-Bīrūnī writes that in the east of Kanouj Dugum was situated in the empire of Shilahat. A modern scholar has suggested that Shilahat may be identified as Sauryaditya of the Malayaketu family of Dardgandaki in the Gandak valley who issued charters in A.D. 1020 and 1026.[23]

Al-Bīrūnī states that during his time the area from Draur to Kunk was ruled by a king called Jaur. If Draur is identified with Dravia used for Andhra and Kunk is taken to be south Konkan towards the western coast of India, it may reasonably be suggested that this Jaur of al-Bīrūnī is none other than Rajendra Chola[24] who ruled from A D. 1016 to 1044 as the supreme power south of the Tungabhadra. It is difficult to state how Rajendra became Jaur in Arabic transcription.

Al-Bīrūnī devotes one full chapter of the *Kitāb al-Hind* (ch. XLIX) to a summary description of the different eras of Hindu history. He states that the Saka era is named after the tyrant Saka[25] who was killed by Vikramaditya in the region of Karur between Multan and the castle of Lini. But he could not solve the problem of this Vikramaditya who flourished many years after the first Vikramaditya after whom another

era of the Hindus is named.[26] It is quite reasonable to suggest that the second Vikramaditya, the conqueror of the Saka, was actually Chandragupta II (Vikramaditya *c.* A.D. 375-414) of the Gupta dynasty.[27]

That Bhojadeva of the Paramara dynasty of Gujarat, Malwa and Rajputana ruled at Dhara the capital of Malwa around A.D. 1030, when the *Indica* was written, is confirmed by al-Bīrūnī.[28] It is recorded that this Bhojadeva ruled between A.D. 1011 and 1055.

Al-Bīrūnī also gives information about those parts of India which were under Muslim occupation in the 11th century.

In the opening chapter of this book al-Bīrūnī discusses the causes which antagonized the Hindus from the Muslims[30] making it difficult for a Muslim to study Hindu sciences and culture.

Al-Bīrūnī then records how Subuktigin and his son Mahmūd led several expeditions into India causing great damage to the lives and properties of the Hindus. He writes with a feeling of deep sympathy for the Hindus who suffered death and destruction at the hands of Sultan Maḥmūd.[31]

Al-Bīrūnī writes about the contemporary history of Multan which was ruled by Jalam bin Shaybān, the Carmathian. There is no evidence either to prove or refute the statement of al-Bīrūnī that Jalam broke the famous idol of Aditya of Multan and killed its priests.[32] However, he does not say that when Sultan Maḥmūd attacked and conquered it in 396/1066 and again in 401/1010, he massacred the Carmathians.[33] He records that the Carmathians had left the old mosque which was closed and had constructed a congregational mosque of their own. After the conquest of Multan the old mosque was opened and congregational prayers were held in it while the Carmathian mosque was allowed to decay being reduced to the position of 'barn floor.'[34] It is a fact that Multan was captured by 'Abd-Allāh the Carmathian around 287/900[35] and it was Sultan Maḥmūd who not only conquered Multan but also expelled the Carmathians from it. When the Arab geographer al-Maqdisī visited India in 375/985 he found that the ruler of Multan was an Ismā'īlī Shī'ī and the *Khuṭbah* (Friday sermon) was read in the name of Fatimid rulers of Egypt.[36]

But the short description of the idol of the temple at Multan and its being the cause of the material prosperity of the town as given by

al-Bīrūnī are borrowed from the works of the early Arabic geographers.[37] According to the reliable statement of *Zayn al-Akhbār* of Gardīzī, Sultan Mahmūd led his expedition into Multan twice, once in 396/1006 and the other time in 401/1010.[38] All historians agree that the ruler of Multan whom Mahmūd defeated was Abu al-Futūḥ Dāwūd bin Naṣr, the grandson of Shaykh Hamid Lāwī.[39] Then Jalam bin Shaybān mentioned by al-Bīrūnī as the usurper of Multan may be the founder of an Arab Carmathian dynasty that ruled it at the end of the 4th/10th century.[40]

There is a difference of opinion as regards the exact situation of Vallabhi, the capital of the kings of the Ballabha dynasty. Vincent Smith held the view that it was located in Eastern Kathiawar while others state that it was in the peninsular portion of Gujarat.[41] Al-Bīrūnī, however, states that the town of Ballabhi was situated at a distance of about 60 *yojnas* south of Ahilwara[42] and thus helps in the correct location of this ancient town which is generally identified as Vala in Saurashtra.

As regards the exact situation of the town of Bhatiya which Sultan Mahmūd conquered in 395/1004, al-Bīrūnī writes: "from Narayan (not Bazana as read by Sachau) towards the west, you come to Multan which is 50 *farsakhs* from it. Bhati (or Bhatiya) is 15 *farsakhs*. Marching from Bhati towards the south-west you come to Aror which is 15 *farsakhs* from it. Aror is a township between two arms of the Sindh river."[43] Thus according to al-Bīrūnī Bhatiya was located between Narayan (Alwar state) and Aror or Rohri somewhere near Sind in the same latitude as Multan.[44] It may be pointed out here that he displays an intimate knowledge of Multan which means that he visited it frequently or lived in it for sometime. Modern research has proved that the location of Bhatiyah as given by al-Bīrūnī is correct.[45]

Al-Bīrūnī states that Rajyapala after being defeated by Sultan Mahmūd fled from Kanouj and set up his capital at Bari which was situated on the east of the Ganges at a distance of three or four days' march from Kanouj.[46] He has clarified the distance by adding later, "Marching from Kanouj towards the east you come to Bari, 10 *farsakhs*."[47] This was actually the second capital of the Gurjara Pratiharas of Kanouj and was situated on the west bank of the Ganges. Al-Bīrūnī's account of Bari is confirmed by al-'Utbī and Ibn al-Athīr.[48]

Al-Bīrūnī's account makes it easy to locate the Nandana fort. He

states that he had lived in it and used a nearby mountain to measure the earth's diameter.[49] Sultan Maḥmūd marched against this fort in 404/1013. It was actually situated among the Balnath hills at the junction of two spurs of the Salt Range. It is the Nardin of al-'Utbī.[50] The editor of a recent critical edition of the *Zayn al-Akhbār* by Gardīzī[51] has read this name correctly, but in the printed edition of the *Kitāb Ādāb al-Ḥarb wa al-Shujā'ah* by Fakhr Mudabbir, it is read as Bandana erroneously[52] by the editor twice on the authority of the *Ā'īn-i Akbarī* of Abu al-Faḍl. It is not mentioned in the *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*.[53]

In conclusion it may be stated that the information about the political history of India contained in the *Kitāb al-Hind* is meagre but valuable as it throws light on some hitherto obscure points in the history of India and it would be an unjust and harsh remark to say that the *Indica* "contributes comparatively little information which can be utilized for the purpose of political history."[54] A detailed study of such information has been presented above. It is all the more important because it is indirect and incidental. It shows how India was divided into small principalities under separate rulers at the time of al-Bīrūnī in the early 11th century.[55] This was the main cause of the weakness of these kingdoms, specially of northern India, which made Sultan Maḥmūd so successful in his expeditions against them.

NOTES

(1) Al-Bīrūnī, *Kitāb fī Taḥqīq mā li'l-Hind* based on the Paris Ms, Bibliotheque Nationale, Schefer no. 6080. (Hyderabad, the Dairatu'l-Ma'ārif al-'Osmānia, 1958), pp. XIV + 30 + 548, Referred to as *KH* throughout this paper.

For al-Bīrūnī in general, see D.J. Boilot, "al-Bīrūnī" in the *Enc. of Islam* new ed., vol. I (1960) pp. 1236-1238; E.S. Kennedy, "Al-Bīrūnī in the *Dictionary of Scientific Biography* (Henceforth *DSB*) vol. ii (New York, 1970), pp. 147-58. Ahmad Saeed Khan, *A Bibliography of the works of Abu'l-Raiḥān al-Bīrūnī* (New Delhi, 1962), pp. 77. M.S. Khan, "A Select Bibliography of Soviet Publications on Al-Bīrūnī," *Janus* (Amsterdam) 62(4), pp. 279-88. See also the forthcoming Bibliography of al-Bīrūnī (by the present writer) containing his works and their studies published after 1972. See also 'Alī Aḥmad al-Shaḥḥāt, *Abu al-Rayḥān al-Bīrūnī* (Cairo, 1968), 242 pp. On the life and works of al-Bīrūnī in general see Fuat Sezgin, *Geschichte Des Arabischen Schrifttums*, vol. v (Leiden 1974), pp. 375-383.

(2) *KH*, p15/1, 20, 21. Another Hindu King Sagara Bhagiratha has been mentioned by al-Bīrūnī; see *KH*, 462/ii, 143 (The first page number refers to the Arabic text of the *Kitāb al-Hind* printed at Hyderabad in 1377/1958 and the second refers to the English translation by Edward C. Sachau, *Indica* (Delhi reprint, 1964), in 2 vols.

(3) See *Vishnu-Purana*, ed. and compiled by H.H. Wilson (Calcutta, 1961), pp. 229, 300, 302. For Sachau's annotations see *Indica*, vol. ii, 260-61. It is a fact that the main contents of the *Vishnu-Purana* were known to al-Bīrūnī. Prof. D.C. Sircar writes, "For Sagara and his father Bahu of the Solar dynasty, see my *Studies in the Society and Administration of Ancient and Medieval India*, vol. 1 (Calcutta, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1967), pp. 41 ff They are the mythical ancestors of Rama of the Ramayana. There was really no Muslim king in their age." (Personal letter dated 11 8.1973).

(4) *KH*, 348/II, 9, 10

(5) For references to the works of these historians, see Muhammad Nāẓim, *The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna* (New Delhi reprint, 1971), pp. 209-212

(6) See "The Hindushahiyya dynasty of Waihind" by Muhammad Nāẓim in *op cit* , pp 194-196; C.E. Bosworth, "Hindu-Shahis" in the *Enc. of Islam* (new ed. 1971), vol. iii, pp. 460. "Shahi's of Afghanistan and the Punjab" in *The Dynastic History of Northern India* by H.C. Ray (Calcutta, 1931), vol i, pp. 55-105; Kalhana, *Rajatarangini*, Bk. v, pp. 152-155; pp 233; Bk vii, pp. 47-69; 144-178, 274, 956, 1470 and BK viii, pp. 225-227; Fakhr Mudabbir, *Kitāb Ādāb al-Ḥarb wa al-Shajā'ah*, ed. by Aḥmad Suhaylī Khwānsārī (Tehran, 1346 A H Shamsi), 307-11. It is regretted that al-Bīrūnī could not consult the pedigree of the dynasty preserved in the fortress of Nagarkot; see D.C. Sircar, *Indian Epigraphy* (Delhi, 1965), p. 14.

Among the Persian historical works it was perhaps the *Zayn al-Akhbār* of Gardīzī which first reproduced al-Bīrūnī's account of Sultan Maḥmūd's skirmish with Jaipal, Anandpal and Trilochanpal. See the new ed by 'Abd al-Ḥayy Ḥabībī (Tehran, 1347 A H Shamsi), pp. 177-80. See "Six Inscriptions in the Lahore Museum" by Daya Ram Sahni in the *Epigraphia Indica* (Delhi, 1931-32), vol. xxi, pp. 298-99. Al-Mas'ūdī calls the ruler of this dynasty "Kabul Shah" *Murūj al-Dhahab*, Paris ed., vol. iv, p. 38.

(7) See *KH*, 348-351/II, 10-14. It has been remarked: "Al-Bīrūnī may or may not be correct in stating that all these monarchs belonged to one family, or that their number was exactly sixty, but it seems probable that they were of the Kushan stock, and used the title Shahiya," R S Tripathi, *History of Ancient India*, 3rd ed. (Delhi, 1967), pp. 339-40.

(8) For example the stories of Barhatakin and the Cave and the story of Kanik; *KH*, 348-350/II, 10-12. It is difficult to verify these statements from any other source.

(9) See Ibrāhīm Bāstānī Pārīzī, *Ya'qūb Layth* (Tehran, 1344 A H Shamsi), pp. 170, 175; D.C. Ganguly, "The Shahis" in the *Age of Imperial Kanauj* (The History and Culture of the Indian People), (Bombay, 1955), 111-112; Anon., *Ta'rīkh-i Sistān* (Tehran, 1314, A H Shamsi), pp. 215 ff. See S.M. Stern, "Ya'qub the Coppersmith and Per-

sian National Sentiment" in the *Iran and Islam*, ed. C.E. Bosworth (Edinburgh, 1971), pp. 535-55.

(10) See *KH*, 216/I, 259; 165/I, 206 and 270/I, 317 and Anon. *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, ed. by Manoochehr Sotudeh (Tehran, 1340/1962), pp. 72, 73; V. Minorsky, *The Regions of the World* (Eng. tr.), 2nd ed. (London, 1970), pp. 92, 251, 253-54. It is stated in error that its king Jaipal was a vassal of the Raja of Kanouj, Gardīzī, *op. cit.*, pp. 177-205. According to al-'Utbī the battle between Sultān Maḥmūd and Anandpal took place on the banks of Waihind (Und, Indus), H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 92; Muhammad Nāẓim, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-90; A. Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India* (1871), pp. 53-54; see Muḥammad Nāẓim's article in the *JRAS*, London, 1927, pp. 485-495; D.C. Sircar, "Udabhanda" in the *Geography of Ancient and Medieval India*, pp. 231-35. (Henceforth referred to as *Geography*.)

(11) R.S. Tripathi, *Ancient India*, p. 340; see "On the Coins of the Dynasty of the Hindu Kings of Kabul" by Edward Thomas in the *JRAS* (London, 1948), IX, pp. 177-96, Rashīd al-Dīn's account of this dynasty is based on the *KH* of al-Bīrūnī, J.F. Fleet, "A Note on the Coins of the Hindu kings of Kabul" in the *Indian Antiquary*, Bombay 1886, XV, pp. 185-87; E. Clive Bayley, "Remarks on Certain Dates Occurring on the Coins of the Hindu Kings of Kabul, Expressed in the Gupta Era and in Arabic Numerals" in *The Numismatic Chronicle*, 3rd Series (London, 1882), vol. II, pp. 128-65; see also A Cunningham, "Coins of the Tochari, Kushans and Yue-Ti" in *The Numismatic Chronicle*, 3rd Series (London 1889), IX, pp. 285-86. For a stone inscription which confirms some of the statements of al-Bīrūnī, see Daya Ram Sahni, *op. cit.*, p. 299; R.C. Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhuri and Kalikinkar Datta, *An Advanced History of India*, vol. I (Ancient India), (New York, 1967), pp. 172-73.

(12) Book vii, pp. 47-69, tr. by Ranjit Sitaram Pandit (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 265-67. As regards the value and importance of the *Rajatarangini*, see Pandit's introduction (Invitation), xix to xli; and the informative introduction to his translation of *Rajatarangini* by M.A. Stein (Delhi, 1961), vol. I, pp. 3-133. R.C. Majumdar *(Historiography in Modern India* [Bombay, 1970], p. 5) states "Kalhana is the only historian that ancient India can boast of"; D.C. Sircar, *Geography*, pp. 86, 252-38. For an analytical study of the *Rajatarangini*, see U.N. Ghoshal, "The Dynastic Chronicles of Kashmir", in the *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Calcutta (1942-43), XVIII/no. 3, pp. 195-207; XIX/no. 1, pp. 27-38 and no. 2; pp. 156-72. See also U.N. Ghoshal, *Studies in Indian History and Culture* (Calcutta, 1957), chap. v, pp. 146-242; "The Royal and Dynastic Chronicle of Kashmir."

(13) Book vii (66-69) refers to the end of this great and glorious dynasty which confirms al-Bīrūnī's statement. See also verses 144-178 and M.A. Stein's notes to verses 66-69 of his translation of the *Rajatarangini*, vol I, pp. 270-71. Although very brief, the importance of al-Bīrūnī's account of the conquest of Somnath and the Hindushahiyya dynasty has been increased due to the fact that his contemporary al-'Utbī does not even mention them in his historical work. Had he done so, it would have been possible to compare the two accounts and test the correctness of al-Bīrūnī. Al-'Utbī's *al-Ta'rīkh*

al-Yamini the only contemporary historical work which could fill the gap left by al-Bīrūnī (see below).

(14) See Kalhana, *op. cit.*, Book vi, 230-86; H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 78, 132.

(15) *KH*, 104-105/I, 135-36. As regards the grammar itself it should be noted here that it is correctly known as *Siva-bhāṣya-sūtra* and it is a commentary on the *Durgavṛtti* mentioned by al-Bīrūnī; see Yudhishthira Mimamsaka, *Samskrita Vyakarana-sastra ka Itihasa* (Hindi), (Varanasi, V.S. 2007), vol. i, pp. 407-12; see G. Buhler, "Bīrūnī's Indica" in the *Indian Antiquary* (Bombay, 1886), XV, p. 32. The statement of al-Bīrūnī is proved correct in every respect.

(16) C.E. Bosworth writes, *op. cit.*, p. 13, "The section of the Hindushahi kings of Kabul is a source for the history of the region on the eve of its annexation of Ghaznavids, and has been much used to elucidate the history of the important Hindushahi dynasty."

(17) *KH*, 165/I, 206. The place-name should be read as Bolor in the text and not Bolar as read by Sachau. Guy Le Strange read it as Bulur, *Lands of the Eastern Caliphate* (Cambridge, 1930), pp. 381-457; A Cunningham, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84; Gardīzī, *op. cit.*, pp. 269; *Regions*, pp. 93-258. In the 12th century A.D these regions were under the Ghūrīds. Fakhr al-Dīn Mas'ūd, the uncle of Shihāb al-Dīn Muḥammad Ghūrī, ruled Bamiyan, Tukharistan, Shughnan and other regions upto Bolor, V.V. Barthold, *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*, p. 338.

(18) *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam*, pp. 27, 28, 40, 74, 121-22; *Regions*, pp. 93, 121, 258 and 369-70.

(19) *KH*, 486/II, 178; for Lalitaditya Muktapida, see Rama Shankar Tripathi, *History of Kanauj to the Muslim Conquest* (Benaras, 1937), pp. 195-97; 201-204; H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 72, 74, 112-14, 116, 227. The most detailed and perhaps the earliest account of this king of Kashmir, son of Pratapaditya II, is given by Kalhana in the *Rajatarangini*, tr. by M.A. Stein, vol. ii, Index no. 522, D.C. Sircar, *Studies*, vol. i, pp. 47, 153. For a list of the rulers of the Karkota or Naga dynasty of Kashmir to which he belongs, see Duff's *Chronology*, pp. 293-94.

(20) R.S. Tripathi, *Ancient India*, pp. 344. *Idem.*, *History of Kanauj*, pp. 204-205; H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 112; see *Rajatarangini*, Book iv, verses 131-264 and M.A. Stein's notes.

(21) *KH*, 161/I, 202. H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 504, D.C. Sircar, *Cosmography and Geography in Early Indian Literature* (Calcutta, 1967), pp. 156; D.C. Ganguly, "The Kalacuris of Tripuri" in *The Age of the Imperial Kanauj*, pp. 86-91. al-Bīrūnī has mentioned the correct name Tripuri of this capital in another context (see *KH*, 254/I, 301). See also D.D. Kosambi, *An Introduction to the Study of Indian History* (Bombay, 1956), pp. 2-3; R.S. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, pp. 239, 256, 265, 293, 295, 314; *Idem.*, *Ancient India*, pp. 263, 360, 370, 371, 376, 382 and 416 n. Sachau (vol. ii, p. 318) states that he could not correctly identify Tlauri. "Gangeyadeva's power was, however, ultimately eclipsed by the rise of Bhoja Parmara who won a victory over him." R.C.

Majumdar *et al.*, *An Advanced History*, vol. i, pp. 159, 174, 178. V.B. Mishra, *The Gujara-Pratiharas and Their Times* (New Delhi, 1966), p. 45. For an inscription of Gangeyadeva dated A D 1038 which mentions Dhahala twice (*Dahala* of al-Bīrūnī), see A. Cunningham, *Archaeological Survey of India Reports* (Calcutta, 1885), xxi, parts. I&II, p. 13 and Gulab Chandra Chowdhury, *Political History of Northern India*, pp. 81-82, 84, 96, 372, 376. For coins of Gangeyadeva, P.N. Srivastava, *Madhya Pradesh District Gazetteer*, Jabalpore (Bhopal, 1968), p. 307 and *Passim:* M.G. Dixit, *Tripuri* (Nagpur, 1955). See also R.D. Banerjee, "The Haihayas of Tripuri and their Movements" in the *Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India* (Calcutta, 1931); Vasudev Vishnu Mirashi, *Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum*, IV, Inscriptions of the Kalacuri-Chedi Era in two Parts, Ootacamund, 1955, 574, LXVII-CVIII, CLXXX-CXCIII, CLXXXII-CLXXXIV.

(22) *KH*, 159/I, 200; H.C Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 394, 410; D.C Sircar, *op. cit.*, p. 155; note 16. About Uwariyahar, Sachau (vol. ii, p. 318) surmised that it meant Orissa. See the list of four rulers of the Somavamsi kings of Katak mentioned without dates in Duff's *Chronology*, p 305, J F. Fleet, "Record of the Somavamsi Kings of Katak" in the *Epigraphia Indica* (Calcutta, 1894-95), specially 327 and 351-55 for a Katak Copper-plate Grant of the Ninth year of Mahasivagupta.

(23) *KH*, 160/I, 201; D.C. Sircar, *op. cit.*, 155 note 17, but in the index (229) Shilahat is entered as Sylhat territory; see his "Two Grants of Sauryaditya" in the *Epigraphia Indica*, ed. D.C Sircar (Calcutta, 1963), XXXV/pt. 3, July 1963, pp. 130-40. The two chapters issued by him are actually dated Vikrama 1077 and 1083 respectively. D.C Sircar writes *(loc. cit.)*, "The king was the son of Hansaraja and the grandson of Helavaraha and belonged to a branch of solar race, of which the progenitor was a royal hero named Malayaketu.... It appears that the rulers of the Malayaketu family were ruling over the north eastern districts of Uttar Pradesh and the adjoining areas of North Bihar. They were at first subordinate to the Gurjara-Pratiharas but became independent about the beginning of the eleventh century." Sachau enquired (vol. ii, p.318) whether this Shilahat can be identified with Sylhet in the Province of Assam. The present writer does not think so because as stated by al-Bīrūnī it was situated at a distance of 10 *farsakhs* or a little more than 35 miles from Kanauj. Professor D.C. Sircar writes, "Shilahat cannot be Sylhet because that would be too far to the east of the area indicated by al-Bīrūnī's language. Al-Bīrūnī does not appear to have any clear idea about the contemporary Pala Kingdom and Sylhet lies even further east." (personal letter dated 11.8 1973)

(24) D C. Sircar, *op. cit*, p. 160, H.C. Ray, *op. cit*, vol. i, pp. 250, 279, 318, 341, 405, 406, 450, 456, 461, 531 (Rajendra Coladeva Parakesarivarman); R.S. Tripathi, *Ancient India*, pp 463-96; *Indica*, 159/I, 200 and 168/I, 209 where it is stated, "Round the bay lies the city of Panjayavar (Tanjavur or Tanjore). When this city had fallen into ruins, the king, Jaur built instead of it, on the coast towards the West, a new city which he called Padnar " Sachau correctly stated that Jaur's possessions meant the Chola empire. He refers to Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii, p. 435; vol iv, pp. 230 ff. For the Tirumalai inscription of Rajendra Chola I, see *Epigraphia Indica*, vol. ix, pp. 229 ff, A.L. Basham, *Studies*, pp. 155, 183, 188, 191. F Kielhorn, "Dates of Chola Kings" in *Epigraphia Indica*, ed. E Huetzsch (Calcutta, 1896-97), vol. iv, pp 68-69.

(25) *KH*, 345-46/II, 6. See the "Saka Era" by R.C. Majumdar in *The Age of Imperial Unity*, 2nd ed. (Bombay, 1953), p. 158. There is a discussion of the Saka era in the *Indian Epigraphy* by D.C. Sircar (1st ed. Delhi, 1965, pp. 258-267) where (at p. 266) it has been stated that the tradition recorded by al-Bīrūnī that Vikramaditya started the era after having defeated and killed the Saka king has no historical basis.

(26) *KH*, 345/II, 5, where al-Bīrūnī discusses the era of Harsha and compares it with that of Vikramaditya. Harsha's era at Mathura and Kanauj was also discussed. Some people of that region told him that there was a difference of 400 years between the two. But a Kashmirian calendar consulted by al-Bīrūnī records a difference not of 400 but 664 years.

(27) H.C. Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, 6th ed. (Calcutta, 1953), pp. 553-65; R.S. Tripathi. *Ancient India*, pp. 249-78. It is a historical fact that the Saka ruler of western India was killed by Chandragupta, II (R.S. Tripathi, *loc. cit.*, footnotes on 250-251). See James Fergusson's criticism of this passage of al-Bīrūnī "On the Saka Samvat and Gupta Eras" in the *JRAS*, new series (London, 1880), XII, pp. 273 ff.; see also his "On Indian Chronology" in *JRAS*, new series (London, 1870), IV, pp. 81-137; A.L. Basham, *Studies*, pp. 105, 139, 205, 209.

(28) *KH*, 152/I, 191; R.S. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, pp. 293-95. Sachau (Preface to the Eng. trans. XLIV), writes "Bhojadeva of Malava, ruling between A.D. 997 and 1053, is mentioned by al-Bīrūnī. His court at Dhar where he had gone from Ujjain was a rendezvous of the scholars of the time." See D.C. Ganguly, *History of the Paramara Dynasty* (Dacca, 1933). For a most detailed, critical and recent account of Bhojadeva, see Pratipal Bhatia, *The Paramaras* (New Delhi, 1970.), pp. 74-95 and *passim*, B.N. Ray *Raja Bhoja* (Hindi), (Allahabad, 1932); C. Mabel Duff, *Chronology*, p. 109, with reference to inscriptions and periodical articles; D.C. Sircar, *Geography*, pp. 121-22.

(29) H.C. Ray, *op. cit.*, vol. ii. p. 865; Sachau refers to Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. iii, 845 seq. (tr. II, 315); R.S. Tripathi, *Ancient India*, pp. 381-384, D.C. Sircar, *Geography*, pp. 121-22.

(30) *KH*, 13-18/I, 17-23.

(31) Al-Bīrūnī, *KH*, 17/I, 22.

(32) *KH*, 88/I, 116. Sachau writes (vol. ii, p. 296) that the history of this Carmathian chief is unknown and it is difficult to identify him, but see Sayyid Sulaymān Nadwī, *'Arab aur Hind ke Ta'allugat* (Allahabad, 1930), pp. 326-28.

(33) For a short account of Abū Tāhir Sulaymān bin Abī Sa'id al-Ḥasan bin Bahrām al-Jannābī and the Qarāmiṭah; see *al-Āthār al-Bāqiyah* of al-Bīrūnī, text 212-14 (*Chronology*, 196-98). Ibn Ḥawqal, *op. cit.*, 210-11. Thābit bin Sinān and Ibn al-'Adīm, *Ta'rikh Akhbār al-Qarāmiṭah* (Beirut, 1391/1971), 127; W. Madelung, "Karmati" in the *Enc. of Islam* (New Edition, Leiden, 1978), vol. iv, pp. 660-665.

(34) *KH*, 89/I, 117.

(35) T W. Haig, *Enc of Islam* (1936) III, 721. cf Syed Sulaymān Nadwī, "The Carmatians of Multan" in *op cit*, 315-26 Al-Bīrūnī's statement *(loc. cit)* that the Carmathians appeared about 100 years before his own time creates confusion. The *KH* was written about A H 421 which means that the Carmathians occupied Multan around A H 321 which does not seem to be correct. Over and above this confusion of date it is perhaps more correct to state that the ruler of Multan contemporary of al-Bīrūnī was not a Carmathian but an Ismā'īlī Cunningham has identified Mulasthana with Multan; see B.C. Law, *Historical Geography*, 112.

(36) *Akwan al-Taqāsīm*, ed M J. de Geoje (Leiden, 1906), p. 485 Al-Maqdisī's contemporary the author of the *Ḥudūd al-'Ālam* states, "Its ruler is a Quraishite from the descendents of Sam He lives at a camp half a *farsang* (from Multan) and reads the *Khuṭba* in the name of the Western One." In the contemporary sources no distinction is generally made between the Ismā'īlīs and the *Qarāmiṭah;* see C E. Bosworth, *op cit.*, 52-53

(37) Al-Iṣṭakhrī, *Kitāb al-Masālik wa' l-Mamālik*, ed. De Goeje (Leiden, 1927), pp. 173-74; Ibn Rustah, *al-A'lāq an-Nafīsah*, ed De Goeje (Leiden, 1892), 135-36. Yāqūt copies the relevant information from these geographers; see *Mu'jam al-Buldān*, ed. F Wustenfeld iv, 689.

(38) See the critical edition of this book by 'Abdu'l-Ḥayy Ḥabībī, who considered the tribal affiliation Lodi with the name of Shaykh Ḥamīd as correct (178 n.5)

(39) That Lawī and not Lodi was the tribal affiliation of Shaykh Ḥamīd, the grand-father of Abu'l-Futūḥ Dāwūd bin Naṣr, is attested by Ibn Ḥawqal who visited Multan in A D 977, Marwazi/Minorsky also mentions Sām bin Lu'ayy (Lawī) and not Lody, *op cit*, p. 48; Muhammad Nāẓim writes (*op. cit*, p. 96, note. 5) "Brigg's Firishta I, 40, says that Dāwūd was a descendent of Shaikh Hameed Lody. Lody is an obvious error for Lawī, who according to al-Mas'ūdī, *op cit*, pp. 234, 385, was probably one of the ancestors of Dāwūd This error has misled some writers to call Dawud a Lody." See also Ishtiaqh Husain Qureshi, *The Muslim Community of the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent (610-1947 A D)* (The Hague, 1962) 42-43; see C.E. Bosworth, 52 He makes a reasonable statement that "the real reasons for the attack seem to have been financial" and this may also be stated as regards his (Maḥmūd's) invasions of India It has to be pinpointed that Sultan Maḥmūd not only attacked the Hindu rulers and the temples of India but also Multan twice which was ruled by a Muslim

(40) Sayyid Sulaymān Nadwī, *op cit.*, p. 316; but this Jalam bin Shaybān needs further investigation Fakhr Mudabbir, *op cit*, p 238; M.I. Shafi', "Fresh Light on the Ghaznavids" in the *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad, 1938), vol. xii, pp, 213-15

(41) See "al-Bīrūnī's knowledge of Indian Geography" in *op. cit*, 5. H.C Raychaudhuri, *Political History of Ancient India*, p 490; *Studies*, p. 241, note I states that the Emperors of the Deccan belonging to the royal houses of Chalukya and Rastrakuta called them-

selves Vallabha, Sri Vallabha or Sri Prthivi Vallabha, doubtless in imitation of the God Visnu the Preserver; B.C Law, *Historical Geography of Ancient India*, pp 300-301; see also *The Imperial Gazetter of India* (Oxford, 1908), p 175

(42) *KH*. 346/II, 7; See D.C. Sircar, *Cosmography*, p 160, where Hieun Tsang mentions Valabhi or Vallabha of al-Biruni which is identified as Manykheta; Gulab Chandra Chowdhury, *op cit*, p. 204, V A. Janaki, *op cit.*, pp. 31, 51, 63-64 (specially the notes and references).

(43) *KH*, 164/I, 205, for Baxana or Narayan, see D.C. Sircar, *Geography*, pp. 162-63, where it is identified as Bayana in the former Bharatpur State Al-Biruni writes in another context "Marching from Kanouj towards the south-west... Baxana the Capital of Gujrat, 20 *farsakhs*. This town is called Narayan by our people " *KH*, 161/I, 202.

(44) Muhammad Nāzim, *op cit*, p. 199 and f.n.. Bhati is not mentioned by any Arab Geographer not even by the author of the *Hudūd al-'Ālam*.

(45) See al-'Utbī, *al-Ta'rīkh al-Yamīnī*, ed. Mawlawy Mamlūk al-Alyy and A Sprenger (Delhi, 1847), pp 258-61 under *Dhikr Ghazwa Bhātiya*, and Muhammad Nāzim, *loc cit*, see A. Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, 1871, p. 256.

(46) *KH*, 158/I, 199; R.S. Tripathi, *History of Kanauj*, pp 285, 287-88 V B Mishra, *op cit*, pp 53-54. "Behind the Ganges flow the rivers Rahāb (modern Ramganga) and Kavinu which join the river Sarva near the city of Bari " D C Sircar, *Geography*, p 45; Muhammad Nāzim, *op cit.*, pp. 94, 108, III, p. 206 Al-Bīrūnī *(loc cit)* writes that between Kanauj and Bari there is a distance of three to four days march, Gardīzī, *op cit*, p. 184 and note 4. King Mahipala who resided at Bari around A D 1026 tried "to consolidate and to extend his empire. This ruler is said to have been Buddhist," cf. Kern, *Geschichte des Buddhismus in Indien*, II, p 544; Sachau, Preface to the *Indica*, XLV; see V.B. Mishra, *op cit.*, pp 53-54

(47) *KH*, 160/I, 201.

(48) Al-'Utbī, *op. cit.*, pp. 394 ff; Ibn al-Athīr, *al-Kamil fil-Ta'rīkh*, ed. Tornberg, IX, pp 218-19 where it is stated that Sultan Mahmūd conquered and destroyed it

(49) See his *Tahdīd Nihāyat al-Amākin*, pp 222; 10, quoted by E S Kennedy, *op cit*, p 150

(50) Al-'Utbī, *op. cit*, pp. 329-36 under *Dhikr Wāqi'āt Nardin*, where it is stated that it was conquered by Sultan Mahmūd in 404/1013, Muhammad Nāzim, *op. cit*, pp. 74 n , 88 n 91-93, 103-35

(51) *Op cit*, p 181 and note 4

(52) Edition cited in note 6 above, 308-311 It is stated in f.n I that in the *Ta'rīkh* of

Abu'l-Faḍl Bayhaqī (ed. Ghanī and Fayyaḍ) it is mentioned as Nandana but in the *Ā'īn-i-Akbarī* it is recorded both as Bandana and Nandana. But the editor has not given any reason why he preferred Bandana to Nandana.

(53) Bhatiyah, Nandana and Bari are not mentioned by the author of the *Ḥudūd* or by Yāqūt or by B.C. Law in his *Historical Geography of Ancient India*.

(54) Vincent Smith, *Early History of India* (Oxford, 1924), p. 15.

(55) See the prejudiced and biased account of Wolseley Haig, *The Cambridge History of India* (Turks and Afghans), (New Delhi reprint January, 1965), III, 11-27 chapter II. An idea about these small principalities can be had from chapter XIII entitled "The Passing of the Old Hindu Kingdoms" in *An Advanced History of India*, vol. I (Ancient India), pp. 171-83.

THE STATE AND RELIGION IN A PLURAL SOCIETY: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

SIYAN OYEWESO

Introduction

TODAY, Nigeria is a country with diverse religious experiences and dispensations. Apart from the fact that the two universalist religions, Islam and Christianity, are engaged in stiff competition for Nigerian souls, there are new religions like Hare Krishna, Guru Mahraji and other para-religious forms such as the Grail Message, Godianism and Echkankar. Besides, there has been an upsurge of religious intensity in the Church and Mosque resulting in new outgrowths. In Christianity, there are Catholics, Baptists, Anglicans, Methodists, Apostolic, Celestial, Cherubim and Seraphim, Seventh Day Adventist, Brotherhood of the Cross and Star, Deeper Life Ministry among others. In the Muslim sector, there are such societies as Nawar-ud-Din, Ahmadiyya, Jamaat Nasr Islam, Ansar-ud-Din, Jamaat Ul-Islamiyya, the Bandele Movement, the Izala and Darika, to mention a few. It should be added that despite the assault of these foreign religions on the traditional setting and beliefs of the people, there are those who cling to their indigenous beliefs and practices.

Just as Nigeria has a multi-religious nature, it is also a nation with a mosaic of ethnic groups and nationalities which have diverse social and cultural identities. Indeed, experts have put the number of Nigeria's ethnic groups at between 250 and 300, with the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba being the dominant ones. In short, Nigeria could rightly be described as a plural society.

From the foregoing, it follows that political office-holders since independence have had to contend with two red-herrings on the path to nationhood: religious rivalry and cultural pluralism. Both constitute sub-national interests resisting national integration. History is indeed full of examples that religion, if not properly handled, could be volatile and undermine the nation's unity, survival and progress For quite some time now, Christians and Muslims have been engaged in what seems a ceaseless religious war in Lebanon with its attendant massive loss of human lives and anarchy. The situation in the Republic of Sudan is somewhat similar to that of Lebanon. Nigeria has also had its own share of religious turbulence in the Maitatsine insurgence and the Kaduna (State) riots of March 1987. If there is any lesson that these religious crises have taught humanity, it would appear to be a demonstration of the fact that religion is a matter of emotion rather than reason. Another conclusion that one can draw is that winners hardly emerge in these wars of attrition and, more often than not, they do not resolve the issues they set out to solve. It therefore follows that it is the duty of the political elite, statesmen and patriots to find means of promoting religious peace and harmony so that the task of nation-building can be less burdensome.

It is against this background that we set to examine religious interactions in Nigeria with a view to determining what should be the proper involvement of the state in religious matters. In achieving this, attention will also be focused on the historical roots of Christian-Muslim rivalry, the points of convergence and divergence between the two religions, and the volatility of religions generally. The paper will also address itself to how peaceful co-existence can be maintained among the adherents of various faiths.

On Religion. Meaning, Nature and Role

It is very difficult to define precisely what we mean by religion, more so when there are many shades of religious beliefs, opinions and interpretations. This difficulty is not even peculiar because most terms are often laced with such problems which could explain why scholars usually shy away from "definitions" in their works. However, we will offer a few definitions with the object of showing the varying perceptions of religion. Bilton defines religion as:

> a system of belief about the individual's place in the world, providing an order to that world and a reason for existence within it.[1]

To the "scientific socialists," religion is an opium of the people, a tool in the hands of the propertied and ruling class for the exploitation of the ruled. To be precise Karl Marx contends that:

> Religion is the sign of the oppressed creatures, the sentiments of a heartless world, as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions, it is the opium of the people.[2]

However, an all encompassing view will be that one which sees religion as the experience, beliefs and rituals expressing in man's awareness of transcendent being or beings. This definition is adopted because it has taken care of the doctrinal controversy on the question of the Godhead.

Experts in the field of religion have long recognized that religion, in any human society, could be a positive agent of development or negative agent of disintegration. Both Emile Durkheim and Max Weber, for example, concur that religion is capable of uniting people and fostering among them orderly existence.[3] Lewis Coser, however, has been very quick to point out that religion could set a house against itself.[4] History has indeed vindicated these two mutually exclusive positions.

The Historical Background to Religious Particularism in Nigeria

Prior to the contact with the Arab and European worlds and the imposition of Islam and Christianity on the peoples, Nigerians reflected on the nature of God and their own existence. Despite the claims by Eurocentric writers at the beginning of the century that the African man was incapable of conceiving God, it is now acknowledged by Christians and Muslims alike that there was a conception of God basically African. The findings of such scholars as Bolaji Idowu, John Mbiti and Godfrey Parrinder have also gone a long way to deepen our understanding of God and Religion in the traditional African setting.[5] And despite the venoms—heathenism, paganism, fetishism, idolatry—that have been poured on African traditional religion, it remains a tolerant religion. Hence, if attention is not focused on indigenous beliefs and practices, the

attempt is deliberate since they have, on their part, maintained good neighbourliness and peaceful co-existence with the practitioners of other faiths. However, before any excursion is made into the history of Muslim-Christian relations, it is important to note that government and religion are mutually dialectical among Nigeria's diverse peoples. It was the *Oba*, the *Obi* or the *Sarakuna* or the *Amayanabo* who was doubling as the political and religious leader, performing rituals when necessary, for the maintenance of political order and promotion of moral code.[6]

The first of the foreign religions to have contact with Nigerian soil was Islam and this event has been dated to the 7th century. According to al-Bakrī, Islam reached Kanem through the Kawar-Fezzan route in A.D. 666.[7] By the 10th century, Islam was still being mixed with traditional faith, but by the 14th and 15th centuries, it had permeated into Hausaland. The process of Islamization during this period has been divided into three stages — quarantine, mixing and militant evangelization.[8] The first stage was the period when Muslims lived in exclusive areas to practise their religion, while the second stage relates to their interactions, mostly as traders and court secretaries, with the indigenous populations. During this period, the survival of Islam rested on the patronage by rulers. In other words, the history of Islam in Nigeria before the 1804 'Uthmān Ibn Fūdī's *Jihād* was characterized by accommodation and assimilation, and it peacefully co-existed with the non-Muslim community. The success of Ibn Fūdī's *Jihād* coupled with the establishment of the Sokoto Caliphate brought religion into the centre of development in Nigeria. For Islam now provided the ideological base for the hitherto politically autonomous societies. And since there is no separation of the state and society in Islam, it sets the stage for the application of Islamic principles in state development. In a nutshell, while the Sokoto *Jihād* provided political cohesion for the Hausa-Fulani states, it simultaneously reinforced the differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in Nigeria.

Christianity, on its own part, made its way to Benin in the 15th century but these early efforts of the Portuguese missionaries and traders were largely unsuccessful. In fact, the effective beginning of Christian evangelization in Nigeria is dated to the 19th century: Badagry (1842), Abeokuta (1846), Calabar (1846), and Ontisha (1857). The coming of the Christians also introduced new ethics and values into the society. With Christianity came its handmaiden, Western education, which led to

the emergence of a new elite—an elite with a slavish commitment to Euro-Christian values. However, while a religio-political entity emerged in the North, the Christian denominations in the South could not achieve such a feat. This development, in the view of this writer, marked the beginning of the much talked about North-South dichotomy in Nigerian politics.

Islam and Christianity Under Colonial Rule

Although it is a fact of history that Nigeria's colonial masters from Lugard (1900) to Robertson (1960) did not choose an official religion for the state, available evidence suggests that some of their policies sowed the seeds of future religious discontent. Out of self-interest and perhaps respect for Islam, the colonial authorities did not give Christian missionaries and educators a free hand to operate in the North. Indeed they even created the impression that Western education and Islam were incompatible. Having checked the influx of these missionaries to the North, they did not take bold steps to develop Western education or to take care of the discrepancy that could emerge in the educational development of their "two protectorates."

The adoption of the Gregorian Calendar with a number of public holidays fixed along Christian model was also, in the eyes of many Muslims, a subtle attempt to undermine the impact of Islam on the society.

Another development which—though not necessarily a creation of British administration — affected Muslim-Christian relations during the colonial era was the use to which the mission schools were put. Apart from the religious indoctrination which Muslim children were exposed to, many were only given admission on the proviso that they would renounce their religion. For this reason, many Muslim parents refused to send their children to school. For instance, while the Iwo Muslims rejected the idea of a Christian teacher, the Iseyin Muslims only had six of their children in the Christian School by 1893. Even Lagos Muslims displayed this antipathy to Western education throughout the 19th century.[9]

Religion in Independent Nigeria

Successive efforts at constitution-making in Nigeria have had to grapple with the question of multi-religious nature of Nigeria. The 1960

constitution, for example, did not impose any religion on the state and gave express provision—Section 23(1)—to freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The constitution frowned at enforced religious education and allowed individuals' freedom of worship and association. Section 24(1) of the 1963 Constitution repeated the 1960 provisions. The 1979 Constitution also similarly stated in Section 35(1) that

> Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.

Section 10 was even unmistakably clear on the question of state religion:

> The government of the Federation or State shall *not adopt any religion as state religion*. (emphasis is mine).

In spite of these constitutional provisions, Nigeria has witnessed religious turmoil and several intra religious feuds. Some of these major religious squabbles include the representation made by some religious groups at the 1958 Willink Commission on Minority groups, the formation of a Muslim political party, the Great (*Sharī'ah*) Debate of 1978, the 1982 Fegge (area of Kano) crisis, the Maitatsine Uprising 1980-85, the Organization of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.) Controversy, the Chapel of Resurrection (University of Ibadan) Crisis and the 1987 Kaduna State Religious Crisis. It is important to remark that astute observers of Nigeria's political scene have earlier warned against the recent spate of religious bickerings and intolerance. Major General Danjuma, for instance, in an address given at the Nigerian Army Staff College, Jaji, in July 1979, stated, among other things:

> I must confess that I share the fears of possibilities of religious and sectarian strifes in this country. I believe that tribalism *(sic)* as a fall-back position was destroyed by the Nigerian Civil War. But I regret to say that religious and sectarian chauvinism is fast replacing tribalism as a vehicle for political cohesion. The use of ethnic and/or religious differences as a means of achieving political solidarity is fraudulent enough but it becomes more disturbing when it is used to polarise the people and thereby disturb the peace and stability of the country. I am not aware of any country that has survived two civil wars. I am afraid that

> our country, Nigeria, may presently be living between wars. I hope I am wrong but all the ingredients and the signs to the contrary are there for any perceptive analyst to see.

We have quoted Danjuma's speech *extenso* because it reveals that some members of the Nigerian ruling class themselves are quite aware of the portent dangers of religion in an emergent nation. Apart from revealing the thinking of a fraction of the ruling class, subsequent events in Nigeria's religious developments have almost proved Danjuma right.[10]

Islam and Christianity in Contrast

Since the birth of Christianity and Islam, the two religions have chosen to develop along different lines doctrinally, although basically they acknowledge the existence of a Supreme Being whom they respectively called *Jehovah* and *Allāh*. In the thinking of this writer, there are areas where no amount of logical discourse can bring both sides nearer to each other and, consequently, such an impasse must be recognized. For instance, while the Divinity of Christ, the Trinity and Crucifixion are central to the Christian faith, they have no place in Islam and all Muslim groups are in agreement on this. Let us first examine the concept of the Godhead. The Muslim conception of God is that God is One, absolute and indivisible. In Islam, it is *Tawhīd per se—lā ilāh illa-Allāh*. Islam emphasizes strict and uncompromising monotheism and, in this connection, Muslims cannot sacrifice dignity for depravity. In Islam, the question of the intermediary does not arise. Prophet Muḥammad is not considered as an intermediary between Allāh and the faithful. He is a Prophet *(Nabī)* and a Messenger *(Rasūl)*. Muslims have direct contact with Allāh. The Qur'ān is very emphatic on *tawḥid*:

> Say: Allah is One. He begetteth not and neither is He begotten and there is none that you can compare unto Him.[11]

However, in Christianity, it is unity in diversity. According to Christian belief, it is the same divine essence which operates in three modes as God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. Some Biblical justifications for this position are John 3:15 "I am the light and the way, nobody cometh unto the Father except through me" and Acts 4:12 "There is no other means of salvation but in Christ alone." In Christian-

nity Jesus Christ is a component part of the Godhead, but in Islam he is recognized as no more than a *Prophet* who enjoys proximity to God and one who constitutes a jewel of moral excellence. Thus, it is obvious that these two positions are diametrically opposed to one another.

The relevance of this area of conflict is to show that there is absolutely nothing that the state can do to bring the two religions together in terms of doctrine. Indeed Nigerian Muslims and Christians recognize this area of conflict and they have not allowed this doctrinal problem to destroy family solidarity but for the threats since 1978. For instance, the phenomenon of religious solidarity is very much pronounced during festivals. Generally, Yoruba Muslims and Christians participate in each other's festivals. They exchange greetings, congratulations and pray for one another. It should, in fact, be emphasized that the areas of agreement surpass the conflictual areas. For instance, Christianity and Islam believe in permanent souls, in the existence of God, and give importance to His grace. More importantly, they both claim love, kindness, compassion as their fundamental principles.

The Roots of Religious Intolerance

1. Some men of religion are responsible for religious intolerance. They believe, rightly or wrongly, that only their belief systems and mode of worship are the best and the only way to God and salvation.
2. Religion is conceived by the religious chieftains as a game of numbers and they are therefore always at each other's throats. Little regard is paid to the quality of the life of the converts.
3. Religion is largely based on faith and it is difficult to call to question some scriptural foundations without risking an emotional outburst.
4. Religion is a source of authority in the society for some chieftains and they would jealously guard against anything that can disrupt the status quo.
5. Religion constitutes the only means of livelihood for some people and, consequently, anything that denigrates or undermines the status of that religion is not likely to go unchallenged.
6. People whose natural calling hinge on their religion would go to any length to safeguard the interest and sanctity of that religion.
7. It is common place to find in any religious group fanatics, extremists or fundamentalists who cannot be tolerant of the viewpoints of their opponents.

Apart from these general considerations, there are specific situations which have continued to fan the embers of religious discord. Nigeria's political elite are generally guilty of this. In their competition for political and economic power they often use religion as a vote-catching weapon. More often, their preys are mostly the less-privileged and the gullible.

Government's involvement in purely religious matters is another factor which is accentuating religious differences. In 1982, the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari invited the Pope to Nigeria while the Archbishop of Canterbury was also received before the end of that year. He also donated N10 million for Muslims to build a national mosque at Abuja while the Christians could only collect theirs under the present Babangida's administration.[12] The present Babangida's regime was also reported to have registered Nigeria as the 46th member of the OIC. There is no gain saying that government has no business with religious affairs. As a matter of fact, instability is inevitable where the state which is supposed to regulate conflict among the various contending interests also serves as the instrument of these contending interests. The mere fact that the state allocates commercial and strategic opportunities is enough to make it an area of political conflict, not even to mention when there is abundant evidence that state power is consistently used to favour certain interests at the expense of others.

Moreover, despite the pious declaration of successive Nigerian leaders that the country is a secular one, it is sad to note that (twenty-eight years after our political independence) a Nigerian child seeking admission to a university or college, a graduate seeking employment in the public service would have to fill a form which requires him to *publicly declare* his religious persuasion. Even if individuals still harbour religious prejudice or bigotry, the state and its institutions must not practise, endorse or condone such habits. Even in God Own Country—the United States — the state needs no information on the creed of those of its citizens or nationals that would have to deal with any of the state organs or institutions. On the University of Pittsburg's Confidential letter, according to Chinua Achebe, the referee is boldly advised thus:

> Please make on statement which would indicate the applicant's *race, creed or national origin.*[13] (emphasis is mine).

Qur'ānic Scriptural Sources and History as a Recipe Against Religious Intolerance

The Qur'ān is replete with provisions which enjoin peaceful co-existence with other religions. As a starting point, it stresses the principle that there is no compulsion in religion. All the prophets of God that delivered their messages before Muḥammad are recognized and accorded respect; no basis for discrimination. According to the Qur'ān, all people were created from the same source and are inherently well disposed and equal. God says:

> Men, have fear for your Lord, who created you from a single soul. From that soul he created its mate, and through them he bestowed the earth with countless men and women...."

The Qur'ān is not only stressing the equality of mankind but also that mankind is one community. It recognizes the division into countries, nations, tribes, religions and traditions but explains that it is only for the purpose of identification. It deprecates all distinctions based on racial, economic or other fancied superiority. The Qur'ān further streases that peace is an essentiality and war is an eventuality. For the Qur'ān there is no difference between the rich or poor, master or slave, white or black; each one is a human being and is entitled to peace and happiness.

The Qur'ān also lays down detailed rules for the regulation of relations between the followers of different religions. It prohibits Muslims from saying anything derogatory about the deities of other religions. With regard to religious controversies, it points out the unreasonableness of criticism levelled against a rival creed to which one's beliefs and doctrines are also open. It teaches that all great religions are based upon divine revelation and that their deterioration is due to subsequent corruption in human hands. It, therefore, prohibits the condemnation of other religions and it fully supports interreligious dialogue aiming to benefit mankind. The Qur'ān commands Muslims to "discuss in better manner" and to say:

> We believe in revelation which has come down to us and in that which has come down to you; Our God and your God is One; and it is to Him we bow.[14]

So difference of religion must not be an obstacle for either national or universal and lasting peace

Besides these Qur'ānic stipulations, history reveals a long history of peaceful co-existence between Muslims and Christians. During the lifetime of the Prophet, the rights of Christians and Jews were not only protected, their properties were also safeguarded. In particular, the monks of the Monastery of St. Catherine, Mount Sinai and other Christians under his jurisdiction were granted a charter which demonstrated a remarkable degree of religious tolerance and human freedom. In this document, according to Chief Imam Sodeinde, Prophet Muḥammad personally undertook and enjoined his followers:

> to protect the Christians, to defend their churches, the residences of their priests, and to guard them from all injuries They were not to be unfairly taxed; no bishop was to be driven out of his bishopric; no Christian was to be forced to reject his religion; no monk to be expelled from his monastery; no pilgrim was to be detained from his pilgrimage, nor were the Christian Churches to be pulled down for the sake of building mosques or houses for the Muslims. Christian women married to Muslims were to enjoy their own religion and not to be subjected to compulsion or annoyance of any kind on account of their religion. If Christians should stand in need of assistance for the repairs of the Churches or monasteries, the Muslims were to assist them.[15]

Prophet Muḥammad clearly stated in the Charter that any Muslim who contradicted these provisions should be regarded as a violator of Allāh's testament. Indeed, there can be no doubt that the Prophet was much concerned with the welfare of non-Muslims living in the Islamic State. Imām Abū Yūsuf quotes two very important Prophetic Traditions in this regard. In the first Tradition, the Prophet is reported as saying:

> The non-Muslims must be treated with leniency and must not be oppressed by any ruler and must not be taxed beyond their capacity and nothing should be taken from them except for a duty encumbering them.

In the second Tradition, the Prophet is also reported as saying:

> Whoever oppresses a non-Muslim subject or taxes him beyond his capacity, then I shall be the party to him in the litigation.[16]

The righteous caliphs (A D. 632-661) too were equally concerned with the fairness of the treatment to be given to the non-Muslims living under their jurisdiction. The second caliph, 'Umar ibn al-Khattāb, is reported to have said during his last days:

> I exhort my successor regarding the treatment to be meted out to the convenanted people by the Messenger of Allāh. They should receive the full execution of their convenant, and their life and property should be defended if it requires to go to war (with oppressors) and they should not be taxed beyond their capacity.[17]

In fact, there is enough evidence to believe that the Muslim-Christian relations witnessed a high degree of tolerance and understanding during the lifetime of the Prophet and during the righteous caliphate. Even Arab rule in Egypt, especially between 7th and 9th centuries, permitted freedom of worship for the Copts. The inhabitants of Egypt were protected as *dhimmīs*. Being outside the pale of Islamic law, they were allowed the jurisdiction of their own canon laws as administered by the respective heads of their religious communities.[18]

Other Suggestions for Religious Tolerance

(i) There is the need for regular inter-religious dialogues among men of religion and intellectuals. These dialogues too should focus largely on common features rather than discussing the differences. In particular, emphasis should be placed on the three aspects of religion: how we arrive at our knowledge about this universe and the ultimate reality (epistemology), the view of the ultimate reality which we obtain through these means (metaphysics), and how our way of life is influenced by our view of the ultimate reality (ethics). These three aspects not only condition each other, they constitute the bedrock of any religion. Such discussion will certainly help in forming greater mutual appreciation and harmony among the diverse religions in Nigeria. There is the need to add that the results of such dialogues should reach the average masses and rural dwellers. Dialogues should not be confined to a few elites and intellectuals.

(ii) Another way of guaranteeing religious peace and harmony is for the government to maintain Nigeria as a SECULAR country. There should not be any extra-hand of government in religious affairs. In this respect we suggest the Zambian model:

> Zambia is a country of many religions....*I did not feel it was my place as the* President of the Republic to adjudicate between them, *to declare this religion or that official, so far as the state is concerned. Each has the right to exist* and it is my desire that believers of all faiths should live together in harmony.[19] (emphasis is mine).

(iii) The men of religions in our educational institutions especially the colleges and universities need to be told that the nation expects them to have "sympathetic understanding" for all religions. There is the compelling need for them to teach each religion from its own point of view rather than from a preconceived bias. Presently, some of them in the departments of religions teach sectarian beliefs in the guise of academic scholarship.

(iv) Our men of religion should be constantly reminded that religion is not a game of numbers. Successful evangelism should be seen in terms of the scope of the delivery of the message and not necessarily in terms of the number of converts. Conversion should be simply invitational.

(v) Religious harmony can be realized through self-discipline whereby one practices his faith and recognizes the right of other people to practicse theirs.

(vi) There is the need for the religious leaders to educate their followers on the ethics of their faiths and to have respect for human lives and property. There is no religion which supports the killing or maiming or burning of the properties of the practitioners of other faiths.

(vii) The government should no longer ask students in schools or those people transacting business with the state to disclose their religious beliefs. Such a practice not only constitutes a veritable instrument of discrimination by a bigoted public official, it gives the concerned citizen the impression that such an information could be used against him or that he could appeal to religious sentiments.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that the ultimate end in view of all religions is to guarantee peace, harmony, social justice, unity, freedom and liberty of all in human society. However, since history has shown that indescribable havoc had been committed in the name of religion, it follows that any pluralistic religious society should find ways of making these religions to peacefully co-exist with one another. The need for religious tolerance in Nigeria is even more compelling because there are families where we have the admixture of the three religions—Islam, Christianity and traditional religions. No doubt, religious tolerance is attainable in Nigeria but the government itself must be very sincere. The way political office holders relate to or treat the three religious groups will go a long way to influence the fruition or otherwise of the religious peace being canvassed. And to our religious leaders, they need to know that it is too late in the course of Nigeria's political evolution to impose any religion on the state. The best advice for religious particularists is that given by Swami Vivekananda in 1893:

> If the Parliament of Religions has shown anything to the world, it is this: it has proved to the world that holiness purity and charity are not the exclusive possession of any church (mosque) in the world and that every system has produced men and women of the most exalted character. In the face of this evidence, if anybody dreams of the exclusive survival of his own religion and destruction of others, I pity him from the bottom of my heart and points out to him that upon the banner of every religion will soon be written in spite of resistance:
>
> Help and not fight
> Assimilation and not destruction
> Harmony and peace and not dissension.

NOTES

(1) Tony Bilton *et al, Introductory Sociology* (London. Macmillan, 1977), p 524

(2) Karl Marx quoted in O. Awolowo, *The Peoples Republic* (Ibadan. Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 206.

(3) Emile Durkheim, *Elementary Forms of Religious Life* (London: London Press, 1951).

(4) For details see O. Otite and W. Ogionwo, *An Introduction to Sociological Studies* (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1979).

(5) E.B. Idowu, *Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief* (London, 1962 Longman); Godrey Parrinder, *Introduction to West African Religion* (London; SCM, 1967); John S. Mbiti, *African Religious Philosophy* (London: SPCK, 1979).

(6) See Elizabeth Isichei, *A History of Nigeria* (London: Longman, 1983), pp. 129-167.

(7) John E. Lavers, "Islam in the Bornu Caliphate: A Survey" in *Odu A Journal of West African Studies*, no. 5, April, 1971, p. 27.

(8) Robin Horton, "On the Rationality of Conversion," *Africa* 43, 3, 1975, pp. 219-35.

(9) T.G.O. Gbadamosi and J.F. Ade Ajayi, "Islam and Christianity in Nigeria" in *Groundwork of Nigerian History*, ed. Obaro Ikime (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1984 reprint), p. 354.

(10) Lindsay Barrett, *Dimgiama: The Making of a General* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1979), p. 124.

(11) Al-Qur'ān, III:64.

(12) See O.B.C. Nwolise, "Awo and Religion in Nigeria," in Olasope Oyelaran, Toyin Falola *et al*, *Obafemi Awolowo The End of an Era?* (Obafemi Awolowo University Press, 1988), p. 867

(13) Chinua Achebe, *The Problem with Nigeria* (Enugu: Fourth Dimension, 1983), p. 8.

(14) Al-Qur'ān, XXIX: 46.

(15) Chief Imam Sodeinde, "Islam believes in Religious Freedom," *The Guardian*, August 1, 1986, p. 7.

(16) Abd Yūsuf, *Kitāb al-Kharij*, pp 69-72.

(17) *Ibid*

(18) Philip k. Hitti, *History of the Arabs* (London: Macmillan, 1974 reprint), pp. 164-73

(19) Quoted in *African Christian Spirituality*, ed. Aylward Shorter (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1978), p. 49.

(20) Quoted in K. Lakshmana, "Interreligious Dialogue: A Hindu View," paper presented to the *Assembly of World's Religions*, Nov. 15-21, 1985, Mc Afee, New Jersey.

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A FORMULA FOR *NAFAQAH* AND HOME MANAGEMENT

MUSA ALI AJETUNMOBI

Introduction

MANY Muslim women have become salary earners in the present age. Some of them (who possess high academic qualifications) earn even higher salaries than their husbands. There are also many successful business-women who are not salary earners but who control abundant wealth. In general, the affected women in this article are found, mostly, in countries of capitalist ideology. Most of the women face the problem of how to disburse their earnings in conformity with the principles of Islam. They are often at logger-heads with either their husbands or parents in this regard.

It is an established fact in Islam that husbands should, traditionally, provide for and maintain their families. Similarly, from a historical perspective, Muslim women among the *Salaf* were mostly housewives who earned little or nothing because of their disengagement in wage-earning ventures. Thus, they were fully maintained by their husbands. If we use that as a legal precedent, housewives of the modern age should be equally maintained fully by their husbands.

That notwithstanding, the motivation for writing this article arises from the predicament of some modern Muslim women who earn some income through engagement in wage-earning ventures. To what extent should they contribute to home management? How can they maintain a peaceful matrimonial home with their earning? Our approach is, therefore, to highlight the Islamic teachings on *Nafaqah* in the first instance. We, thereafter, examine the lawfulness, or otherwise, of embarking on wage-earning ventures by Muslim women. We, finally, propose a formula for *Nafaqah* and home management, using the principles of the Islamic law of inheritance as a basis.[1]

Nafaqah: *Responsibilities of the Couple*

Jurists have developed the content of many Qur'ānic verses, especially IV:34, as well as many Prophetic Traditions in charging the husband with the responsibility of providing food, cloth and shelter for the wife. According to some legal manuals, these responsibilities of the couple can be classified into three categories:

i) Joint responsibilities,
ii) Responsibilities of the husband; and
iii) Responsibilities of the wife.

Joint responsibilities are, mostly, non-material. They include the worship of Allāh as He ought to be worshipped[2] as well as sharing the company of each other by the couple (as may be required from time to time, etc.).

Responsibilities of the husband include provision of food, cloth[3] and shelter[4] for the family. Wife or wives and minor children may constitute the family in this regard. However, major children and some close relatives may equally be maintained as explained later.

The husband must maintain his wife according to his means, provided he enjoys in her what he desires from time to time. Even if the wife is slightly sick or temporarily absent from town (like going on pilgrimage), the husband must continue to provide her with the necessary shelter, feed her with the commonest food in the society or according to his means (if he can afford expensive food), and give clothes to her twice a year or according to the custom of the locality. Details of when the wife shall lose these benefits (i.e. when the husband ceases to derive desired enjoyment in her) are also contained in Islamic legal manuals.[5]

Islamic law provides, further, that parents may be maintained if they require such maintenance. This presupposes that wealthy parents who can look after themselves are exempted from receiving maintenance from their children. Another proviso attached to the maintenance of parents is the ability of the child (who wants to maintain them) to possess sufficient provisions for himself, his wife and children and then have a surplus that can be extended to the parents. If the child has insufficient

means, the parents become helpless.[6] It is clear from the foregoing that the husband may, additionally, cater for his parents while the wife can equally cater for her own parents — if she has the means.

Male children should be maintained till they attain the age of majority or when they become capable of looking after themselves (with lawful earnings). On the other hand, female children should be maintained until their marriages have been performed and consummated. This means that daughters, whose marriages have been merely contracted, should continue to be maintained by their parents until such daughters' marriages have become consummated; then, their maintenance shifts to their husbands. It should be remembered that, generally, maintenance includes provision of food, cloth, shelter and other essential services required in the locality.[7]

Islam, as a complete way of life, also caters for the maintenance of possessions. Therefore, slaves, domesticated animals and even captured birds in cages must be maintained by their owners.[8] Further still, a child who possesses abundant wealth is required to assist his/her father by maintaining for him (the father) a servant and just one of his wives (be that wife the child's mother or step-mother—as may be chosen by the father). In short, therefore, the maintenance of close relatives is conditioned by the ability of the maintainer while the maintenance of wives, children and possessions is an obligatory duty—though, dependent on the means and ability of the maintainer.

As regards the specific responsibilities of the wife, she should be obedient to the husband. Prophet Muhammad (SAW) is reported to have said: "If a woman observes her five daily prayers, fasts in the month of Ramaḍān protects/guards her private parts, and (voluntarily) obeys her husband, she will be requested to enter Paradise through the gate of her choice."[9] She should also protect her honour and the glory of the family. She must equally assist the husband in catering for the family. The Qur'ān (II:228) reads in part: "And women shall have rights similar to the rights against them—according to the tradition—but men have a degree (of advantage) over them...." This Qur'ānic portion conforms with, and explains further, what Allāh says in Verse 34 of the same chapter, viz: "Men are the protectors and maintainers of women, because Allāh has given the one more (strength) than the other, and because they support them from their means...." Men are, therefore,

more responsible for *Nafaqah* than women. But this does not suggest that man should provide everything. Rather, women with means should not fold their arms, watching their husbands doing everything. Maintenance is a mutual responsibility, though men should play a leading role. For example, it was reported that Umm Salamah went to the Prophet and asked him: "O Apostle of Allāh, is there any reward for me if I spend my wealth on the children of Abū Salamah, though they are also my children?" The Prophet replied that she surely would have the reward.[10] This means that a mother can buy clothes, provide food and do other necessary things for the comfort of her children.

It should be noted at this juncture that difference in religion is not a barrier to maintenance.[11] A Muslim husband should maintain his non-Muslim (lawful) wife and non-Muslim parents or children must maintain their Muslim relations—just as such Muslim relations can maintain their non-Muslim parents or children.

Can a Muslim Woman Work for Earning?

In an ideal Islamic society, a woman's duties include complete obedience to her husband, staying in his home, managing that home, observing general cleanliness of the home, taking custody of children, and bringing up such children with sound Islamic and moral education. She ought to please and satisfy her husband in all perspectives. Prophet Muḥammad (SAW) is reported to have said: "Whoever among women is dead, and she had earned the blessings and pleasure of her husband, will surely enter Paradise."[12] Islamic legal manuals are replete with injunctions on how a woman can please her husband. Prominent among such injunctions is that she should not go out of her matrimonial home except with the permission of her husband.[13]

During the early days of Islam, Muslim women were, mostly, house wives. Perhaps, they drew an inference for their stay at home from the Qur'ān (XXXIII:33) which is a specific message to the wives of the Prophet: "And stay quietly in your houses and make not a dazzling display like that of the former 'Times of Ignorance'...." It was reported that in deciding a case between 'Alī b. Abī Ṭālib and Fāṭimah, the Prophet allotted home duties to Fāṭimah and (outdoor) duties for earning to 'Alī.[14] That notwithstanding, the Prophet's wives were often busy at

home, baking, cooking, cleaning and serving guests with food.[15]

Muslim scholars (of all ages) have discussed the role of women at home vis-a-vis their engagement in duties that can fetch them some earning. The consensus was that a Muslim woman can work; but such work should neither be injurious to her nor harmful to her matrimonial life.[16] Ibn 'Ābidīn has summarized the opinion of scholars in this regard thus: "The husband should not prevent his wife from a non-harmful work. He should also not prevent her from any out-door duty that is generally known for ladies."[17] The stand of scholars in this regard is supported by the Qur'ān (IV:32) which reads: "...To men is allotted (part of) what they earn; and to women (part of) what they earn...."

The Qur'ān (IV: 29-32) and many Prophetic Traditions, in which Muslims are encouraged to feed on the product of their labour, agree with jurists' speculations on women's rights of ownership and possession. For example, the bride has absolute authority on the disbursement of her *Ṣadāq* (dower) without interference from any quarter whatsoever. Similarly, some categories of female heirs have their respective Qur'ānic shares; and generally, properties of women should be shared by close relatives (after death)! Our question in this regard is: if women should have no property of their own and they are to be maintained by their husbands, what properties of theirs has Allāh subjected to sharing in the law of inheritance? We feel that women can engage in lawful revenue-yielding ventures, but such job should be in keeping with the dignity of their status. Women's income through gift, inheritance and subsidy from the husband and elsewhere may not be sufficient for their needs. After all, such subventions may not be constant nor consistent; hence they may be augmented.

In as much as Muslim women are permitted to go out of the matrimonial home for acquisition of Islamic education—if the husband fails to teach them—we feel that they can equally go out to perform their allotted duties, in this modern age, if they are public servants. They must, however, seek permission of their husbands, dress modestly by covering all parts of the body except the face and the hands, and protect the sanctity of their homes. We have highlighted, earlier, the right of a Muslim woman to go out of her matrimonial home and her right to possess wealth through gift, inheritance or dignifying labour (to her feminine status). Below is our formula for a just disbursement of earnings

by members of a family.

Home Management in the Modern Age: A Formula

Husband and wife (or father and mother) should share the responsibility of running the home for the purpose of maintaining peace, harmony and tranquillity within the family. Children also have their responsibilities in this regard. Many Prophetic Traditions have allotted specific duties to each member of the family. In one of such Traditions, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) mentioned that each member of a family is a shepherd and each shall account for his flock; while in yet another Tradition, he stated that the eldest brother should step into the shoes of the father of the family in terms of responsibilities, etc. Based on such Traditions, and in as much as several verses of the Qur'ān call on Muslims to make deductions from the Signs of Allāh,[18] we observe that our formula in this article may rest on the principles of the Islamic law of inheritance and bequest. If a Muslim is allotting to living close relatives what such relatives should have shared from the Muslim's property (after his death), he is merely disbursing, proportionately, what would be disbursed to each heir (after his death).

Based on a principle of the Islamic law of bequest in which a prepositus is permitted to bequeath a maximum of one-third of his property at will before his death, we hereby propose that a living working-class lady may retain one-third of her earning for disbursement at will. Neither her husband nor parents may question her on what she does with the one-third. If she is on a net income of $540, one-third for her exclusive disbursement is $180. The balance of two-thirds, i.e. ($540-$180 or two-thirds of $540) $360, may be distributed to her close relatives who have the right to inherit her property after death. If she has a living husband, father, mother and children, she may follow the Qur'ānic injunction to cater for each of them. (It will be recalled that the husband is entitled to share a half of his wife's property if the deceased is childless and one-quarter if she has a child while each parent is entitled to share one-sixth of the child's property if such a child has his/her own child[ren], otherwise, each parent may share one-third.)[19] Thus, the balance of $360 will be shared by her husband, father, mother and children as follows:

Husband = 1/4 of $360 = $90

Father = 1/6 of $360 = $60
Mother = 1/6 of $360 = $60
Children = Residue = ($360 - $90 - $60 - $60) = $150

She can spend part of her personal $180 on household utensils and objects of decoration to beautify her body or home. The other part may be spent on the maintenance of her servant, offering gifts to distant relatives and friends, or other essential services like maintaining a car and any of her possessions. The share of her children can be spent on the provision of cloth for them or rendering assistance to the husband in either buying text-books or paying school fees (if education is not free in her area of domicile). The share of the husband must be presented to him with kindness and humility. We want to advise the husband, at this juncture, to reserve the same amount he receives from a particular wife for clothing the same wife. Thus, each wife may assist the husband in the provision of one of the three essentials, i.e. clothing.

We now consider the situation of the husband:

The wife is entitled to share a quarter of the husband's property if the latter is childless but one-eighth if he has a child. The same fraction shall be shared *per capita* by the (many) wives of the same husband. By way of illustration, if a man has four wives, father, mother and children to maintain, and he has a net income of $720, the first one-third which he shall retain for his personal care is $240. He can spend this one-third (bequest) on the provision of shelter for himself and other members of the family as well as on the procurement of other personal needs like car maintenance etc. The balance of ($720 - $240) $480 shall be distributed to the wives, father, mother and children as follows:

Wives = 1/8 of $480 = $60 for all; and ($60 ÷ 4 = $15 per wife)
Father = 1/6 of $480 = $80
Mother = 1/6 of $480 = $80
Children = Residue = ($480 - $60 - $80 - $80) = $260

It can be observed from the foregoing that what eventually goes to each wife is comparatively small while the bulk goes to the children! The solution is that mothers and children are considered together: what goes to each child must be routed through each mother. Assuming that the

children are ten: one for the first wife, two for the second, three for the third and four for the fourth, the $260 shall be divided by ten. The first wife will receive $26 to cater for her only child while the second will receive $52 (i.e. $26 × 2) to cater for her two children. The third wife takes $78 while the fourth wife receives $104 for the three and four children respectively. Each wife shall add the sum allocated to her child(ren) to her original $15 (she shared *per capita* with other wives). Where a wife is barren, and her share seems inadequate, the husband can reimburse her from his reserved one-third (bequest). Each share in this regard (i.e. wife or child) should provide food for him/herself with the received share from the husband/father.

It is important to note that the principle of ratio 2:1 (male:female) does not apply to children in this formula. Children should share their allocation equally, be they male or female. Prophet Muḥammad (SAW) instructed parents to treat their children on an equal basis. He added that, if not for the purpose of maintaining justice, he would have instructed a preferential treatment for female children.[20] We must also note that if a family is living where education is not free, like Nigeria, the husband may decide to reserve a certain percentage of the child's share for school fees, text-books, and general cost of training. We should note further that women should be encouraged to work for their personal earning. Each wife's share from the husband may be too meagre for a meaningful disbursement. Why should she not work for the betterment of her lot when the law provides that immediately her husband dies, she is no longer entitled to maintenance? If the distribution of her deceased husband's property is delayed due to the pregnancy of one of the wives of that husband, or for some other lawful reasons, a wife who has no personal source of income may suffer! It is, therefore, better for her to work for earning so that in the long run, she will be able to assist herself.

Children must cater for their parents as the latter had earlier catered for the former. Hence, in the two illustrations given above, each parent had one-sixth share from the income of his or her child; of course, after the child had reserved one-third of the total income to him/herself. Assuming that a woman has six children, each giving her one-sixth of his income, at the end of the day, that woman would be receiving an amount which will be approximately an equivalent of two-thirds of a child's total income. The same situation applies to a father who is blessed with many children. With this formula, training of children for a better future is an

investment which provides a better saving than pension and gratuity which governments provide for workers on retirement from service. This means that the more children a parent had trained (when he or she was strong and energetic) for a better future, the higher might be his/her total income on attainment of old age (when he or she may no longer be strong enough to support him/herself). In this regard, Muslims who have sympathy for limiting the number of children, on account of Western notions of birthcontrol, may have to think twice. After all, Allāh has warned Muslims against killing their children for fear of poverty.[21] Lastly, this formula advocates, in stronger terms, that children should assist their parents; rather than a mere persuasion (to do that) which the jurists among the *Salaf* had advocated. Our stand is based on the various roles often played by parents in regard to their children as well as many Qur'ānic and Prophetic Traditions and injunctions which stress the place of parents in general.

Conclusion

Muslim women are allowed to earn from their labour as provided by Allāh in the Qur'ān, IV:32. They also have exclusive rights on the disbursement of their earning. However, modern trends (in Western capitalists' ideology) tend to be dissuading them from maintaining a peaceful matrimonial home, especially the working-class among them. The contention of some salary-earners among modern women is that no husband can harass them, as long as their appointment with their employers remain intact! Thus, Muslim women should be guided on the teachings of their religion on *Nafaqah* and home management.

The injunctions of Allāh on marriage and inheritance, as contained in verses one to twelve of the Qur'ān, chapter four, are parts of the Limits *(Ḥudūd)* of Allāh which no Muslim should violate. Allāh has actually prescribed Paradise for people who follow His injunctions and Hell for those who disregard His Limits.[22] We believe, very strongly, and it is our contention, that if the formula of joint responsibility in managing the home is adopted by a couple, peace will reign supreme in that home. We note that where a wife is richer than her husband, the proposed formula in this article can curtail, to some extent, such a concentration of wealth in the hands of the wife. For example, if a wife's income is $9,000 and her husband's earning is only $6,000 the balancing can be maintained thus:

(a) Where there is no child for the spouse, the husband is entitled to half of the wife's property. But according to the formula in this article, the wife shall bequeath one-third of her income to herself in the first instance, i.e. $3,000. Thus, the husband is entitled to half of the balance, i.e. 1/2 of $6,000 = $3,000.

(b) As in the above case, the wife is entitled to one-quarter of her husband's earning (if she is the only wife) after the husband must have bequeathed one-third to himself. Thus, 1/3 of $6,000 ($2,000) is the bequest to the husband while 1/4 of $4,000 balance, i.e. $1,000, will go to the wife.

(c) In short, the husband receives $3,000 from his wife and he bequeathes $2,000 to himself, totalling $5,000. Similarly, the wife receives $1,000 from her husband and she bequeathes $3,000 to herself from her original earning, totalling $4,000. In the long run, the husband's total amount becomes higher than that of the wife by $1,000 despite the wife's original higher income in the first instance. It is to be noted that we discountenance the portions that go to the couple's respective relatives in this example.

Indeed, the Qur'ān is replete with injunctions upon which man can ponder, reflect and deduce formulae for the benefit of mankind as the jurists among the *Salaf* had earlier deduced many legal provisions from the same source.

A Summary of the Formula

(i) A husband can spend one-third of his income on special obligations and provision of shelter for the entire family. As situations vary from place to place, provision of shelter may take the form of paying rents or building personal houses. Similarly, special obligations can take the form of payment of school fees (where education is not free), purchase of text-books or payments for some essential services like water and electricity bills. On a general note, a wife can equally spend one-third of her income on her personal needs. That notwithstanding, an unmarried Muslim who has no child may be saving one-third of the earning while he/she who has many poor distant relatives may be catering for such people with a substantial part of

that portion. This formula is based on the law of bequest.

(ii) Husband or wife can take good care of his or her parents without difficulty through the adoption of this formula. Each parent shall receive his or her share from his or her son or daughter.

(iii) If a husband has more than one wife, the share of each wife (from his earning) may be too meagre. Thus, each wife shall augment her share with her own earning, the share of her child(ren) from the father, or a reimbursement from the husband.

(iv) If a wife is working for earning, her share from the husband's income may be devoted to feeding while the husband's share from her earning may be (returned to her by him, and) devoted to her clothing. By so doing, the husband has been assisted in the provision of cloth for the wife. If each of the many wives of the husband is earning, he must have been, by that, relieved of the burden to clothe each of them!

(v) Children should be jointly maintained by the couple. Spending on young children shall be *per capita* and according to the need of each child. For example, if a couple has two children, one attending a primary school and the other is a university undergraduate, it is contrary to the rule of justice to earmark an equal amount to each child, since the need of the university undergraduate is surely higher than that of the one in a primary school.

However, if the children are adult, each earning for sustenance, (and the female among them are married), parents may stop maintaining them. Rather, the children should reciprocate by spending adequately on the parents.

As for young children who receive sustenance from both parents, the mother who manages their affairs is advised to spend each child's share from the father on feeding that child while the same child's share from her—as mother—can be spent on clothing him.

Mother should not leave the duty of training children to fathers alone. It is a jiont responsibility. A mother can feed, clothe or educate her

child(ren) without seeking a refund of cost from her husband. She should also make no noise (by boasting or trying to score a point) in doing that. *Ḥaḍānah* and upbringing of children is part of her compulsory duties.

Finally, the more the children of a mother or a father, the higher might be the share of each from such children on attainment of old age. We are inclined to recommend a minimum of six children per wife so that in the long run and on attainment of old age, her one-sixth share from the property of each child shall amount to about two-thirds of a child's income—since the child must have bequeathed one-third of his/her original earning to him/herself. An addition of that share from the children to her share from the husband will surely eliminate her financial constraints in old age.

This formula is a surer pension and gratuity than what any government can provide. Of course, governments' provisions are often marred by galloping inflation and devaluation of local currencies.

May Allāh guide us all!

NOTES

(1) This article was originally a paper presented by the writer at a seminar of Department of Religions, University of Ilorin, Nigeria. The seminar was held in Shawwāl 1408/May 1988 and the title of the paper was "Utilising the Principles of Islamic Law of Succession for Home Management." Consequent upon the contributions of the participants at the said seminar, Islamic concept of *Nafaqah* was added to the paper during retouch and the title was modified. I, therefore, seize this opportunity to express my profound gratitude to the participants who made constructive criticism of the paper at the said seminar.

(2) Al-Qur'ān, IV. 36.

(3) *Ibid*, II· 233.

(4) *Ibid*, LXV: 6.

(5) Al-Sayyid 'Uthmān b. Ḥasanayan Birrī al-Ju'alī al-Mālikī, *Sirāj al-Sālik*, vol. ii (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1402/1982), pp. 144-16.

(6) *Ibid.*, p. 113.

(7) Muhammad b. Aḥmad Mayārah al-Fāsī, *Sharḥ Tuḥfat al-Ḥukkām*, vol. I (NP: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), p. 188.

(8) Al-Mālikī, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

(9) Al-Sayyid Sābiq, *Fiqh al-Sunnah*, vol. ii, 3rd reprint (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1401/1981), p. 175.

(10) Fazlul Karim, *al-Hadis*, vol. I (Lahore: The Book House, n.d.), p. 193.

(11) Al-Mālikī, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

(12) Sābiq, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

(13) Sālih 'Abd al-Samī' al-Abī al-Azharī, *Jawāhir al-Iklīl*, vol. I (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, n.d.), p. 403.

(14) Sābiq, *op. cit*, p 174.

(15) *Ibid.*, p. 175.

(16) *Ibid*, p. 178.

(17) *Ibid*, p. 179.

(18) Al-Qur'ān , IV:82, XXXVIII 29; etc.

(19) The case in which a spouse inherits in company of parents (where the deceased has no child) is called *Gharra'ayn* or *'Umariyyatayn* in the Islamic law of inheritance. According to the Sunni traditional teaching on the subject, the spouse will first take his or her share; then the residue is shared by the parents (of the deceased) on ratio 2: 1—two to father and one to mother. We have observed in some of our articles on *al-'Aul (Pro-rata* Reduction) that this practice of the Sunnī Muslims violates some Qur'ānic injunctions on the subject. Hence, we have recommended a half or a quarter of the property to the husband or wife of the deceased—as the case may be—a third to the mother (being her Qur'ānic share), and the residue (whatever that may worth) to the father For details, read Musa Ali Ajetunmobi, "The Intricacy of *al-'Aul (Pro-rata* Reduction) in Islamic Law of Succession" in *Islamic Culture*, vol. lxi no. 2, April, 1987, pp. 51-69; *idem*, "Collection and Review of Cases of *al-'Aul (Pro-rata* Reduction) in *Sharī'ah* Law of Succession" in *Islamic Studies* vol , 27, no. 3, Autumn, 1988, pp. 209-220.

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(20) 'Izz al-Dīn Bulayq, *Minhāj al-Ṣālikīn* (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 1398/1978), p. 359.

(21) Al-Qur'ān, XVII: 31.

(22) *Ibid.*, IV:13 and 14

ARAB HISTORIOGRAPHY*

SHUKRIEH R MERLET

A GREAT deal has been written on medieval historiography and abundant information and published works are available on European historians. Not much, however, is known about Arab historiography. One reason for this is that most of the works dealing with the subject are not within the reach of English readers. One has to be able to read Arabic and know the literature to value what it has to offer. The knowledge contained in this literature is of great value not only to Western historians, but to the development of Arabic culture as well.

During the middle ages there existed a Muslim as well as a Christian civilization, and a Muslim as well as a Christian historiography. Founded in the 7th century in Arabia, Islam spread with unparallelled rapidity over the eastern provinces of Rome, Persia, Sind, Egypt, North Africa, and Spain. It roused and quickened the minds of its believers; and for several centuries Muslim civilization equalled, and in some respects surpassed, the Christian civilization which it confronted.

There were no historical compositions in Arabic before the time of Prophet Muhammad. The Prophet himself was the first subject of historical interest and treatment; the next was the exploits of those who fought in his cause. For about a century after his death, history was communicated almost exclusively by the spoken, not the written word. Oral tradition, however, increasingly disclosed its inadequacy; and as great events rapidly succeeded one another, a luxuriant growth of historical literature naturally followed.

*This article is in memory of my father, Shukri Jabbour, who was very interested in, and read a great deal on, the subject

This literature became not only of vast magnitude but of great value. The Christian medieval world was only a part of greater medieval world, and a part imperfectly intelligible without acquaintance with its Islamic counterpart and complement. All our universal histories, histories of civilization, and philosophies of history, suffer from their authors' defective knowledge of the history of Islam. Probably no class of scholars have it more in their power to increase the stock of generally useful historical knowledge than those who are qualified to appreciate and utilize the Arabic historians. The histories of Islamic countries in the middle ages have been as fully recorded by Muslim annalists as those of the various regions of Christendom during the same period by the monk chroniclers. Consequently, a knowledge of Islamic regions as exact and ample as of Christian regions is recoverable. This history may equally be made to become part of the common inheritance of educated mankind.

In the early period of Muslim historiography a prominent place was occupied, as has been said, by accounts of Prophet Muḥammad, and of the wars in which his immediate followers were engaged. The genealogies of Arab tribes and families received much attention. The collection of the Traditions relating to the Prophet and to religious beliefs and practices was of great interest, and one by which reputation was most easily gained. The mode in which written history arose out of oral testimony had a decisive influence on its whole form and character. This is well indicated in the remarks of de Slane[1] when he said that the documents relative to Muhammadan history were transmitted during the first centuries by oral tradition from one *ḥāfiẓ* (memorizer/custodian) to another, and those persons made it an object of their particular care not to alter, in the least degree, the narrations which they had received.

The preserved pieces were initially furnished by eyewitnesses and are therefore of the highest importance, not only for the history of the Muslim people, but for that of the Arabic language. The *ḥāfiẓ* who communicated a narration of this kind to his scholar never neglected indicating, beforehand, the series of persons through whom it had successively passed before it came down to him, and this reference, or testimony *asnād* (ascription/attribution), as the Arabs call it was the surest proof that what followed was authentic.

The increasing number of these narrations became a burden even to the best of memories, and it was found necessary to write down the

more ancient of them. One of the first and most important of these collections was Ibn Ishāq's[2] *Kitāb al-Maghazi*, a work of which we possess but a small portion. It contains the life of Muḥammad, with notes and additions by a later editor, Ibn Hishām.[3] This is a book of the highest authority and deservedly so, but it is unfortunately very rare. The *Ta'rikh al-Umam wa al-Mulūk*, by al-Ṭabarī,[4] was formed also in a similar manner, being merely a collection of individual narrations preceded by their *asnād*. Many of them relate to the same event, and from their mutual comparison a very complete idea can be acquired of the history of that early period. These collections of original documents were consulted by later historians, such as Ibn al-Jawzī, Ibn al-Athīr,[5] and others, and it was from these sources that they drew the facts set forth in their respective works.

It may be laid down as a general principle that Islamic history assumed at first the form of a collection of statements, each of them authenticated by an *isnād;* then came a writer who combined these accounts, but omitted the *asnād* and the repetitions; this was followed by the maker of abridgements, who condensed the work of his predecessor and furnished a less expensive book on the same subject.

The method followed by Muslim historians in the composition of their works compelled them to exercise a certain kind and measure of historical criticism. Proceeding on a recognition of the supreme importance of the testimony of the primary witnesses, it required an examination of the claims of those who passed for such. The Muslim historian could not fail to perceive that he was bound to satisfy himself as to the credibility of the persons whose reports he collected and recorded. But he was content to discharge this duty in a very perfunctory manner. He deemed it enough to know on merely general and external grounds that they were men of good reputation, without any careful comparison and sifting examination of their reports themselves.

We can not credit the Arabic historians with the knowledge or practice of historical criticism in its modern sense. Al-Wāqidī,[6] al-Ṭabarī,[4] Ibn Qutaybah (Coteiba),[7] al-Mas'ūdī[8] were unacquainted with it. Ibn Khaldūn[9] stood almost alone in clearly apprehending its nature and realizing its importance. There was great need for its exercise. An

enormous number of false Traditions were early in circulation; genealogies were at an early date largely fabricated; the early chroniclers readily accepted fictions as facts whenever they tended to glorify the Prophet and his followers. At a later period, works deliberately falsifying history were written to serve some immediate purpose, and ascribed to early annalists of good repute. A number of writings on which European authors have founded their works, regarding them as genuine productions of the older Muslim historians, are spurious or mendaciously corrupted. For example, *Futūḥ al-Shām*, attributed to al-Wāqidī,[6] on which the first part of Ockley's[10] well-known book, probably written at the time of crusades, is chiefly based and so also *al-Ma'ārif* attributed to Ibn Qutaybah (Coteiba),[7] and unfortunately relied on by Gayangos,[11] Weil,[12] and Amari.[13]

In the second century of the Muslim era Ibn Hisham[8] was the most renowned of the genealogists. Until recent research cast suspicion on the whole assumption of the soundness of the Arabic genealogical system, he was credited with having laid a solid foundation for the labours of his successors. Ma'mar (bin al-Muthannā), who died in A.H. 209 (A.D. 821), published about 200 works, the most important of which treated historical subjects. He wrote a history of Mecca and Medina, but showed (like so many Arabic historiographers) a marked preference for themes relating to war. In one of his writings he commemorated 1200 of the days on which the Arabs had been engaged in battle. He was himself of Jewish-Persian descent, and although he had in various writings glorified the achievements of the Arabs, he gave free expression to his hatred of them, and thereby caused great offence.

His contemporary al-Wāqidī (d. A.H. 207) enjoyed immense popularity in his lifetime. His fame as an historian has never waned in the East. He was a man of indefatigable diligence. He is said to have kept two slaves constantly employed in copying and transcribing for him, and to have left books filling 600 chests, each of which required two men to carry it. To give an idea of the size of his collection, it has been said that "Arabian historian Omar Al-Waqidi (736-811 A.D.), possessed one hundred and twenty camel loads of books."[14] *Kitāb al-Maghāzī*, though unreliable, is his most important work, and it is an excellent, almost typical, example of the Arabic historiography of the time.

Literature in many forms was cultivated with great zeal and success

in Muslim lands during the third century after the migration (A.D. 815-912). Among the historians of the period it may suffice to mention only al-Bukhārī, Ibn Qutaybah, and al-Ṭabarī.

Al-Bukhārī[15] acquired high fame as the most eminent authority on the subject of Tradition. He wrote a work known as *al-Ta'rīkh al-Kabīr*, on the trustworthy and untrustworthy traditionists; and drew up *al-Ṣaḥīḥ*, a collection of 7275 Traditions which he regarded as genuine. These are said to have been selected from a mass of 600,000 Traditions. The Traditions accepted by al-Bukhārī are generally received by Muslims without question, his discrimination and fairness of judgement being deemed by them to have been as extraordinary as his memory and erudition.

Ibn Qutaybah[16] was a man of varied literary gifts. He was particularly distinguished as a philologist and exegete. His 'Book of Facts,' or, as Wustenfeld,[16] its editor, calls it, 'Handbook of History,' and his 'Exquisite Histories' are characterized by exceptional keenness and comprehensiveness of research, accuracy and elegance of statement. He avoided diffuseness, refrained from useless repetitions, and silently rejected uncertified traditions.

Al-Tabarī was born in 224 and died in 310 of the Hegira. His Commentary on the Qur'an, the *Jāmi' al-Bayān*, is deemed by some judges as an even greater work than his *Annals*.[4] However, the latter work has made his name one of the most renowned and esteemed in Arabic historiography. It may be reckoned as the first general history written from the Muslim point of view. The book begins with the creation and ends A.H. 302 (A.D. 914). It was planned on the largest scale, and excuted with great skill and ability, with unsparing toil, with vast information, with independence of judgement and with attractiveness of style. It was a collection of historical traditions and documents, ample yet judicious, and was at once recognized as a substitute for many, and a supplement to all, previous historical works.

The study of general history had been not only neglected by the early Muslims, but purposely shunned as unlawful and dangerous. This prejudice was overcome in time; and after the appearance of al-Ṭabarī's *Annals*, general surveys of history became common. The authors of such surveys all assumed that the triumph of Islam was the goal of history. The guiding thread through the ancient world was the succession of generations, and especially the succession of prophets, from Adam to

Muḥammad, as represented in the Hebrew records and Arabic or Persian traditions.

The Muslim view of ancient history had all the defects of the Medieval Christian view, with others peculiarly its own. Al-Ṭabarī's work had the fault of being far too long. The Arabic mode of writing history necessarily tended to excessive bulk, and therefore excessive cost. Hence there was a demand for abridgements, and these often practically displaced the works which they summarized. With all its reputation and merits, the Chronicle of al-Tabari fell almost into oblivion after it had been abridged and continued by El-Makin[17] (Elmacin). Considerable portions of it have been translated into Latin by Kosegarten, into French by Dubeux,[18] and into German by Noldeke.[19]

Another historical writer of great celebrity was Mas'ūdī, whose life fell mostly within the 10th century of our era. He died in A.H. 345 or 346. He has been linkened to Herodotus, and cannot be denied to have had an active and universal curiosity. He acquired a large stock of general knowledge. He spent a large portion of his life travelling, and yet left an enormous mass of writing. He visited India, Ceylon, China, Madagascar, South Arabia, Persia, the regions about the Caspian Sea, Russia, Syria, Egypt, Morocco, and Spain. Wherever he went, geography, manners, politics, religion, and history alike were the objects of his eager investigation. He embodied the results in a *History of the Times*, the wonder and delight of the East, yet so vast that it has never been printed. He shortened the work and published it under the title of *Murūj al-Dhahab wa Ma'ādin al-Jawāhir*.[8] It is on this abridgement that his fame chiefly rests. He showed little skill in methodizing the enormous stores of information. His transitions from one subject to another are often most arbitrary. He was devoid of the artistic sense which enabled Herodotus to combine his varied materials into an admirable, almost dramatic, whole. He lacked also Herodotus' simple grace and exquisite naturalness of style. He was even less critical than Herodotus and used information received on hearsay as facts. Yet his work was highly valuable, greatly increasing the sum of historical knowledge, and even displaying more genuine historical interest and ability than any work produced in Europe in the same century. The mere indication, however, of the variety and distribution of its contents may be more instructive than further description.

The first six chapters of *History of the Times* give an account, drawn from the Hebrew Scriptures, the Qur'ān and oriental traditions, of the period between the creation of the world and the birth of Prophet Muḥammad. Ludicrous and legendary as it in great part is, this still passes in Muslim lands for true history. The seventh chapter discusses the Hindus; their scientific knowledge, religious opinions, and various governments, but shows complete ignorance of their early history. It is followed by seven chapters (8-14) relating to physical and historical geography, but including not a few digressions and marvellous stories. The fifteenth chapter is on China, admirably appreciative of the character, religion, and polity of its people, although the views on early Chinese history are quite mythical. The next chapter is a strange medley of seas and islands, Spain and other countries, and perfumes. It is followed by one which contains much valuable information regarding the Caucasian regions and their inhabitants, and a good deal which is merely curious about apes and falcons. Then come seven chapters (18-24), weighted with matter imperfectly sifted, on the Assyrian and Persian kings. They are succeeded by three chapters, respectively, on the Greeks and their history, Alexander in India, and the Greek kings after Alexander. These are followed by three chapters relating to the Roman Empire—the first treating of the period before Christianity was acknowledged as the state religion, the second of the Byzantine emperors prior to the rise of Islam, and the third of the emperors who reigned from that date to the time when al-Mas'ūdī wrote. Egypt and Alexandria are dealt with in two chapters (31-32); the Sudanese, Slavonians, Franks, and Lombards, in one each (33-36). The chapters on the Adites (37), on the Themudites (38), and on Mecca and the Ka'ba (39) may be regarded as forming another group. They are followed by a general discourse on the various countries of the earth, and on love of the native soil (40). The next five chapters relate to Yemen and its history. The succeeding six form a treasury of information on the manners, customs, superstitions, and folklore of the Arabs. After giving an account of *Sayl al-Aram* (53), al-Mas'ūdī introduces an erudite and elaborate dissertation on the months of the Arabs, Copts, Syrians and Parsis, on the revolutions of the sun and moon, and on opinions as to the influence of the heavenly bodies (54-62). With equal fulness he treats the sacred house of the Hindus, Greeks, Romans, Slavonians, Sabaeans, and chronologizes the beginning of history to the birth of Prophet Muḥammad. Five chapters are occupied with the Prophet—his descent, his deeds, his mission, and his

doctrines. The last sixty-seven chapters are a history of the caliphates to the end of the 9th century.

During the five centuries after the death of al-Mas'ūdī, Arabic historiography continued to be diligently cultivated. It was perhaps the last branch of Islamic literature to wither and decay. In all these centuries there were writers who attempted to compose universal histories on the model of that of al-Ṭabarī, and to combine geography and physical science with history after the manner of al-Mas'ūdī. There were others who rendered eminent service by working within narrower and more definite limits, e.g. al-Bīrūnī[20] (A.D. 1038) in his researches into the history of India, and 'Abd al-Laṭīf.[21] (A.D. 1231), whose well-known description of Egypt is very remarkable for naturalness and simplicity of style, and complete and accurate of information. Local history received much attention, and such towns as Damascus, Baghdad, Isfahan, etc. were the subjects of voluminous works.

Biography was specially popular. Biographical dictionaries were numerous. Most of them were specialized, some treating the Companions of Prophet Muhammad, or the persons mentioned in the collections of Traditions, others focused on the princes of a particular dynasty, the famous men of a particular city, or classes of celebrated persons — e.g. of theologians, jurists, philosophers, physicians, or poets. Others were general. Of these, the most successful was the *Wafayāt al-A'yān* of Ibn Khallikān[22] (A.D. 1282), whom Sir William Jones has pronounced to be perhaps the best writer of lives, "et certe copiosior Nepote, elegantior Plutarcho, Laertio jucundior." Shahrastani[23] (A.D. 1153) deserves to be gratefully remembered for his *Kitāb al-Milal wa' l-Niḥal.*

Arabic historiography was not devoid of obvious merits; however, it never reached the scientific or philosophical level. Among the many who cultivated it, none got much beyond mere description and annalistic narration. Ibn al-Athīr (A.D. 1160-1232), the author of a universal history or Chronicle,[5] edited in 14 volumes (and partially translated into Swedish by Tornberg), probably comes nearest to being an exception to this statement. He was not content merely to relate events in the order of their occurrence, but sought also to discover and exhibit their natural antecedents and consequences. He did not go farther than this. He made no endeavour to obtain an insight into the evolution of the general ideas which pervade history, or to understand the operations of those deeper

causes of social change by which its immediate and visible causes are called into existence.

As regards the science or philosophy of history, Arabic literature was adorned by one most brilliant name. Neither the classical nor the medieval Christian world can show one of nearly the same brightness. Ibn Khaldūn (A.D. 1332-1406), considered simply as an historian, had superiors even among Arabic authors, but as a theorist of history he had no equal in any age or country until Vico appeared, more than three hundred years later. Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine were not his peers, and all others were unworthy of being even mentioned along with him. He was admirable alike in his originality and sagacity, his profundity and his comprehensiveness. He was, however, a man apart, solitary and unique among his co-religionists and contemporaries in the department of historical philosophy as was Dante in poetry or Roger Bacon in science among theirs. Arabic historians had, indeed, collected the materials which he could use, but he alone used them. He was a remarkable man, and his work *al-Muqaddimah*[9] or the Introduction (Prolegomena) laid the basis for a field of science all its own. From his work developed the study of sociology as we know it today.

The world is all the richer for the historical legacy, contribution, and recorded data that these Arab historians have left behind for the use of generations to come and for the advancement of culture.

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BOOK REVIEWS

SATYAPRAKASH

MUSLIMS IN INDIA: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THEIR RELIGIOUS, SOCIO-ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LITERATURE

Indian Documentation Service, Gurgaon, Haryana, 1985, XX + 279 pp; Rs. 180/-, 36 $ 27.

The terms 'Muslim India' or 'Indian Muslims' or 'Muslims in India' are not very different linguistically, historically or in any other sense. It is mere wastage of time to create political meanings out of these. What is relevant is Indology or Indian studies will always remain incomplete if Muslims are excluded from its scope. A vision of India exhibition in U.S.; or any history of India, written after 1947, need to be revised in this lights, if this history and this vision are to remain unbiased.

There have been quite a few secondary sources on various aspects of Muslims, the largest minority of India. The pace of production though not very high has nevertheless broken past traditions of neglect/bias/ignorance. For instance one can see a host of these emerging, more so since the late 1960s and picking up momentum by the late 1970s.

These sources include bibliographies like Moin Shakir's *Muslim Attitude: A Trend Report and Bibliography* (1974); Indian Council of Cultural Relations, *Islam* (1976); B.S. Kumedan's *Modernisation and Social Reforms Among the Muslims* (1978); ICSSR Southern Regional Centure, Hyderabad's *Select Bibliography of Indian Muslims* (1983); relevant parts in Akhtar H. Siddiq's *Muslim World: A Selected Bibliography on its Socio-Economic Development* (1984); and also in Charles Geddes's *Guide to Reference Books for Islamic Studies* (1985).

There is probably only one exclusively biographical source on Muslims, recently compiled, N.K. Jain's *Muslims in India: A Biographical Dictionary*, 2 vols. (1979). Interestingly it spreads over a period of over a hundred years and covers some very important, as well as lesser known, Muslims from 1857 onwards to the date of its publication.

Institutional sources are found in Ziauddin Desai's *Centres of Islamic Learning in India* (1978); a few references in Himayatul Muqeet Siddiqi's *Alam-e-Islam* (1981); also some references in Shaheed Khan's *Directory of Islamic Libraries and Librarians* (1983); a recent source, quite comprehensive is, Akbani Informatic's *Directory of Islamic Studies and Allied Centres in India* (1989).

However, these sources are scattered and both Islamicists and laymen have still to run from pillar to post, in gathering data. The reviewer intends to solve a major problem of this nature and is intending to provide a holistic approach to this area of study by compiling *Islamic Studies in India . A Directory* This proposed book will list in

one volume institutions (academies, libraries, funding agencies); who's who (research guides in the field and scholars/authors in the area); documentary sources (secondary sources and journals in the field); along with a list of book-sellers and publishers, as well as a sketch of places of historical interest.

Coming back to the book under review, Satyaprakash's bibliography, it is a significant addition to the number of existing secondary sources while it has many serious limitations and shortcomings, yet it is a useful tool for any library which specialises in Islamics, Indology, Orientalia, etc.

Basically it is a facsimile of all references available in *Guide to Indian Periodical Literature*. A major cause of the deficiency is this kind of reproduction, rather than any other reason. A noteworthy defect of this bibliography is its lack of clear scope. It does not define its coverage, nor speak about its sources of data. This apart it has another imbalance and that is it lists only such book reviews which are published in Indian Journals—interestingly such books are not necessarily Indian, nor deal with Indiana. On the other side some of these books speak of Islam/Muslims in other parts of the globe. In short in the absence of a defined limit, it has become less Indian and more international and in this sense the title is also misleading.

The reviewer, however, feels that if the gaps and overlapping data are rectified, this bibliography can be the best source for the study of Muslims in India. It needs to revise its coverage pattern, approach and format. Its extra-territorial coverage needs to be checked if the title should remain as it is.

It is apt to see this tool furthermore, quantitatively, and qualitatively. In terms of quantity, 35% of its contents deal with Muslims in India, 45% deals with Islamic themes and 20% pertains to Muslims living elsewhere (which in the ideal pan-Islamic view are exclusive). Furthermore the quantification of the data reveals that there are 53% Muslim authors and 47% non-Muslim authors. This significantly, if proved form a larger data base, would reveal that the days of non-Muslim scholars specialising in the field are over.

There are more articles (83%) than books (17%). This may be hinting that Islamic studies scholars now prefer journals as a medium of communication to books. This trend of transfer of medium is more vividly seen in the reviewer's doctoral dissertation ("Bibliometric Analysis of the Literature in the Field of Islamic Studies," 1989).

There has been an interesting trend in Indian Publications: Islamics/Muslim books on the subject of the bibliography have been more indigenous (61%) than foreign (39%). This may speak of improved publication numbers (as well as proportions, as against the past).

Qualitatively, its coverage has failed to cover quite a few books, journals, and secondary sources. Of the list given above, hardly a few find their place. Furthermore it has not covered the following Indian Journal Titles:

Islamic Literature, *Crescent Times* (Monthly)
Radiance (Weekly)
Voice of Islam (Monthly)
Young Muslim Digest (Monthly) etc

This fact is significant as its coverage does include *Jamaat* (Weekly), *Thought* (Weekly), *Organiser* (Weekly), *Peoples Democracy* (Weekly) and so on.

Furthermore, writings, on Indian Muslim pioneers like Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Sir Syed Ahmed Khan, Abul Kalam Azad, Ali Brothers, etc. are excluded. And a thorough coverage is found of Asghar Ali Engineer, Moin Shakir, Rafiq Zackria, and others.

The following tabulation will provide some idea of the coverage of the respective subjects and indicate the change of themes/subjects, if any, and emphasis by writers:

Under the heading Islamic Sociology are included 11 articles and 2 books.
Islamic Economics : 6 articles and 4 books.
Islam : Education = 34 articles, 5 books.
Islam & State = 26 articles, 2 books.
Islam & Politics = 12 articles, 5 books.
Islam & Hinduism = 11 articles only;
The Quran = 41 articles, 21 books.
Hadith = 7 articles, 3 books.
Sufism = 49 articles, 24 books.

What emerges from the above simple numbers is that while social and economic materials are inlcuded in the bibliography, their place is far behind than that of the Qur'anic literature or Sufism. May be some one else may examine the literature of Islamic studies and prove, supporting the above numericals, that the area is still biased towards humanities. But, this reviewer in his thesis has proved that the post II World War literature, of this field, is definitely biased towards social sciences.

To sum up, qualitatively and quantitatively, Islamic studies in India has good prospects, and to support this, there is a continuous need for the listing of comprehensive and exhaustive secondary sources for research and study. The effort of the compiler of the bibliography is not, therefore, waste.

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